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fOREWORD 
„No man is an Iland, intire of it self; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part 
of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if 
a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any 
means death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never 
send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.“
The above phrase was written by John Donne in his “Meditation XVII” in the 17th 
century. The phrase was mainstreamed by Ernest Hemingway in the mid-20th cen-
tury when he chose to use a part of the quote for the title of his novel “For Whom 
the Bell Tolls”. Today, more than ever, this phrase is identifiable with the idea of a 
united Europe. The Jean Monnet International Scientific Conference “Procedural 
aspects of EU law” takes place on the 60th anniversary of the European Union. 
Even though the Union is an elderly experienced “lady”, it seems that on many 
levels the Union citizens and leaders need to be reminded of the importance of 
unity and solidarity – to never ask for whom the bell rings, because it rings for us. 
These Conference Proceedings are one of the last outputs of the Jean Monnet Chair 
in EU Procedural Law (reg. no. 553095-EPP-1-2014-1-HR-EPPJMO-CHAIR) 
that was granted to the Faculty of Law Osijek three years ago. The Jean Monnet 
Chair is funded by the European Commission in the framework of the Erasmus+ 
Programme with the aim of encouraging professors, students and professionals to 
teach and research EU law and especially EU procedural law. Symbolically, this 
conference marks the end of the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Procedural Law, but 
also the beginning of the EU and comparative law issues and challenges series that 
aspires to pursue the scientific idea conceived by Jean Monnet Chair projects. 
We take pride in the fact that in spite of the European identity and unity crisis, 
this Conference brought nearly 40 academics from EU Member States and candi-
date countries, and created a unique regional academic forum that emerged new 
ideas and debates. Common to all ideas on the numerous aspects of criminal, 
commercial, civil, consumer protection, and judicial system, international, fam-
ily, international private, administrative and constitutional law are reconciliation, 
European ideas and values, and European Union law. 
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To close, these Conference Proceedings reflect European values of peace, democ-
racy and solidarity that have been highlighted by the Rome Declaration issued 
on the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, wherein we are 
reminded that: 
“We have united for the better. Europe is our common future.”
Editors:
Dunja Duić 
Tunjica Petrašević
Topic 1
EU criminal law and procedure
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ADVERSARIAL PRINCIPLE, THE EqUALITy 
Of ARMS AND CONfRONTATIONAL RIGHT – 
EUROPEAN COURT Of HUMAN RIGHTS RECENT 
JURISPRUDENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper deals with differences and similarities regarding three elements of the main crimi-
nal procedure principle, the right to a fair trial. In the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) these three elements, the adversarial principle, the principle of 
equality of arms and confrontational right are often considered together. Recent ECHR ju-
risprudence changes the Court’s approach slightly, but significantly. This paper will therefore 
show the Court’s practice before and after its landmark decision in Schatschaschwili v. Ger-
many, followed by Paić v. Croatia and Seton v. United Kingdom. Confrontational standards 
developed by the Court are very important to national laws and jurisprudence. The following 
presentation will show how Croatian criminal procedure and court practice changed based on 
the ECHR interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Since there is almost always room for improvement in the implementation of the 
right to a fair trial, this paper will draw attention to the main areas and directions of possible 
improvement of judicial practice.
Keywords: adversarial principle, equality of arms, confrontational right
1. INTRODUCTION
As a central principle of criminal procedure the right to a fair trial is defined in 
Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, November 
4, 1950, ETS 5 (further in text: Convention). In Article 6 § 3 the Convention 
defines so called “minimum rights” of defense.1 One of these minimal rights is the 
confrontational right enshrined in Article 6 § 3(d) of the Convention.2
1  Trechsel, S., Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 292.
2  „Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: … (d) to examine or 
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The right to a fair trial is not “closed” because its content is open to judicial inter-
pretation and the addition of certain other rights not enumerated in Article 6 of 
the Convention.3 These other rights are also essential for a fair trial and are devel-
oped through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (further 
in text: ECHR). Other components of the right to a fair trial, which at first sight 
are not visible in article 6 § 3(d) of the Convention, are: the right of access to the 
court, the right to the presence of the defendant at the hearing in the criminal 
proceedings (principle of immediacy), the privilege of self-incrimination, the right 
to adversarial proceedings and the right to a reasoned decision.4
The principle of equality of arms is the first right that the ECHR developed while 
interpreting the central principle of criminal proceedings i.e. the right to a fair tri-
al.5 The adversarial principle, confrontational right and equality of arms partially 
overlap and often in practice are considered together.6 Sometimes one might not 
see the difference between them. Therefore, it is necessary to identify them and 
delineate.
2. EqUALITy Of ARMS
The term “equality of arms” corresponds to the German legal term “Waffenglei-
chheit” that was first used in the proceedings before the European Commission 
of Human Rights. In its Report from November 23, 1962, the Commission re-
ferred to “Waffengleichheit” first as to “the principle of treatment on an ´equal 
footing´”.7 Later in the Report, the Commission expressed an opinion “that what 
is generally called ´equality of arms´, that is the procedural equality of the accused 
with the public prosecutor, is an inherent element of a ´fair trial´.”8 The notion 
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.“
3  Harris, D., O’Boyle, M. &Warbick, C., Law of the European Convention of Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, New york, 2009, p. 306.
4  Mole, N., and Harby. C., The Right to a fair Trial, A quide to the implementation of Article 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, Human rights handbooks, No. 3, 
  URL=https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documen-
tId=090000168007ff49, Accessed 9 February 2017.
5  Ibid. p. 46, Harris et. al., op. cit. note 3., p. 246.
6  See for instance Fedorova, M.I., The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings,
  URL=https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/257535/Fedorova.pdf?sequence=1. Ac-
cessed 9 February 2017, p. 45.
7  Applications lodged by Herbert Ofner (No. 524/59) and AloisHopfinger (No. 617/59) against Aus-
tria. The German term “Waffengleichheit” was used by lawyer who represented applicants, Mr. Hans 
Gürtler, Barrister-at-Law from Vienna. URL=http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“sort”:[“kpdateAscend-
ing”],”languageisocode”:[“ENG”],”respondent”:[“AUT”],”kpthesaurus”:[“119”]}
8  Ibid. p. 78.
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of “equality of arms” appeared later in other Commission’s reports.9 Finally, the 
ECHR accepts the term in Neumeister v Austria.10 It is therefore considered that 
the equality of arms is a “concept that has been created by the European Court of 
Human Rights in the context of the right to a fair trial (Article 6)”.11 The ECHR 
uses the notion of equality of arms more or less consistently when they evaluate 
that segment of the fair trial.12
Equality of arms requires that each party in the proceedings be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present their views under conditions that will not put one party 
in a significantly inferior position to the opponent.13 The principle exists also in 
proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former yugoslavia 
and Rwanda where it is required that “the defendant must have the same position 
without the benefits that belongs to the prosecutor”.14
Although this principle, as well as the adversarial principle, applies equally to both 
parties in the process, usually equality of arms means that “the defendant must not 
be deprived in their fundamental procedural rights in relation to the prosecutor”.15 
This is even more important when we are considering systems where investigation 
is conducted by the prosecutor. It is without doubts that in that case there is no 
real equality between prosecutor and defendant. One may even argue that allow-
ing full equality in that stage of criminal procedure would jeopardize effective in-
vestigation notably gathering of evidence and thus even preventing the possibility 
that the perpetrator is found guilty.16 In that respect, the principle of equality of 
9  X v Austria (1963) App. no1418/61, NM v Austria (1964) App. no 1936/63.
10  „The Court is inclined to take the view that such a procedure is contrary to the principle of “equality 
of arms” which the Commission, in several decisions and opinions, has rightly stated to be included in 
the notion of fair trial (procèséquitable) mentioned in Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1).“(1968) Application no 
1936/63.
11  Oxford Dictionary of Law, seventh edition, Oxford University press, New york, 2009 p. 202.
12  See for instance Zhuk v. Ukraine, (2010) App. no 45783/05, par. 25: “The Court reiterates that the 
principle of equality of arms – one of the elements of the broader concept of a fair trial – requires each 
party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him 
at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.”
13  Ibid., p. 46, Harris et. al., op. cit. note 3., p. 251. See also Bulut v. Austria (1996) App. No. 17358/90, 
Foucher v. Francei (1997) App. No. 22209/93, Bobek v. Polandi (2007) App. No. 68761/01. 
14  Calvo-Goller, K., The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, Martinius Nijhof Publisher, 
Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 46.
15  Ivičević-Karas, E., Okrivljenikovo pravo da ispituje svjedoke optužbe u stadiju istrage kao važan aspect 
načela jednakosti oružja stranaka u kaznenom postupku, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, 
vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, p. 1000. From the same author see also, Načelo jednakosti oružja kao konstitutivni 
element prava na pravični postupak iz članka 6. Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava I temeljnih 
sloboda, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 57, No. 4-5, 2007., pp. 761-788.
16  For instance, if we would allow full equality during the investigation, then we would not be able to 
gather evidence through special investigative measures (ie. different types of secret surveillance). That 
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arms represents the “functional principle that participants in criminal proceedings 
must have equal opportunities to influence its course and outcome”, and superi-
ority of the prosecutor must be offset by “effective defense capabilities”.17 There-
fore we are seeking fair balance between parties considering criminal procedure as 
whole and not only one part of it.
3. ADVERSARIAL PRINCIPLE 
In continental law the adversarial principle is often called the principle of con-
tradiction. Contradiction is important, if not the most important feature of ac-
cusatorial procedure. Adversarial principle consists of the fact that all “procedural 
actions ... as far as the nature of the case permits, are performed in the presence of 
both parties who have the right and the possibility that during of the performance 
of these actions represent their interests and express their position”.18 In other 
words, each party should have an opportunity to contradict the opponent’s allega-
tions (evidence).19 A known Latin maxim is often used to express this principle; 
audituretaltera parts.
4. CONfRONTATIONAL CLAUSE
The Confrontational right is one of defendant’s minimum rights and is provided 
through the confrontational clause in Article 6 3(d) of the Convention.20 Although 
the clause refers to “witnesses” which would suggest that confrontational rights 
applies only to witnesses as a personal evidence, that is not the case. Namely, the 
ECHR developed autonomous interpretation of the term “witness”. According to 
the consistent Court’s practice, all evidence that is used as a basis for conviction 
is considered as “witness” regardless of the terminology that is used in national 
laws.21 In that sense, any document, victim or expert witness testimony should be 
would prevent investigation and adjudication of serious criminal offences. Therefore, one might say 
that “inequality” is allowed during investigation or to be more accurate that we are tolerate it for the 
sake of effectiveness of criminal procedure.  
17  Krapac, D: Kazneno procesno pravo, Prva knjiga: Institucije, Narodne novine, V. izmijenjeno I dopun-
jeno izdanje, Zagreb, 2012, p. 108.
18  Ibid.
19  Zlatarić, B. –Damaška, M., Rječnik krivičnog prava I postupka, Informator, Zagreb, 1966, p. 136.
20  “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights…to examine or have ex-
amined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him.” Almost the same wording is in Article 29 of Croatian 
Constitution. Similarly, the VI Amendment of United states of America Constitution provide that “in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
21  Isgrov.Italy (1991) App. No 11339/85, Vidalv. Belgium (1992) App. No.12351/86, Luca v.Italy (2001) 
App. No. 33354/96., Mathisen v. Norway (2006), App. No. 18885/04 and 21166/04. For more de-
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tested by the defense at least once during procedure, ideally during the trial since 
a trial is best place for confrontation.22 It should be emphasized that a co-accused 
statement is also to be considered as “witness” and therefore included under the 
confrontation clause protection as long that statement is used for conviction.23
Therefore, we can conclude that the confrontational clause means the right of the 
defendant to effectively examine the witnesses against him/her at least once in the 
process. Ideally, this option should be at the trial because that is the best place and 
time for the confrontation. Nevertheless, it is possible that the confrontational 
right may be exercised at a time other than the trial.The ECHR is requires fulfill-
ments of certain criteria which will be elaborated here further. 
5. DIffERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
Having in mind elaboration in previous chapters we might perceive differences 
and similarities between contradictory (adversarial) principle, equality of arms 
and confrontational right. 
The contradiction refers “to certain actions in the procedure (filing the indictment, 
presentation of evidence, prosecution’s argumentation)” and to those actions the 
defendant must have the opportunity to contradict them.24 Equality of arms is the 
“right of a party that in any action or proceeding in any procedural stage mayput 
forward its position and the evidence under conditions that do not place him/her 
at a substantial disadvantage compared to the counterparty” which means that 
equality of arms has a wider scope of contradictions but narrower content.25
Regardless of that slight distinction, both principles refer ”to the way arguments, 
documents, elements and evidence are presented before the court and to the char-
acteristics of the procedures before the court.”26
tails see, Mrčela, M., Svjedoci u kaznenom postupku, Ispitivanje svjedoka kao dokazna radnja, Narodne 
novine, Zagreb, 2012, p. 143 et al.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid. To establish whetherevidence was used for conviction, the ECHR established so called “sole or 
decisive” rule. According to that rule, an evidence was used for conviction if it was the only evidence 
for a conviction (“sole”) or if it was so relevant that conviction without that evidence would not be 
possible (“decisive”). 
24 Krapac, op. cit. note 17., p. 108.
25  Ibid., see also Mrčela, M., Načelo kontradiktornosti u dokaznom postupku kao novo temeljno načelo hr-
vatskog kaznenog postupka, Modernizacija prava, Knjiga 22, HAZU, Zagreb, 2014.
26  Silveira, J.T., Equality of Arms as a Standard of Fair Trials,
  URL=http://www.joaotiagosilveira.org/mediaRep/jts/files/Equality_of_Arms_Fair_Trial_Lithua-
nia__15052015.pdf, Accessed 13 February 2017.
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Adversarial principle and equality of arms are principles. Generally, both principles 
apply on toboth parties in criminal procedure. On the other hand, confrontation 
is only the right of the defendant, not the prosecutor. Still, the confrontational 
right is part of the adversarial principle.
Even though the adversarial principle and equality of arms generally refers to both 
parties, it is obvious that more attention is given to ensuring both principles re-
garding the defendant, and not to prosecutor. That is self-evident having in mind 
the advantage that prosecutors enjoy over the defense particularly during the in-
vestigation.27
6.  ECHR CONfRONTATIONAL STANDARDS bEfORE 
SChATSChASChwili v. GeRmAny28
It was already mentioned that ECHR often considers both the principles and con-
frontational right together. Since some of their elements overlaps, ECHR some-
times finds a breach of all three elements of minimal rights or only two of them 
(equality of arms and confrontational right). In some cases there is only a violation 
of confrontational right.
In any case, ECHR developed the confrontational standards that ought to be 
amplified in cases dealing with Article 6 3(d) of the Convention. They might be 
presented throughout these nine points.29
1.   The term witness has autonomous meaning.Classification under national law is 
not relevant.30 It includes all persons whose statements the national court used 
as evidence for conviction (victims, witnesses, expert witnesses) but also docu-
ments. The Prosecution witness is also a codefendant if his/hers statement was 
taken into account while establishing guilt.31
2.   “Sole or decisive rule”. Confrontational right has been violated if a conviction 
is based only on non-confronted (untested) evidence or if that evidence has 
27  Mrčela, M. – Bilušić, I., Konfrontacijska mjerila,Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, Vol. 23, 
No. 2, 2016, p. 379.
28  Schatschaschwili v. Germany (2015) App. No. 9154/10.
29  Mrčela, op. cit. note 21, pp. 175 and 176.
30  Sibgatulin v. Russia (2012) App. No. 1413/05, S.N. v. Sweden  (2002) App. No. 34209/96.
31  Vidgen v. the Netherlands (2012) App. No. 29353/06,  Isgrov.Italy (1991) App. No 11339/85, Luca 
v.Italy (2001) App. No. 33354/96, Doorson v. the Nehtherlands(1996) App. No. 20524/92, Trofimov v. 
Russia (2009) App. No. 1111/02, Romanov v. Russia (2009) App. No. 41461/02).
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significant influence in a way that conviction could not be possible without it. 
The rule is finally formulated in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom.32
3.   All the evidence against the defendant must normally be produced in his pres-
ence at a public hearing for the purpose of adversarial argument. Since that is 
not always possible, the confrontational right could be achieved earlier in the 
proceedings, especially if there is any indication that the witness will later be 
unavailable or that it would not be possible to question him/her at the trial. In 
any case, the defendant must have an adequate opportunity to examine wit-
nesses against him/her during the proceedings.
4.   The use of anonymous witnesses should be avoided. However, if that is not 
possible, their vulnerability or the vulnerability of their families should be ob-
jectively determined before a status of anonymity is granted. In addition, it 
is not enough to read their statements given in the pre-trial proceedings. The 
defense should be able to examine them without the presence of the public 
or with the use of technical means for transferring image and sound (not just 
audio). The use of police investigators as anonymous witnesses should be kept 
to a minimum and conviction should not be based solely or almost solely on 
their statements. 
5.   Regarding particularly vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences, espe-
cially children, the need for their protection is higher, but not at the expense of 
the defendant’s rights. The defendant should have the opportunity to examine 
these witnesses. The use of technical aids (audio-video recording) of that proce-
dure is recommended. The fact that conviction is based only on the testimony 
of particularly vulnerable witnesses does not mean immediately that it is a 
violation of the right to a fair trial - what is important is that the defense had 
the opportunity to ask questions to the witness.
6.   The trial court should be able to observe the behavior and expression of a wit-
ness in order to facilitate evaluation of their credibility. It is also important 
that the judge or competent person who examined the anonymous witness or 
leads his interrogation knows the identity of the witness. The record of that ex-
amination should contain the reasoning for the conclusion about the necessity 
of testifying as an anonymous witness and assessment of the credibility of his 
testimony. When evaluating this testimony the trial court should use excessive 
and elaborate caution.
7.   Reading the statements of the previous examination of witnesses is not in 
itself a violation of the right to a fair trial. However, the national court must 
32  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom (2011), App. No. 26766/05 and 22228/06.
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take reasonable measures to ensure the presence of witnesses. Any Legal system 
which cannot secure the examination of witnesses which exclusively or pre-
dominantly was the grounds for conviction cannot be an alibi for violating the 
rights of the fairness of the proceedings.33
8.   A conviction in which the defendant was not given the opportunity of ques-
tioning a witness against him, must include the reasons for the failure to pro-
vide that possibilities. Otherwise, it is violation of the rights of the defense.
9.   Confrontational right is the right of the accused, not his duty. Waiver of right 
to ask questions to the witness of the prosecution and waiver of the right to 
propose evidence is possible. If so, there is no violation of confrontational 
clause and therefore neither violation of the right to a fair trial.
7.  ECHR NEW APPROACH AfTER SChATSChASChwili v. 
GeRmAny
The ECHR practice regarding confrontational right changed with Schatschaschwili 
v. Germany. In a 9 to 8 majority the ECHR introduced a change of assessing viola-
tion of confrontational right that was not tremendous but it was significant. Al-
though the dissenters and even four of the concurring judges were not particularly 
thrilled with the majority decisions,34the new approach of assessing violation of 
confrontational right was followed by Paić v. Croatia35 and Seton v. United King-
dom.36
In Schatschaschwilithe ECHR did not depart from the previous practice which was 
reinforced in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom(performing three-part 
test, so called “Al-Khawaya test”). The first part of the test should assess whether 
there was a good reason for non-attendance of the witness whose untested tes-
timony was introduced at trial. The second part is related to the assessment of 
“sole or decisive rule”. The third part is evaluation, “whether there were sufficient 
33 Mild and Virtanen v. Finland (2004) App. No. 39481/98; 40227/98.
34  Judge Kjølbro wrote that “the judgment is another example of the Court’s focus on the importance 
of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings (and) an example of a rather 
formalistic approach to the importance of procedural guarantees”. Other six dissenters were milder and 
regretted that they were “unable to agree with the view of the majority that the applicant’s rights under 
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention were violated”. It is interesting to note that four judges who 
concur with the Court’s decisions “have a reasonable fear that the clarification provided by the Court 
in this case … can be summarised in one single question: were the proceedings fair as a whole? This 
overall test is not, in our view, a step in the direction of strengthening the rights guaranteed by Article 
6 (3) (d) of the Convention.”   
35 Paić v. Croatia (2016) App. No. 47082/12.
36 Seton v. United Kingdom (2016) App. No. 55287/10.
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counterbalancing factors, including strong procedural safeguards, to compensate 
for the handicaps faced by the defence as a result of the admission of the untested 
evidence and to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair”.37
The order of examination should not always be the same. Since “all three steps of 
the test are interrelated and, taken together, serve to establish whether or not the 
criminal proceedings at issue have, as a whole, been fair, it may be appropriate, in 
a given case, to examine the steps in a different order, in particular if one of the 
steps proves to be particularly conclusive as to either the fairness or unfairness of 
the proceedings”.38
In Schatschaschwilithe Grand Chamber confirmed that the absence of a good rea-
son for non-attendance of the witness by itself does not necessarily lead to the 
violation of the right to a fair trial. Equally, it is not enough to asses only (non)
existence of counterbalancing factors if the evidence of the absent witness was the 
sole or the decisive basis for conviction. The overall assessment must be also if 
untested evidence carried significant weight and its admission might have handi-
capped the defense.39In other words, complete “Al-Khawaya test” should be per-
formed always even in cases where there is no good reason for nonattendance of 
non-confronted evidence. 
It is, therefore, possible to have a breach of confrontational right that would not 
inevitably lead to a violation of the fairness of the process in a whole. In that 
case, a conviction could be based on untested evidence (“sole or decisive rule”) 
even if there was no good reason for its non-attendance at trial but only if there 
were enough counterbalancing factors (“strong procedural safeguards”) that would 
clearly show that defense handicap was not of significant weight. Hence, it would 
appear that counterbalancing factor test has crucial impact when assessing fairness 
of thewhole proceedings.
7.1 Counterbalancing factors
Since they appear to become of particular importance in assessing fairness of pro-
cedure in whole, it is necessary to point out to the ECHR practice. Of course, 
particularity of each case and factual situation dictates the extent and scope of the 
37 Paić v. Croatia op. cit. note 35, § 29.
38 Ibid. § 31 which refers to 
39  Schatschaschwiliv. Germany, op. cit. note 28, § 118. Same:Seton v. UK, Op. cit. note 36 § 59: “The 
extent of the counterbalancing factors necessary in order for a trial to be considered fair would depend 
on the weight of the evidence of the absent witness. The more important that evidence, the more 
weight the counterbalancing factors would have to carry in order for the proceedings as a whole to be 
considered fair.”
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assessment. In essence and according to Schatschaschwili v. Germany and more 
precise Paić v. Croatia, counterbalancing factors should be evaluated in relation to 
following elements.
First element is trial court’s approach to the untested evidence. Trial court should 
pay specific caution and attention in evaluating credibility of absent and untested 
evidence. Reasoning should be “detailed”.40
Second element is availability and strength of further incriminating evidence. The 
assessment goes not only if there was corroborating evidence and what is there 
strength, but also did “national authorities make any serious attempt to collect 
further evidence”.41
Third element is procedural measures aimed at compensating for the lack of op-
portunity to directly cross-examine the witness at the trial. Those measures could 
include but not limited to: existence of opportunity for defendant to give his ver-
sion of events and whether he was afforded with possibility to dispute credibility 
of an absent witness whose identity was known to him.42
8.  RECEPTION Of ECHR CONfRONTATIONAL STANDARDS IN 
CROATIA 
The Republic of Croatia ratified Convention in 1997.The Convention has prima-
cy over domestic law.43 Since decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia may be subject to assessment before the ECHR, one might say that 
Convention by its legal force is even above the Croatian Constitution. However, 
that would not be completely accurate because Croatian Constitution is drafted 
40  Paić v. Croatia, op. cit. note 35 § 43. In national case credibility of absent and untested witness testimo-
ny was reasoned only as “credible and truthful”. ECHR find that explanation not sufficient. It should 
be noted that according to Croatian Criminal procedure act the reasoning of the judgment should 
contain “…reasons why the disputed facts found proven or unproven, producing the assessment of the 
credibility of contradictory evidence…” (Article 459 para. 5). Obviously, assessment that contains only 
two words is not enough. The reasoning should contain explanation why a testimony is “credible and 
truthful”.   
41  Paić v. Croatia, op. cit. note 35 § 44. The use of term “national authorities” indicates that ECHR is 
aware of the fact that evidence collection initiative in some jurisdiction is practically only in prosecu-
tors hands and in others court have power to introduce evidence ex meromotu.
42  Paić v. Croatia, op. cit. note 35, § 45.
43  Article 141 of CroatianConstitutionstipulates: “International treaties which have been concluded and 
ratified in accordance with theConstitution, published and which have entered into force shall be a 
component of the domestic legal order of the Republic of Croatia and shall have primacy over do-
mestic law. Their provisions may be altered or repealed only under the conditions and in the manner 
specified therein or in accordance with the general rules of international law.”www.sabor.hr/fgs.ax-
d?id=17074, Accessed 23 February 2017.
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and is in conformity with the Convention. Besides, wording of Article 141 of the 
Croatian constitution suggests that Convention and Constitution have same legal 
force. Therefore, one might say that Convention is not above the Constitution; in 
effect both legal acts have same legal significance and should be applied together 
when evaluating fairness of procedure in the particular case.44 Nevertheless, any 
discrepancy of a national law with the Convention at the same time is discrepancy 
with the rule of law that is stipulated in Article 3 of the Croatian Constitution.45
Having that in mind, it might sound strange that allocation of confrontational 
standards of the ECHR started only in 2006, nine years after Convention ratifica-
tion, first with Constitutional Court decisions.46The Supreme Court of Croatia 
made first assessment of confrontational clause in 2009.47It found violation of 
Article 6 (3) (d) of the Convention because “the investigating judge failed to in-
form defendants of questioning of the victim, although he did in relation to the 
prosecutor, and then the trial court refused the defense’s proposal for direct, ad-
ditional examination of the victim at the trial, and precisely on her testimony [the 
trial court]based the finding of relevant facts on which the existence of a criminal 
responsibility of the accused has been established”.48Interestingly, in almost com-
pletely same situation in another case the Supreme Court did not find violation 
44  In former yugoslavia judges were not able to apply Constitution directly in particular case. Instead, 
they were obliged to initiate the process before the competentConstitutional Court to assess the consti-
tutionality of a law and if they did so, they were obliged to stop the proceedings until the completion 
of proceedingsbefore the Constitutional Court (Article 24 Law on Courts, “Narodnenovine”, Official 
Gazette 5/77, www.digured.hr/(active)/tab261Accessed 23 February 2017.
45  Therefore, the ECHR jurisprudence, although is formally not source of the law, is the most important 
form of interpretation of Convention, and thus all the regulations that are valid under it. This follows 
also from the decision of the Constitutional Court, which stated “…that that the entire Croatian law 
must be interpreted in accordance with the legal standards created in case-law of the European Court 
until Croatia is a member of the Council of Europe, which means as long as the part of its judicial juris-
diction Croatia conveyed with own sovereign decision to the European Court” (U-I-448/2009).Con-
stitutional court decisions are available on its web site https://www.usud.hr/hr/praksa-ustavnog-suda.
  Still, ECHR might find violation of the Convention even if a case is decided fully in conformity with 
national law and constitution. That suggest strongly than in fact the Convention has supremacy over 
national constitution. 
46  First decision where Constitutional Court mentioned confrontational clause from the Convention and 
from Croatian Constitution (wording is almost completely the same) is case in which confrontational 
right was assessed through defendant’s right to introduce evidence on his behalf (U-III/444/2005 from 
23 November 2006). There were two decisions following year (U-III/601/2006 from 27 September 
2007 and U-III/2241/2006 from 18 October 2007); for further details see Mrčelaop. cit. note 21, p 
229 – 235. Constitutional court decisions are available on its web site https://www.usud.hr/hr/prak-
sa-ustavnog-suda.
47  VSRH I Kž 731/08 from 22 January 2009. All Supreme Court decisions are available on its web site 
http://supranova/hpcl/component/main.
48  Ibidem.
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because absent witness testimony “does not interfere nor compromise version of 
the defense, but it is in its conformity”.49
Confrontational objections appear more often in Supreme Court cases. Therefore, 
the Court’s considerations together with ECHR decisions and Constitutional 
court practice led to changes in the Criminal Procedure Law. Among other chang-
es, the “sole or decisive rule” was introduced.50Rules for reading at trial testimony 
obtained earlier during process were changed. According to the Article 431 (2) it 
is possible during the trial to read witness or expert witness testimony that were 
obtained earlier even if the defense was not notified about their questioning but a 
conviction cannot be based solely or decisively on such testimony. In other words, 
witness or expert witness testimony for which the defense did not have a real and 
objective opportunity to question at least once during the procedure may not be 
the basis for conviction. Following ECHR practice, the Supreme Court extends 
that rule to the codefendant statements. Consequently, even if the untested defen-
dant’s statement is not explicitly stated in Article 431 (2) of Criminal Procedure 
Law as evidence that cannot be used for a conviction, the Court’s practice extends 
the application of the “sole or decisive rule” in cases where the codefendant’s state-
ment serves as prosecution evidence.51
Since reading of the untested testimony at trial is legally allowed but basing con-
viction on such evidence is forbidden, one might wonder what the purpose of 
such trial exercise is. This is situation when a witness is present at the trial. If there 
is an absent witness and all legal conditions for reading such a statement during 
the trial are fulfilled (existence of good reason for non-attendance), sole or deci-
sive rule will apply because in such case defense during the whole proceedings did 
not have a single opportunity to challenge evidence that could serve as basis for 
conviction. That means that conviction may not be based of previously obtained 
untested testimony that has been read at the trial.
But, if a witness is present at the trial, his previous statement should be read at the 
trial if he deviates from his previous untested testimony. The reason for such an 
exercise lays in one part of the adversarial principle (each party should have op-
portunity to contradict the opponent’s evidence).The prosecution should have an 
opportunity to challenge the trial deviation. The ability to contradict evidence is 
49  VSRH I KŽ 1078/08 from 3 June 2009. In this case a situation was assessed in relation to principle 
of equality of arms but there is no doubt that evaluation included confrontational clause elements. 
Further detailed elaboration of particularities of this case goes beyond purposes of this paper. 
50  Changes came into force on 15 December 2013 (“Narodnenovine”, Official Gazette 145/13). 
51  See for instance the Supreme Court decisions: I Kž 407/13 from 9 October 2013, I Kž-455/13 from 
13 February 2014, IKž 505/14 from 31 March 2015.
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possible only if that evidence is produced during the trial. Therefore, it is permis-
sible at the trial to read previously obtained but untested testimony of a witness 
who is present at the trial. It is important to realize that further use of such a 
testimony depends on witness statement after he is confronted with his previous 
statement. “Basically, if a witness at the trial repeats content of untested testimony 
which contains incriminating parts, that statement at the hearing then includes 
charging of the defendant and may be used for a conviction because the trial ex-
amination is carried out with respect to the defendant’s confrontational right. If 
at the trial witness “withdraws” his/her previously obtained untested statement 
or if at the hearing witness does not incriminate the defendant, then the earlier 
untested statement may not be used for conviction.”52
The Supreme Court also developed multi part test that should always be applied 
when assessing alleged violation of defendant’s so called minimum rights stipu-
lated in Article 6 (3) of Convention. It embraces ECHR jurisprudence concerning 
procedural fairness asking to evaluate the whole process and only after analysis of 
complete procedure draw conclusion about (no)violation of defendant’s minimum 
right stipulated in Article 6 (3) d of the Convention and Article 29 (2) of Croatian 
Constitution. If necessary, in any case such analysis should include consideration:
-   Whether the accused had the opportunity to defend himself (and with a defense 
lawyer if necessary),
-   Whether the defendant had the opportunity to challenge the credibility of pros-
ecution evidence and oppose to their presentation, and what is a quality of the 
evidence on which the conviction is based including an assessment whether 
their acquisition or presentation cast doubt to their credibility,
-   Whether the evidence has been presented in a way that ensures a fair trial, and 
in particular whether reasons for the rejection of the defense proposal to present 
evidence were given, particularly in relation to the significance of this evidence, 
and particularly in the case of rejection of the alibi witnesses.53(Khan v. UK, PG 
and JK v. UK, Vidal v. Belgium).
52  VSRH I Kž 414/16 from 10 October 2016.
53  See for instance the Supreme Court decisions: I Kž 174/14 from 8April 2014,I Kž 323/11from 23 
September 2014,IKž 1005/11 from 23December 2014, I Kž 858/11, from 20 January 2015, I Kž 
379/15 from 1. September 2015,Kzz 55/15 from 18 January 2016. In all those decisions the Croatian 
Supreme Court refered to ECHR jurisprudence in: Asch v. Austria (1991) App. No. 12398/86, Sevinc 
v. Turkey (2009) App. No. 26892/02, Bykov v. Russia (2009) App. No. 4378/02, Lisica v. Croatia 
(2010) App. No. 20100/06, Barim v. Turkey (2006) App. No. 47874/99, Khan v. UK (2000) App. No. 
35394/97, PG and JK v. UK(2001) App. No. 44787/98, Vidal v. Belgium(1992) App. No. 12351/86.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
The ECHR jurisprudence shows that three elements of the main principle of fair-
ness (the adversarial principle, the principle of equality of arms and confrontation-
al right) are often considered together. They are overlapping by the definition since 
defendant’s confrontational right is part of adversarial principle and that equality 
of arms has a wider scope of contradictions but narrower content.54
Blending of the three elements in ECHR decisions should not be problematic 
as long as the Court is firm and clear about confrontational standards. However, 
those standards are slightly but significantly changed with Schatschaschwili v. Ger-
many. Now complete “Al-Khawaya test” should be performed always even in cases 
where there was no good reason for nonattendance of non-confronted evidence. 
Consequently, in each and every case related to Article 6 (3) d, often in conjunc-
tion with Article 6 (1) of the Convention, ECHR will assess all three elements of 
“Al-Khawaya test”; existence of good reason for nonattendance of untested wit-
ness, sole or decisive rule and counterbalancing factors.   
After such an assessment, a situation could arise where a breach of confrontational 
right would exist but that would not inevitably lead to a violation of the fairness 
of the process as a whole. If so, a conviction could be based on untested evidence 
even if there was no good reason for its nonattendance at trial but only if there 
were enough counterbalancing factors (“strong procedural safeguards”) that would 
clearly show that the defense handicap was not of significant weight. Hence, it 
would appear that the counterbalancing factor test would be a corner stone when 
assessing fairness of the whole proceedings.
In Croatia, however, there is a stronger confrontational standard based also on 
ECHR jurisprudence before Schatschaschwili v. Germany. The sole or decisive rule 
is crucial in assessing defendant’s confrontational right. A conviction is not pos-
sible on the basis of untested evidence.55 Such a crystal clear rule obviously rep-
resents higher confrontational standard then one of the ECHR. Having in mind 
the Croatian court’s well established jurisprudence in that area and the fact that 
higher confrontational standard serves as a stronger guarantee of defendant’s right, 
there should be no changes in Croatian laws and consequently in court practice.
54  Krapac, op. cit.note 17., p. 108., see also Mrčela, op. cit. note 25.
55 See note 50 and accompanied text.
Marin Mrčela: AdversAriAl principle, the equAlity of ArMs ... 29
REfERENCES
bOOKS AND ARTICLES
1.   Calvo-Goller, K., The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, MartiniusNijhof 
Publisher, Leiden/Boston, 2006.
2.   Dictionary of Law, seventh edition, Oxford University press, New york, 2009
3.   Harris, D., O’Boyle, M. &Warbick, C., Law of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press, New york, 2009.
4.   Ivičević-Karas, E., Okrivljenikovo pravo da ispituje svjedoke optužbe u stadiju istrage kao važan 
aspektnačelajednakosti oružja stranaka u kaznenom postupku, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pra-
vo i praksu, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007.
5.   Ivičević-Karas, E., Načelo jednakosti oružja kao konstitutivni element prava na pravični postupak 
iz članka 6. Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava I temeljnih sloboda, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 57, No. 4-5, 2007.
6.   Krapac, D: Kazneno procesno pravo, Prva knjiga: Institucije, Narodne novine, V. izmijenjeno i 
dopunjeno i zdanje, Zagreb, 2012.
7.   Mrčela, M., Načelo kontradiktornosti u dokaznom postupku kao novo temeljno načelo hrvatskog 
kaznenog postupka, Modernizacija prava, Knjiga 22, HAZU, Zagreb, 2014
8.   Mrčela, M., Svjedoci u kaznenom postupku, Ispitivanje svjedoka kao dokazna radnja, Narodne 
novine, Zagreb, 2012.
9.   Mrčela, M. – Bilušić, I., Konfrontacijska mjerila,Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, 
Vol. 23, No. 2, 2016.
10.   Trechsel, S., Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2006
11.   Zlatarić, B. –Damaška, M., Rječnik krivičnog prava i postupka, Informator, Zagreb, 1966.
ECHR
1.   European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, November 4, 1950, ETS 5
European Court for Human Rights decisions
1.   Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom (2011), App. No. 26766/05 and 22228/06,
2.   Asch v. Austria (1991) App. No. 12398/86, 
3.   Barim v. Turkey (2006) App. No. 47874/99, 
4.   Bobek v. Polandi(2007) App. No. 68761/01,
5.   Bulut v. Austria (1996) App. No. 17358/90, 
6.  Bykov v. Russia (2009) App. No. 4378/02, 
7.   Foucher v. Francei(1997) App. No. 22209/93, 
8.   Doorson v. the Nehtherlands (1996) App. No. 20524/92, 
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES30
9.   Isgro v. Italy  (1991) App. No 11339/85, 
10.  Khan v. UK (2000) App. No. 35394/97, 
11.  Lisica v. Croatia (2010) App. No. 20100/06, 
12.  Luca v. Italy  (2001) App. No. 33354/96.,
13.  NM v Austria (1964) App. No. 1936/63,
14.  Mathisen v. Norway  (2006), App. No. 18885/04 and 21166/04
15.  Mild and Virtanen v. Finland (2004) App. No. 39481/98; 40227/98
16.  Paić v. Croatia (2016) App. No. 47082/12,
17.  PG and JK v. UK (2001) App. No. 44787/98, 
18.  Romanov v. Russia (2009) App. No. 41461/02),
19.  Schatschaschwili v. Germany (2015) App. No. 9154/10,
20.  Sibgatulin v. Russia  (2012) App. No. 1413/05,
21.  Seton v. United Kingdom (2016) App. No. 55287/10,
22.  Sevinc v. Turkey (2009) App. No. 26892/02, 
23.  S.N. v. Sweden, (2002) App. No. 34209/96,
24.  Trofimov v. Russia (2009) App. No. 1111/02, 
25.  Vidal v. Belgium, (1992), App. No.12351/86, 
26.  Vidgen v. the Netherlands (2012) App. No. 29353/06,  
27.  Zhuk v. Ukraine  (2010) App. No. 45783/05,
28.  X v Austria (1963) App. No.1418/61. 
LIST Of NATIONAL REGULATIONS,  
ACTS AND COURT DECISIONS
1. 1.  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 85/10. 
2. 2.   Ciminal Procedure Act, Official Gazette 152/08, 76/09, 80/11, 91/11, 121/11, 143/12, 
56/13, 145/13 and 152/14.
3. 3.   Law on Courts, Official Gazette 5/77.
Constitutional Court decisions
1.   U-III/444/2005
2.   U-III/601/2006 
3.   U-III/2241/2006
4.   U-I-448/2009
Marin Mrčela: AdversAriAl principle, the equAlity of ArMs ... 31
Supreme Court decisions
1.  VSRH I Kž 731/08
2.  VSRH I KŽ 1078/08
3.  VSRH I Kž 323/11 
4.  VSRH I Kž 858/11 
5.  VSRH I Kž 1005/11 
6.  VSRH I Kž 407/13 
7.  VSRH I Kž-455/13 
8.  VSRH I Kž 174/14 
9.  VSRHI Kž 505/14 
10.  VSRH I Kž 379/15 
11.  VSRH Kzz 55/15 
12.  VSRH I Kž 414/16
WEbSITE REfERNCES
1.   Applications lodged by Herbert Ofner (No. 524/59) and AloisHopfinger (No. 617/59) 
against Austria
      URL=http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“sort”:[“kpdateAscending”],”languageisocode”:[“ENG,
”respondent”:[“AUT”],”kpthesaurus”:[“119”]} Accessed 13 February 2017.
2.   Fedorova, M.I., The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings,
      URL=https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/257535/Fedorova.pdf?sequence=1, 
Accessed 9 February 2017.
3.   Mole, N., and Harby. C., The Right to a fair Trial, A quide to the implementation of Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, Human rights handbooks, No. 3,
      URL=https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?do
cumentId=090000168007ff49.  Accessed 9 February 2017.
4.   Silveira, J.T., Equality of Arms as a Standard of Fair Trials
     URL=http://www.joaotiagosilveira.org/mediaRep/jts/files/Equality_of_Arms_Fair_Trial_
Lithuania__15052015.pdf.  Accessed 13 February 2017.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES32
Jelena Kostić, PhD
Institute of Comparative Law
Terazije 41, Belgrade, Serbia
suputjelena@yahoo.com
Sanja Jelisavac Trošić, PhD
Institute of International Politics and Economics
Makedonska 25, Belgrade, Serbia
sanja@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs
DIGITAL fORENSIC PROCEDURES Of EUROPEAN 
ANTI-fRAUD OffICE AND PROTECTION Of 
PERSONAL DATA1
ABSTRACT
The European Anti-Fraud Office is established in order to step up the fight against fraud, cor-
ruption and other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the European Union. In 
that fight essence of investigation makes a digital forensic procedure. Digital forensic procedure 
implies a technological inspection, acquisition, and examination of digital media or their 
contents using forensic equipment and software tools. The objective of digital forensic procedure 
is to locate, identify and collect data which may be relevant to an investigation and use it as 
evidence in administrative, disciplinary and judicial procedures. These operations can include 
acquiring personal data what may be perceived as privacy invasive. In this paper, the authors 
will try to analyze the legislation of European Union in this field and the European Anti-
Fraud Office legislation in order to explain the conditions of use and protection of personal 
data. 
Key words: digital forensic procedure, European Anti-Fraud Office, investigations, privacy, 
protection, EU.
1  This paper was created within the two projects: “Serbian and European Law: Comparison and har-
monization“, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia, number 179031, for the 
period 2011-2017 and is implemented in the Institute of Comparative Law and “Serbia in contem-
porary international relations: Strategic directions of development and firming the position of Serbia 
in international integrative processes – foreign affairs, international economic, legal and security as-
pects”, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia, number 179029, for the period 
2011–2017 and is implemented in Institute of International Politics and Economics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy falls into the rights of a new generation. Privacy is a funda-
mental right that protects the private sphere of life of an individual. The protec-
tion of the right to privacy allows the life and development of a human without 
arbitrary interference of the state and other parties. In recent years, there is an 
increasing need for protection of the right to privacy, because the development of 
science and technology opens up large opportunities for endangering the private 
sphere of a human life.2 In this Digital Age, faster exchange of personal data, es-
pecially on-line, creates the possibility of easy access and abuse to a large number 
of individuals and companies. When it comes to data relating to private life they 
are part of the private sphere, i.e. human right to live how they want, protected 
from the public to some extent.3 Therefore, the right to respect a private life limits 
the extent to which the individual himself brings his private life into contact with 
public life or in close connection with other protected interests.4 But, sometimes 
it is necessary to use some data, which fall into the category of personal data, in 
order to carry out certain activities to satisfy public interest by both national and 
international institutions. One of those interests is controlling the EU budget 
expenditure.
The responsibility for spending of financial resources of the Union is an issue that 
is on the list of priorities for both its institutions and EU Member States.5 The 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), based in Brussels, is established at the Eu-
ropean Union level in order to ensure effective protection of its financial interests. 
It has been established in 1999, based on the Decision of the European Commis-
sion, as an independent body with power to investigate possible financial offenses 
that could endanger the financial interests of the European Union.6 OLAF carries 
out investigations into the existence of irregularities, regardless of whether such 
irregularities deserve criminal or other kind of prosecution. Its jurisdiction is the 
prevention of irregularities relating to the expenditure of European Union funds.7 
2  Dimitrijević, V.; Popović, D.; Papić, T.; Petrović, V.; Međunarodno pravo ljudskih prava, Beogradski 
centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2007, p. 203.
3  Dimitrijević, V.; Paunović, M.; Đerić, V.; Ljudska prava, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Dosije, 
Beograd 1997, p. 286. 
4  Ibid.
5  Rabrenović, A., Odgovornost za trošenje finansijskih sredstava Evropske unije, in: 50 godina Evropske 
unije, Institut za uporedno pravo, Vlada Srbije - Kancelarija za pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji, Beograd, 
2007, p. 186.
6  Commission decision of 28. April 1999 establishing the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) (notified 
under document number SEC (1999) 802) 1999/352/EC, ESC, Euroatom) [1999] OJ L136/20. 
7  Article 1 of Decision No 352/1999. Cited by Šuput, J., Zaštita finansijskih interesa Evropske unije-us-
postavljanje AFCOS sistema, Pravni život, No 7-8, 2014, p. 24.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES34
It is part of the European Commission and conducts fraud investigations in all 
European Union countries and within the European institutions themselves. It 
can also conduct investigations in non-EU countries with which it has agreements. 
OLAF is not competent to fight fraud that does not concern the budget of the 
European Union. In other words, EU money has to be involved. The same goes 
for the fight against corruption: OLAF can only investigate cases where EU staff 
appears to be involved.8 When OLAF control is carried out in the territory of the 
Member State, authorities in that territory are obliged to provide all necessary as-
sistance to its inspectors during controls and inspections.9 The control is done by 
examining the books and records, invoices, contracts, receipts, bank statements 
and computer databases. It includes physical verification, check of the quantity 
and nature of goods ordered or the quality of service, taking and checking of 
samples, control of completed works and investments from the European Union 
funds, as well as insight into the technical implementation of subsidized proj-
ects.10 The information gathered during the control are representing a business se-
cret, in accordance with national regulations of the country in whose territory the 
inspection was conducted, and may only be used for the protection of the finan-
cial interests of the Union. Materials and documentation collected in the process 
of inspection may be used as evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in 
the territory of the State where the irregularity was detected at the expense of the 
financial interests of the European Union.
The European Anti-Fraud Office is not a judicial authority or law enforcement 
agency. The punishment of the perpetrators of any violations or criminal offenses 
against the financial interests of the European Union is the responsibility of the 
police and judicial authorities of the countries on whose territory OLAF performs 
its financial investigations. Accordingly OLAF collects data and submits them to 
relevant institutions at the national level.11 In that way, relevant institutions are 
able to use the information and data that OLAF collects during its investigation. 
8  IAACA, European Anti-Fraud Office, URL=http://www.iaaca.org/AntiCorruptionAuthorities/ByIn-
ternationalOrganizations/InterGovernmentalOrganization/201202/t20120215_805457.shtml. Ac-
cessed 31 January 2017.
9  Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Council Regulation (Euroatom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 
concerning on-the-spot checks inspections carries out by the Commission in order to protect the Euro-
pean Communities´ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities. Cited by Šuput, J. op.cit. 
note 7 , p. 25.
10  Ibid. Article 4.
11  Reljanović, M.; Ivanović, Z.; Evropska kancelarija za borbu protiv finansijskih prestupa in: Borba protiv 
korupcije, iskustva i poređenja, Ćirić, J. (ed.), Beograd, 2013, p. 113. 
Jelena Kostić, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić: DIGITAL FORENSIC PROCEDURES OF EUROPEAN ... 35
The European Anti-Fraud Office has the right of access under the same conditions 
as national administrative inspectors to all the information and documents con-
cerning economic activities, including computer data necessary to conduct proper 
inspections.12 A special kind of evidences is data on a digital media, i.e. the infor-
mation contained in the digital form. They are further processed and prepared for 
the purpose of a possible proof of certain facts in court proceedings. However, also 
in a digital media you can found a large number of personal data, and that always 
raises the question of the efficiency of their protection, both in general and at the 
institutional level.
During development of the legal protection of personal data in the European 
Union, emerged the need for more specific protection of personal data from abuse. 
Legal regulations are developed gradually, and some institutions have established 
their own rules of procedure relating to the collection and disposal of personal 
data in a digital form. Under personal data we consider any information that can 
point to a particular person, such as name, phone number or photo. Personal 
data can be collected directly from individual person or from the database. Thus, 
the data collected may be made available to a larger number of entities and may 
be used for other purposes.13 Privacy as an ethical concept and as a fundamental 
human right is not static. The privacy concerns and expectations of research par-
ticipants are likely to evolve in the upcoming years.14
Although, at the level of the European Union, there are a number of regulations 
that provide effective mechanisms of personal data protection, certain institutions 
adopted internal acts for employees regulating the manner of handling in order 
to protect personal data. The same approach in this regard is also present at the 
European Anti-Fraud Office.
2.  LEGAL PROTECTION Of PERSONAL DATA
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Universal Declaration) was the 
first legal document which provides protection of personal data at the interna-
tional level.15 Besides Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil 
12  Council Regulation (Euroatom, EC) No 2185/96, op. cit. Article 7.
13  Nikodinovska-Stefanovska, S., Lisbon Treaty and the Protection of Personal Data in the European Union, 
in: Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Republike Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije (II), Dimitrijević, D.; 
Miljuš B. (ur.), Beograd, 2012, p. 717. 
14  Joly, y.; Dyke, S.O.M.; Knoppers, B.M.; Pastinen, T., Are Data Sharing and Privacy Protection Mutually 
Exclusive?, Cell 167, Elsevier Inc, November 17, 2016, p. 1153.
15  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 
1948, in Paris, General Assembly Resolution 217A, United Nations. Universal Declaration was pro-
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and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms) also has provisions for the protection of personal data.16 Ac-
cording to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with her/his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to 
attacks upon her/his honor and reputation. Everyone has a protection provided 
by the law against such interference or attacks. The same right to protect privacy 
is guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights mentions the right to 
respect private and family life, home and correspondence. The term implies the 
respect and protection of the individual against arbitrary interference with privacy 
by public authorities, but requires the state to actively participate in the provision 
of the mentioned law.17 It is therefore necessary both at national and international 
level to establish effective mechanisms for prevention of a behavior that can be 
arbitrary interference in the private life of individuals.
Modern development of science and technology opens up previously unimagined 
possibilities of interference in the most intimate parts of human life.18 One of the 
first documents that provide protection of personal data in digital form in the 
European Union is the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data from 1981.19 It envisages the obligation 
claimed as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. Text of the Declaration 
can be found at: URL=www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. Accessed 02 February 
2016. 
16  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights   (ICCPR) was adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966. That document entered into force on 23 March 1976. Law on ratification of IC-
CPR, Službeni list SFRJ-Međunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette SFRy-International Agreements), No 
7/1971. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was ratified by the Law on Ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol 11, Protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the 
Protection of human rights and Fundamental freedoms securing certain rights and freedoms that are 
not included in the Convention and the first Protocol thereto, Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for 
the protection of human rights and Fundamental freedoms concerning the abolition of the death pen-
alty, Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and Fundamental freedoms, 
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and Fundamental freedoms 
and Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and Fundamental freedoms 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Službeni list SFRJ-Međunarodni 
ugovori (Official Gazette SCG-International Agreements), No. 9/2003 and 5/2005. 
17  Paunović, M.; Krivokapić, B.; Krstić, I.; Osnovi međunarodnih ljudskih prava, Megatrend univerzitet, 
Beograd, 2007. p. 217. 
18  Dimitrijević et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 203.
19  The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic processing of Personal data. 
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of every country to respect the rights and fundamental freedoms of every person, 
especially the right to privacy during the automatic processing of personal data.20 
When it comes to the Community institutions and bodies of the European Union, 
the first time the protection of personal data is referred to was in Article 286 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. According to that provision, 
the Community is taking measures for the protection of personal data during data 
processing and exchanging of Community institutions and bodies.21 The mecha-
nisms to achieve this objective are contained in the Regulation on the protection 
with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data No. 45 of 2001 (hereinafter the 
Regulation).22 When collecting personal data in digital form the OLAF employees 
are obliged to comply with the provisions of the Regulation. Given that a large 
number of financial data is nowadays in digital form, such data are often subject 
to digital forensics, which is carried out in special OLAF laboratories. Since often 
among the financial data can also be found personal data, they must be processed 
in accordance with applicable regulations of the European Union. That is why the 
European Anti-Fraud Office issued special instructions to be followed by employ-
ees during digital data processing.23
3.  OLAf - COLLECTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND 
PROTECTION Of PERSONAL DATA
Since OLAF is the European Commission institution, it is required in conducting 
their investigations, i.e. when collecting data in digital form, to primarily obey the 
provisions of Regulation No 45/2001. However, this does not mean that when 
The Convention was adopted and opened for accession in Strasbourg 28.01.1981. Convention entered 
into force in 1985. Text of the Convention can be found at:
  URL=www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007b37. Accessed 07 
February 2016.
20  Ibid. Article 1.
21  The Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community [1997] OJ C340 and 
[2002] OJC325. Text of the Treaty can be found at: 
  URL=www.eu-lex.europa.eu/legl-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12002E%2FTXT. Accessed 03 
February 2016. 
22  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, Text of the Regulation can be found at: 
URL=http://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webday/site/my/Site/shared/Documents/EDPS/Dat-
aProt/Legislation/Reg_45-2001_EN.pdf. Accessed 04 February 2016.
23  Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff,15. February 2016, Text can be found 
at: URL=https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/guidelines_en.pdf. Accessed 08 February 
2016.
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performing investigations the European Anti-Fraud Office does not apply internal 
rules and procedures. OLAF has the right during inspection to access all informa-
tion relevant to the investigation, including digital data and databases. It is autho-
rized to check the accounts and financial records of institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies. In order to take adequate inspection measures inspectors or auditors 
employed by OLAF may take a copy of any document. They have the same rights 
in this respect, as well as national inspectors in accordance with the regulations 
of the country where the controls or inspections are conducted. Also, there is an 
obligation of the employees of the institution in which inspection is carried out to 
provide OLAF personnel the data necessary to carry out their activities.24
The data that are taken in the process of inspection, which can serve as evidence 
in subsequent proceedings, must be protected as a confidential data in the same 
manner as the data that are in similar situations provided protection at the nation-
al level. These data can not be disclosed to anyone, except the person or institution 
in the Member State whose function requires that such data to be used in their 
work. They can be used solely for the purpose of protecting the financial interests 
of the European Union. If irregularities are detected in the work of the institutions 
whose operations is being investigated, the Commission should immediately in-
form the competent authorities of the Member State in question. In any case it is 
necessary to inform the competent authorities in relation to the reported results of 
the inspection. The Commission has an obligation to prepare a draft report which 
is an integral part of the collected materials and evidence in the future to be used 
as evidence in a possible misdemeanor or criminal proceedings, in the same way as 
in the case where the materials and evidence collected by the competent national 
authority.25 If the national inspectors participated in the inspection and control, 
they are also obliged to sign the report.26 Bearing in mind that OLAF represents 
the kind of budget inspection of the European Union, it should be noted that it is 
also responsible for providing evidence for future legal proceedings with regard to 
violations of the financial interests of the Union. 
When the digital evidence began to be accepted as equal to the other evidence in 
the court, digital forensic has developed, as part of forensic science, whose subject 
24  Council Regulation (EUROATOM, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on the spot 
checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities´ 
financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, Article 7., OJ L 292/96, URL=https://publi-
cations.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/adc86f79-268e-4ac4-8ae5-85c70ade888f/lan-
guage-en. Accessed 07 February 2016.
25  The Commission is responsible for ensuring that Member States respect European Union laws.
26  Ibid. Article 8.
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is legal analyzes of the obtained evidence found in computer and digital media.27 
Sometimes in order to provide relevant evidence the large amount of personal data 
are also collected. Therefore, there are the possibilities of violations of right to pri-
vacy, not only during data collection and processing, but also in delivering these 
data to other relevant institutions. In order to avoid violations of right to privacy, 
when performing digital forensics, OLAF employees have an obligation to comply 
with that provision of Regulation No 45/2001 and Guidelines on Digital Forensic 
Procedures for OLAF Staff.
3.1. Protection and free movement of personal data 
The provisions of Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the 
free movement of such data are obliged to adhere to all institutions and bodies 
which are established in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community.28 One such body is the European Anti-Fraud Office. It 
has the obligation, during digital forensic operations, to protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy 
with respect to the processing of personal data and to allow the free exchange of 
such data with other EU bodies and Member States.29 The Regulation also applies 
to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means (automatic 
data processing).30
Data provided by OLAF delivered to the Member States in order to carry out the 
responsibilities of entities on their territories can be delivered only if it is necessary 
to exercise the powers in the public interest, or if it is a public institution provid-
ing data to perform its obligation from its jurisdiction, or if the recipient proves 
that these data are really necessary and if it proves that there is no possibility to 
harm legally protected personnel interests of persons whose data are submitted.31 
When institutions or bodies of the European Union, or countries that have na-
tional legislation in accordance with Directive 95/46 /EC are not in question 
27  Korać, V.; Prlja D.; Gasmi, G., High Technology Criminal and Digital Foresics, in: Preventing and Com-
bating Cybercrime, Cluj_Napoca, Accent, 2016, p. 93.
28  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] OJ L008 pp. 0001 – 0022.
29  Ibid. Article 1. 
30  Ibid. Article 3.
31  Ibid. Article 7-8.
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special conditions shall be applied.32 Under these conditions, personal data may 
be submitted only if the protection of personal data is provided at an adequate 
level, and if the submission of these data is done solely for the purpose of perform-
ing legal powers by the person requesting the information. When it comes to an 
adequate level of protection at the level of countries that are not members of the 
European Union or international organizations, they should be treated depending 
on the particular circumstances, such as: nature of the information that is pro-
vided, the duration of the procedure of processing such data, respect for the rule 
of law in the country where the information is provided on both the general and 
at the institutional level as well as the security measures that are taken to protect 
data. If it is concluded that the level of protection of personal data in the country 
of international institutions is not adequate, the data will not be send, and OLAF 
should inform about that decision the Commission and data protection officer. 
In this case the Commission, not OLAF, exclusively informs the third party of a 
refusal. Exception from that rule is only if the person, to whom the personal data 
are relating, give explicit consent, as well as other conditions prescribed in the 
Regulation. In such situations it is also necessary to inform data protection officer 
at EU level.33 
The collection, processing and exchange of special categories of data such as eth-
nic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, membership in 
business associations or data relating to health and sex life is strictly prohibited. 
However, there is a possible deviation in the case of one of the exceptions set 
out in the Regulation. The exception is the explicit consent of the person whose 
personal data is processed during the investigation.34 Any person who considers 
that her or his privacy rights are violated as a result of taking action by OLAF can 
lodge a complaint to the European data protection supervisor or to the European 
Ombudsman.35 
32  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. In accordance with mentioned Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data.
33  Ibid. Article 9.
34  Ibid. Article 10.
35  The European data protection supervisor (EDPS) in an independent supervisory authority established 
by the Regulation No 45/2001 devoted to protecting personal data and privacy and to promoting good 
practice in the EU institutions and bodies. More information about mentioned authority can be found 
on the website: http://secure.edps.europa.eu/EPDSWEB/edps/EDPS The European Ombudsman is 
an independent and impartial body that holds the EU administration to account. Mentioned body 
investigates complaints about maladministration in EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The 
Ombudsman may find maladministration if an institution fails to respect fundamental rights, legal 
Jelena Kostić, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić: DIGITAL FORENSIC PROCEDURES OF EUROPEAN ... 41
3.2. Rights and obligations when processing personal data
When it comes to the use of personal data we saw rights and obligations of the 
institution and employees that collect them. But also a person whose data is used 
by OLAF has certain rights.
When taking personal data OLAF employee is obliged to communicate to per-
son in question she/he identity, the purpose for which such data is collected and 
the name of the institutions and bodies that will be allowed to use this infor-
mation. In addition, it is required that person in question should be informed 
when answering certain questions mandatory, and when voluntarily, as well as the 
consequences of failure to give answers, to be informed of the right of access to 
data concerning she/he personality, the right to revise these data. The person in 
question should also be given additional information, such as the legal basis for 
the collection of data, the time limit for storing the data, the right to contact at 
any time the supervisor for personal data protection in the European Union. Also 
the person from whom the personal data are collected will be given any additional 
information, bearing in mind the special circumstances under which the data were 
collected, in order to ensure protection of the right to privacy.36
In some cases, personal data have not been obtained from the data subject. Then 
it is necessary that a person who collects information at the time of taking, if a 
disclosure to a third party is envisaged, inform the person to whom they relate 
about the purpose for which they are collected, the data category, the category of 
recipients, the existence of the right of access or modification of data concerning 
data subject, as well to offer additional information concerning a legal basis for 
an action for which the data is collected, the time period of storing such data, the 
right to apply to the supervisor for the protection of personal data at the European 
level Union, the origin of the data (how to reach these data) unless that person is 
unable to disclose the information due to professional secrecy, as well as any other 
information that depending on the circumstances is necessary to ensure legality 
of such data.37
Also, a subject whose personal data are used in the process of digital forensics, 
has the right to access this information, right of correction, the right to block 
rules or principles, or the principles of good administration. Any citizen or resident of the European 
Union or business, association, or other body with a registered office in the Union can lodge a com-
plaint. Ombudsman only deal with complaints concerning the EU administrations. Complaint can be 
sumitted electronicaly or printed out and sent by post. More information about mentioned body can 
be found on the web-site:URL=http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home.faces 
36  Ibid. Article 11.
37  Ibid. Article 12.
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their use, deletion, right to request the modification and deletion of data that 
are communicated to a third party (unless it does not require additional efforts), 
and have requested that she/he identity not mentioned in the decision. However, 
these rights may be denied, and if necessary, take the necessary measures in order: 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses, if it is 
an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or the European 
Community, by which it means a circumstance which belongs to monetary, bud-
getary or tax matter.38
When it comes to personal data which are the subject of digital forensics by ex-
perts employed in OLAF, that organization in compliance with the provisions 
of Regulation, is obliged to deny access unauthorized persons to computerized 
systems used for the processing of personal data, and to prevent unauthorized 
reading, copying, modification or transfer of data stored on digital media, as well 
as unlawful destruction, modification or deletion of data stored on digital media. 
Obligations of OLAF in connection with the above consists in preventing unau-
thorized persons to use the system for processing data, ensuring that at any time 
can be checked when, where and who participated in the processing of personal 
data, ensuring that data can only be delivered, in accordance with the relevant legal 
documents, to the other institutions. During transport of media in which personal 
data are kept, personal data can not be read, copied or erased by unauthorized per-
sons.39 Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation, Guidelines 
on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff provides for monitoring entry and 
exit of authorized persons in the laboratory for digital forensics, as well as the ob-
ligation of recording the persons involved in the processing which are authorized 
to access personal data. The Regulation provides for certain measures for recording 
any damage related to the digital media where personal data are stored, as well as 
measures for recording communication between persons involved in the process 
of personal data processing.
3.3.  Data protection officer
The European Anti-Fraud Office in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation ap-
points officers for the protection of personal data. Data protection officer com-
mitments are: to ensure that persons who process personal data, as well as persons 
whose data is processed should be made aware of their rights and obligations 
pertaining to them in accordance with the Regulation, to respond to requests 
to monitor protection of personal data at the level of the European Union, to 
38  Ibid. Article 20.
39  Ibid. Article 21.
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cooperate with supervisors to ensure the internal application of the provisions of 
the Regulation to lead register of activities related to data processing, to inform 
the manager for the protection of personal data in the European Union if certain 
operations pose a particular risk to the violation of privacy rights, and to ensure 
that data processing respect all the rights of the individuals whose personal data 
are subject to processing.40 
Data suspected to contain a high level of risk in terms of potential violation of 
privacy rights are, for example, information with respect to whom there is a sus-
picion of certain criminal offenses, violations, as well as data contained in court 
rulings, or information on safety measures relating to the assessment of the per-
sonal qualities and abilities of a specific person. After receiving the notification 
data protection officer in the European Union gives its opinion and recommenda-
tions to OLAF in order to most effectively protect personal data in their process-
ing procedure. The European Anti-Fraud Office also has an obligation to submit 
proof on the implementation of the recommendations to a data protection officer. 
Given that this is a very sensitive data and a specific situation, the person respon-
sible for the protection of personal data at the level of OLAF is obliged to seek 
opinion from the data protection officer before the start of the processing of such 
data. Apart from these situations, it is possible that the case file contains infor-
mation on a large number of people, which are not relevant to the investigation 
conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office. Notification to such persons that 
their data are stored in the file would be too much time consuming and burden 
for OLAF. However, bearing in mind that these are personal data, it is essential 
that the person responsible for the protection of personal data seek the opinion 
of the data protection officer for the protection of personal data at EU level. In 
order to ensure in the internal level that measures necessary for the protection of 
personal data are conducted in accordance with Regulation 45/2001, EU issued a 
Guideline which defines the manner of employees in relation to personal data in 
the process of digital forensics.
3.4.  Protection of personal data in accordance with OLAf Guidelines 
Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff were adopted in 
2016.41 Its provisions are applied in the process of identification, collection, pro-
cessing, analysis and storage of digital evidence, while their goal is to establish 
rules for conducting digital forensics, to ensure the integrity and quality of the 
40  Ibid. Article 24.
41  Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff, European Commission, European Anti-Fraud 
Office, 15 February 2016.
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evidence that is admissible in court proceedings. Adoption of these rules achieves 
two objectives. One is to provide valid evidence in eventual court proceedings, 
and the other is the protection of personal data from abuse. The provisions of 
the Guidelines defines that the digital forensics laboratory, in the framework of 
OLAF, should be physically separated from other rooms and equipped with means 
for monitoring the entry and exit of authorized persons. Also, they are required 
to record communication between persons who access data and those involved in 
data processing. A person who carries out the procedure of digital forensics before 
undertaking any activities informs the person whose data are subject to process-
ing, by submitting “OLAF digital forensic operations information leaflet”. In ad-
dition, it is also obliged to provide answers to questions to persons whose data are 
subject to processing, concerning the specific procedures of digital forensics. 
In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of all relevant legislation, a per-
son who conducts digital forensics has the obligation to draw up a written report 
in which will be described method, the process of collection and storage of data 
being processed. The same report describes possible damage incurred in connec-
tion with digital data. Also, the report should indicate the complaints related to 
personal data. In addition, the report should include data on all persons involved 
in the process of collection and processing of evidence which are the subject of 
digital forensics.42 A special part of the Guidelines relates to the special protection 
of personal data. Accordingly, information concerning marital status and informa-
tion about children can only be included in the case file if they are relevant to the 
investigation.43 
During the preparation and implementation of activities that fall into digital fo-
rensics, conducted at the level of OLAF, persons employed in the mentioned insti-
tutions are required, when it comes to personal data, to comply with the provisions 
of Regulation No 45/2001. Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF 
Staff were adopted to facilitate the application of these provisions. Therefore, in 
situations that are not defined in the Guidelines directly applicable are provisions 
of the aforementioned Regulation.
4. CONCLUSION
Digital Forensics by the European Anti-Fraud Office is carried out mainly for the 
purpose of producing evidences for court proceedings. Considering the fact that 
among digital data investigator can found a large number of personal data it is 
42  Ibid. Article 4.
43  Ibid. Article 9.
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important for OLAF to act in accordance with the provisions regulating the pro-
tection of privacy rights. Such provisions are prescribed by Regulation on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Com-
munity institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. However, 
that Regulation, in addition contains a large number of exceptions to the rules. 
It is therefore of a great importance, for the legality of the OLAF activities, the 
adequate selection of officials within the institution. Those officials are authorized 
to monitor the application of Regulation No 45/2001 and cooperation with su-
pervisors for personal data protection in the European Union. 
Bearing in mind that in the process of digital forensics personal data should be 
handled in a special way, at the level of the OLAF was adopted Guidelines on 
Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff. Application of the Guidelines has 
two objectives. One is to protect the integrity of digital data in order for these data 
to be used in the future as evidence by the competent authorities of the Member 
States. The second is to increase the effectiveness of protection of personal data 
at the level of institution. The special quality of the Guidelines provide measures 
that are prescribed, relating to the submission of the “OLAF digital forensic op-
erations information leaflet” to a person whose data are subject to processing; 
the provisions on monitoring the entry and exit from the laboratory; recording 
communication of a person who processes data with other persons; and the obli-
gation of drawing up reports on the method of collecting and storing data; as well 
as specific information on possible damage that occurs during the processing of 
these data; also a data on complaints submitted by authorized persons and data 
related to information on all persons who have been involved in the process of 
digital forensics. Guidelines that is compatible with the provisions of Regulation 
constitutes a kind of written procedures that all employees involved in the process 
of digital forensics are required to apply. Bearing in mind that Guidelines is a 
mean for effective implementation of the provisions of the Regulation on the level 
of the institution, its practical application oversees data protection officer at the 
European Anti-Fraud Office. 
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fORCED MARRIAGES Of CHILDREN  
AS A fORM Of EXPLOITATION Of HUMAN 
TRAffICKING VICTIMS*
ABSTRACT
Forced marriages of children are one of the forms of exploitation in the commission of the crime 
of trafficking in human beings. Children are treated as a commodity, sold to interested par-
ties for the establishment of a family, while the children, victims of trafficking, are completely 
deprived of their human (children) rights, their health is impaired, they are deprived of the 
right to education and denied the development of their personality as well as belonging to their 
own family. Children who have suffered such a serious crime will cope with extremely serious 
consequences all of their lives. The first part of the paper covers the concept, scope and causes of 
this form of exploitation of children and the consequences that children need to cope with. The 
second part presents the international legal framework relating to the suppression of trafficking 
in children as well as the documents to guarantee international protection of children and their 
rights. Furthermore, it points out to the national legislation, principally in the field of criminal 
law, but also other blanket regulations which ensure the protection of children and their rights. 
This paper also analyses the collected data on child victims of forced marriage. In concluding 
remarks, listed are recommendations de lege ferenda in combating exploitation of children for 
the conclusion of forced and arranged marriages and other forms of exploitation of children. 
Keywords: Child trafficking, forced marriages, arranged marriages, children’s rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Forced marriages of children are increasingly common form of exploitation of hu-
man trafficking victims. It is the exploitation of a child in a way that the child is 
forced into a marriage with an adult or another child. This form of exploitation is 
expressed in many, both developed and developing nations, while the victims tend 
to be children of socially vulnerable groups and minorities. In our region this kind 
of exploitation affects a large number of members of the Roma community, the 
victims are both boys and girls, although there is a significantly larger number of 
*   This research has been fully supported by the Croatian Science Foundation, under the project number 
1949. „Multidisciplinary Research Cluster on Crime in Transition - Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Corruption and Economic Crime.“
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girls victims of forced marriages. At the international level, documents have been 
passed to combat this form of trafficking in persons and in accordance with them 
the signatory states harmonize their national legislation, however, even despite 
that forced marriages of children remain a global problem. With harmonized na-
tional legal framework, it is necessary and relevant for the authorities to promptly 
respond and in every possible and allowed way protect the children that are be-
ing exploited in such an inhuman way. Children, victims of forced marriage, are 
doomed to early parenthood, deprived of education, with completely destroyed 
possibility of further development, sufferring enormous consequences for their 
entire lives. Given that this problem is largely present, it requires continuous and 
thorough work with the aim of effective prevention and suppression.
In order to counteract and prevent a serious violation of children’s rights, each 
state where there is an increased practice of entering children into marriage in 
certain minority communities must develop successful programs to combat the 
problem within the community in order to a priori protect any potential child 
from the suffering and exploitation because the child’s life must come first.
2. fORCED MARRIAGES Of CHILDREN
Marriage is a legally regulated community of woman and man1 based on the free 
will of a man and a woman to get married, the equality of spouses and on mutual 
respect and mutual support. Child marriage is defined as a formal or customary 
union in which one or both parties are under the age of eighteen.2 Marriage can 
not be concluded by a person who has not reached eighteen years of age, excep-
tionally court may in non-contentious proceedings allow a marriage to the person 
who has attained the age of sixteen years if it founds the person to be mentally 
and physically ready for marriage and that the marriage is in accordance with the 
well-being of the person.3
When we talk about marriages of children, we meet with different terminology. 
Early marriage means a community of two people who according to their age do 
not meet the legal requirements in order to be married or community where only 
one of the future spouses does not meet these requirements. To a person who 
1  Art.12., Family law, Official Gazette No.103/2015
2  European Roma and Travellers Forum&Romani Women Informal Platform „Phenjalipe”, Making ear-
ly marriage in Roma communities a global concern, available at:
  URL=https://cs.coe.int/team20/cahrom/7th%20cahrom%20plenary%20meeting/item%2004%20
-%20ertf%20and%20phenjalipe%20joint%20paper%20making%20early%20marriage%20in%20
roma%20communities%20a%20global%20concern.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
3  Art.25. op.cit. note 1.
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does not meet the age requirements for marriage, a child, consent must be given 
by another person, usually their parent or legal guardian. Therefore, the person 
for whom the consent is being given, is still considered a child, and here we are 
talking about child marriage. Therefore, early marriage is also the child marriage. 
Furthermore, given that the child is a person who is not yet 18 years old,4 he/she 
is a minor, so there arises the concept of underage marriages.
Forced child marriages are illegal because they do not meet the legal requirements 
for a community that can be considered a marriage and are forced because in their 
conclusion there is no consent of the will. Child marriage can be a contracted mar-
riage that is planned, negotiated and contracted for the children by their parents 
or other people who care for them or persons under whose auspices they are cur-
rently residing. 
According to data published by the InternationalCenter for Research on Women 
(ICRW), in the developing world, one third of girls are married before the age of 
18, while in 2012, 70 million women 20-24 around the world had been married 
before the age of 18.5 If this trend continues, within the next ten years, 150 mil-
lion girls will be married before their 18th birthday, which is on average 15 mil-
lion girls each year.6 Victims of forced marriages are prevented and deprived from 
all guaranteed rights, the right to freedom and dignity, the right to free movement, 
the right to make decisions and choices, the right to life, work and education, the 
right to choose one’s own family and the right to health.
Poverty, lack of education, illiteracy, domestic violence, are factors that create fer-
tile ground for the development of this form of criminal exploitation of children. 
Girls, victims of forced marriages, suffer greater psychological effects than boys in 
particular for reasons of impairment of their reproductive health. Lack of physical 
maturity and the unwillingness of the body for pregnancy can lead to death of 
girls, and according to available data, more than 50,000 girls aged 15-19 die each 
year during pregnancy or from the effects of pregnancy.7
It is difficult to predict how many children are living in forced marriage and con-
sensual unions, while it is impossible to determine their age limit. Most child 
marriages are concluded in the countries of South Asia and Africa. The highest 
4  Art. 4. par. 6. A child is a person under the age of eighteen years; The Social Welfare Act, Official Ga-
zette No.157/2013, 152/2014, 99/2015, 52/2016, 16/2017.
5  Data available at: URL=http://www.icrw.org/child-marriage-facts-and-figures/. Accessed 20 February 
2017.
6  Ibid.
7  More in: Early marriage child spouses, available at: URL=https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/
digest7e.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
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rate of child marriages is recorded in Bangladesh where 66% of young women are 
married before the age of 18, while 32% enter into marriage before the age of 15.8 
The average age for marriage for girls and boys in Nepal is 6-8 years.9
Some communities justify the entry of children into marriage for traditional and 
economic reasons, facilitating the life and survival of the family, returning certain 
debts of one family to another, as well as pre-arranged and promised marriage 
between the specific future bride and groom. No tradition of a nation can be a 
justification or have justification for acts that destroy a young life, for acts that are 
contrary to the constitutionally guaranteed human rights. First of all, considering 
that the entry of children into marriage under 16 years of age is not allowed in 
most states and is a crime to cohabit with a child under 16 years old,10 therefore, 
the customary law of a certain community, according to which a child under the 
age of 16 years of age may enter into marriage, should not be approved, but on the 
contrary, such behavior must be punished.
3. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL fRAMEWORK
The first and fundamental international document11 that protects the rights of the 
child was the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 1924, adopted by 
the League of Nations12 which regulated the protection of a child from all forms 
of exploitation. The Declaration guarantees the right of the child to physical and 
spiritual development, the right to food, health care and social protection and the 
right to help in trouble. UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights,13 adopted 
and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on December 10, 
1948 ensures for children the right to freedom and equality by birth, the right to 
equality before the law and judicial protection and prohibits slavery,14 torture or 
8  According to the report of UNICEF, 01/2013, op.cit. note 2. p.8.
9  The Sad Hidden Plight of Child Grooms, available at:
  URL=http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/18/the-sad-hidden-plight-of-child-grooms.
html. Accessed 20 February 2017.
10  Enabling common-law lives with a child, Art. 170. Criminal code RC, Official Gazette No. 125/2011, 
144/2012,56/2015,61/2015
11  See also: Božić V, Combating sexual exploitation as the leading form of trafficking in persons in the function 
of protection of the right to life and fundamental human rights, Pravni život, 2016, 583 1-780; pp.267-288
12  More in: Ćubelić I, Rights of children in international documents, Church in the World, Vol. 29 No.4 
December 1994, pp. 453-459, available at: URL=http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/80329. Accessed 20 Febru-
ary 2017.
13  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: URL= http://www.pariter.hr/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/10/opca_deklaracija_o_ljudskim-pravima.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
14  Art. 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all 
their forms. Ibid.
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humiliation. The Universal Declaration explicitly states that marriage may be en-
tered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.15UN Gen-
eral Assembly in 1954 adopted the Resolution 843 (Status of women in private 
law: customs, ancient laws and practices affecting the human dignity of women) 
ordering the abolition of old customs and to ensure freedom in the choice of a 
spouse, the elimination of child marriages and the practice of betrothal of girls 
before puberty age.16
UN adopted the 1956 Supplement to the Convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,17 stipulating 
the right of women to freely enter into marriage and calling on states to clearly 
define a minimum age for marriage as well as to prescribe penalties for violation 
of applicable provisions and to take all measures to combat child exploitation. At 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1959 adopted was the Declaration on 
the Rights of the Child18 in order to protect the position of children in the world 
and the 1962 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages19 with the aim of extra protection and security of 
the child. Under the Convention, no marriage is legitimate unless there is full and 
free consent of both parties while the State Party are once again called upon to 
determine the legal minimum age for marriage. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women was adopted in 1979 and stipulates that engagement and the entry of a 
child into a marriage shall have no legal effect, and all necessary actions shall be 
taken, including legislation, to specify a minimum age for marriage, as well as to 
introduce the obligation of registration of marriages in an official registry.20
15  Art.16.par.2. Ibid.
16  Resolution 843, available at URL=http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/843 
(IX). Accessed 20 February 2017.
17  Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery Adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social 
Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956, available 
at: URL=http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SupplementaryConventionAbolition-
OfSlavery.aspx. Accessed 20 February 2017.
18  Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959, available at: URL=http://www.humanium.org/en/chil-
drens-rights-history/references-on-child-rights/declaration-rights-child/. Accessed 20 February 2017.
19  Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of marriages of 10 
December 1962 - (Decision on the publication of multilateral treaties to which Croatia is a party on the 
basis of notifications of succession, OG-MU 012/1993), Available at: URL=http://digured.srce.hr/arhi-
va/263/33320/www.hidra.hr/hidrarad/pobirac-upload/murh/000217.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
20  Art.16.par.2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, avail-
able at: URL=http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/05bosniak/BConElimination-
DiscriminationWomen.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
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The UN General Assembly adopted the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,21 which represents the essential international document in the field of chil-
dren’s rights. Convention has been ratified by almost all countries of the world, 
and in the Republic of Croatia it has been in force since October 8, 1991. The 
most significant provisions relate to the shared responsibility of parents, the best 
interests of the child, free primary education for children, prohibiting the abuse of 
children, labor,22 sexual and other exploitation. The States Parties to the Conven-
tion commit themselves to take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction, sale and trafficking of children for any purpose 
and in any form.23 Each State Party to the Convention is obliged to submit regular 
and additional reports on the state of children’s rights. It is important to mention 
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 199524 concerning the protec-
tion of women’s rights, according to which States parties are invited to provide 
in their national legislation provisions to ensure that marriage is only entered 
into with the free and full consent of the intending spouses, and to prescribe the 
minimum legal age of consent and the minimum age for marriage and to raise the 
minimum age for marriage where necessary.25
Council of Europe Resolution 1468 on forced and child marriages26 adopted in 
2005 calls on the Member States to prescribe 18 years as the lower age for mar-
riage. Furthermore, the resolution calls on the State parties to criminalize forced 
marriages in their national criminal legislation. 
Istanbul Convention, Council of Europe Convention on preventing and com-
bating violence against women and domestic violence,27 the most far-reaching 
international treaty that requires states parties to criminalize or otherwise penalize 
domestic violence (physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence), stalking, 
21  Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at: URL=http://www.azoo.hr/images/AZOO/
Ravnatelji/radni_matgerijali/Konvencija_o_pravima_djeteta.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
22  See more: Božić V, Labor exploitation as the most common form of the crime of trafficking in human beings 
in spite of the state border control and the labor market, Collection of Papers, Faculty of Law Niš, 2016, 
pp. 335-352.
23  Art.35. op.cit. note 21.
24  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, URL=http://www.e-jednakost.org.rs/kurs/kurs/down-
load/pekinska_deklaracija.pdfhttps://ravnopravnost.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/arhiva/images/pdf/
Izvje%C5%A1%C4%87e%20Republike%20Hrvatske%20UNECE-u%20o%20provedbi%20Pe-
kin%C5%A1ke%20deklaracije%20i%20Platforme%20za%20djelovanje%20(Peking%2015).pdf. 
Accessed 20 February 2017.
25  Art.234. par.e. Ibid.
26  Resolution 1468 (2005) Forced marriages and child marriages, available at: URL=http://assembly.coe.
int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17380&lang=en. Accessed 20 February 2017.
27  URL=https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documen-
tId=090000168046fc87. Accessed 20 February 2017.
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sexual violence (rape, sexual harassment, forced marriage,28 female genital mutila-
tion, forced abortion and forced sterilization).
Croatia has ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and III of the Protocols that supplement the Convention.29 The first protocol, 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Wom-
en and Children, is significant in the field of human trafficking and defines the 
concept of trafficking. The protocol deals with various forms of exploitation, both 
within and outside the country and does not differ particularly for men and wom-
en but speaks about persons.30
Republic of Croatia adopted the Law on Ratification of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings on 27 June 2007.31 
The Convention was adopted with the intention to reinforce and develop the 
standards contained in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children,32 and defines trafficking in persons 
as a violation of criminal law and as a violation of fundamental human rights.33
28  Article 32 – Civil consequences of forced marriages
  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that marriages concluded under 
force may be voidable, annulled or dissolved without undue financial or administrative burden placed 
on the victim.
  Article 37 – Forced marriage
  (1) Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct 
of forcing an adult or a child to enter into a marriage is criminalised.
  (2) Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct 
of luring an adult or a child to the territory of a Party or State other than the one she or he resides in 
with the purpose of forcing this adult or child to enter into a marriage is criminalised.
 Article 59 – Residence status
  (4) Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that victims of forced mar-
riage brought into another country for the purpose of the marriage and who, as a result, have lost their 
residence status in the country where they habitually reside, may regain this status.
29  Law on Ratification of UN CATOC, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Official Gazette IA No. 14/2002,13/2003,11/2004.
30  More: Holmes P, Fight Against Trafficking in Persons for the Western Balkans Region: Manual for Training 
of Special Investigators, International Organization for Migration, Zagreb, 2007.
31  Law on Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human 
Beings Official Gazette IA No.07/2007
32  Art. 39. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Council of 
Europe Treaty Series - No. 197.
33  More: Božić V, Trafficking in human organs as a form of organized crime, PhD Dissertation, University 
of Zagreb, Faculty of Law, 2012.
  See also:Derenčinović D, Not for sale - on the rights of victims of trafficking after the European Court 
of Human Rights ruling in the case Rantsev against Cyprus and Russia, Almanac of Academy of Legal 
Sciences of Croatia No.1, 2010.
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Directive 2011/36 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on pre-
venting and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting victims of 
human trafficking, which replaces the EU Council Framework Decision on Com-
bating Trafficking in Persons from 19 July 2002 (2002/629 / JHA), was adopted 
on 05 April 2011.34 The Directive provides for stronger sanctioning of the crime 
of trafficking in persons and the seizure of illegally acquired assets from convicted 
persons for the crime of trafficking in persons. 
In addition to the aforementioned legal framework, institutional framework relat-
ing to the fight against child marriages is also necessary, among which we can high-
light the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),35 UN Population Fund (UNFPA),36 the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)37 with 18 experts in the field pro-
tection of children’s rights, then the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)38 
with 23 independent experts who monitor the implementation of the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. It is necessary 
to mention the World Health Organization (WHO)39 that cares about the health 
of vulnerable groups, children and women.
It should be noted that there is quite a large number of organizations that are 
globally engaged in the protection of children, namely: Breakthrough, CARE, 
Humanium: Help the Children, Defence for Children International, Save the 
Children and Girls not Brides.40
4. NATIONAL LEGISLATION Of CROATIA
Republic of Croatia has aligned its national legislation with international instru-
ments concerning the protection of the rights of the child to enter into marriage. 
Family Law stipulates an age limit of 18 years of age as the assumption of legal 
age for marriage, with the exception, according to which the court may in non-
contentious proceedings allow marriage to a person who has attained the age of 
sixteen years if he/she is found to be mentally and physically ready for marriage 
34  Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing 
and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Frame-
work Decision 2002/629/JHA
35  See:URL=https://www.unicef.org/.
36  See:URL=http://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage.
37  See:URL=http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIntro.aspx.
38  See: URL=http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Introduction.aspx.
39  See: URL=http://www.who.int/en/.
40  More in: Aleksić M, NVO Atina: Child Marriages in Serbia, Belgrade, 2015.
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and that this marriage is in according to the well-being of the person.41 Accord-
ingly, the minimum age for marriage with the consent of the court in Republic of 
Croatia is 16 years. 
Taking into account that a man and a woman by getting married are taking upon 
themselves a great responsibility and in accordance with the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, according to which a child means every human being below 
18 years should not be allowed to get married to persons before they gain full 
maturity. Furthermore, young girls by early marriage and early childbearing are 
exposed to possible health problems; they remain deprived of education and ac-
cordingly are condemned to economic dependence on another person, the spouse. 
One should consider, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee 
for the elimination of discrimination against women that the minimum lower 
limit for marriage without exceptions should be prescribed to 18 years and to 
undertake activities that will inform the public about the negative impacts and 
consequences that an early marriage leaves on a minor and violates their human 
rights, especially those concerning health and education.
The Criminal Code of Croatia prescribes sanctions relating to the protection of 
children from coercion and illegal entry into marriage. According to the criminal 
law a child is a person under the age of eighteen years.42 Forcing another person to 
enter into marriage is a new criminal offense in line with Council of Europe Con-
vention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic 
Violence, punishable by imprisonment of six months to five years.43 The reason to 
criminalize this aggravated criminal offense of coercion lies in preventive combat-
ing of forced marriages, which in some communities are still ingrained. Recruit-
ment of a person to another country with the aim of forcing the marriage in that 
country is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.44
An adult who does no other crime but only lives with a child under the age of six-
teen, as well as a person who enables a child under sixteen years of age to cohabit 
with another person or leads a child to do so, and thus does not make any other 
criminal offense for which a more severe punishment is prescribed, commits an 
offense of Enabling Extramarital Life With a Child which carries a prison sentence 
41  Art.25. Op. cit. note 1.
42  Art.87. par.7. CC Republic of Croatia
43  Art.169. par.1 Ibid.
44  Par.2. Ibid.
Vanda Božić: FORCED MARRIAGES OF CHILDREN AS A FORM OF EXPLOITATION ... 57
of up to three years.45 If the crime was committed out of personal gain it is an ag-
gravated form that is punishable by imprisonment from six months to five years.46
Forced marriages are criminalized by crime of Trafficking in Human Beings as a 
form of exploitation. Imprisonment for 1 to 10 years shall be inflicted on every-
one who recruits, transports, transfers, harbors or receives a child, or exchanges or 
transfers control of a child with an aim of concluding an unauthorized or forced 
marriage.47 Trafficking in children with the use of force or threat, deception, fraud, 
kidnapping, abuse of power or difficult position or relationship addiction, giving 
or receiving financial compensation or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over a child to conclude an unauthorized or forced marriage is an 
aggravated form punishable by a sentenced from three to fifteen years.48
It is important to note that the act of marriage with a child is a form of exploita-
tion, and it is not necessary to determine whether the child was abused in a mar-
riage or not.
5.  RESEARCH AND ANALySIS Of CHILDREN AS VICTIMS Of 
fORCED MARRIAGES
Behind the large number of child marriages lies trafficking. Forced marriages are 
increasingly expanding every day, and we can only surmise their dark figure. The 
most affected are communities where there are traditional customs of early entry 
into marriage as is the case in the Roma population. 
Main characteristics of forced child marriages are the following:
1-   The child has no right to choose his or her spouse and has no right to refuse 
it
2-   The child for the imposed spouse usually gets a much older partner
3-   The child is exposed to coercion, threats and abuse so that he/she does not 
leave the spouse
4-   Physical abuse and violence is carried out against a child
5-   The child is restricted in movement and imposed various other restrictions
45  Art.170. par.1. i 2. Ibid.
46  Par. 3. Ibid.
47  Art. 106. par.2. Ibid.
48  Par.3. Ibid.
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6-   The girl in a forced marriage is not entitled to a free choice about whether 
to have children
7--  Forced marriage realizes an exchange of economic goods over which the 
forced spouse has no control.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014 identified was a total of 49 potential victims 
of human trafficking with the purpose of labor exploitation, sexual exploitation 
and for the purpose of organized and forced begging and selling with the aim of 
concluding contractual or forced marriages as well as for the production, posses-
sion and viewing of child pornography. For the purpose of forced marriage and 
subsequent begging registered were 4 minor victims.49 In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
children are to a large percentage exposed to human trafficking, particularly for 
forced begging and entering into forced marriages or child abuse via the Internet.50
Economically vulnerable Roma children were in 2016 subjected to forced begging 
and domestic servitude against their will in forced marriages.51 
In 2015 in Croatia identified were 38 victims of human trafficking (35 citizens of 
the Republic of Croatia, 2 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one citizen of 
Hungary). In comparison to 2014 registered was an increase in the total number 
of victims, however, significantly reduced was the number of identified minor 
victims of trafficking in 2015 (4 minor victims was identified). In a large number 
of cases these are the so-called cases of “internal” trafficking in persons, but there 
are documented cases of Croatian citizens who are victims of trafficking within 
the EU.52
The Criminal Code, which entered into force on 1 January 2013 has brought an 
important innovation in criminalizing the offense of human trafficking. Former 
Art.175. “Trafficking in human beings and slavery”53 is now regulated through 
two articles, Art.105. “Slavery” and Art. 106. “Trafficking in human beings.” As 
forms of exploitation of human trafficking in the new CC incriminated are the 
49  Report on the state of human trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, National Coordinator 
for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Sarajevo, April/March 2015, URL=http://msb.gov.ba/
PDF/IZVJESTAJ_trgovin_%20izvjestaj_2014.pdf, Accessed 20 February 2017.
50  Ibid.
51  Report on human trafficking in 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina - Nivo 2, available at: URL=http://
photos.state.gov/libraries/sarajevo/30982/pdfs/2016%20TIP%20REPORT_BOS.pdf. Accessed 20 
February 2017.
52  More: Office for Human Rights and National Minorities: Report on the implementation of the Na-
tional Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings for the period from 2012 to 2015, for 2015.
53  Criminal code RC 97, Official Gazette No. 110/1997,129/2000, 51/2000, 111/2003, 105/2004, 
84/2005, 71/2006, 110/2007, 152/2008
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conclusion of unauthorized or forced marriage and the use of persons in armed 
conflicts.
In the Republic of Serbia, we are mostly talking about children marriages con-
tracted between adults and juveniles, mostly girls. The table below under number 
2 shows the criminal charges for forced marriage.
Table 1. Criminal charges for forced marriage54
year No. of charges
2009 5
2010 4
2011 2
2012 2
Total 13
Indicators by which we can recognize a child as a potential victim of human traf-
ficking are as follows:
- Injuries that look like the result of a physical attack,
- Signs of neglect and child abuse,
- Signs that they are subject to control of movement,
- They have no persons with which to socialize,
- They are not entered in the register of births,
- They are illegally adopted,
- They do not attend school,
- They do not have time to play, are aggressive, exhibit behavioral problems
- Constantly changing testimony,
- Are exposed to violence or threats of violence to them or their families,
- Exploited for begging, prostitution, street work,
- Poorly or not paid at all for work for working overtime,
- Falsely representing themselves in order not to reveal their status,
- They do not have personal documents,
54  Morača T, Galonja A, Jovanović S, Milanović L, Local communities in the fight against human traffick-
ing, Beograd, 2013,
  URL=http://www.atina.org.rs/sites/default/files/Local%20communities%20publikacija.pdf. Accessed 
20 February 2017
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-  They reside and work in the place and at the time inappropriate for the age 
of the child, 
- Pregnancy and child abortion,
- They are found in a location that is known or is connected with trafficking,  
- They do not know the language,
- They do not know their work or home address,
- In their presence instead of them someone else is talking, 
- They live in poor and inhuman conditions,
- They have no health care,
- Without the right to communicate with their family and loved ones,
- They depend on third persons,
-  They are in the presence of adults who are not family members or are caught 
alone on the street without an adult,
- They have contact with people from the criminal milieu,
- They show great resourcefulness that is not expected of the average child, 
- They act and speak as per the instructions received,
- They have traumatic reactions,
- They live in a common-law marriage or forced marriage,
- They’re frightened and show fear,
- They are traveling without adults or people who are not their parents, 
- Very often change residence,
- As foreign nationals they have no resolved status,
- They are dressed inappropriately for age or weather conditions,  
- They show signs of addiction to drugs or alcohol, and similar.
As can be seen from Table 2, most girls married between the ages of 15-19 years 
have been recorded in Dem. Rep. of Congo (74%), in second place was Nigeria 
(70%), and in third the Congo (56%). As for the boys in the same age situation 
is slightly different. Considerably fewer is married (1/4) compared to girls (3.4). 
The highest number of married are in Iraq (15%), followed by Nepal (14%) and 
Tsonga (12%).
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Table 2: Percentage of minors aged 15-19 that are married55
Married Adolescents:
Percentage of 15-19 year-olds married
boys girls
Dem. Rep. Of Congo 5 74
Niger 4 70
Congo 12 56
Uganda 11 50
Mali 5 50
Afghanistan 9 54
Bangladesh 5 51
Nepal 14 42
Iraq 15 28
Syria 4 25
yemen 5 24
Honduras 7 30
Cuba 7 29
Guatemala 8 24
In 2015, the FMU handled cases involving 67 ‘focus’ countries which a victim was 
at risk of, or had already, been taken to in connection with a forced marriage, the 
five highest volume countries in 2015 were: Pakistan - 539 cases (44%), Bangla-
desh - 89 cases (7%), India - 75 cases (6%), Somalia - 34 cases (3%), Afghanistan 
- 21 cases (2%).56
According to research conducted, which includes representatives of social welfare 
centers, institutions responsible for the issues of trafficking and non-governmental 
organizations, the questions which are the possible indicators that the minor is the 
victim of human trafficking and what are the reasons why it has become a victim, 
obtained the answers presented in tables 3 and 4.
55  Source: UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Marriage Pat-
terns 2000, URL=http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldmarriage/worldmarriagepat-
terns2000.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017.
56  Forced Marriage Unit Statistics 2015 8 March 2016, URL=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505827/Forced_Marriage_Unit_statistics_2015.pdf. Accessed 
20 February 2017.
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Table 3: Indicators suggesting that a minor is the victim of human trafficking
Indicators suggesting that a minor is the victim of human trafficking %
1 Injuries caused by violence 29
2 Children caught alone on the street without an adult 35
3 Frightened, neglected, abandoned children 49
4 Children not entered in the register of births  15
5 Children outside the education and health systems 35
6 Denied rights of the child exploitation 29
7 Residing and working in the place and at the time inappropriate for the age of 
the child
Pregnancy and child abortion
55
8 Children are not playing with other children, showing behavior disorders 29
9 Statement and recognition of victims 15
10 Other 15
Stay and work in the place and at the time inappropriate for the age of the child, 
pregnancy and abortion, and frightened, neglected, abandoned children are the 
most important indicators that the minor is a victim of human trafficking.
Table 4: Reasons for which the minor has become a victim of human trafficking
Reasons for which the minor has become a victim of human trafficking %
1 High degree of poverty 55
2 Child neglect 49
3 Misguidance 15
4 Threat, coercion or duress 49
5 Kidnapping 15
6 Customs and traditions 70
The number one reasons why the minor had become a victim of trafficking, ac-
cording to the survey, are the customs and traditions and high degree of poverty.
6. CONCLUSION
Forced marriages of children leave huge consequences on the physical and mental 
development of the child. The practice of early marriage, approval of parents, low 
education, economic dependence as well as any other reason can not and must not 
be an excuse for entering a child into marriage nor the life of a child out of wed-
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lock. Children are not able to cope with the problems and responsibilities that in-
clude marriage, they are expected to take responsibility for their decisions, which 
they are not able to do. They are still children in need of parental care, and should 
not themselves become and be parents. Worrying is a situation where parents give 
their approval to a minor child to enter into marriage, and not to talk about situ-
ations where parents are the ones that lead their child into marriage. Accordingly, 
it is proposed de lege ferenda to introduce legislation under which a marriage can 
be entered into only with people over 18 years.
With early, forced child marriages, children’s basic rights to their own choice of 
partner have been violated, the right to development and education, right to 
health, the right to free will in connection with the decision about having children 
and various other restrictions have been imposed on them.
Of great importance is scientific research and media coverage of the public through 
prevention campaigns to raise public awareness of the problem of trafficking, es-
pecially trafficking of children, as an aggravated form of the crime. Of significance 
is the comprehensive research in the Region on all forms of trafficking in persons, 
their distribution and causes. It is necessary to continuously work on the methods 
of identification of victims in relation to all forms of trade and modes of selection 
and finding the victims. Particular attention should be paid to the activities of 
the detection of criminal offenses of organized crime related to trafficking in per-
sons, organized by forcing children to beg and the conclusion of forced marriages. 
Regional and international cooperation is crucial in the detection of criminal of-
fenses in the area of combating trafficking in persons and victim identification.
Finally, the state must clearly define the institution of child marriage as a totally 
unacceptable and harmful category. Consequently, we should act preventively and 
take account of particular risk groups and categories to separate the concept of 
child marriage from any ethnic or religious community.
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ABSTRACT
Intensive process of Europeanization and the creation of internal market significantly changed 
European business landscape. More and more European companies are spreading their busi-
nesses across Europe what consequently raised considerable number of issues to address, such as, 
law applicable to corporate activities, creditor’s rights, etc. The problem is particularly complex 
and complicated in case of companies’ bankruptcy. In „massive“ bankruptcy cases with cross 
border elements, involving large number of creditors, companies assets in several member states, 
large number of employees etc., it is hard or impossible to coordinate all activities, to ensure 
equal treatment and equal rights to all creditors, prevent forum shopping or/and to trace, col-
lect and sell debtor’s assets.
Having in mind all that and the fact that conflicting Member States insolvency rules create 
uncertainty among investors, discourages cross-border investments and cause delay in restruc-
turing, EU is taking steps in harmonizing insolvency law since early 1980’s. However, the first 
EU Insolvency Regulation was not enacted until year 2002. The 2002 EU Insolvency Regu-
lation sets forth a framework for cross border insolvency within the EU, especially providing 
rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for opening of insolvency 
proceedings, the automatic recognition of these proceedings and the power of „liquidator“ in 
the other Member State, and important choice of law provisions. After 10 years of application 
of 2002 Insolvency Regulation, in year 2012, the EU Commission decided that it is time to 
modernize EU insolvency law. As a result it came out with the proposal of the Recast Insol-
vency Regulation. Recast Insolvency Regulation was finally adopted by the EU Parliament and 
Council in June 2015 but it will enter into force in year 2017.
The new Recast Insolvency Regulation does not adopt radically different approach compared 
to previous Regulation not it offers revolutionary different solutions. The fundamental premise 
that insolvency law is a matter for each EU member state has remained. However the Recast 
regulation strengthens and broadens the framework of recognition and co-operation which 
the 2002 Insolvency regulation set up over a decade ago. In that context, paper will address 
processes of harmonization of EU insolvency law. It will emphasize the most important aspects 
of EU insolvency regime. Special attention will be given to substantive and procedural issues as 
regulated in the Recast Insolvency Regulation. 
Keywords: Recast Insolvency Regulation, EU insolvency law
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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 20th 2015 European Parliament and Council after lengthy and complex 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of European Insolvency law, adopted new 
Insolvency Regulation1. New Insolvency regulation will enter into force on June 
26th 2017. Since that is the first comprehensive reform of EU insolvency law 
since the first EU Insolvency regulation entered into force in year 2002,it seems 
that it is an appropriate occasion to explore and reflect on achievements and weak-
nesses of EU insolvency law and to define the course or direction of “new” EU 
insolvency law.
The paper will generally focus on the legal measures and efforts undertaken on 
EU level to provide legal framework for dealing with cross-border bankruptcies. 
However, paper will also shortly reflect on international treaties and process of 
harmonization of insolvency law on international level particularly explaining rea-
sons and importance of harmonization of cross border insolvency proceedings.
Furthermore, paper will provide a comprehensive overview of the rules adopted 
by new Recast Insolvency Regulation. Special attention will be given to the is-
sues which are considered to be a cornerstone of reform such as (re)definition of 
COMI and to the other most important aspect of last EU insolvency reform. 
2.   GOALS, POLICy REASONS AND HARMONIzATION Of 
CROSS- bORDER INSOLVENCy PROCEEDINGS
With the development of international trade and economic integration, cross-
border insolvency become increasingly important2.In present time it is quite often 
to have a situation where a company is registered in one country, managed from 
another country and having subsidiaries, employees and assets spread in several 
other countries. 
When such company becomes insolvent, that affects a great variety of stakehold-
er’s employees, shareholders, suppliers, customer’s financial lenders, pensioners 
and tax man3. 
1  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 [2015] OJ 
L 141/19 (Further in the text: Recast Insolvency Regulation)
2  Mucciarelli,Federico,Not Just Efficiency: Insolvency in the EU and Its Political Dimension,European Busi-
ness Law Organization Review, No. 14, 2013, p. 176.
3  Hey, Jon, Harmonising Insolvency Law- Nice but Not Necessary,Global Capital, May 2015., avaialble 
at: URL=http://www.globalcapital.com/article/rmwjf2st641x/harmonising-insolvency-law-nice-but- 
not-necessary, Accessed 3 February 2017.
Dubravka Akšamović: EU INSOLVENCY LAW- NEW RECAST REGULATION ON ... 71
It is possible that each country in which insolvent company has business premises 
or assets will have aspiration to conduct an insolvency proceedings. It may happen 
that under the national insolvency law, insolvency proceedings can be opened at 
the same time in several countries. It is also possible that a company will move 
assets or/and registered office from one jurisdiction to another because of more fa-
vourable insolvency regime. And finally, the problem can also arise in connection 
to creditor’s rights, creditor’s protection etc. 
Therefore, in order to maximize and protect value of assets of insolvent company, 
prevent forum shopping, protect creditors from fraudulent insolvency practice, 
avoid simultaneous insolvency proceedings against same debtor in several states 
etc., number of states as well as leading international institutions begun to explore 
the possibility of harmonization of insolvency proceeding having cross-border 
dimension long time ago4. For example, already in 1933. Bankruptcy conven-
tion was applicable in five Scandinavian states5. But such and similar documents 
enacted worldwide and in Europe did not have significant local or international 
impact6. 
The first international piece of legislation that had major influence on harmoniza-
tion of cross-border insolvency proceeding on global level was the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency7. It was accepted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in Vienna on 30 May 1997.Number of 
countries around the world adopted legislation based on the Model Law8 what led 
to soft harmonization of cross border insolvency proceedings worldwide.
4  Burman, Harold, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, Ford-
ham Law Review, vol. 64, Issue 4, 1996, p. 2544; See more: Paulus, Christoph, Global Insolvency Law 
and the Role of Multinational Institutions, Brook.J.Int’lL, Vol. 32, No.3, 2007.
5  Ibid., p. 2544.
6  First attempts to harmonize cross border insolvency rules we can trace back in 1889 when several Latin 
American states entered into the Treaty called Montevideo Treaty on Commercial International Law. 
This Treaty was updated in 1940’s but was than ratified by Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. Another 
such document was Bustamante Code from 1928, based on the Havana Convention on Private In-
ternational Law. See: Paulus, Christoph, A Vision of the European Insolvency Law, Norton Journal of 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2008, p .608
7  UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, UNCITRAL, 1997.
  avaliable at: URL= http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html8.
8  Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted in 41 States in a total of 43 jurisdictions. Among 
those countries are also several European countries, Greece, Poland, Romania,UK, Slovenia,but also 
U.S., Australia, Canada and Japan.  
  See more: URL=http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html, 
Accessed 14 February 2017.
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However, with no intention to minimize importance or significance of UNCIT-
RAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Model Law focuses on authorizing 
and encouraging cooperation and coordination between jurisdictions, rather than 
attempting the unification of substantive insolvency law. As stated in its preamble 
„it focuses on the legislative framework needed to facilitate cooperation and coordina-
tion in cross-border insolvency cases, with a view to promoting the general objectives of 
insolvency law such as: 
(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of the enacting 
State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; 
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment;  
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvency proceedings that protects 
the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor; 
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; (e) Facilitation of 
the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserv-
ing employment“9.
Another piece of legislation that also had worldwide impact on insolvency pro-
ceedings with cross-border dimension originates from the EU. It is the Council 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings enacted in year 200010 (2002 Insolvency 
Regulations), only three years after UNCITRAL Model Law was enacted.
But, unlike the process of harmonization of insolvency law on global level, har-
monization of cross border insolvency law within the European Union took place 
indifferent political context and with different political background and goals.
3.    EU INSOLVENCy LAW HARMONIzATION: fROM 
INSOLVENCy CONVENTION TO THE RECAST INSOLVENCy 
REGULATION
Harmonization of insolvency law on EU level has a long history. The dream of a 
European-wide insolvency regime goes back to the1960’s11 when European coun-
9  UNCITRAL, Practical Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, United Nations, New york, 
2010, p.12
10  Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160, 
pp. 1–18.
11  Caneco, A., Joseph, Insolvency Law and Attempts to Prevent Abuse and Forum Shopping in the EU, 2016, 
Setton Hall University, Scholarship Paper 90, p. 5.  
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tries recognized the need and importance of harmonization of insolvency law for 
creation of the internal market12. 
It was generally accepted that orderly and effective insolvency procedure plays 
a critical role in fostering growth and competitiveness of European economies. 
Without effective procedures that are applied in a predictable manner, creditors 
may be unable to collect on their claims, different creditors may not be treated 
adequately, and level of domestic and foreign investments on internal market will 
decrease13.Also, it was obvious that disparities between national laws create ob-
stacles to cross border activities within the European Union.
Nevertheless, a process of harmonization of EU insolvency law went slowly and 
not too smoothly. In 1970s and subsequently in1980sEuropean Communities 
Commission proposed a draft for an Insolvency Convention14. But the draft was 
rejected as irrational and too complex in certain areas. Finally, after the years of 
various negotiations, in November 1995. Convention on Insolvency Proceeding15 
was published. Although the Convention never came into force, because it was 
not ratified by all EU countries16, the Convention strongly influence future of EU 
insolvency law, notably the first 2002EU Insolvency Regulation. 
12  Effective and efficient functioning of cross-border insolvency proceedings is recognized as an impor-
tant factor for the smooth functioning of internal market.
13  International Monetary Fund, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures, Legal Department, 1999, 
pp 1-7.
14  Draft Convention on bankruptcy, winding –up arrangements, composition and similar proceedings, 
Bulletin of teh European Communities, Supplement 82, 1982 ( available at:URL= http://aei.pitt.
edu/5480/1/5480.pdf ),
  See more: Rudbordeh, Amir, Adl, Ananalysis and hypothesis on forum shopping in insolvency law: 
From the European Insolvency regulation to its Recast, < https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
media/RUDBORDEH,%20Amir%20-%20An%20Analysis%20%26%20Hypothesis%20on%20
Forum%20Shopping%20in%20Insolvency%20Law%20(EU).pdf >p. 6.; Muir, Hunter, The Draft 
Bankruptcy Convention of the EEC, International and Comparative Law quaterly, vol. 5, No. 2, 1976, 
pp. 310-328.
  available: URL=https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/RUDBORDEH,%20Amir%20-% 
20An%20Analysis%20%26%20Hypothesis%20on%20Forum%20Shopping%20in%20Insolven-
cy%20Law%20(EU).pdf. Accessed 11 February 2017.
15  Text of the Convention is avaialble at: URL= http://aei.pitt.edu/2840/1/2840.pdf, Accessed 3Febru-
ary 2017; See also Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, EU The Council, 6500/96, 
3.May1996, (so called: Virgos Report); (available at: URL=http://globalinsolvency.com/sites/all/files/
insolvency_report.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2017.)
16  The text of the EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedingswas open for a signature between 23 No-
vember 1995 and 23rd May 1995. By May 23rd 1996., 14 out of 15 Member States signed the Con-
vention.Only UK due to political controversies didn’t sign Convention
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Most of the content of the Insolvency Convention was taken over in the text of the 
2002 Insolvency Regulation17.So the question is, why something that was rejected 
just few years ago was accepted now? The answer lays in fact that Convention, as 
a legal instrument ,in order to be applicable on national level had to be ratified 
by Member States. Contrary to that, regulation is a Community law instrument 
which is binding and directly applicable in all Member States18.
So, contrary to the Convention whose application was postponed until it is rati-
fied by all Member States, 2002Insolvency Regulation entered into force in all 
Member States on May 31st, 2002, with the exception of Denmark19.
2002 Insolvency Regulation had crucial impact on development of EU Insolvency 
Law in Europe. It sets forth a framework for cross border insolvency within EU, 
especially providing:
1/ rules for the international jurisdiction of a Court in a Member State for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings,
2/ the automatic recognition of these proceedings,
3/ the powers of liquidator in the other Member States, and
4/ important choice of law provisions20.
Concerning the scope of application, the 2002 Insolvency Regulation primarily 
aimed at regulating cross–border insolvency proceedings of “European” compa-
nies. However, it has broader territorial scope. It also applies on foreign (non EU) 
companies, notably the US corporations having registered office out of EU, it they 
operate in the EU and have the economic activities in the European Union.
2002 Insolvency Regulation was inforce for more than a decade. It is generally 
regarded as a successful legal instrument for the recognition and for the coordina-
tion of cross-border insolvency proceedings in the EU21. But just as UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross- Border Insolvency, 2002 Insolvency Regulation was not 
enacted with intention to harmonize substantive insolvency law of EU Member 
17  Wessels, Bob, EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, INSOL, 2006 p.6., Available at: URL=http://
www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session%205/European%20Union%20Regula-
tion%20on%20Insolvency%20Proceedings%20An%20Introductory%20analysis,%20Bob%20Wes-
sels.pdf. Accessed 16 February 2017.
18 Ibid., p. 6
19 Ibid., p. 6
20  Ibid., p. 1.
21  Report from the Commission Ont he Application of Council Regulation No 1346/2000 On Insolven-
cy Proceedings, COM (2012) 743, 12 December 2012.
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States. The fundamental premise, adopted by 2002 Insolvency Regulation was 
that the insolvency law is the matter for each Member State. As a result, 2000 In-
solvency Regulation did not have significant effect on harmonization of national 
substantive laws in this field, what proved to be one of its major weaknesses22. 
Also, the economic crisis which affected European countries in period between 
2009 and 2011 and which has led to increase in number of failing businesses, 
indicated that current insolvency regulation on EU level may not be adequate in-
strument for dealing with increased number of insolvency proceedings in enlarged 
EU. According to the data published by the European Commission, in period 
between 2009- 2011, an average of 200 000 firms went bankrupt per year in EU. 
About one-quarter of these bankruptcies have a cross –border element. 1.7 million 
jobs are estimated to be lost due to insolvencies every day23.
Faced with this economic realities European Commission opened broader pub-
lic consultation about possible reform of EU insolvency law. In time frame be-
tween 2011and 2014 it presented a package of measures24to modernize insolvency 
rules25. Final outcome of all those efforts is the enactment of new insolvency regu-
lation, Regulation (EU) 2015/848of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 May 2015, commonly referred as the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
As mentioned in the introduction, Recast Insolvency Regulation will enter into 
force in June 2017, two years after it was adopted by the European Parliament and 
the Council. It will replace former 2002 Insolvency Regulation. 
The Commission has high expectations from this legislative reform. One of the 
objectives of Recast Insolvency Regulation is to shift the focus away from liqui-
dation towards encouraging viable business to restructure at the early stage to 
prevent insolvency26.  
22  See more: Wessels, Bob, Twenty Suggestions for a Makeover of the EU Insolvency Regulation, International 
Caselaw Alert, No. 12, 2006, pp. 68-73 
23  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and The European 
Econimc and Social Committee, A new approach to business failure and insolvency, COM ( 2012) 
742 final, Strasbourgh, 12 December 2012, p. 2.
24  In 2011 the European Parliament published the Report with Recommendations to the Commission 
on the Insolvency Proceedings (A7-0355/2011). In 2012 Commission published Communication on 
a New Approach to Business Failure and insolvency ( COM(2012) 742 Final). In 2014 Commission 
published Reccomendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency ( COM 2014).
25  See: European Commission, Press release, Insolvency: Commission recommends new approach to 
rescue businesses and give honest enterpreneurs a second chance, Brussels, 12 March 2014.
26  Stones, Kathy, What harmonisatio provisions have the EU Commission recomended and what is their legal 
status?, LexisNexis, 19 March 2014; Avaialble at: URL=http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/randi/the-chal-
lenges-of-harmonising-insolvencies-and-restructurings/). Accessed 15 February 2017.
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Furthermore, it is also expected that the new Recast regulation will significantly 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of cross border insolvency proceedings and 
thus contribute to “building solid foundations for boosting growth and jobs in Eu-
rope27”. 
As stated in European Commission press release, “the modernized regulation will 
bring:
   A broadened scope: The rules will cover a broader range of commercial 
and personal insolvency proceedings, such as the so-called Spanish scheme of 
arrangement, the Italian reorganisation plan procedure and the Finnish con-
sumer insolvency procedures. Overall, the reform will allow 19 new national 
insolvency procedures to benefit from the Regulation.
   legal certainty and safeguards against bankruptcy tourism: If a debtor 
relocates shortly before filing for insolvency, the court will have to carefully 
look into all circumstances of the case to see that the relocation is genuine and 
not abusive.
   interconnected insolvency registers: Businesses, creditors and investors will 
have easy access to any national insolvency register European e-Justice Portal
   increased chances to rescue companies: The new rules avoid secondary 
proceedings in other Member States being opened, while at the same time 
guaranteeing the interests of local creditors. It will be easier to restructure 
companies in a cross-border context.
   A framework for group insolvency proceedings: With increased efficiency 
for insolvency proceedings concerning different members of a group of compa-
nies, there will be greater chances of rescuing the group as a whole“28.
4.   STRUCTURE AND THE MAIN fEATURES Of THE RECAST 
INSOLVENCy REGULATION
Recast Insolvency Regulation addresses different aspects of cross border insolvency 
proceedings29 among which some of the most important are: criteria for opening 
27  European Commission, Press release, Justice Ministers agree on modern insolvency rules, Brussels, 
4 December 2014., available at: URL=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2322_hr.htm. Ac-
cessed 15 February 2017.
28  Ibid.
29  Regulation is organized in seven chapters as follows: Chapter I (1-18), General provisions, Chapter 
II, Recognition of Insolvency Proceedings (19- 33), Chapter III ( 34-52), Secondary Insolvency Pro-
ceedings, Chapter IV ( 53-55) Provisions of Information for Creditors and Lodgment of Their Claims, 
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of an insolvency proceedings, management of insolvency proceedings, creditor’s 
rights, main and secondary insolvency proceedings, rules on recognition of insol-
vency proceedings, insolvency proceedings of a group of companies etc. Recast 
Insolvency Regulation brings number of improvements and clarifications of legal 
concepts previously insufficiently regulated by 2002 Insolvency Regulation. In 
many aspects, the reform simply codifies EU Courts case law with the aim of 
increasing legal certainty30. However it is important to emphasize that the Recast 
Insolvency Regulation doesn’t attempt to harmonize insolvency rules of EU level. 
In the preamble of Recast Insolvency Regulation it is stated that “as a result of 
widely differing substantive laws it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings 
with universal scope throughout the Union”31.
In that sense, substantive insolvency rules of Member States still remain main 
source of law even in cross border insolvency proceedings. Recast Insolvency Reg-
ulation applies only to proceedings which fall within its scope as defined in the 
Recast Insolvency Regulation.
4.1.  Proceedings within the scope of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
According to the wording of Article 1of the Recast Insolvency Regulation it ap-
plies to all collective insolvency32 proceedings which entail the partial or total 
divestiture of a debtor as well as to pre-insolvency, rescue or/ and to other similar 
reorganization proceedings where a debtor remains in possession.
Closer examination of above rule reveals three conditions that must be fulfilled in 
order to apply the Recast Insolvency Regulation:
a) Firstly, proceeding must be collective. That means that all creditors may seek 
satisfaction only through these insolvency proceedings, as individual actions will 
be precluded33. 
Chapter V (56-77), Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group of Companies, Chapter VI (78-
83), Data Protection, Chapter VII (84-92), Transitional and Final Provisions.
30  Mucciarelli, Federico, Private International Law Rules in the Insolvency Regulation Recast: A Reform or Re-
statement of the Status Quo? ECFR1, 2016, p.1. (available at: URL=https://ssrn.com/abstract=2650414 
or URL=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650414. Accessed 17 January 2017)
31  Recast Insolvency Regualtion, op. cit. note 1, Preamble (22). 
32  Collective insolvency proceedings means proceedings which include all or a significant part of a de-
botr’s creditors, provided that, in the later case, the proceedings do not affect the claims of creditors 
which are not involved in them. (Article 2. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation)
33  Wessels, Bob, op. cit. note 17, p. 11
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b) Secondly, proceedings can be opened only in connection to the debtor’s in-
solvency and not on other grounds34. This doesn’t mean that the debtor must be 
insolvent. Recast Insolvency Regulation may be applied in case when there is only 
likelihood of insolvency but only if the purpose of such pre-insolvency proceed-
ing is to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the cessation of the debtor’s business 
activities35. Therefore, insolvency, pre-insolvency and reorganization proceedings 
should fit within scope of Article 1of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
c) Thirdly, the proceeding should entail the appointment of insolvency practitio-
ner36 such as for example “liquidator” and must be subject to control or supervi-
sion by the court. 
All three conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively.
Concerning the scope of application of the Recast Insolvency Regulation ratione 
personae, it applies both to corporates and individuals37.In practice this encom-
passes various corporate entities as well as individual entrepreneurs.
And finally, Recast Insolvency Regulation applies on all insolvency proceedings 
having impact on internal market and that is presumed to be when parties have 
their centre of main interest within a Member State of the EU. This means that 
the Recast Insolvency Regulation also applies to corporate entities whose place 
of incorporation is outside EU, but whose centre of main interests is within EU. 
4.2.   Lex forum concurs or the law applicable to cross border insolvency 
proceedings: “COMI” solution
The topic that has probably gained the greatest attention in connection to cross-
border insolvency proceedings is related to law applicable to cross border insol-
vency proceedings38. When a company is doing business in several Member States 
and has business premises, assets and employees in every of several Member States 
34 Ibid., p. 11
35  Article 1 (1) par.2 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation, See also, Mucciarelli, F, op.cit. note 33, p. 10.
36  Notion „insolvency practitioner“ cover wide range of persons differently defined in European juris-
dicions. In order to be qualified as an „insolvency practitioner“ one must: person or body whose 
function, including on an interim basis, is to: (i) verify and admit claims submitted in insolvency 
proceedings; (ii) represent the collective interest of the creditors; (iii) administer, either in full or in 
part, assets of which the debtor has been divested; (iv) liquidate the assets referred to in point (iii); or 
(v) supervise the administration of the debtor’s affairs. The persons and bodies referred to in the first 
subparagrap.
37  Article 3. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
38  See: Latella, Dario, The COMI Concept in the Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation, ECFR, No. 
4, 2014, pp. 1-16.
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it may be difficult to determine or identify which court is competent to open in-
solvency proceeding.
Since this creates number of problems in practice in connection to rules on pub-
licity, forum shopping, creditors’ claims etc., the issue was already dealt in 2002 
Insolvency Regulation. According to the 2002 Insolvency regulation, jurisdiction 
of the competent court in cross –border insolvency proceedings has been deter-
mined based on so called COMI or centre of the debtor’s main interest.
Recast Insolvency Regulation follows the same approach.
According to the Article 3 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation, the courts of the 
Member State within the territory of which the centre of the debtor’s main inter-
est (COMI) is situated shall have jurisdiction to open (so called) “main insolvency 
proceeding”. 
So in order to determine which court is competent for opening an insolvency 
proceedings one must first determine where the debtor’s COMI or main centre of 
interest is.
Proper determination of COMI is extremely important. Under the principle of 
unity, generally adopted by EU insolvency law, it is not allowed to open or con-
duct multiple or parallel main proceedings over the same debtor. So when in-
solvency proceedings is once opened in one Member State, this proceeding will 
be considered the “main insolvency proceeding”, and no other main insolvency 
proceedings can be opened in other Member State.
Although determining COMI at first glance may seem simple, determining 
COMI in practice is not always an easy task. In many situations it may be unclear 
where the COMI is. For example, if company is incorporated in UK, company’s 
management is located in Germany and business activity (business premises) is 
dominantly located in Croatia, we may not be certain in which country is the cen-
tre of the debtor’s main interest (COMI).Also, it may be problematic to determine 
COMI in situation when company transfer corporate seat from one jurisdiction 
to another. So the question is, where is COMI now? 
From above it is clear that defining COMI is more factual than legal issue. In each 
and every case it should be determined which among several place of debtor’s busi-
ness is “central” place of business.
Recast Insolvency Regulation provides general guidelines for determining COMI. 
Basic presumption is that COMI is “in the place where debtor conducts the adminis-
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tration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties”39. 
The definition evidently gives primacy to the place from which debtor in reality 
manages its business over the place of incorporation. The idea is to look for the 
“brain” of the company, not for the “mussels”: the actual centre of management 
and supervision of the interest of the debtor (head office functions) which may not 
necessarily coincide with the location of the debtor’s principal place of business or 
operations40.
However, if debtor has several places of administration, so it is unclear which of 
several places is debtors main centre of interest, than for legal persons COMI is 
presumed to be in the place of the registered office, unless otherwise is proved41. 
For individuals, an independent business or professional activity, COMI is pre-
sumed to be in individual’s principal place of business, unless otherwise proved42. 
In both mentioned cases, the presumption of COMI shall only apply if the reg-
istered office has not been moved to another Member State within the 3-month 
period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings43. This rule 
has been introduced in EU insolvency law by the Recast Insolvency Regulation, 
and it is aimed at preventing abusive forum shopping. 
EU rules of free movement allow individuals as well as to companies to move 
their central administration from one country to another. Companies in financial 
troubles or faced with the imminent probability of opening insolvency proceed-
ings tend to move corporate seat to another more favourable jurisdictions in order 
to prevent opening insolvency proceedings or in order to have more “friendly” 
insolvency regime.
The above rule does not affect the companies’ right to transfer corporate seat (reg-
istered office). Any kind of such restriction would be contrary to the right on free 
movement. However, it is expected that introducing a minimum period of the 
location of the COMI will discourage abusive COMI relocation.
Recast Insolvency Regulation introduces another important rule concerning the 
COMI concept. According to the new rule it is a duty of the court seized with a 
39  Article 3 (1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
40  Garcimartin, Francisco, The EU Insolvency Regulation: Rules on Jurisdiction, Available at: URL=http://
www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6333/Rules_on_jurisdiction.pdf. Accessed 16 February 2017.
41  Article 3 (1 ) par. 1. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
42  Article 3 (1) par. 2. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation; See more: Wessels, Bob, The Changing Land-
scape of Cross-border Insolvency Law in Europe, Juridica International, Vol. 12, 2007, p.120; Mucciarelli, 
op.cit. note 32., pp. 15- 17.
43  Article 3 (1) par. 2. and par. 3. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
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request for open insolvency proceeding to examine, ex officio and prior to opening 
insolvency proceeding, whether it has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceed-
ing44. It is also in obligation to specify the grounds on which the jurisdiction is 
based, meaning to support the presumption that the COMI is within the territory 
of this particular Member State.
Such decision may be challenged by debtor or any creditor before a court on 
grounds of international jurisdiction45.
However, once when COMI is properly determined and when insolvency pro-
ceeding is opened in one country it is not possible to open another “main“ in-
solvency proceeding over the same debtor in another country, nor can court of 
a certain Member State re-examine debtor’s insolvency when a main insolvency 
proceeding is opened in another Member State46. The Recast Insolvency Regula-
tion is based upon the principle that only singe “main insolvency proceedings” 
may be opened with regard to the same debtor47.
Notwithstanding to this general rule, it is however possible to open so called sec-
ondary or territorial proceeding. There is general consensus that secondary pro-
ceedings serve mainly two purposes: 1) they protect creditors, usually local credi-
tors, from the main proceedings, and 2) at the same time they assist and support 
the operation of the main insolvency proceedings48.
4.3.  Secondary insolvency proceedings versus main insolvency proceedings
Secondary proceeding is proceedings which can be opened in country in which 
debtor has an „establishment„ within the territory of that particular State. This 
would for example be the case when debtor’s COMI is in Germany and its estab-
lishment is in Italy. In this case, despite the fact that debtor’s COMI is in Germa-
ny, according to the Recast Regulation it is possible to open so called secondary or 
territorial insolvency proceeding in country of establishment. In this case, country 
of establishment is in Italy, thus secondary proceedings can be opened in Italy.
The general rule is that, if such proceeding is opened, the effects of the secondary 
proceedings shall be restricted to the debtor’s assets in that territory.
44  Article 4 (1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
45 Article 5 (1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
46 See: Mucciarelli, F., op.cit. note 32, p. 8
47 Garcimartin, F., op.cit. note 40, p.8
48 Wessels, B., op.cit. note 18, p. 13
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Recast Insolvency Regulation distinguishes between two kinds of secondary pro-
ceedings: 1) independent territorial proceeding49 and 2) secondary territorial pro-
ceeding.50
1)Independent territorial proceedings is independent of „the main proceeding“. It 
can be opened prior the main insolvency proceedings and if no main proceeding 
is opened.
It must be opened prior to opening of main insolvency proceeding where:
a) Main insolvency proceeding cannot be opened because of the conditions 
laid down by the law of Member States or 
b) the opening of territorial insolvency proceeding is requested by a creditor 
whose claim arises from or is in connection with the operation of an estab-
lishment situated within the territory of a Member State where the opening 
of territorial proceeding is requested, or
c) A public authority under which, under the law of the Member State 
within the territory of which the establishment is situated, has the right to 
request the opening of insolvency proceedings51.
If, and when, main proceedings are opened, the territorial insolvency proceedings 
shall become secondary insolvency proceedings.
2) Secondary territorial proceeding can be opened only after the main proceedings 
have been opened by the competent court52.
The opening of secondary proceedings may be requested by the insolvency prac-
titioner in the main insolvency proceedings and any other person or authority 
empowered to request the opening of insolvency proceedings under the law of the 
Member State within the territory of which the opening of secondary insolvency 
proceedings is requested53.
The law applicable to secondary insolvency proceedings shall be the law of the 
Member State within the territory of which the secondary insolvency proceedings 
are opened54.
49 Article 3(2) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
50 Article 3(3) and (4) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
51  Article 4(4) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
52  Article 3(3) and article 34 of the the Recast Insolvency Regulation
53 Article 37 (1)of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
54 Article 35 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
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Before opening secondary insolvency proceeding, a court seized of a request to 
open secondary proceedings must immediately notify insolvency practitioner in 
the main proceeding that it has seized a request and must give an opportunity to 
the practitioner to be heard on the request. 
Practitioner (liquidator) of the “main proceedings” are granted certain rights to 
prevent and avoid opening of secondary proceedings, because it is generally con-
sidered that opening of secondary proceedings can“ hamper the efficient adminis-
tration of the debtor’s estate“55.
So, in order to avoid the opening of secondary proceedings, the insolvency practi-
tioner in the main insolvency proceeding may commit to undertaking, that when 
distributing assets in main proceedings, he will comply with the distribution and 
priority rights under national law that creditors would have if secondary insol-
vency proceeding were opened in that Member State56.
If the insolvency practitioner does not comply with the obligations and require-
ments he or she shall be liable for damage to local creditors57.
4.4.   Creditor’s rights and obligations as regulated by the Recast Insolvency 
Regulation
Although protection of creditors is just one among several insolvency proceedings 
objectives, protection of creditors is fairly important insolvency law issue. Prob-
lem of creditor’s rights and their equal treatment, as one of basic insolvency law 
principle,58 arises particularly in connection to opening a secondary insolvency 
proceeding. Indeed, historically, the opening of secondary proceedings was often 
viewed as having a destabilizing effect on main proceedings or other rescue plans, 
at times hindering the administration of the main proceedings and leading to in-
creased costs with unnecessary duplicative work across borders59. 
Thus, question is, whether in such a case the interests of the creditors are secured 
in proper manner?
55  Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council amending Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM/2012/0744 final, p.2.
56 Article 36 and article 34 of the the Recast Insolvency Regulation
57 Article 36 (10) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
58  Equal treatment of creditors with similar rights is one of the main principles of modern insolvency 
laws.
59  Hastings, Paul, The New EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, June 2015, available at: URL=https://
www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=2011e669-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded. 
Accessed: 12 February 2017.
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The Recast Insolvency Regulation contains large number of norms which deal 
with the creditor’s rights in connection to secondary proceedings. Nevertheless, it 
also regulates other issues of direct interest to creditors such as rules on publicity, 
lodgement of creditors’ claims, implications of opening of the proceedings to in 
rem creditors, etc.
In following sections attention will be directed towards the most relevant issues 
relating to creditor’s as regulated by the Recast Insolvency Regulation. A special 
focus will be on: 1/Creditors rights in connection to secondary territorial proceed-
ings, 2/ Right in rem creditors, 3/Provisions of information’s for creditors and 
lodgement of their claims.
1/ Creditors rights in connection to secondary territorial proceedings
Right to request opening of insolvency proceedings falls in category of substantive 
issues regulated by the laws of Member States. When, debtor’s COMI is defined 
and jurisdiction is determined, insolvency proceedings will continue according 
to the law of that particular Member State. For example, if debtor’s COMI is in 
Italy, Italian law will be applicable law. In that sense, Recast Insolvency Regula-
tion regularly does not decide on the issues such as who has iusstandi in iudicio for 
opening insolvency proceeding or do creditors have right to appoint insolvency 
practitioner, when and how distributions of assets will take place, etc. Those issues 
are resolved by Member State insolvency law.
However, Recast Insolvency Regulation makes an exception in connection to sec-
ondary territorial proceedings. Right to request opening of the secondary territo-
rial proceedings is directly granted to creditors. According to the Article 3 (4) of 
the Recast Insolvency Regulation territorial secondary proceedings may only be 
opened when cumulatively two conditions are fulfilled: 1/ that secondary territo-
rial proceedings is opened prior to the opening of main insolvency proceedings 
and 2 /that the opening of such proceedings is requested by a creditor whose 
claim arises from or in connection with the operation of an establishment situated 
within the territory of the Member State where the opening of territorial proceed-
ings is requested. 
In that sense, it is important to emphasize that the secondary insolvency proceed-
ings will not be opened ex officio or as a result of direct application of Member 
States Law.
Creditors of secondary proceedings are those who must take action in order to 
initiate opening of secondary territorial proceeding. The intention to this rule is 
to empower creditors to demand opening of the insolvency proceeding in country 
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of debtor’s establishment because they expect that their chances to participate in 
distribution of debtors assets are much better within this proceedings, than within 
the main insolvency proceeding. 
2/ Right in rem creditors
Recast Insolvency Regulation dedicates whole article to the “third parties’ rights in 
rem. However, it fails to define what is a right in rem what may cause legal uncer-
tainty in connection to defining in rem creditors and their rights. Typically right 
in rem includes, but is not limited to pledge or mortgage. Broader guidance in 
relation to what will constitute a right in rem is given in Virgos-Schmit Report60. 
From this report it appears that: 
“a) a right in rem is not to be given an unreasonably wide interpretation. It should not 
include, for instance, rights simply reinforced by a right to claim preferential payment; 
(b) in particular, a right in rem may not only be established with respect to floating 
charge assets but also rights which are characterized under national law as rights in 
rem over intangible assets or over other rights; and 
(c) a right in rem basically has two characteristics: its direct and immediate relation-
ship with the asset to which it relates, which remains linked until the debt has been 
satisfied (without depending upon the asset belonging to a person’s estate, or on the re-
lationship between the holder of the right in rem and another person); and the absolute 
nature of the location of the right to the holder“. 61
The fundamental policy concerning right in rem, and in rem creditors adopted by 
the Recast insolvency regulation is that the third parties’ right in rem should be 
respected. The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem 
of creditors or third parties in respect of tangible or intangible, movable or im-
moveable assets62. Rights in rem have a very important function with regard to the 
60  Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, prepared by Virgos. M., Schmit, E., European 
Union Council, Brussels, 3 May 1996, 6500/96, p. 70.
61  Marshall, J., The Future of the European Insolvency regulation, Article 5 (rights in rem), available at: 
URL=http://www.eir-reform.eu/uploads/PDF/Jennifer_Marshall.pdf. Accessed 28 February 2017.; 
See also: Wessels, Bob, Rights in rem of third parties under the EU Insolvency Regulation, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, New york, June 2006., 
  Available at: URL=https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/1_Wessels_Rightsinrem.PDF. 
Accessed 9 January 2017.
62  Article 8 ( 1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
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granting of credit and obtaining capital investment63. They protect their holders 
against the risk of insolvency and the interference of third parties64. 
In line with this philosophy, Recast Insolvency Regulation grants number of rights 
toin rem creditors, in particular, in rem creditors are entitled a) to dispose of assets 
or income from those assets, in particularly by virtue of a lien or mortgage, b) to 
demand assets or restitution from anyone having possession or use of them con-
trary to the wishes of the in rem creditors, and c) to use assets65. 
The protection given by Article 8 of the Recast Insolvency regulation applies where 
the secured assets is situated within the territory of a Member State other than the 
one in which insolvency proceedings are commenced.
3/ Provisions of information for creditors and lodgement of their claims
The Recast Insolvency Regulation introduces several practical novelties aimed at 
increasing clarity and simplifying procedure concerning lodgement of claims. Two 
major innovations refer to: a) the standardized procedure to file and lodge claims, 
and b) the reinforcement of the publicity of information relating to insolvency 
proceedings.
These novelties are the most welcomed since in cross border insolvency proceed-
ings creditors come from different Member States, so the problem may arise in 
connection to language of the claim, timely distribution of information, unequal 
treatment of same type of creditors etc. In complex insolvency cases it may not be 
clear where to file a claim, how to file a claim, who is entitled to file a claim etc. 
Concerning a right to lodge a claim, the Recast Insolvency Regulation prescribes 
that any foreign creditor may lodge claims in insolvency proceedings by any means 
of communication, which are prescribed by the law of the State of the opening 
of proceedings66. A foreign creditor may lodge its claim using the standard claim 
forms67, and the claim can be lodged in any EU official language. This means that 
63  Wessels, Bob, op.cit. note 18, p. 19.
64  Ibid.
65  Article 8 (2) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
66  Article 53. of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
67  This standard claim form is created by the Commission, and it includes, certain specific information 
(including, inter alia, the debtor’s name, contact details, bank details, the amount of the claim, and 
possible interest claimed) and will specify the interest rate the period of calculation and the capitalized 
amount of interest.  When a cross-border insolvency procedure is opened under the Regulation, all 
the creditors have to provide the same essential information to the insolvency practitioner in order to 
get a clear view of the liabilities of the debtor. It also enables creditors to provide all the information 
necessary to protect their rights.  
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the claim can be written in mother tongue of creditor. Claim must be accompa-
nied by copies of any supporting documents. Where the court, the insolvency 
practitioner or the debtor in possession has doubts in relations to a claim, it shall 
give the creditor opportunity to provide additional evidence on the existence and 
the amount of claim68.
Concerning the deadline for lodging the claim, Recast Insolvency Regulation pre-
scribes that it should be lodged within the period stipulated by the law of the State 
of the opening of proceedings69. In case of foreign creditor, the Recast Insolvency 
regulation prescribes that for a foreign creditors, that period shall not be less than 
30 days following the publication of the opening of insolvency proceedings in the 
insolvency register of the State of the opening of proceedings.
Publication of opening of insolvency proceedings is standard practice in all Mem-
ber States. But the question is how this information shall reach foreign creditors. 
For example, if insolvency proceedings is opened in Germany, how will foreign 
creditors find out about that?
The issue is dealt in the Recast Insolvency Regulation if following way. It is stated 
that: “As soon as insolvency proceedings are opened in a Member State, the court of 
that State or insolvency practitioner appointed by the court shall immediately inform 
the known creditors”.70They shall do so by using “standard notice form”.71
Two thing seems problematic in connection to above rule. First, what happens 
with other, “unknown” creditors? How will they learn about opening of insolven-
cy proceedings? Second, it is hard to imagine that insolvency practitioner or the 
court will have any idea at all who may be a foreign creditor. The only creditor that 
they can be aware of is creditor who initiated opening of insolvency proceedings. 
The Recast Insolvency Regulation contains another, more general rule that deals 
with this particular issue. Article 28 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation empow-
ers the insolvency practitioner or the debtor in possession to request that the no-
tice of the judgement opening insolvency proceedings is published in any other 
Member State where an establishment of the debtor is located. This seems as quite 
reasonable solution for the above problem.
  Standard form is avaialble at: URL=ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/.../bankruptcy_ec_en_form2.doc
68  Article 55 (7) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
69  Article 55 (6) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation
70  Article 54 (1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
71  Article 54 (3) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
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For the conclusion, it should be noted that in a case where one main proceedings 
is opened and one or several secondary territorial proceedings are opened, credi-
tors can file their claims to any of those proceedings. Potential risk in connection 
to that lays in fact that they may simultaneously file claim in several states. To 
prevent fraudulent behaviour of such creditors, the Recast Insolvency Regulation 
in its text included set of norms dealing with cooperation between insolvency 
practitioners, communication between courts.
4.5.   Other points to note: cooperation between insolvency practitioners, 
communication between courts
Where several insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor are running 
(on main insolvency proceedings and one or more secondary proceedings), the 
Recast Insolvency Regulation provides for duties for different insolvency practitio-
ners and courts involved to cooperate and communicate in various ways. 
In particular, Recast Insolvency Regulation imposes obligation to cooperate to 
insolvency practitioners of main and secondary proceedings, unless such coopera-
tion is not incompatible with the rules applicable to the respective proceedings.72 
Such cooperation may take any form, including to conclusion of agreements or 
protocols.73
Recast Insolvency Regulation provides details concerning forms of cooperation. It 
says that insolvency practitioners should communicate to each other any informa-
tion which may be relevant to the proceedings, in particular any progress made in 
lodging and verifying claims, information aimed at rescuing or restructuring the 
debtor, information regarding terminating proceedings etc.74 Furthermore, they 
should also communicate in order to coordinate the administration of the realiza-
tion or use of debtor’s assets and affairs etc.75
Recast Insolvency Regulation imposes cooperation to the courts too. Judges of 
the main and secondary proceedings should coordinate in the appointment of the 
insolvency practitioners, they should coordinate administration and supervision 
of the debtor’s assets and affairs, coordinate on hearings etc.76
72  Article 41(1) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
73 Ibid.
74 Article 41(2) (a) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
75 Article 41(2) (b) of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
76 Article 42 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
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Such communication could be useful, for example, in order to ensure that the 
judge in the main proceedings is informed of relevant developments in the sec-
ondary proceedings before deciding on further actions. 
And finally, Recast Insolvency Regulation also prescribes compulsory cooperation 
and communication between insolvency practitioners of main and secondary pro-
ceedings with the courts of main and secondary insolvency proceedings.77
In order to increase transparency of cross- border insolvency proceedings, improve 
access to information for the relevant creditors, courts and practitioners and to 
prevent the opening of parallel insolvency proceedings the Recast Insolvency Reg-
ulation introduces a two new instruments- Interconnected Insolvency Registers 
systems and a central European database. 
Interconnected Insolvency register systems shall be composed of the insolvency 
registers of the Member States and the EU e-justice Portal. The system shall pro-
vide a search in all the official languages of the Member States. Introduction of 
those registers will simplify research on cross- border insolvency proceedings and 
will ensure that certain standard set of essential information are published in all 
Member States. All Member States are in obligation to establish those registers 
latest by 26 June 201978.
4.6.   Recognition of Insolvency Proceedings  
Last issue that is going to be addressed in the paper is the issue of recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings and effects of such recognition. The general prin-
ciple adopted by the Recast Insolvency Regulation is that any judgement opening 
insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State shall be rec-
ognized in all other Member States from the time it becomes effective in the state 
where proceedings are opened (so called automatic recognition)79. Automatic rec-
ognition should therefore mean that the effects attributed to the insolvency pro-
ceedings by the law of the State in which the proceedings were opened extend to 
all other Member States80.Recognition requires no preliminary decision or other 
77 Article 43 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
78  Rules on establishing „Insolvency Registar“ (Art. 24 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation) become 
effective as of 26 June 2018, and rules on creation of Interconnection of Insolvency Registers (Art. 25 
of the Recast Insolvency Regulation) become effective as of June 26 2019.
79 Article 19 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
80 Wessels, Bob, op.cit. note 18, p. 25.
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formality by a court to all Member States81. The effects of the proceedings may not 
be challenged in other Member State82. 
However, a Member State may refuse to recognize foreign judgement on the open-
ing of insolvency proceedings where the effects of such recognition would be man-
ifestly contrary to public policy, fundamental constitutional principles or rights 
and liberties of individuals83. 
Once main insolvency proceedings have been opened in one Member State and 
automatically recognized in other Member States, the question arises in connec-
tion to the effects of such recognition. The general principle is that the judgement 
opening proceedings produces its effects with equal force in all Member States. 
This means that in any Member State the same effect are produced as under the 
law of the State of the opening of proceedings.84
The main effect of the recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in a Member 
State is the recognition of the appointment of the liquidator and his powers in all 
other Member states in connection to allocation, distribution of debtor’s assets. 
Another effect of the recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in a Member 
State is inclusion of the debtor’s assets in the estate regardless of the state in which 
they are situated. Furthermore, whole set of creditors rights are directly linked to 
the moment of recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in a Member State, 
such as lodging claim, obligation to return what has been obtained by individual 
creditors in secondary proceeding, after opening main insolvency proceedings etc. 
The law also ensures that decisions closely linked to insolvency proceedings - such 
as actions to set aside detrimental acts (i.e. acts that are harmful to the creditors) - 
are recognised in the other country.
5.   CONCLUSION- IS RECAST INSOLVENCy REGULATION A 
STEP fORWARD TOWARDS UNIfORM EU INSOLVENCy LAW 
OR JUST THE STATuS Quo?
Recast Insolvency Regulation has not yet entered into force. However, its an-
nouncement and its adoption, almost 2 years ago, in year 2015, prompted many 
81 Ibid.
82  The fact that insolvency proceedings have been opened in a Member State, and therefore, recog-
nized throughout the EU, doesn’t preclude the opening of secondary territorial proceedings in another 
Member State. One or several secondary territorial proceeding may be opened in country of debtor’s 
establishment.
83 Article 33 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation.
84  Wessels, Bob, op.cit. note18, pp. 25.
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discussions about the course or direction of a future of EU insolvency law. Opin-
ions on that are quite different. While some consider that more intensive harmo-
nization, in particularly of substantive insolvency law on EU level is not possible 
or feasible due to significant differences in substantive insolvency law of EU Mem-
ber States, the other argue that after years of struggling with “soft” coordination 
of insolvency proceedings it is time to accelerate the process of convergence of 
insolvency law on EU level or even, “for the sake” of the internal market, to adopt 
uniform EU insolvency law85.
So, the question is, which of those conflicted approaches Commission adopted in 
the Recast Insolvency Regulation?
A closer look reveals that the Recast Insolvency Regulation provides a sensible 
revision of the 2000 Insolvency Regulation. The overall impression is that the Re-
cast Insolvency Regulation does not drastically alter the concept adopted by 2002 
Insolvency Regulation.
However, it introduces number of novelties, most of them already mentioned in 
the paper. Some of the most prominent Recast Insolvency Regulations innova-
tions are:
   Redefinition and clarifications of debtor’s COMI
   The definition of main proceedings has been broadened to include pre-
insolvency  rescue proceedings
   Recast Insolvency Regulation introduced several  new mechanisms in order 
to prevent and/or minimise the need to open secondary proceedings
   It introduces rules which enable that cross-border claims are dealt with in a 
more centralized manner
   Under the new regime, any creditor may challenge the decision to open 
main proceedings on jurisdictional grounds
   Recast Insolvency Regulation also provides for various additional amend-
ments in connection to setting up interconnected insolvency registers, it 
prescribes a standardised EU wide claim form, etc.
85  See more: Mucciarelli, Federico, Optimal allocation of law –making power over bankruptcy law in „fed-
eral“ and „quasi-federal“ systems:is there a case for harmonizing or unifying bakruptcy law in the E.U?, 
Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No11-28, New york University School of 
Law, September 2011.;Wessels, Bob, The Changing Landscape of Cross-border Insolvency Law in Europe, 
Juridica International, No.12, 2007, pp. 116-124.; Kilborn, Jason J., The Personal Side of Harmonizing 
European Insolvency Law (August 1, 2016). URL=https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816618 or URL=http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2816618. Accessed 12 March 2017.
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From above it is obvious that the Recast Insolvency regulation does not provide 
for only „cosmetic” innovations. Proposed innovations will result with increased 
efficiency and effectiveness of EU cross-border insolvency proceedings. However, 
at the moment, and based on approach taken by the Commission in the Recast 
Insolvency Regulation, it seems that unification of EU insolvency Law is still not 
on Commission’s agenda. 
But, enactment of the new Recast Insolvency Regulation is not the end of Com-
mission work in area of cross-border insolvency proceedings. Undoubtedly, Euro-
pean legislatures in field of cross-border insolvency proceedings on EU level will 
continue.
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ABSTRACT
The tendency towards a harmonisation of procedural law in the European Union is increas-
ingly stronger and gaining importance. It is achieved by reaching a consensus in overcoming 
differences between legal systems. The European Union is at present an alliance of 28 sovereign 
states aimed at establishing an area of freedom, security and justice. Moreover, that the Euro-
pean Union is a creation in statu nascendi is clearly visible in the current situation and the 
development trends of legal harmonisation in the field of international consumer insolvency 
law. Consumers are frequently travelling, buying abroad and entering into contracts with 
foreign credit institutions. As they move from one country to another and are employed in 
countries other than the one in which they reside, insolvency and debt relief at the cross-border/
international level is becoming more widespread, and more effective regulation is a necessity. 
The aim of this paper is to point out potential problems in the regulation of consumer bank-
ruptcy with a cross-border element that may occur in the case-law of the Croatian courts. In 
the analysis of the institute of consumer bankruptcy with a cross-border element through the 
solutions of the Regulation 1346/2000 and Regulation 2015/848 (recast) we used a meth-
odological procedure which involves the study of domestic and foreign literature, relevant legal 
provisions, as well as an analysis of domestic and foreign legal practices.
We consider it important to note that the framework of this paper does not allow a detailed 
analysis and that we are forced to limit ourselves exclusively to some aspects of the issue at hand.
Keywords: consumer bankruptcy, cross-border element, forum shopping, American experience.
1.  INTRODUCTION
International insolvency law found its place and has been gaining importance in the 
legal system of the EU in the past few decades.1Efforts to create a legal document 
that would regulate the issue of international insolvency law began in the 1960s in 
*  Ovaj je rad nastao uz potporu Hrvatske zaklade za znanost u okviru projekta 6558 Business and Per-
sonal Insolvency &#8211; the Ways to Overcome Excessive Indebtednes. 
1  Wessels, B., International Insolvency Law, Kluwer, Deventer, 2006, p. 355.
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the European Economic Community and, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the 
doctrine and case law, today we can say that the basic principles and rules are codi-
fied, which gives the parties of the insolvency proceedings with international element 
equal treatment and the possibility of realisation of their claims within the Union.2
From the perspective of Croatia, as one of the Member States, (consumer) in-
solvency law with an international element shares the same fate of the overall 
development of EU laws, while, at the same time, it reflects certain specific devel-
opmental characteristics. Therefore, bearing in mind the complexity of problems 
in this paper, we consider it important to analyse the genesis of the issue from the 
perspective of Croatian legislators.3
2.   OLD bANKRUPTCy ACT AND THE PROVISIONS fOR 
INTERNATIONAL bANKRUPTCy
Although the need for expansion of passive bankruptcy ability on natural persons 
was recognised long ago, and the causes which pointed out this need did not come 
suddenly and unexpectedly, the whole process of implementation of consumer 
bankruptcy in the legal order of the Republic of Croatia from the institutional 
aspect was moving very slowly.4 The adoption of the Bankruptcy Act in 19975 rep-
resented a radical change in how the bankruptcy proceedings were conducted. In 
all subsequent novels,6 in varying degrees of success, the legislator tried to achieve 
functionalisation of bankruptcy law protection.7 Although the issue of the bank-
ruptcy law was not terra incognita in recent domestic legal history,8it should be 
noted that the rules of international bankruptcy are some of the youngest ones 
in the Croatian legal system, as they were introduced on January 1st, 1997. These 
provisions of international bankruptcy represented a modern and comprehensive 
2  More details in Virgos, M., Garcimartin, F., The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Prac-
tice, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 7-8. and Garašić, J., Europska uredba o insolvencijskim 
postupcima, Proceedings of the Faculty of Law in Rijeka, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2005, p. 260 et seq.
3  The subject matter was originally analysed in the paper, Bodul, D., Vuković. A., Prilog raspravi o 
uvođenju potrošačkog stečaja: neka pitanja potrošačkog stečaja s međunarodnim / prekograničnim elemen-
tom, Hrvatska pravna revija, no. 7/8, 2013, pp. 61-68.
4  Bodul, D., et al., Kratka povijest potrošačkog stečaja ili još jedna nenaučena lekcija iz povijesti, XI. Majsko 
savjetovanje, usluge i zaštita korisnika, Kragujevac, 2015, pp. 1067-1087.
5  Official Gazette, No. 44/96.
6  Bankruptcy Act, Official Gazette, No. 44/96, 29/99, 129/00, 123/03, 82/06, 116/10,25/12, 133/12 
and 45/13 – hereinafter: old BA.
7  Bodul, D. et al., Stečajno zakonodavstvo u tranziciji: komparativni osvrt, hrvatski izazovi i potencijalna 
rješenja, Proceedings of the Faculty of Law in Split, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2012, pp. 633-661.
8  Bodul, D. et al.,Pravno povijesni i poredbeno pravni prikaz razvoja stečajnog postupka, Proceedings of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Rijeka, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2013, pp. 911-941.
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regulation of this legal matter. In regulating this demanding area, the legislator 
demonstrated an enviable systematic approach, placing the complex provisions 
of the bankruptcy proceedings with elements of internationality in Title X of the 
old BA, and divided them into seven sections. However, we have to be aware, 
as the doctrine points out, that the term “international bankruptcy” covers a 
much broader area than exclusively bankruptcy proceedings with international 
elements.9 Therefore, Croatian legislation is one of the first that comprehensively 
and independently regulated the bankruptcy proceedings with an international 
element. In addition, one of the most important “novelties” from the reform of 
the bankruptcy law in 1997, compared to the earlier arrangement of the bank-
ruptcy matter,10 was the introduction of the institute bankruptcy proceedings on 
the assets of an individual debtor (sole trader and craftsman). It is difficult to say 
why the category of a consumer as a possible subject of bankruptcy was omitted 
from the old BA. However, the provisions relating to bankruptcy proceedings on 
the property of the individual and the provisions of international bankruptcy are 
some of the few provisions which were not significantly changed in all the novels 
of the old and even new BA.11 This can be explained by the fact that these models 
of bankruptcies were rare and most of the provisions remained unpractised. Exem-
pli causa, according to the legal opinion of the High Commercial Court of the Re-
public of Croatia, in the case of bankruptcy on the assets of a natural person who 
is not a sole trader or a craftsman, creditors who initiate bankruptcy can realise 
their legal rights by other legal means, but not through proposal for recognition 
of a foreign decision for opening bankruptcy proceeding with the legal effect of 
the opening of bankruptcy proceedings in the Republic of Croatia. Such foreign 
decision does not have all the prerequisites for recognition, because its recognition 
is contrary to the Croatian ordre public (Art. 311, par. 3 in conjunction with Art. 
3, par. 1 of the old BA).12 Thus, the application of the old BA in relation to bank-
ruptcy proceedings with an international element on the property of natural per-
9  Hrastinski Jurčec, L., Međunarodni stečaj u hrvatskom pravnom sustavu, Legislation and Practice - col-
lection of reports presented at the Regional conference on insolvency, German Organisation for Tech-
nical Cooperation (GTZ) GmbH Open Regional Fund for South East Europe – Legal Reform, Banja 
Luka, 2008, p. 175 et seq.
10  We are referring to the Law on Forced Settlement, Bankruptcy and Liquidation, Official Gazette, No. 
53/91 and 54/94.
11  Bankruptcy Act, Official Gazette, 71/15 – hereinafter: BA.
12  Decision of the High Commercial Court - 7770/07. Available on the website of the High Commercial 
Court: http://www.vtsrh.hr/index.php?page=conference&conf_id=2200&article_id=2211&lang=hr 
(12/11/2016). There are conflicting views, claiming that it is “... the magic word that lawyers (civilians 
and publicists, legislators and judges, practitioners and theorists) use when they cannot find a legal 
basis ...”. Perović, S., Sloboda uređivanja obveznih odnosa i javni poredak, Proceedings of the Faculty of 
Law in Zagreb, Special Edition, Zagreb, 2006, p. 404.
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son - consumer – has not determined the appropriate legal standards and certain 
interpretations related to the issue of consumer bankruptcy with international/
cross-border element will yet have to be established.
3.   MEMbERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
ObLIGATIONS Of IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 1346/2000.
During a long period of time, the international effects of consumer bankruptcy 
law were regulated as part of international private and procedural law. By entering 
the EU and accepting the body of law and practice of the EU (the so-called acquis 
communautaire), the legal complexity of consumer bankruptcy with cross-border / 
international element imposed reasonable caution in the application of that insti-
tute. Namely, based on the principle of universality, according to which the legal 
effects of the bankruptcy proceedings should be recognised outside the country of 
its opening in the area of the European Union, the Council Regulation (EC) no. 
1346/2000 of 29th of May 2000 on insolvency proceedings was adopted by the 
Member States, with the exception of Denmark, and it entered into force on May 
31st, 2002.13 The Regulation’s rules on conflict of law replaced the rules of private 
international law in the field of bankruptcy law. It is not explicitly stated in its 
text, but only in the recital that aims to facilitate understanding and application of 
the text of the Regulation.14 Two annexes (A and B) to the Regulation determine 
the national proceedings covered by the Regulation 1346/2000. The third Annex 
(C) determines the persons or bodies that act as liquidators. These Annexes form 
an integral part of the Regulation 1346/2000 and have been revised a few times.
In principle, for the purpose of this study, consumer bankruptcy with internation-
al element implies the bankruptcy process that is opened on the basis of primary 
jurisdiction - the centre of the debtor’s main interests, for example, the residence 
of the debtor15 and as such has a tendency to encompass the entire property of 
the debtor, both domestic and international. Only one main bankruptcy pro-
ceeding should be possible against the debtor.16 Although there is no unique and 
13  Council Regulation of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (No 1346/2000/EC), [2000] OJ L 
160, pp. 1-13) - hereinafter: Regulation 1346/2000. 
14  Radović, V., Osnovno koliziono pravilo u međunarodnom stečajnom pravu (lex foricon cursus) sa posebnim 
osvrtom na Uredbu o stečajnim postupcima, Harmonius - Journal of Legal and Social Studies in South 
East Europe, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 240.
15  In the Virgos-Schmit report, it is stated that in these constellations the COMI is the place of a natural 
person’s habitual residence. Virgos, M., Schmit, E., Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 
Annex 2 to G. Moss, I. F. Fletcher and S. Isaacs (editors), in: The EC Regulation on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings: A Commentary and Annotated Guide (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), par. 75.
16  Legislators should take into account that there are already some unpleasant examples of court cases 
involving individuals in cross-border insolvency proceedings - in particular, the Stojevic case (Case No. 
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unambiguous definition of the centre of the debtor’s main interests,17 the law ap-
plicable for opening, conducting and concluding bankruptcy proceedings is that 
of a Member State on the territory of which such proceedings were initiated (“the 
State in which the proceedings were initiated” or Lex fori concursus).18 The term 
special bankruptcy proceeding involves the bankruptcy process that is open on 
the basis of some subsidiary jurisdiction, for example, the debtor’s assets, and as 
such encompasses only the debtor’s assets in the state of opening of these proceed-
ings. Thus, the doctrine distinguishes two types of special procedures: particular 
and secondary proceedings. The term particular bankruptcy proceedings involves 
the special bankruptcy proceeding which does not presuppose the opening and 
recognition of a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding and which is completely in-
dependent of that proceedings. Particular bankruptcy proceedings can be opened 
both before and after the opening of a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding, if the 
latter is not domestically recognised. The term secondary bankruptcy proceedings 
involves special bankruptcy proceedings which presupposes opening and the rec-
ognition of a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding and is in this sense dependent 
on it. However, the rule is that it is subordinate to the main bankruptcy proceed-
ings on the basis of the rules on co-operation and coordination between these two 
procedures. Secondary bankruptcy proceedings can be opened only after the rec-
ognition of a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding.19 The doctrine indicates that a 
number of very different terms are used for these types of procedures in literature 
and in various regulatory instruments of international bankruptcy / insolvency.20
9849 of 2002, High Court of Justice in Bankruptcy, London, 20 December 2006). In this case, Mr. 
Stojevic, a Croatian national of Russian descent, was declared bankrupt in two courts in succession, 
on 27 March 2003 in England and on 28 January 2004 in Austria, both proceedings being the main 
insolvency proceedings. The annulment of the Austrian Bankruptcy Order removed the conflict of 
jurisdiction between the two European countries, England and Austria, but in this case, the centre 
of the debtor’s main interests within the meaning of the European Insolvency Regulation, when the 
bankruptcy petition was filed, was actually in Austria and not in England. It took four years to resolve 
this matter legally, and the situation resulted in the annulment of the English Bankruptcy Order dated 
27 March 2003 under Section 282 (1) (a) of the 1986 Act. The downside of this action meant that Mr. 
Stojevic, who had huge debts both in Austria and in England, and no assets in either country, escaped 
bankruptcy altogether. Viimsalu, S., The Over-Indebtedness Regulatory System in the Light of the Chang-
ing Economic Landscape, Juridica International, No. XVII, 2010, p. 225.
17  Fletcher, F. I., Choice of Law Rules - The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and 
Annotated Guide, (eds. G. Moss, I. F. Fletcher, S. Isaacs), Oxford University Press, New york, 2009, p. 
57.
18  Art. 4. Regulation 1346/2000.
19  Garašić, J. op. cit. note 2., p. 260 et seq. Id., Posebni tzv. partikularni stečajni postupak u hrvatskom 
pravu, Proceedings of the Faculty of Law of the University in Rijeka, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2012, p. 87 et seq.
20  Ibid., p. 87 et seq.
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3.1. The application of Regulation 1346/2000 ratione territori
The Regulation applies only to proceedings in which the Centre of main interests 
(COMI) („Le centre des interest principaux“, „Als Mittelpunkt der hauptsächlichen 
Interessen“), is situated on the territory of one of the Member States. A common-
ality of all solutions is that they are based on the principle of opening the main 
insolvency proceedings with the effects in the Member State in which the centre 
of business interests of the debtor is located, with the possibility of opening spe-
cial procedures, of local character, in other EU Member States where the debtor 
has assets or establishment. Therefore, the fundamental principle of the Regula-
tion is that insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State are automatically 
recognised in other Member States. However, this does not preclude the court of 
another Member State to initiate special insolvency proceedings against the same 
debtor if the conditions are fulfilled.21 In the event that the centre of interest is 
located outside the EU, the Regulation has no effect of direct application and each 
Member State may apply its own rules of private international law or international 
bankruptcy law. However, when in some cases there are no bilateral or other agree-
ments, the provisions of the Regulation can serve as a guide.22
21  Par. 16, Regulation 1346/2000.
22  In this regard, an interesting case is Lavie v. Ran (406 B.R. 277 (S. D. Tex. 2009), aff ’d sub nom. Lavie 
v. Ran (In re Ran) 607 F.3d 1017, 5th Cir. 2010) where the American court decided that the mere 
presumption in Section 15 of the Bankruptcy Code is not sufficient to determine the centre of the 
main interests of the debtor. In the previously mentioned case, insolvency administrator requested the 
recognition of the bankruptcy proceedings in Israel as the main insolvency proceeding. The debtor was 
an individual, a consumer, who had lived in the United States for ten years and was in the process of 
obtaining U.S. citizenship. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the decision of the Bankruptcy Court 
and agreed that the centre of main interests of the debtor is not Israel, but the place of his residence, 
in this specific case, the city of Houston. The decision of the lower court indicated that the “... stat-
utes, cases, and interpretative materials of the European Union are also instructive. Hence, the court 
should consult the European Union’s Convention on Insolvency Proceedings…. and the Report on 
the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings…” (Virgos-Schmit Report) “Bankruptcy court extensively 
analysed the COMI issue through an exhaustive comparison of COMI or COMI-equivalent case law 
in the EU, United States, and Israel” (Lavie, 406 B.R. p. 285). This Bankruptcy Court analysis found 
that the conditions set for the centre of main interests in each country are very similar (Lavie, 406 B.R. 
p. 285), and all have presumption that the centre of the main interests of the debtor is his residence 
(Lavie, 406 B.R. p. 285). The Israeli court has taken into account the following factors: a) the owner-
ship of property abroad or lack of assets in Israel, b) possession of a U.S. passport and residence permit 
in the United States; c) a license for employment in the United States and d) the fact that the family 
lives abroad. This may indicate the presence or absence of strong ties with Israel. The High Court has 
welcomed the use of foreign legal sources of the lower court and found that such detailed analysis is 
uncontested and does not require any further explanation from the Higher Court (Lavie, 406 B. R. p. 
285, 288). This case is interesting, because the American court applied foreign law in deciding the case 
of consumer bankruptcy with international element. It also points to the flexibility in determining the 
centre of main interests, taking into account the experience of other countries. What distinguishes the 
U.S. bankruptcy courts is the ability and the commitment that in the bankruptcy proceedings under 
Article 15 “…the court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application 
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3.2. The application of Regulation 1346/2000 ratione materiae
The scope of application of Regulation 1346/2000 is also limited to certain mod-
els of bankruptcy proceedings. The Regulation is generally applicable to all col-
lective insolvency proceedings which can result in a partial or complete sale of the 
debtor’s assets and the appointment of a trustee.23 The doctrine suggests that the 
Regulation applies to all debtors, regardless of whether they are a natural or legal 
person.24 Exceptions are insolvency proceedings concerning insurance companies, 
credit institutions, investment firms that provide services which include access 
to money or securities of third parties and companies for joint ventures.25 In the 
recital of the Regulation 1346/2000 it is stated that such companies are subject 
to special rules and that national supervisory authorities have broader powers to 
act.26
3.3. The application of Regulation 1346/2000 ratione personae
Although the Draft of the Regulation 1346/2000 was made with the rules of cor-
porate bankruptcy in mind, Regulation 1346/2000 will, in principle, apply to all 
insolvency proceedings, whether the debtor is a natural or legal person, a trader 
or a private individual.27 The question of who can be a debtor in insolvency pro-
ceedings is governed by national law.28 It has to be stated that the legislations of 
EU countries vary significantly in approaches in regulating this matter, given the 
fact that they belong to different legal systems. In order to offer some insight into 
the complexity of the matter at hand, it suffices to say that Regulation 1346/2000 
tried to harmonise the rules of 54 different models of bankruptcy proceedings and 
that there is a big difference in the scope and the application of the Regulation.29 
Depending on the perspective of the central issues posed in consumer bankruptcy, 
legislations are largely different. Thus, the doctrine speaks of the liberal system, 
of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdic-
tions” (par. 1508. 11 U.S.C.). Using the term “shall”, according to American legal theory, the court 
must consider foreign legal sources (a bankruptcy judge does not ‘choose’ to consider foreign law; the 
statute requires it…). See Ragan, A. C., Comment - COMI Strikes a Discordant Note: Why U. S. Courts 
Are Not in Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Jour-
nal, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2010, p. 117, 142, and 159.
23  Par. 1, par. 1, Regulation 1346/2000.
24  Garašić, J., op. cit. note 2 ,p. 261.
25  Art. 1, par. 2, Regulation 1346/2000.
26  Recital 9, Regulation 1346/2000.
27  Recital 9 and Art. 1, Art. 2, par. 1, p. 1, Regulation 1346/2000.
28  Art. 4, par. 2(a), Regulation 1346/2000.
29  Baltić, M., Načela evropskog stečajnog prava sa posebnim osvrtom na evropsku regulativu o stečajnim pos-
tupcima, Revija za evropsko pravo, Vol. 5, No. 1-3, 2003, pp. 43-63.
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which lays down a small number of the necessary preconditions for access to con-
sumer bankruptcy, which, of course, results in a large number of bankruptcies 
(exempli causa, the French model of forgiveness of debt), and conservative conti-
nental systems which are burdened with a large number of conditions implying a 
small number of initiated bankruptcies (exempli causa, the German model of con-
sumer insolvency). While Member States have different insolvency procedures for 
different debtors, Regulation 1346/2000 applies to procedures set forth in Annex 
A of the Regulation.30 Each Member State has informed the competent authority 
in the EU about the procedures included in Annex A. The States have taken dif-
ferent views on the application of Regulation 1346/2000 on existing insolvency 
procedures for consumers.
The first group of countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, have decided that the 
Regulation 1346/2000 should be applied to their consumer bankruptcy proce-
dures, which are listed in Annex A. (Annex A: insolvency procedures under Art. 
2, p. (A): BELGIЁ - BELGIQUE (Het faillissement / La faillite; Het gerechtelijkak-
koord / Le concordstr. judiciairei De collectieveschuldenregeling / Le règlementcollectif 
de dettes); NEDERLAND (Het faillissement; De surséance van betalingi De schuld-
saneringsregelingnatuurlijkepersonen).
In the second group, consisting of Germany and Austria, consumer bankruptcy 
procedures are not explicitly mentioned in Annex A, but since they are part of 
insolvency regulation mentioned in Annex A, they fall within the scope of Regula-
tion 1346/2000.
In the third group of countries, which includes France, Finland, Luxembourg 
and Sweden, consumer bankruptcy procedures are not mentioned in Annex A. 
However, since these procedures are regulated by special laws (for example, in 
France, discharge of consumers’ debt is regulated by the Consumer Protection Act 
(French Code de la Consommation) and are not subject to the procedures specified 
in Annex A, there were initially some doubts about the application of Regulation 
1346/2000. Nevertheless, for instance, France has already added the safeguard 
proceeding to the Annex A. It could also add excessive debt proceedings for con-
sumers (“procédures de surendettement”) insofar as such proceedings, considered by 
the Cour de cassation as real collective proceedings, have similar effects.31
30  Art. 2, par. 1, p. a.
31  Vallens, J.-L., Reform of the European insolvency regulation on cross-border insolvency proceedings: A 
French point of view, Revue des procédures collectives, May-June, 2010, p. 25 et seq.
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4.   IMPLEMENTATION Of THE CONSUMER bANKRUPTCy ACT 
AND ADOPTION Of REGULATION 2015/848
Bankruptcy proceedings on an individual’s property as regulated in the old BA 
was the first step towards the possibility of conducting bankruptcy proceedings 
on the assets of all individuals and the introduction of consumer bankruptcy. 
The breakthrough was made on January 1st, 2016 when the Croatian legislator 
implemented the institute of consumer bankruptcy.32 We can conclude that the 
legislator recognised, relatively late, the need to introduce the bankruptcy on the 
assets of all individuals, especially if one takes into account the fact that the con-
sumer bankruptcy was first introduced in the European legal circle in Denmark 
(“Gældssaneringslov”) in 198433 and that Italy is the last remaining Member State 
that failed to implement the institute of consumer bankruptcy.34
The rules related to the bankruptcy of consumers are primarily defined by the 
provisions of the CBA. Nomotechnically speaking, CBA is divided into two parts. 
The first part is divided into two sections which contain the basic provisions and 
regulation of non-judicial proceedings.35 This part of the procedure consists in an 
attempt of a consumer to reach extrajudicial agreement on fulfilment of obliga-
tions with creditors. Only a failed attempt to reach an out-of-court agreement 
on the regulation of debt is a precondition for initiating court bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.36 The second part of CBA is divided into eight sections which include 
basic procedural provisions in court proceedings, regulation of the authorities of 
bankruptcy proceedings, regulation of the initiation of proceedings and prelimi-
nary hearing, the opening of consumer bankruptcy proceedings and legal conse-
quences of opening, bankruptcy mass and consumer protection, the conclusion of 
bankruptcy proceedings, the period of good conduct, the relief of the remaining 
debts and final provisions.37 Thus, in the judicial bankruptcy proceedings, there is 
another possibility of reaching an agreement on the regulation of the debt, with 
the possibility of imposing solutions by the court through the so-called “rules 
against obstruction”.38 If, during the second stage of the proceedings, the creditors 
32  Consumer Bankruptcy Act, Official Gazette 100/15 – hereinafter: CBA.
33  See, Kilborn, J. J., Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in Continental Europe: Internalizing Neg-
ative Externalities and Humanizing Justice in Denmark, International Insolvency Review, vol. 18, no. 1, 
2009, p. 155.
34  See, The Bill, Disegno di legge. URL=http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede /Ddliter/testi/29935 
_testi.htm. Accessed 14 December 2016.
35  Art. 1-20, CBA.
36  Art. 8-20, CBA.
37  Art. 21-81, CBA.
38  Art. 44-53, CBA.
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do not accept the debt management plan of the debtor, a bankruptcy procedure 
is opened and a liquidation of the debtor’s unexempt property follows. This hap-
pens in legal proceedings with simplified rules. Depending on the motion of the 
debtor, the release of the remaining debts can follow. This happens over a period 
not exceeding five years (the so-called period of good behaviour). Since CBA does 
not regulate consumer bankruptcy with an international element, mutatis mutan-
dis are applied39 provisions of the BA on international bankruptcy,40 while for the 
EU, provisions of Regulation 1346/2000 are in force. From 26 June 2017 we will 
have a new primary source of the bankruptcy law, the Regulation (EU) 2015/848 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20th,2015 on insolvency 
proceedings. The Regulation was published on 5th of June 2015 in the OJ of EU, 
entered into force 20 days after the publication and shall be applied as of 26th of 
June 2017.41 The text of the EIR Recast is twice as large. It contains 89 recitals, 
92 articles and four annexes (A: listing all the national names of insolvency pro-
ceedings; B: all national names of insolvency practitioners; C: listing all repealed 
Regulations, including Regulation 1346/2000, and D: a correlation table of the 
Articles of the EIR and those of the EIR Recast). The very concept of Regulation 
1346/2000 is not modified in the context of the reform; a new version consists of 
partially known, partially revised, but also a whole series of new provisions. The 
new provisions of Regulation 2015/848 are primarily provisions on insolvency 
proceedings of a group of companies42 and certain provisions on data protection.43 
Summa summarum, similar to the solution of Regulation 1346/2000, Regulation 
2015/848 solves the problem of conflicts of jurisdiction by enabling main insol-
vency proceedings to be opened before the Court where the debtor has the centre 
of its main interests, and at the same time permitting that the special insolvency 
proceeding is commenced in another Member State where the debtor has an es-
tablishment. The effect of the special insolvency proceedings are limited to the as-
sets located in that State.44 Rules on international jurisdiction, based on a debtor’s 
COMI, are further specified, including the possibility of a judicial review,45 whilst 
jurisdiction for insolvency-related actions (actions which derive directly from the 
insolvency proceedings and are closely linked to them) is now included in the 
text.46 The material scope of the recast EIR is broader than the scope of the origi-
39  Art. 23, CBA.
40  Art. 392-427, BA
41  Hereinafter: Regulation 2015/848.
42  Art. 56-77, Regulation 2015/848.
43  Art. 78-83, Regulation 2015/848.
44  Art. 3, par. 1, Regulation 2015/848.
45  Art. 4 and 5, Regulation 2015/848.
46  Art. 6, Regulation 2015/848. 
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nal EIR, as it extends to proceedings, among others, granting debt-relief or debt 
adjustment for consumers or the self-employed. In other words, when Regulation 
2015/848 deals with the concept of a natural person, an individual who performs 
independent business or professional activity, it is presumed that the centre of 
their main interests is situated in the principal place of business of the individual if 
it is not proven otherwise. This presumption applies only if the principal place of 
business of the individual is not moved to another Member State within a period 
of three months before the proposal to initiate insolvency.47 In the case of any oth-
er individual, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that the centre of their main 
interest is the usual place of residence of the individual. This presumption applies 
only if habitual residence has not been moved to another Member State within a 
period of six months before the proposal of initiation of insolvency.48 Neverthe-
less, taking into account the lack of harmonisation in the domestic consumer 
bankruptcy legal regimes, there is still a proper „breeding ground“ for insolvency 
forum shopping. The legal consequences of the main proceedings must be recog-
nised in all Member States; a bankruptcy manager who is appointed in the main 
bankruptcy proceedings must be recognised and able to exercise his powers and 
rights in all Member States without the need for additional injunctions.49 If and 
when the question arises of the bankruptcy proceedings in the territory of another 
Member State where the debtor has an establishment rather than the main centre 
of interest, this is the question of the so-called special bankruptcy proceedings.
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are many questions concerning the application of consumer bankruptcy 
law with an international element. One of the major problems of the existing 
Regulation is that all of its primary objectives are aimed at protecting the rights 
of creditors.50 On the other hand, consumer bankruptcy has a specific material 
and legal objective, which refers only to the economic rehabilitation of debtors 
and represents differentia specifica in relation to corporate bankruptcy.51 There is 
an additional problem that arises from the fact that the holders of the freedom of 
establishment are also natural persons who are nationals of Member States. More-
over, Member States cannot condition or change the application of this rule by a 
bilateral agreement with another Member State as the content of the freedom of 
47  Art. 3, par. 1, p. 3, Regulation 2015/848.
48  Art. 3, par. 1, p. 4, Regulation 2015/848.
49  Art. 19, Regulation 2015/848.
50  Virgos, M., Garcimartin, F., op. cit. note 2, pp. 7–8.
51  Art. 2, CBA.
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establishment is defined by the Treaty establishing the European Community.52 
Therefore, consumers often, before initiating the process of debt relief, change 
their habitual residence which can be considered abuse. For example, due to lib-
eral approach to the process of release of the remaining debts, France became 
“popular” for consumers (i.e. forum shopping). The goal is to get faster and cheaper 
debt relief, which is not in the interest of creditors since it does not contribute to 
the preservation of the bankruptcy estate and the return of overdue debts to the 
creditors. On the other hand, in Germany, the debt relief is obtained after a pe-
riod of good behaviour, which lasts for six years. During that period, the debtor is 
required to give creditors certain amounts from the debtor’s unexempt property. 
Therefore, the system of debt relief in France, especially in the department of 
Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle, is much more debtor-friendly. However, we 
should be aware that the consumers can change their residence before submitting 
a proposal for consumer bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the impending in-
solvency. Therefore, the assessment as to whether the change of residence is abuse 
should be made after a consideration of the facts of each individual case. In any 
case, the decision of the European Court in the case Staubitz-Schreiber53 is very 
significant. In this case a question was raised before the European Court – does 
the court of the Member State which receives a request for the opening of insol-
vency proceedings still have jurisdiction to open Insolvency proceedings if the 
debtor moves the centre of his or her main interests to the territory of another 
Member State after filing the request, but before the proceedings are opened, or 
does the court of that other Member State acquire jurisdiction? Specifically, it was 
decided according to Art. 3, par. 1 of the Regulation 1346/2000, that the Insol-
vency proceedings stipulates that the court of the Member State within the terri-
tory of which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated at the time when 
the debtor lodges the request to open insolvency proceedings retains jurisdiction 
to open these proceedings if the debtor moves the centre of his main interests to 
the territory of another Member State after lodging the request, but before the 
proceedings are opened. Thus, at some point, an individual can only have one 
country as the centre of its main interests. The relevant date is the date of initiat-
ing insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the Court retains jurisdiction even if the 
debtor’s main interests are subsequently changed in the sense that they move on to 
another country. The novelty of Regulation 2015/848 with regard to jurisdiction 
concerning an individual is that it now distinguishes between professionals and 
individuals/consumers with different „suspect periods“.
52  Art. 43 and 48, Treaty Establishing the European Community, Consolidated Version, [2006] OJ C 
321.
53  Case C-1/04 Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber [2006] ECR I-701.
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Furthermore, a problem can arise if the Member State has not implemented the 
institute of consumer bankruptcy, as in the case of Italy. The doctrine states that, 
if it is assumed that the centre of main interests of the debtor is in a state that 
recognises the consumer’s ability to declare bankruptcy, then the main insolvency 
proceedings will be opened in that State and it will be recognised in any other 
EU Member State, regardless of whether that Member State allows bankruptcy 
proceedings against these persons. The state of recognition may not invoke the 
protection of public order as a legal basis for refusal of recognition.54 In the op-
posite situation, where the state which has an international jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings does not recognise the bankruptcy ability of a particular 
person, the main bankruptcy proceedings cannot be opened. However, this does 
not mean that in this case an independent territorial insolvency (special - particu-
lar) proceeding cannot be opened, because there is an inability to open the main 
insolvency proceedings.55
Furthermore, in the insolvency proceedings with an international element, one of 
the fundamental problems is the formation of the insolvency mass since the prop-
erty is located in a few countries. However, we should take into account the fact 
that consumers can keep unexempt assets. Lex fori concursus decides which assets 
of the debtor are, and which property is not included in the bankruptcy estate. At 
the practical and empirical level, the situation becomes very complex; specifically, 
in case of a home and privilege of a consumer to invoke the right to a home. For 
example, CBA follows the judicial doctrine of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in relation to Article 8, which re-
sulted in thousands and thousands of cases. These cases have been stopped for a 
whole decade at the stage of enforcing the claims of creditors on debtors’ home, 
because it is very questionable from a social point of view. Furthermore, in prac-
tice, the consumers are obliged to co-operate with insolvency administrators. A 
practical problem may arise from the question of how the bankruptcy manager 
can find out about the existence of a property in another state, and, in the Croa-
tian case, whether he has an incentive to do so? Although the CBA came into 
force, the issue of regulating the system of compensation, providing adequate in-
centives for the operating body of consumer bankruptcy proceedings, namely, the 
bankruptcy manager, has not yet been satisfactory solved.56
54  Art. 19, par. 2, Regulation 2015/848.
55  Virgós, M., The 1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Insider’s View, 
Forum Internationale, No. 25, 1998, fn. 17.
56  Bodul, D., Novo operativno tijelo u sustavu kolektivne zaštite potrošača - povjerenik, Hrvatska pravna 
revija, No. 1, 2017, pp. 52-60.
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Thus, a common problem in international consumer insolvency proceedings is the 
fact that debtors often work in a country other than their country of residence. 
Respecting the right to freedom of movement for workers, debtors can migrate to 
another country during the insolvency proceedings. In such situations, the prob-
lem of the termination of the enforcement proceedings in another Member State 
occurs, as well as the problem of an efficient fulfilment of the debt repayment 
plan. An additional problem is that the debt repayment plan can last for years, 
and debtors will have to move during this period. By moving to another Member 
State, it is likely that debtors’ economic circumstances will change, as well as their 
ability to meet their debt repayment plans. What legal consequences the reloca-
tion has on the plan of debt repayment and whether debt repayment plan can be 
modified, depends on the applied law, and whether there is an economic interest 
of a creditor to enforce their claims in the event of non-co-operation of the debtor.
Although all these situations impose caution, a new regulation has some advan-
tages in terms of consumer-debtor relations. In particular, it offers comprehensive 
solutions in terms of the effects of actions in other Member States. On the one 
hand, it is understandable to expand its application to insolvent consumers. On 
the other hand, it is doubtful whether this is the most acceptable solution for the 
consumers. Thus, regardless of the enthusiasm that is evident in the area of legal 
literature, harmonisation of law in practice has proven to be a hard and slow pro-
cess at the European level. Even if the EU has created and established a common 
market of hundreds of millions of people from different Member States, there 
are many differences within the EU. Therefore, the task of creating a real joint 
cross-border (consumer) insolvency law is a difficult one, especially in the light of 
the recital in which it was pointed out that cross-border insolvency proceedings 
should be “effective” and “urgent”.
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THE EUROPEAN COURT Of HUMAN RIGHTS1
ABSTRACT
The relation between companies and human rights is usually observed through the concept 
of corporate social responsibility, i.e. companies being human rights violators. However, this 
subject can be observed from a different angle that is gaining greater significance nowadays - 
the possibility for companies to protect their rights before the European court of human rights 
(ECtHR). The aim of this paper is to determine how the scope of human rights protection has 
evolved and expanded. From the basic notion of human right belonging to a human being to 
the idea that this term can be expanded to capture ‘human rights of companies’ (Emberland). 
Indisputably company’s right to property can be protected before the ECtHR, as it is officially 
recognised under Protocol No. 1 of the European convention on human rights. However, the 
case law has gradually started to expand the scope of the Convention to other rights that were 
not explicitly granted to companies - first by recognising procedural rights to companies, and 
later by recognising rights such as right to respect for private and family life (article 8), freedom 
of expression (article 10) and right to just satisfaction (article 41) (so-called ‘hard cases’). This 
expandedpersonal scope of the Convention is raising many controversies. The major concern 
is that granting right to companies would diminish the rights of natural persons, as compa-
nies would utilise their newfound position to avoid honouring rights of natural persons. The 
question is where this case law dynamics will lead us to – shall we soon be raising the issue of 
company’s right to life. Also, there is the issue whether shareholders have right to sue in case of 
violation of rights of their companies.
Keywords: human rights, companies, European convention on human rights, European court 
of human rights.
1. INTRODUCTORy REMARKS
Companies are invaluable members of legal order and economy of one country. 
As such they operate in the web of legal norms on the national and international 
level. The concept of the legal personality of companies evolved from the idea that 
company is a mere legal fiction to the idea that it is a legal subject in full right, 
1  This paper is a result of project Srpsko i evropskopravo – upoređivanje i usaglašavanje (No. 179031) fi-
nanced by the Ministry of education, science and technological development of the Republic of Serbia.
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separated from its human substratum.2 It was generally accepted they can have 
obligations and rights under the national law but the status of the company in the 
international legal framework remains ambiguous. The answer depends on which 
legal instrument we observe. Analysis has shown that European convention on 
human rights (ECHR) affords the widest scope of rights to companies.3
Companies’ relations to human rights have mostly been linked to corporate social 
responsibility and grave breaches of fundamental rights of individuals.4Thus, the 
idea of corporate human rights will, at first sight, appear contradictory – an oxy-
moron.5
2.  HUMAN RIGHTS Of COMPANIES – pRo eT ConTRA
The essential question is certainly should companies enjoy human rights and if so, 
under what conditions and to which extent. Theory has given arguments both in 
favour and against the extensive interpretation of human rights protection. Some 
don’t deny that certain rights can apply to corporations but consider that unjus-
tified.6
Reasons in favour of extending the scope of rights can be summed up as follows: 
affording rights to companies provides protection not only for the entity but also 
protects interests of natural persons and acts as a safeguard for the rule of law and 
democratic society.7 Granting human rights to companies wouldn’t deprive hu-
man beings of their rights but would make companies more aware of the need for 
human rights protection.8Case Yukos v. Russia9 is seen as a perfect example why 
companies should enjoy protection – possibility to appear before ECtHR offers a 
2  Isiksel T., The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Man-Made: Corporations and Human Rights. 
 URL< https://ssrn.com/abstract=2546401>. Accessed 13 April 2015, pp. 44 etc.
3  Van Kempen, P. H., The Recognition of Legal Persons in International Human Rights Instruments: Pro-
tection Against and Through Criminal Justice?, Pieth, M.; Ivory, R. (eds.), Corporate Criminal Liability, 
Netherlands, 2011, pp. 358-364.
4  Oliver, P., Companies and Their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative Perspective, International and 
Comparative Law quarterly, Vol. 64, Issue 3, 2015, p. 663.
5  Grear, A., Redirecting human rights: Facing the challenge of corporate legal humanity, Hampshire, 2010, 
p. 1. 
6  Scolnicov, A., Lifelike and lifeless in law: Do corporations have human rights?, University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 13, 2013, URL <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2268537>. Accessed 30 
September 2016, p. 6.
7  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, pp. 371, 386-387.
8  Dhooge, L. J., Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, J. Transnat’l L. &Pol’y, Vol. 16, 2006, pp. 
205-206.
9  OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (Just satisfaction) (2014) App. no. 14902/04.
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corporation whose rights were violated by its own state an independent interna-
tional venue for judicial review.10
Some theorists consider that corporations must enjoy certain fundamental rights 
that are essential to their purpose and functioning but those rights are not neces-
sarily as extensive as those of natural persons or non-profit entities.11Legal persons 
should be offered protection under each human right that can reasonably be ap-
plied to them.12 Some authors base their considerations on the fact that companies 
should enjoy protection only in a measure that is necessary to protect rights of 
natural persons within them.13 Others claim the opposite –corporation has legal 
personality separated from its members and isn’t reducible to, nor interchangeable 
with its human substratum for the purposes of human rights attribution.14
Criticism encompasses conceptual incompatibilities (human rights can only be 
extended to human beings), practical difficulties (overabundance of applications) 
and assertions that if companies refuse to accept human rights ’obligations, they 
should not be able to benefit from their protection.15 The firstnegative argument 
is related to the human vulnerability as the underlying value of human rights 
law.16 Furthermore, companies can use this new development to promote and 
protect their interests, regardless of the consequences for natural persons.17 Grant-
ing rights to companies often leaves humans vulnerable and corporations protect-
ed.18 Companies can undermine government efforts to improve of human rights 
protection,19 making it harder for individuals to hold corporations accountable.20 
Extension of scope is also criticised on the grounds that corporations tend to 
10  Van den Muijsenbergh WH.; Rezai S., Corporations and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. LJ, Vol. 25, 2012, pp. 62, 68.
11  Oliver, op. cit.note 4,p. 695.
12  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 387.
13  Ku, J. G., The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, Chi. J. Int’l L., Vol. 12, 2011, p. 732; 
Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 17. 
14  Grear, A., Challenging corporate ‘humanity’: Legal disembodiment, embodiment and human rights, Hu-
man Rights Law Review, Vol. 7, Issue 3, 2007, p. 517. Harding C.; Kohl U., Human rights in the 
market place: the exploitation of rights protection by economic actors, Routledge, 2016, p. 36. Scolnicov, 
op. cit. note 6, p. 7.
15  Van den Muijsenbergh; Rezai, op.cit. note 10, p. 52.
16  Grear, op. cit. note 14, pp. 520-521. Isiksel, pp. 52, 60. Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, pp. 15-16.
17  Lafont, C., Should We Take the “Human” Out of Human Rights? Human Dignity in a Corporate World, 
URL <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768881>. Accessed 8 October 2016, p. 19; Isiksel,op.cit. note 2, pp. 
40, 59.
18  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 9. 
19  Lafont, op.cit. note 17, p. 20. Isiksel,op.cit. note 2, p. 13. Harding; Kohl, op.cit. note 14, p. 46.
20  Grear, op. cit. note 5, p. 17; Grear, op. cit. note 14, p. 514.
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be in a much more balanced position towards public authorities.21 This is espe-
cially true for the multinational corporations that can use their economic power 
to avoid responsibility.22Having that in mind, granting them human rights would 
be paradoxical.23They should be treated more like a State within the human rights 
framework - to have obligations but no rights.24 Some authors base their criti-
cism on the historical interpretation. Namely, during Convention drafting process 
companies were gradually left out and don’t appear as applicants in the final ver-
sion of the ECHR.25
3. SCOPE Of THE RIGHTS GRANTED TO COMPANIES
Despite the initial dilemma whether to grant human rights to companies, steady 
rise of these cases before ECtHR, shows the number of human rights that the 
ECtHR has deemed applicable to corporations has grown.26 However, thesis not a 
result of apre-planned strategy to grant protection to corporations but of analysis 
of specific problems in given cases.27Only remains the question of the scope of 
rights attributed to companies.28 We can single out several of these types of rights 
under ECHR:
   rights explicitly granted to companies (the right to property);
   rights granted to “everyone”, where the ECtHR interpreted that the scope 
of the norm includes companies as well (freedom of speech, right to privacy 
and procedural rights);
   “derivative” rights realised through individuals that constitute the company 
(freedom of association and protection from discrimination);29
21  Sanchez-Graells, A., Marcos, F., ‘Human Rights’ Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We 
Not Going Overboard?,University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-04, URL<https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2389715>. Accessed 13 January 2017, p. 10.
22  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 388.
23  Harding, Kohl, op.cit. note 14, p. 49. 
24  Ibid., p. 50.
25  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 5; Harding; Kohl, p. 32. Oposite Van den Muijsenbergh; Rezai, op.cit. note 
10, p. 48. 
26  Lafont, p. 15. This phenomenon is named “the snowball effect”. Emberland, M. Protection Against 
Unwarranted Searches and Seizures of Corporate Premises under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: The Colas Est SA v. France Approach, Mich. J. Int’l L., Vol. 25, 2003, p. 93.
27  Sanchez-Graells; Marcos,op.cit.note 21, p. 3.
28  Oliver, op. cit. note 4, p. 662.
29  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 11.
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   rights inextricably linked to human personality and incompatible with arti-
ficial nature of the company30- the right to life,31 rights against torture and 
ill-treatment, prohibition of slavery, right to liberty and security and a right 
to marry. However, boundaries are being constantly pushed and the initial 
scope stretched beyond recognition.32
3.1. Right to property
The right to property is the only right explicitly granted to legal persons under 
ECHR. Having that in mind, we would only like to point to two potentially 
moot issues. First is the question of protection of shareholders under the ECHR. 
Shareholding and the rights that stem from it enjoy protection. However, the issue 
is whether shareholders have a standing before the Court when company’s prop-
erty rights have been violated.33 The other is related to intellectual property rights 
that have only recently emerged as a contentious issue and that can have major 
implications for the future jurisprudence. They raise the issue of ECtHR’s role in 
shaping innovation policy in Europe and striking appropriate balance between 
interests of corporations and humans.34
 3.2. Procedural rights
ECHR grants protection during government investigations of law violations and, 
afterwards, against government decisions imposing sanctions or liability.35 Set of 
procedural rights includes article 6 (fair trial), article 7 (no punishment without 
law), article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and article 4 of the Seventh Protocol 
(right not to be tried or punished twice). 
It is generally accepted that there is no reason companies should be treated less 
favourably regarding these rights than individuals since otherwise they cannot en-
force their rights.36 However, it is still unclear whether granting procedural guar-
antees to a legal person is a matter of legal policy or obligation derived from the 
30  Van den Muijsenbergh; Rezai, op.cit. note10, p. 50.
31  Some fear that case law would eventually result in granting companies right to life which would inter-
fere with necessary state regulation of corporations (especially registration and liquidation). Van den 
Muijsenbergh; Rezai, op.cit. note 10, pp. 51, 60; Dhooge, op.cit.note 8, p. 239. 
32  Harding; Kohl, op.cit.note 14, p. 28. 
33  For detailed discussion see Part 4 of the paper. 
34  Helfer, L. R. The New Innovation Frontier-Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 
Harv. Int’l LJ, Vol. 49, 2008, p. 6.
35  Sanchez-Graells; Marcos,op.cit.note 21, p. 8.
36  Oliver, op. cit.note 4, p. 678.
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fundamental legal acts.37As Article 6 indicates, its guarantees apply both to the 
civil and criminal procedure.38 Criminal procedure gives reasons for greater con-
cern, especially in the scope of human rights of the accused legal person and the 
issue of representation of a legal person in criminal proceedings.39
The self-incrimination privilege raises the most controversies. The right aims pri-
marily to protect the defendant against having to give evidence that has no ex-
istence outside of his/her will.40 The content of the principle is determined by 
criminal legal norms and the case law of ECtHR and it encompasses verbal com-
munication and non-verbal forms of acting. The former relates to defendant’s 
right to remain silent, and the latter to the right of the defendant to refuse to give 
the incriminating evidence.41
Some deny this right to companies because it was primarily established to 
protect individuals from torture and attack on their physical integrity by 
the state organs.42Companies are far more equipped to resist state’s coercion 
mechanisms.43Furthermore, granting company this privilege would undermine 
state’s efforts to conduct an effective monitoring of company’s activity, as it would 
discourage whistle-blowers and encourage concealment of information.44 Others 
grant companies this right providing the pressure is put on those that represent 
the company (management or employees).45Whether legal persons can invoke this 
privilege depends on its legal foundations. If the root of the privilege is in human 
dignity and protection of personality, there is no legitimate reason for its extension 
to legal persons. On the contrary, if the privilege is seen to derive from the rule 
of law, then it relates to all of the defendants in criminal proceedings, including 
legal persons.46
37  Đurđević Z., Pravna osoba kao okrivljenik: temeljna prava i predstavljanje, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno 
pravo i praksu, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2005, p.740.
38  We cannot disregard competition law investigations that are considered to fall under the criminal law 
procedures, but it is stated that company shouldn’t enjoy full benefits of the fair trial because it would 
diminish the effectiveness of competition law enforcement. Sanchez-Graells; Marcos, op.cit. note 21, 
p. 19.
39  Đurđević,op.cit. note 37, p. 740.
40  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 375.
41  Đurđević,op.cit. note 37,p. 757.
42  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 22. Oliver, op. cit.note 4, 685. Isiksel, op.cit.note 2,pp. 51-52.
43  Dhooge, op.cit. note 8, p. 241.
44  Ibid.
45  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 376.
46  Đurđević,op.cit. note 37, p. 757.
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3.3. “Hard cases”
In practice several articles of the ECHR gave rise to the disagreement between 
theorists regarding whether they can apply to companies at all, or on equal footing 
with natural persons.
3.3.1.  Right to respect for private and family life (article 8)
Privacy in its broadest sense is the right to personal autonomy, to self-fulfilment 
and to develop one’s personality. In the narrow sense, this notion covers “freedom 
from prying” by the State or third parties. Privacy in the economic sphere is con-
sidered to fall under the latter concept.47
Article 8 grants four rights – respect for family life, respect for private life, re-
spect of home and correspondence. The protection under this article envelops 
companies, though not in respect of all the interests covered and less exten-
sively and intensively than with respect to individuals.48Clearly, due to their 
nature companies cannot have family or private life.49 However, the ECtHR 
case law suggests that they can have their home and correspondence protected 
under this article. The first relevant case on this matter was Société Colas Est v 
France50where ECtHR found that company’s right to home was violated by the 
French authorities, who entered the premises without the consent of the man-
agement and without a judicial authorization (though under law at that time 
the warrant was not necessary). Even though the word “home” is primarily 
associated with natural persons, the Court extended its meaning to business 
premises, because the French text of the ECHR uses the word “domicile” that 
has a broader connotation than the one in the English version (“home”).51The 
interpretation of the Article poses two questions. What is the rationale behind 
widening the scope? Is there any difference inthe scope of the protection of 
companies and individuals? 
47  Oliver, P., The protection of privacy in the economic sphere before the European Court of Justice, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 46, 2009, p. 1443.
48  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 377.
49  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 14. To claim otherwise „would seem to stretch language beyond all reason-
able limits“. Oliver, op. cit. note 47, p. 1449.
50  Société Colas Est and Others v. France(2004) 39 EHRR 17. 
51  The ECHR consists of two authentic versions written in English and French that are equally binding. 
In this case, confronted with versions of a treaty that are equally authentic but not exactly the same, 
the Court opted for interpreting the Convention text in effective rather than formalistic manner. Em-
berland, op. cit. note 25, p. 88.
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Interpreting the concept of “home” in this case shifted from formalistic-linguistic 
inquiries - whether a company can have a “home” - to a teleological inquiry - what 
is the purpose of Article 8’s protection of the “home”.52 The protection of the rule 
of law is seen as an underlying value of the Convention.53Having that in mind, 
Article 8 should be interpreted not only as a protection of the individual, but of 
private activity in general (both personal and commercial) from arbitrary exercise 
of governmental power.54 However, some authors acknowledge that corporations 
have a legitimate interest in commercial secrecy, but deny them human right of 
privacy.55
Caselaw shows that companies enjoy more limited protection under Article 
8 than individuals or legal entities not involved in commercial matters, espe-
cially concerning the right to respect for one’s home.56It appears that the EC-
tHR has adopted a system under which corporate premises (offices, branches and 
other business premises) enjoy a lower degree of protection than the residences of 
individual persons57 (two-tiered scheme of protection).58 Namely, Article 8(2) 
establishes conditions under which rights of beneficiaries can be restricted – 
governmental actions must be prescribed by the law, conform to one of the 
enumerated interests and must be necessary.59
3.3.2.  Freedom of speech
Freedom of expression is recognised as an essential prerequisite of the democratic 
political process and the development of every human being.60 In the era of en-
hanced commercialisation, the perception that this freedom does not apply to the 
economic sphere has been challenged.61 Discourse about freedom of expression of 
52  Ibid., p. 89.
53  Van den Muijsenbergh; Rezai,op.cit. note 10,p. 56.
54  Dhooge, op.cit. note 8, p. 235; Emberland, op. cit. note 25, pp. 81, 90-91. Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 
13.
55  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 6, p. 12.
56  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 378.
57  Emberland, op. cit. note 25, p. 100.
58  Ibid., p. 80.
59  In the case Vinci Construction e.a. v France (App. no. 63629/10 et 60567/10), ECtHR concluded that 
the actions of the authorities conformed to the first two conditions, but that conducted inspections 
and seizures were disproportionate to the aim pursued and thus violated Article 8 of the ECHR. 
60  Macovei, M., Freedom of expression - A guide to the implementation of Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 2004, URL < https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168007ff48 >. Accessed 1 February 2017, p. 7.
61  Randall, M. H. Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or 
Equal?, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2006, p. 54.
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companies mostly refers to the media enterprises. As the primary transmitters of 
information in modern democratic societies, media may have a dual capacity - ei-
ther as violators of freedom of expression or as entities exposed to the infringement 
of freedom of expression.62 ECtHR’s decisions show that the Article 10 protection 
encompasses not only the content of expressions but also the means by which they 
are communicated.63The most controversial issue regarding this phenomenon and 
companies is related to the nature of speech that is protected. Namely, the ques-
tion is whether the pure commercial activity (i.e. an activity exclusively conducted 
for aims of marketing a product and for purposes of pecuniary gain), may qualify 
as an “expression” worthy of protection under ECHR,64 as opposed to other forms 
of speech, and particularly political speech.65 Political speech enjoys stronger pro-
tection due to its part in the preservation of pluralism of opinions in the society,66 
its role as a check on governmental power and the fact that is more susceptible to 
governmental censorship.67
ECHR provides restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 10 (2), which 
grants the state right to derogate the rights under circumstances which are essen-
tially the same as in Article 8(2). Under these provisions, authorities are granted 
wider discretion when it comes to assessing the commercial expression. The Court 
has basically, depending on the content of information and ideas which are to be 
conveyed, established a hierarchy of values protected under Article 10 and pro-
vides different levels of protection for different categories of expression (political, 
commercial, artistic, academic, etc.).68 Under this two-tiered system commercial 
speech is scrutinised according to a more lenient standard of review than other 
forms of protected speech69 and can be imposed greater restrictions than politi-
cal speech.70 The double standard is justified on the grounds that the state has a 
legitimate need for control over economic activity and that economic activity is 
62  Aleksovski Đorđević S. Article 10 of the European convention in light of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. FACTA UNIVERSITATIS-Law and Politics, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2016, p. 56.
63  Van den Muijsenbergh; Rezai,op.cit. note 10, p. 57.
64  Ibid.
65  Political speech can be described as comments provided by the media and public figures on issues of 
public concern. Aleksovski Đorđević,op.cit. note 62,p. 57. 
66  Ibid.
67  Harding, Kohl, op.cit.note 14, p. 207. Randall,op.cit. note 61, pp. 80, 84.
68  Aleksovski Đorđević, op.cit. note 62, p. 57.
69  Emberland, op. cit. note 25, p. 104; Randall, p. 63. So far, ECtHR has explored boundaries of the 
commercial speech in the area of advertisement, unfair competition law and broadcasting. Randall, p. 
59.
70  Harding; Kohl, op.cit.note 14, p. 201.
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remote from the essential purpose of certain ECHR provisions.71We can suppose 
that the reason can be the fear that unrestricted free speech of companies would 
be abused – companies would drown dissenting voices using the advantage of 
their economic strength.72
This divide is criticised on the two grounds – lack of objective reasons to differ-
entiate between categories of speech and efforts to make the difference are often 
futile because of the practical difficulties that arise.73Special problem poses situ-
ation when it isn’t (easy) to determine whether the speech is in the realm of the 
commercial or political sphere. If the expression is not aimed at promoting the 
speaker’s products or services but is intended to advocate a certain cause, it is not 
considered to be commercial regardless of the fact it was communicated through 
an advertisement.74 It is suggested to treat all categories of speech the same and to 
balance all the interests involved in an ad hoc fashion.75
Granting freedom of speech inevitably leads to cases when the use of this right 
can damage someone’s reputation. This is particularly reflected in the struggle 
between the need for company’s accountability for the sake of consumer protec-
tion and company’s interest in preserving its reputation as one of its most valuable 
assets. On the one hand, speech critical of corporations is a key prerequisite for 
consumer safety.76 Large corporations appear as powerful public actors, impacting 
upon people’s lives, and as such should be open to the same kind of criticism as 
governmental bodies.77 On the other hand, the company has a legitimate inter-
est in preserving its reputation, which represents a valuable property interest.78 
Corporations stand to lose substantial amounts of wealth if their corporate name 
is tarnished.79 Particularly, they have a legitimate need to protect themselves from 
rivals which try to cause harm to their business by spreading false information.80 
Damage can have far-reaching consequences, especially nowadays with the use 
of modern technologies. However, companies must be aware that by entering in 
71  Emberland, op. cit. note 25, p. 106.
72  Stoll, M. L. Corporate rights to free speech?, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 58, Issue 1, 2005, p. 266.
73  Emberland, op. cit. note 25, p. 106. 
74  Randall, op.cit. note 61, p. 71.
75  Ibid., p. 55.
76  Jackson, D. M., The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: Revisiting New York Times v. 
Sullivan, Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J., Vol. 9, 2000, p. 520.
77  Scolnicov A., Supersized Speech-McLibel Comes to Strasbourg, Cambridge LJ, Vol. 64, 2005, p. 313. 
Similar Jackson, note 76,p. 492.
78  Jackson, op.cit. note 76, p. 522.
79  Ibid., p. 513.
80  Scolnicov, op. cit. note 77, p. 313.
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the business sphere, they voluntarily accept the risks of being subjects of public 
debate.81
3.3.3.  Just satisfaction
In case there was a violation of rights granted under ECHR or its protocols, the 
ECtHR can award just satisfaction to the injured party. The award is not an au-
tomatic consequence of a finding a violation of a right but is at the discretion of 
the Court.82 Just satisfaction may be afforded in respect of (a) pecuniary damage; 
(b) non-pecuniary damage and (c) costs and expenses.83 The redress can be pro-
vided as a declaratory judgment establishing violation(s) of the ECHR, or as a 
financial award consisting of pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages.84 Pecuni-
ary damage involves the decrease of the economic wealth of a person and can be 
calculated by relying on market prices, whereas non-pecuniary damage does not 
involve a diminution of the victim’s patrimony and cannot be priced on the mar-
ket.85 Although immaterial harm can never be “remedied” by money, most legal 
instruments(including the ECHR), foresee the possibility to award money to per-
sons who suffered such harm.86 Moral damages are typically afforded for injuries 
such as harm to reputation, psychological harm, distress, frustration, humiliation 
and sense of injustice.87
Regarding companies, the problem has arisen when the Court granted them right 
to non-pecuniary damage, especially the right to monetary satisfaction.88 The first 
of such cases was Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal.89 This case included in the scope 
of potential immaterial damages for the company „uncertainty in decision-plan-
ning, disruption in the management of the company and, albeit to a lesser degree, 
anxiety and inconvenience caused to the members of a legal entity’s management 
81  Jackson, op.cit. note 76, p. 514. 
82  Rules of Court - Practice directions just satisfaction claims, 14 November 2016, Strasbourg, URL=< 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf>. Accessed 12 February 2017, p. 60, par. 1.
83  Rules of Court - Practice directions just satisfaction claims, p. 61, par. 6.
84  Nifosi-Sutton I., The Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-Monetary 
Relief: a Critical Appraisal from a Right to Health Perspective, Harv. Hum. Rts. J., Vol. 23, 2010, p. 52. 
Altwicker-Hàmori, S., Altwicker, T., Peters, A., Measuring Violations of Human Rights An Empirical 
Analysis of Awards in Respect of Non-Pecuniary Damage under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, URL=< http://ssrn.com/abstract=2631404>. Accessed 12 February 2017, p. 13.
85  Altwicker-Hàmori, Altwicker, Peters, op.cit. note 84, p. 7. 
86  Ibid., p. 8.
87  Nifosi-Sutton, op.cit. note 84, p. 54.
88  This was criticised on the grounds that a pecuniary loss is the only loss a company can suffer. Harding; 
Kohl, op.cit.note 14, p. 214. 
89  Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal (2001) 31 EHRR 31.
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team”.90 The controversy concerned the fact that the ECtHR identified immaterial 
damage of the directors with damages of the company itself. This caused dissen-
sion among members of the judicial team because it was incompatible with the 
principle of separate legal personality. Imputing the mental distress experienced 
by the management to the company the Court is in a sense piercing the corporate 
veil in reverse.91
4. THE “VICTIM” STATUS UNDER ECHR (ARTICLE 34)
Companies are given the right to file applications before the Court as “non-gov-
ernmental organisations”. However; the question is whether shareholders or other 
stakeholders (managers or employees) can file claims when the violation is di-
rected against the company in which they have interests.92 The answer is relevant 
not only to the company, but also has consequences for its stakeholders, for a 
democratic society, and the rule of law.93 The problem arises because “victim” con-
cept under ECHR is not clearly established but developed through court practice 
and is susceptible to constant evolution, which can cause increased level of legal 
uncertainty in the domain of human rights protection.94
Along-standing principle of company law is that company’s rights and interests are 
separated from rights and interests of its shareholders and “corporate veil” can be 
pierced only under a limited number of circumstances. In the context of victim 
status, court has two options. The first is identification or lifting the corporate 
veil - rights of the company and the stakeholders are treated as being one and the 
same which means that state actions violate the human rights of the organisation 
90  In one case Court spoke of “prolonged uncertainty in the conduct of its [company’s] business and 
feelings of helplessness and frustration”. See Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v. Italy (2012) GC, 
par. 221.
91  Wilcox, V., A Company’s Right to Non-Pecuniary Damages An Enquiry into the Practices of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights and some of its High Contracting States, URL=<https://ssc-rechtswis-
senschaften.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/s_rechtswissenschaft/Doktoratsstudium_PhD/Ex-
pose1/Europarecht/A_Company_s_Right_to_Non-Pecuniary_Damages.pdf>. Accessed 7 February 
2017, p. 3.
92  The case law suggests that shareholders file these applications for several reasons: they misunderstand 
the meaning of „victimhood“, they believe that applications submitted by several company constitu-
ents enhance the chances of admissibility, they believe they represent identical interests as those of the 
company, they think that they have suffered a direct violation or because the company cannot itself 
take care of its own affairs, or doesn’t want to initiate litigation. Emberland, M., The corporate veil in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, Vol. 63, 2003, p. 946 fn 8.
93  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 356.
94  Ćorić V., Model žrtve u svetlu novije jurisprudencije Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, Evropsko zakono-
davstvo, Issue 49-50, 2014, p. 568. 
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and the individual jointly. Under the second concept, the infringement against the 
company and the violation of the individual’s rights are distinguished instead of 
being seen as one.95
The seminal case Agrotexim v. Greece96 has shown that ECtHR opted for the non-
identification principle as a starting point.97 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, 
shareholders cannot in principle be identified with their company98 and are not 
regarded as “victims” unless the injury directly harms their property, or violates 
rights they enjoy (dividends, voting rights, or the right to a share in a company’s 
assets after liquidation).99 However, the ECtHR established a few narrowly inter-
preted exceptions to this principle: a) impossibility for the company to apply to 
the court and b) case when the company is a mere vehicle for shareholders’ busi-
ness undertakings.100
The current practice of the ECtHR is criticised because the Court offered no 
guidelines for defining the standard that it will use to determine the victim status 
of future applicant shareholders,101 thus leaving them more vulnerable to govern-
ment actions.102 It is pointed that the Court should abandon its current standard 
and adopt a more realistic multifactor test based on the following factors: whether 
the shareholder’s right was infringed (as opposed to harm to its monetary in-
terests), to what extent the shareholder exercised control over the company, to 
what extent it was impossible for the company itself to file suit, and the severity 
of the harm the shareholder suffered.103 What also remains unclear is the ques-
tion whether broader interpretation (identification) should be applied only to the 
property rights,104 or should have a wider scope.105
95  Van Kempen, op.cit. note 3, p. 365.
96  Agrotexim and others v. Greece (1996) 21 EHRR 250.
97  Emberland, op. cit. note 92, pp. 950, 956.
98  Ibid., p. 949.
99  Tishler, S. C. A New Approach to Shareholder Standing before the European Court of Human Rights, 
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., Vol. 25, 2014, p. 263-264.
100  The prevailing factors in this case shall be the degree of shareholding, holding of management positions 
and status as joint debtor for company loans. Other kinds of personal involvement may also suggest 
identification. Emberland, op. cit. note 92, p. 952-955.
101  Tishler, op.cit. note 99, p. 270.
102  Ibid., p. 279.
103  Ibid., p. 262-263 and 281-285.
104  Harding; Kohl, op.cit.note 14, p. 27.
105  Emberland, op. cit. note 92, p. 951.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The public is gradually becoming aware that companies can be harmed by illegal 
acts of other constituents in the society but there is no general agreement whether 
they can be full beneficiaries of human rights protection under international in-
struments. This is especially true for multinational corporations as opposed to 
small enterprises that would benefit from the protection.
Unlike other instruments, ECHR provides protection of companies’ rights either 
explicitly or through ECtHR’s interpretative powers. Court develops two-tiered 
scheme of protection of certain rights where standards relating to rights of compa-
nies are treated differently than that of individuals (e.g. wider margin of apprecia-
tion in applying restrictions on commercial speechor laxer standards in interpreta-
tion of companies’ “home“). 
Apart from adopting the practice to take into consideration peculiarities of com-
pany’s form when granting protection under the human rights charter, it can be 
advocated the possibility to create a separate charter of basic corporate rights that 
would take into consideration their specific nature,106 as it was applied in national 
laws (e.g. criminal liability).
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IMPACT Of EU INSOLVENCy REGULATION ON 
PROCESS Of RESOLVING DISPUTES bEfORE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARbITRATION
ABSTRACT
The insolvency law contains summary processes for dealing with claims and protections against 
certain proceedings being initiated or continued. There has been some debate, as well as the 
recent case law, concerning the primacy of these rules over court proceedings and arbitration 
agreements. In the following article, we look at what the current position of Insolvency Regula-
tion 2015/ 845 under EU law is, and we consider the relation between the arbitration and 
the insolvency proceedings and the impact on the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, we will 
discuss the differences between the EC Regulation 1346/2000 and the EU Insolvency Regula-
tion 2015 /848. 
The first part will be dedicated to how the arbitration agreement and the Regulation relate. 
In the past, the initiation of insolvency procedure rendered the arbitration agreement null and 
void in some member states. Such cases happened under the Polish and Spanish national laws. 
Therefore, the case Elektim v. Vivendi will be discussed as an example. Moreover, the current 
situation in those countries will be analyzed. 
The second part of this paper analyzes the effects of the insolvency on the pending arbitra-
tion proceedings. A subject of discussion will also be the question of whether the arbitration 
procedure must be terminated or continued. A comparative analysis shows that some national 
laws provide for a compulsory termination of arbitration proceedings, while another group of 
countries allows for the continuation of the arbitration process. 
In the third part, we will examine the amendments of the EC Regulation 1346/2000 adopted 
and implemented in the EU Regulation. We will try to analyze what changes there are and 
what their impact is on the arbitration proceedings. 
In conclusion, all the arguments discussed in the paper will be summarized.
Keywords: arbitration agreement, arbitration proceeding, bankruptcy proceeding, EC Regu-
lation 1346/2000, EU Insolvency Regulation 2015 /848
1.  INTRODUCTION
The initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against a legal entity produces conse-
quences that affect not only the entity that undergoes the proceedings but also 
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their creditors or other persons with whom the insolvent entity has entered legal 
relations.1
For the entity that has undergone the insolvency proceeding,2 the commencement 
of bankruptcy proceeding means the termination with the current way of doing 
business and entry into the regulated procedure which may result in complete 
shutdown of their legal personality.3 The consequence of initiating bankruptcy 
proceedings relates to the debtor that lacks legal capacity to take action concerning 
their estate and to sue or to be sued in the legal proceedings regarding the estate. 
These rights are “transferred” to the trustee.
For creditors and other contracting parties the main question is what happens 
with agreements that have been executed by a bankrupt party and other duties 
that party has assumed. The question is more complex if there is an arbitration 
agreement between a creditor and debtor. The main issue in that regard is how the 
dispute will be resolved –either before an arbitration tribunal as per the arbitration 
agreement, or as the bankruptcy proceeding entails in a national court. Depend-
ing on the institution that will have jurisdiction over resolving disputes, we may 
have different outcomes of the proceedings.
Keeping in mind that arbitration and bankruptcy proceedings are a special type of 
proceedings, we may identify a number of differences and similarities. The main 
similarity between bankruptcy and arbitration proceedings reflects in the purpose 
of such proceedings. Both proceedings are intended to resolve issues relating to 
the assets of the debtor. However, while the arbitration settles for meeting the 
individual requirements of the parties involved, the bankruptcy process is aimed 
at settling collective or group requests, in accordance with the rules and principles 
1  More about insolvency see Vasiljević, M., Poslovno pravo, Beograd 1999, p. 318 et seq; Čolović, V., 
Stečajno pravo, Banja Luka, 2010.
2  The term insolvency has a broader meaning than the term bankruptcy. The insolvency proceeding is a 
collective term for all situations in which an entity encounters issues with performance of assumed du-
ties. In the language of former yugoslav countries, the term bankruptcy translates as “stečaj”, while the 
insolvency is “insolventnost” (non-performance of duties). To avoid a potential misunderstanding be-
tween the terms insolvency and bankruptcy in this article we will use the term bankruptcy as a proceed-
ing used in national legal order for the situation when the debtor cannot fulfill the assumed duties. For 
the situation where the entity is a multinational company regulated by the regime of the EU Insolvency 
Regulation we will use the term insolvency. It should be noted as well that insolvency is a predominant 
term in international legal doctrine. The root of this term can be found in the English school of law where 
the term insolvency is used for a number of different proceedings that reflect the impossibility to meet the 
obligations. For further explanations see Sajter D.;Hudeček, L.: Temeljni pojmovi i nazivi stečajnog prava,  
URL:  https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/430868.Temeljni_pojmovi_i_nazivi_stecajnog_prava.pdf. Accessed 
20 December 2016. 
3  The initiation of bankruptcy proceedings does not imply that this procedure will end in bankruptcy of 
a person or entity. A legal entity may be reorganized in the process and continue to transact business.
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that apply to bankruptcy.4 Taking this into consideration, we should note that the 
principle of jurisdictional attraction is of particular importance due to the fact that 
the court conducting the bankruptcy proceeding attracts all other proceedings un-
der its jurisdiction (that are) directly related to the bankruptcy proceedings. Apart 
from the similarities, there are also numerous differences concerning the manner 
in which the jurisdiction of the court running a bankruptcy proceeding or of an 
arbitration tribunal is established,5 as well as differences in the main principles of 
insolvency and arbitration proceedings and the extent of legal protection provided 
in one and in another proceeding. These and other similarities and differences 
raise a question of the impact of bankruptcy proceedings on the arbitration as a 
method of private dispute resolution.
The impact of bankruptcy of a party on the arbitration proceeding brings about at 
least two other questions. Firstly, whether the bankruptcy of a party to the arbitra-
tion agreement affects the validity and existence of such agreement, and secondly, 
whether the initiation of proceedings determines the commencement of arbitra-
tion or, if the latter process is already underway, its further destiny. These are a few 
of the main issues we are going to discuss in this article.
2. bANKRUPTCy AND ARbITRATION AGREEMENT
Bankruptcy, as at term, is used to broadly designate the condition wherein a per-
son’s (natural person or legal entity) assets are worth less than their debts. In this 
condition one is unable to meet debts when they fall due.6 Bankruptcy in a nar-
rower sense represents a legal process governed by national insolvency laws.7 In 
this article we will refer to bankruptcy in the narrow sense of the term, i.e. as insol-
vency proceeding initiated against and imposed upon the debtor’s assets, and from 
that perspective we will discuss its relationship with the arbitration proceedings. 
In case when a bankruptcy proceeding is initiated against a legal entity holding 
assets in more that one country, we will resort to the term ‘insolvency’. 
The arbitration agreement is a prerequisite to determine the jurisdiction of an 
arbitral tribunal. The very effect of a valid arbitration agreement is reflected upon 
the establishing of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal which should resolve a dis-
4  Velimirović, M., Poslovno pravo, Podgorica, 2000, pp. 175-177.
5  About arbitration agreement, Perović, J., Standardne klauzule u međunarodnim privrednim ugovorima, 
Beograd, 2012, pp. 187 -217; Redfren, A.; Hunter, M.; Blackaby, N.; Partaside, C.; Law and Practice 
of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5 et seq.
6  Rajak, H., The Culture of Bankruptcy, in International insolvency law, themes and perspectives, ( Omar 
P. ed.), Ashgate, 2008, pp. 4-6.
7  Ibid.
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pute.8 In determining the competence of international commercial arbitration, the 
arbitration agreement needs to fulfill the necessary requirements governed by the 
New york Convention on the recognition and execution of Foreign Arbitration 
Awards (NyC).9 According to the Convention “...every Contracting States shall 
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or may arise between them 
in respect of defined legal relationship, contractual or not, concerning a subject 
matter capable of settlement by arbitration”.10 The arbitration agreement has to 
be signed by the parties with the legal capacity to sign the arbitration agreement. 
In the case of bankruptcy, the arbitration agreements entered into by the debtor 
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings may be attempted to 
be invoked against the trustee, and not against the debtor. After the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is left without the capacity to sign 
this agreement. 
As we can see from the above, it is necessary that the disputes can be subjected to 
arbitration for the purpose of a dispute resolution. In other words, the disputes 
have to be arbitrable. Arbitrable disputes are capable disputes in an objective (ra-
tione materiae) and a subjective matter (ratione personae). Every country is free 
to define the arbitrability of a dispute in accordance with its own public policy 
considerations.11
In that way, the principle of party autonomy, as an underlying principle of arbitra-
tion law, is restricted or limited by the arbitrability of the dispute. Bankruptcy dis-
putes are deemed arbitrable, if related to “non-core” issues of bankruptcy, such as 
a proceeding in which creditor may solicit the arbitral tribunal to determine that 
the creditor’s claim is valid in order to register the claim in the creditor’s list in the 
bankruptcy court, or any disputes about the value of the creditor’s claim.12 Such 
disputes are those arising from the contractual relationship between the parties. 
Core insolvency disputes such as the declaration of bankruptcy,13 initiation and 
termination of the bankruptcy proceedings, equal treatment of creditors, appoint-
8  Lew, J., The law applicable to the form and substance of the arbitration clause, ICCA Congress series, No. 
9, Paris, 1998, pp. 114-145.
9  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - the New york Conven-
tion, Official Journal of the Federal Republic of yugoslavia- International treaties, No. 11/81, p. 607. 
10  Art. 2 of the New york Convention
11  More about arbitrability see Vukadinović, J., Pojam arbitralnosti u arbitražnim pravima Srbije i Hrvat-
ske, Aktuelna pitanja savremenog zakonodavstva, Budva, 11-15. jun 2012, pp. 235-245.
12  yang, G., Insolvency Proceedings and Their Effect on International Commercial Arbitration, University og 
Ghent, 2013, p 7.
13  ICC award no. 9163.
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ment of the trustee, verification, collection and distribution of the estate consid-
ered are non-arbitrable in most countries.14 Core (pure) bankruptcy disputes have 
to be resolved in a national court of law.15 In the national insolvency proceedings, 
national courts apply national insolvency law.
The situation is more complex in cross-border insolvency disputes. Cross-border 
disputes exist whenever the debtor has assets or creditors in more than one coun-
try. Such situations are regulated on the EU level by the EU Regulation on cross-
border insolvency proceedings, which has been in effect since January 1, 2017.16 
Before we move on to analyze the provisions of this Regulation (EU Regulation), 
we should first discuss the provisions of the (former) EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings (EC Regulation)17 and its connection to the arbitration proceedings.
Contrary to established rules of party autonomy in international arbitration, the 
EC Regulation, arguably, restricts the freedom of the arbitral tribunal to apply 
the choice of law rules chosen by the parties or that the arbitral tribunal deems 
are otherwise appropriate and replaces them with the mandatory choice of law 
rules provided for in the EC Regulation.18 The applicable law should be the law 
of country where the proceeding is initiated. That law should be lex concursus.19
As a result, the effects of the insolvency of a corporation will have effect on the 
enforceability of the current contracts against the insolvent estate, including ar-
bitration agreements or on pending arbitral proceeding to which it is a party, are 
highly related to the personal law of the corporation.20
The EC Regulation recognizes an exception to this rule in Article 15. According to 
Art. 15 of the EC Regulation “the effects of the insolvency proceedings on lawsuit 
pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested shall 
be governed solely by the law of the Member State in which the lawsuit is pend-
ing” (lex fori / lex arbitri). 
14  Lazić, V., Insolvency Proceedings and Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law Internatioanl 1998, p. 154. 
Lazić, V.; Jarvin, S.; Magnusson, A., International Arbitration Court Decisions, Juris Publishing, 2008, 
p. 768.
15  ICC award No. 6697 (1990), Casa v Cambior, Rev Arb 1992, p. 135.
16  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insol-
vency proceedings, Official Journal of the European Union, L 141, 5 June 2015.
17  Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, [2000] OJ L 160, 
pp. 0001 – 0018.
18  Robertson M., Cross Border Insolvency and International Arbitration Characterization and choice of 
law issues in light of Electrim SA ( in bankruptcy) v. Vivendi SA, MLB thesis, Bucerius Law School, 
2009.
19  Art. 4 of the EC Regulation
20  Karagianni, I., Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings, International Hellenic University, 2014, p. 21. 
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According to these rules, the insolvency proceeding has to be run by the court in 
the country where the debtor has assets and applicable law should be the law of 
that county, except when a lawsuit is pending. 
However, the question is what is the meaning of a pending lawsuit? Are arbitra-
tion proceedings covered by this term? The case Elektrim v. Vivendi 21 brings up 
this issue. 
As previously mentioned, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings does not affect 
the validity of the arbitration agreement in most countries.22 In other words, most 
national jurisdictions consider that the arbitration agreement remains unaffected 
by the commencement of insolvency proceedings, though there are domestic laws 
providing for the exact opposite.23
However, there are national laws that contain provisions directly addressing the 
effect of bankruptcy proceedings on arbitration, such as the Article 142 of Polish 
Bankruptcy and Reorganization Act (PBRA).
We will discuss this matter as we examine the case Elektrim v. Vivendi as an ex-
ample. Vivendi, a French company, and its subsidiaries initiated arbitration under 
the ICC Rules with the seat of arbitration in Geneva against Elektrim S.A, a Polish 
company. The action was first taken in 2006. In August 2007 however, Elektrim 
was declared bankrupt in Poland. In a separate proceeding, Elektrim claimed that 
the Polish law with respect to bankruptcy should apply on the arbitration. The 
Polish company claimed the invalidity of the arbitration agreement based on the 
Art. 142 and 147of the Polish Bankruptcy and Reorganization Act (PBRA), “Any 
arbitration clause concluded by the bankrupt shall lose its legal effect as of the date 
bankruptcy is declared and any pending arbitration proceedings shall be discon-
tinued.”
The arbitral tribunal qualified the issue of a bankruptcy of the Polish party as 
an issue of the standing to participate in the proceeding which depended on the 
preliminary issue of the party’s legal capacity. The tribunal held that the matter of 
21  Swiss Federal Tribunal, March 31 2009,Vivendi v 4A, 428/2008. Interim award of 21 July 2008.
  URL:http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/31%20mars%202009%204A%20
428%202008.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2016, and English Court of Appeal, July 9 2009, Syska & 
Anor v Vivendi Universal SA & Ors, [2009] EWCA Civ 677. 
  URL: http://www.lawreports.co.uk/WLRD/2009/CACiv/Syska_v_Vivendi.html. Accessed 20 De-
cember 2016.
22  Lazić, V., Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings: Claims of Ordinary Bankruptcy Creditors, 
 URL=http://www.ejcl.org/33/art33-2.html#N_1_, 17 January 2017. 
23  Kroll, S., Arbitration and Insolvency in (Mistelis, L., Lew, J., eds), Pervasive problems in international 
arbitration , Alpheen aan den Rijn, 2006
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legal capacity had to be taken according to general laws on conflicts of law of the 
Private International Law Act (PILA). This means that for a foreign legal entity, 
legal capacity is governed by the law at the place of incorporation.24 In this case, 
the law of incorporation was the Polish law. The arbitration tribunal further held 
that, pursuant to that provision, Elektrim lost the capacity to be a party in the 
arbitration proceeding and the arbitration agreement was void. 
As a consequence, the arbitration proceeding against Elektrim was abandoned. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirmed the award. Furthermore, in inter-
preting the Art. 142 of PBRA, the Court determined that any pending arbitration 
proceedings are to be terminated ex lege, even if they are at an advanced stage.25
On the other hand, the English perspective on the same matter is completely 
different.26 In 2003, Vivendi initiated LCIA arbitration proceedings against Ele-
ktrim with the seat of arbitration in London. As mentioned above, Elektrim was 
declared bankrupt in August 2007 and again pleaded the Polish Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization Act requesting the discontinuation of the arbitration proceedings. 
Contrary to the Swiss Arbitral decision, the LCIA posed the question as an issue 
of law applicable to the effect of bankruptcy on the lawsuit pending under the 
Article 15 of the Insolvency Regulation and found the English law to be appli-
cable, being “the law of the Member States in which that lawsuit is pending”. The 
tribunal stated that the Article 15 should take precedence because it is lex specialis 
and deals more directly and pertinently with the problem at hand, whereas Ar-
ticle 4.2(e) is lex generalis. Article 4.2(e) of the EC Regulation covers all contracts 
(substantive agreements and procedural agreements), including arbitration agree-
ments and contracts for reference of a dispute to arbitration. The LCIA decided 
that the English law governed the issues and not the Polish law, and according to 
the English law the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to arbitrate despite Elektrim’s 
bankruptcy. The English High Court confirmed the award. The arbitral tribunal 
and the English High Court were based on the EU Regulation on Cross-Border 
Insolvency which in the Article 15 states “the effects of insolvency proceedings 
24  Art. 154, 155 PIL. 
25  Lazić, V., Cross border Insolvency and Arbitration, Which consequences of insolvency proceedings should be 
given effect in arbitration, Chapter 18, International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: 
Synergy, Convergence, and Evolution: Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten, Kluwer Law International, 
2011, p. 343. This finding gave rise to strong criticism in the arbitration community, with most com-
mentators arguing that Article 142 PBRA did not affect the capacity of an insolvent Polish entity to 
be a party in foreign arbitral proceedings. In their view the provision pertained to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, which is an issue governed exclusively by the Swiss lex arbitri.
26  Syska and Elektrim SA (in administration) v. Vivendi Universal SA, High Court of Justice queen’s Bench 
Division Commercial Court, 2 Oct. 2008, [2008] EWHC 2155; Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ 
677.
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on a lawsuit pending concerning an asset or a right of which a debtor has been 
divested shall be governed solely by the law of the Member State in which that 
lawsuit is pending”. 
The English High Court confirmed that the lawsuit pending included pending ar-
bitral proceedings and thus the arbitral tribunal had correctly applied the English 
law to determine the effect of Elektrim’s bankruptcy on the pending arbitration. 
The arbitration agreements that relate to future, non pending arbitral proceedings 
constitute current contracts for the purposes of Art. 4.(1) of the EC Regulation 
and are thus governed by the lex concursus, while the arbitration agreements that 
relate to existing pending arbitration proceedings are covered by the exception in 
the Art. 4.2 (f ) and 15 of the EU Regulation.27
Conclusion. These articles govern not only the validity of the arbitration clause, 
but further effects of bankruptcy on pending arbitration as well. Both the loss 
of legal effect and discontinuation of pending arbitration proceedings are effects 
of bankruptcy on arbitration, and as such should fall under the Article 15 of the 
Insolvency Regulation when the applicable law is to be determined.28 Also, we 
can add that arbitration proceedings are equivalent substitutes to ordinary legal 
proceedings in all Member States, and there is no substantive or procedural reason 
justifying a different solution.
The case Elektrim v. Vivendi opened a major debate in arbitral theory, but this 
“Elektrim era” has come to an end. On January 1, 2016, the new Polish Bank-
ruptcy Act came into force. The new law derogates from the provision under 
which a declaration of bankruptcy rendered an arbitration agreement entered into 
by an insolvent party void. According to the new law a declaration of bankruptcy 
will not affect ongoing arbitration, in the way that arbitration will no longer have 
to be discontinued and will be treated in the same way as proceedings in the 
state courts. However, any new arbitration proceedings will have to be conducted 
against the official receiver of the bankruptcy estate if the bankrupt company is 
the respondent, or can be initiated only by the receiver if the bankrupt company 
is the claimant.29
27  Syska and another v. Vivendi Universal SA and others 2008, EWHC 2155, statement 11 and 71.
28  Lazic V., The Effects of Bankruptcy on Arbitration: An Unresolved Issue of Characterization and Applicable 
Law,
  URL=http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/09/14/the-effects-of-bankruptcy-on-arbitra-
tion-an-unresolved-issue-of-characterization-and-applicable-law/. Accessed 10 January 2017.
29  For more details see Galkowski, K., K., Elektrim case era comes to an end, URL http://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=461ea330-c8dc-42ac-a196-45b5c843f69b,10 January 2017.
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3.  IMPACT Of bANKRUPTCy ON ARbITRATION PROCEEDING
For a party that initiated an arbitration proceeding against a company which later 
declared bankruptcy the question emerges as to what will happen with the ongo-
ing arbitral proceedings. The question is whether the bankruptcy of a party in the 
arbitration agreement leads to suspension (interruption) of all other procedures or 
otherwise affects the continuation of the arbitration proceedings.
In internal disputes where the applicable law is the law of the country of the tri-
bunal seat, the suspension of the arbitral proceedings should be applied if it is so 
stipulated by the national law. According to the rule of suspension which reflects 
the principle of jurisdictional attraction, the commencement of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings as a form of court proceeding should terminate or interrupt all other 
actions in order to preserve the bankruptcy estate, and all creditors of the debtor 
(except for the privileged creditors) put in the same position.30 This practically 
means that any already initiated judicial or administrative proceedings will be 
terminated or that they cannot be even initiated in the first place. In this sense, 
for the specific moment when bankruptcy proceedings are instituted, the Ser-
bian Bankruptcy Act provides as follows: “As soon as the legal consequences of 
initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding have become effective, any and all judicial 
proceedings against the bankrupt debtor and their assets are to be suspended, as 
are any and all administrative proceedings initiated at the request of the bankrupt 
debtor and any and all administrative and tax proceedings the matter of which 
is to determine the pecuniary obligations of the bankrupt debtor”.31 The rule of 
suspension or termination of all proceedings is applied to internal bankruptcy 
proceedings to such an extent that it can be considered a generally accepted rule 
or principle.32 This provision usually represents a mandatory provision on the na-
tional level,33 and it reflects the principle of territoriality.
For example, if the arbitration proceedings were not terminated by the tribunal after 
the declaration of bankruptcy, the court would refuse to allow enforcement of the 
30  In this regard, it is implied that special principles apply in bankruptcy proceedings: such as the prin-
ciple of collective protection of creditors, the principle of equality, the principle of universality etc. 
Vasiljević, M., Kompanijsko pravo, Beograd 2012, p. 440 et seq, Jovanović Zattila, M. ; Čolović, V., 
Stečajno pravo, Niš, 2013, pp. 20-22.
31  Art. 88 Law on Bankruptcy Procedure, The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, (“Sl. glasnik 
RS”, br. 104/2009, 99/2011 - dr. zakon, 71/2012 - odluka US i 83/2014) No. 84/04 
32  Belohlavek, A., Impact of Insolvency of a Party on Pending Arbitration Proceedings in Czech Republic, 
England and Switzerland and Other Countries, yearbook on International Arbitration, (Roth, M; Giest-
linger,M., eds.), EAP, Berlin, 2010, pp. 145-166, URL= http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721724. Accessed 
10 January 2017
33  More about mandatory rules in International commercial arbitration, Vukadinović Marković, J., De-
jstvo normi neposredne primene u međunarodnoj trgovinskoj arbitraži, Pravna riječ, 2016, pp. 139-152 
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rendered award. The principle of territoriality institutes a separate or independent 
proceeding to be pursued in each forum in which the debtor’s assets are located.34
Namely, in contrast to the so-called internal or national bankruptcy in which na-
tional judges apply national rules of the suspension, the arbitrators and judges in 
cross-border insolvency are faced with the dilemma of whether they are obliged to 
apply the principle of universality or principle of territoriality.
Since the national bankruptcy laws are mainly based on a territorial approach,35 
there are several issues that occur when multinational enterprises go bankrupt. 
The essential problem is that national legal systems can be confronted by each 
other, considering that there is a conflict of laws between different legal systems 
governing the bankruptcy proceedings.36 Furthermore, locating the centre of 
main interest (COMI) of the multinational company, according to which the 
applicable law is determined, is even more complex when a company operates 
through its subsidiaries in different legal regimes.37 For international or cross-bor-
der insolvencies,38 the issue is, however, more complex,39 especially in cases where 
prior to the opening of bankruptcy of one of the parties has already initiated arbi-
tration proceedings. In these cases, as previously, the question arises whether the 
arbitrators, who lead the arbitration proceedings as a private procedure and under 
the authority of the private contracting parties in general are obliged to take into 
account the application of others’ national rules on suspension of the proceed-
ings, i.e. to accept the principle of suspension.40 If so, what constitutes the legal 
basis of this commitment, especially in consideration of the fact that the arbitra-
tion tribunals do not have a classic lex fori41 and are not obliged to apply national 
provisions to open proceedings in court and to a recognized foreign proceeding?42 
34  Omar. P., European Insolvency law, (1st edn), Ashgate, 2004, p. 24.
35  Ibid.
36  Warner, S., Cross Border Insolvency: The COMI Issue in the Stanford Case p. 3-4. 
  URL=http://www.legalhoudini.nl/images/upload/S%20Warner_Cross%20Border%20In-
solvency.pdf.  Accessed 15 January 2017.  
37  Ibid.
38  yang, G., Insolvency Proceedings and Their Effect on International Commercial Arbitration, p. 39. 
  URL=http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/892/212/RUG01-001892212_2012_0001_AC.pdf. 
Accessed 20 January 2017.
39  Ibid, p. 3.
40  Ibid, p. 43. 
41  Kovach, B. R., A Transnational Approach to Arbitrability of Insolvency Proceedings in International 
Arbitration, p.56.
  URL://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/391/5979.html. Accessed 20 January 2017.
42  Ibid., p. 57, note 290. states that the arbitrators in numerous ICC decisions are not related to the 
bankruptcy process opened beyond their seats 
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To avoid these difficulties, in the situation where one multinational company goes 
bankrupt, the national court applies the principle of universality. The legal basis 
for such action can be found in the above-mentioned provisions of EC and EU 
Insolvency Regulation.
The principle of universality is a system in which all aspects of the debtor’s insol-
vency are encompassed by a single central proceeding under one insolvency law. 
The universality system usually relies on international treaties or conventions as 
the EU Insolvency Regulation. According to Article 3, the jurisdiction to initiate a 
single universal proceeding should be in the state in whose territory the debtor has 
the centre of their main interest.43 This centre is presumed to be the place where 
the office is registered, if there is no proof to the contrary. According to the pre-
amble of the regulation, COMI should be in the place where the debtor conducts 
their business administration on a regular basis and therefore ascertainable by 
third parties.44 Likewise, the jurisdiction to initiate a secondary proceeding should 
be in the state where the debtor has an establishment. The effects of the secondary 
proceeding are restricted to the assets situated in that territory.45
4.  THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCy REGULATION
The regulation on insolvency proceedings (EC) No 1346/2000, adopted by the 
Council of the European Union, went into force in 2002.46 The regulation pro-
vides the first set of unified rules for the settlement of cross-border insolvency.47 It 
has a binding nature and is directly applicable to the EU member states.48 There-
fore, it did not require any implementation by national legal systems. 
The regulation has the following objectives: proper functioning of the internal 
market of EU,49 avoiding incentives for transferring the assets from one member 
state to another while seeking a more favorable legal position (forum shopping),50 
improving efficiency and effectiveness in cross-border insolvency,51 and introduc-
43  Art. 3 of the EU Insolvency Regulation
44  Recital 13 of the EU Insolvency Regulation
45  Kolmann, S., European international insolvency law – Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on in-
solvency proceedings (The European Legal Forum, 2002), p.169; URL= http://www.simons-law.com/
library/pdf/e/287.pdf. Accessed 22. January 2017.
46  Ibid., p. 167 
47  Ibid.
48  Exept Denmark. More about direct effect and direct applicability see Vukadinović, R; Vukadinović 
Marković, J., Uvod u institucije i pravo EU, Kragujevac 2016, p. 137 et seq.
49  Recital 2 of the EC Regulation No. 1346/2000
50  Ibid, recital 4
51  Ibid, recital 8.
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ing uniform rules on conflict of law rules.52 With respect to the determination of 
the courts with jurisdiction, the EC Regulation distinguishes between the main 
proceedings (Art. 3.1),53 and secondary proceedings (Art. 3.2).54
For the relationship between arbitration and insolvency proceedings the Art. 4 
is important as it determines the applicable law to the insolvency proceeding. 
The law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the 
Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are initiated.55 The 
consequences of this provision are that the law of the State where the proceedings 
are initiated shall in particular determine the conditions for the commencement of 
such proceedings, how they will be run and closed. It shall determine in particular: 
the effects of insolvency proceedings on current contracts to which the debtor is 
party,56 the effects of the insolvency proceedings brought by individual creditors, 
with the exception of lawsuits pending.57 Another exception is provided under 
the Art. 15 and it reads: The effects of insolvency proceedings on a lawsuit pend-
ing concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested shall be 
governed solely by the law of the Member State in which that lawsuit is pending.
As we can see, this exception applies to the aforementioned arbitration cases. As a 
conclusion, we can point out that the arbitration proceedings in progress should 
be treated as pending law suits and applicable law should be the law of the country 
where the proceeding is conducted.
The regulation was subject to revision ten years after enforcement, which resulted 
in the adoption of the Recast Regulation in 2015 (EU Regulation).58 The aim of 
the revision was to improve the operation of the regulation regarding its initial 
aims, and its resilience in economic crisis.59 The EU Regulation extends the scope 
52  Ibid, recital 23.
53  The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests 
is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. In the case of a company or legal 
person, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the center of its main interests in the 
absence of proof to the contrary.
54  Where the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated within the territory of a Member State, the 
courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings against that 
debtor only if he possesses an establishment within the territory of that other Member State. The 
effects of those proceedings shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the 
latter Member State.
55  Art 4 of the EC Regulation. 
56  Art. 4(e) of the EC Regulation
57  Art. 4(f ) of the EC REgulation 
58  Leandro, A., The new European Insolvency Regulation, URL=http://conflictoflaws.net/2015/the-new-eu-
ropean-insolvency-regulation/. Accessed 22 January 2017.
59  Ibid.
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of the regulation to proceedings whose aim is to give the debtor a ‘second chance’, 
by promoting a rescue culture (pre-insolvency proceedings). It includes provisions 
regarding the insolvency proceedings of corporate groups and puts in more con-
trols to prevent abusive forum shopping.60 It improves the coordination between 
the main and secondary proceedings, by making a stronger legal framework. 
The EU Regulation provides that unless otherwise stated, the law of the Member 
State of the opening of proceedings should be applicable (lex concursus). This rule 
on conflict of laws should be valid both for the main insolvency proceedings and 
for local proceedings. The lex concursus determines all the effects of the insolvency 
proceedings, both procedural and substantive, on the persons and legal relations 
concerned. It governs all the conditions for the opening, conduct and closure of 
the insolvency proceedings.61 For the first time, the EU Regulation determines 
relationship between insolvency and arbitration proceeding, provides that “...the 
law applicable to the effects of insolvency proceedings on any pending lawsuit or 
pending arbitral proceedings concerning an asset or right which forms part of the 
debtor’s insolvency estate should be the law of the Member State where the lawsuit 
is pending or where the arbitration has its seat. However, this rule should not af-
fect national rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards”.62
Regarding jurisdiction, the EU Regulation provides that the courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situ-
ated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.63 In accordance with 
the international jurisdiction, the EU Regulation provides in article 6 (1): “The 
courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings 
have been opened in accordance with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction for any ac-
tion which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked 
with them”. Article 6 (2) is important for the arbitration, and it states: “Where an 
action referred to in paragraph 1 is related to an action in civil and commercial 
matters against the same defendant, the insolvency practitioner may bring both 
actions before the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the 
defendant is domiciled, or, where the action is brought against several defendants, 
before the courts of the Member State within the territory of which any of them 
60  Recital 5 and 10 EU Regulation . “When the corporate’s centre of main interest is shifted in the 
preceding 3 months, the rebuttable presumption that centre of main interest is at the registered office 
will not apply.” See Deringer, B. F., The recast EC Regulation on Insolvency proceedings: a welcome revi-
sion, 
  URL=http://www.freshfields.com/en/global/. Accessed 22 January 2017.
61  Recital 66 of the EU Regulation. 
62  Recital 73 of the EU regulation. 
63  Art. 3 of the EU Regulation.
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is domiciled, provided that those courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012.”
And the most important novelty of the EU Regulation refers to the effects of in-
solvency proceedings on arbitral proceedings. The Article 18 provides: “The effects 
of insolvency proceedings on a pending lawsuit or pending arbitral proceedings 
concerning an asset or a right which forms part of a debtor’s insolvency estate shall 
be governed solely by the law of the Member State in which that lawsuit is pend-
ing or in which the arbitral tribunal has its seat”. With this provision there is no 
more room for the dilemma about the law that applies to the pending arbitration 
proceedings.  
5.  CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that there are various areas in which the principles of insolvency 
law and arbitration law are conflicting, the commencement of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. In the case of a 
cross-border insolvency proceeding, when the arbitral proceeding began before 
the insolvency proceeding against the debtor had, the arbitral tribunal should 
apply the law of the country of the seat of arbitral tribunal. In the event that the 
arbitration proceeding has not commenced, arbitrators shall respect the provision 
on general jurisdiction provided by EU Regulation.  
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ABSTRACT
Just like every human invention, intellectual property has two sides to it, on the one hand it 
allows businesses to be more productive and scientists to share research data almost instanta-
neously, on the other hand it grants criminals an additional tool to commit crimes and get 
away with it. The question is how such criminal behavior can be controlled because crime is 
hidden behind technology and innovations. Also cyberspace offers room for the entire spectrum 
of transnational criminal activity. Analysis of the comparative judicial practice in connection 
with intellectual property is of the exceptional importance for securing intellectual property 
rights in the territory of EU. The states who are the leaders in innovation and creativity estab-
lish strong legal mechanisms which provide the protection of intellectual property rights. It is 
generally accepted that only legal use of intellectual property can bring innovation and progress 
to a society. In Republic of Serbia adopted laws are, to the greatest extent, harmonized with 
the current both regional and international standards in the field of protection of intellectual 
property rights. Author deals with the criminal law protection of intellectual property and the 
importance of intellectual property rights as activators of global streams in EU.
Keywords: intellectual property, criminal law, piracy, digital currency.
1.  REASONS fOR IPR PROTECTION
Much has been written about the nature and meaning of IP rights but they can 
best be described as intangible property rights or rights in ideas. The people all 
over the world work daily to create a better world. They create products and ser-
vices that improve the world’s ability to communicate, to learn, to understand 
diverse cultures and beliefs, to be mobile, to live better and longer lives, to produce 
and consume energy efficiently and to secure food, nourishment and safety. Most 
of the value of this work is intangible—it lies in people’s entrepreneurial spirit, 
their creativity, ingenuity and insistence on progress and in creating a better life 
for their communities and for communities around the world.
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As a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) publication explained:1“The 
history of the human race is a history of the application of imagination, or innova-
tion and creativity, to an existing base of knowledge in order to solve problems. 
Imagination feeds progress in the arts as well as science. Intellectual property (IP) 
is the term that describes the ideas, inventions, technologies, artworks, music and 
literature that are intangible when first created, but become valuable in tangible 
form as products.” These intangible assets, often captured as copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, trade secrets and other forms of “intellectual property,” reflect most 
developed countries’ advantage in the global economy.2
Legal protection of the intellectual property has significant importance for modern 
states and it has both global and national components. Global economic aspects 
of the IPR protection includes fulfilment of all basic principles of the multilateral 
conventions and adoption in the national legislation. Due to the changes in mod-
ern economy and business strategy, new legal tools of protection are introduced. 
3The profit from intellectual property infringement is a strong lure to organized 
criminal enterprises, which could use infringement as a revenue source to fund 
their unlawful activities. When consumers buy infringing products, including dig-
ital content, distributed by or benefiting organized crime, they are contributing to 
financing their dangerous and illegal activities.
We are facing the digital challenge on the field of the infringement of the IPR. The 
Internet and other technological innovations have revolutionized society and the 
way we can obtain information and purchase products lowering barriers to entry 
and creating global distribution channels, they have opened new markets and 
opportunities for exports of information, goods and services, including enabling 
small and medium sized businesses to reach consumers worldwide. These innova-
tions have also facilitated piracy and counterfeiting on a global scale.4
While the costs and risks involved in product development are high, the costs of 
product imitation or intellectual property infringement are generally low. Once a 
successful book is published, it may be replicated with little effort by photocopy-
ing, commercial reprinting, or unauthorized electronic distributions. A successful 
1  Intellectual Property: A Power Tool for Economic Growth, WIPO Publication, No. 888, 2003, pp.10-11.
2  Farah, P. D., Tremolada, R., Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 2014, pp. 21–47.
3  Ryan, M., Knowledge Diplomacy, Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington DC, 1998, p.12.
4  Horan, A.,Johnson, C., Sykes, H., Foreign Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for 
Selected U.S. Industries, Office of Industries U.S. International Trade Commission Washington, 2005, 
p.21.
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new software program may easily be copied by digital means and transmitted via 
the Internet. A drug approved by the government for marketing after extensive 
R&D and clinical testing by the developer may be duplicated with much less cost 
by others. One result of market exclusivity is that it permits the intellectual prop-
erty right holder to demand higher prices.5
The aim of this paper is to investigate various aspects of the legal protection of 
intellectual property rights. Specifically, it is assumed that the intellectual property 
appears in different forms and as such is the subject to protection of many legal 
authorities. In particular, legal protection of the intellectual property is primarily 
provided by the right of intellectual property, which includes copyright and re-
lated rights as well as the industrial property right. A special form of the violation 
of intellectual property is performed by the internet and computer data usage. 
In a broader sense, the suppression of illegal behavior in the area of computer 
protection often includes the offenses that directly violate the rights protected by 
the intellectual property rights. The author started from the basic principles of the 
protection of the intellectual property rights in the international and European 
law and then discussed the connection between the infringement of the intel-
lectual property rights and the criminal acts committed via Internet, in order to 
emphasize the uniqueness of the problem and the need to enable the protection 
of the intellectual property rights through the unique and broad legal protection. 
In this paper, different forms of violations of intellectual property rights provided 
with criminal legal protection by different law areas are analyzed, with particular 
reference to a wide array of problems concerning violations of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
2.   THE CONCEPT Of WILLfUL INfRINGEMENT Of IPR AND 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
The owner of a copyright has five specific rights: reproduce, prepare derivative 
works, distribute, perform and display. Thus, violation of any of these rights is 
considered trespassing into the owners “exclusive domain”. Copyright law aims 
to balance the competing interests of both, the artists and the general public by 
protecting artists works and encouraging their creativity on the one hand and 
on the other by allowing public access to information. An intellectual property 
infringement occurs when an act is done which is inconsistent with the rights of 
a rights holder.6
5  Correa, C. M., Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, London and New york, 
Zed Books Ltd., 2000, pp. 35-37.
6  Branstetter, L. G., Fishman, R., Foley, C. F., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase Interna-
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Intellectual property laws are territorial in scope, in that they apply only to rights 
which are registered within the country. This is relevant to the question of in-
fringement. For example, an overseas company which is a patent or trade mark 
owner in its home country can only complain about an infringement in a foreign 
country if its patent or trade mark is registered in that foreign country.7
The situation is different in the case of copyright, which as a consequence of the 
importation of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS Agreement8, is enforceable 
by a copyright owner in all countries which are signatories to the TRIPS Agree-
ment.
Generally, TRIPS (1) establishes minimum standards of protection of such rights, 
(2) prescribes procedures and remedies to be available in member states to enforce 
rights, (3) makes the WTO dispute settlement mechanism available to address 
TRIPS-related disputes, and (4) extends basic WTO principles such as transpar-
ency, national treatment, and most favoured nation treatment to intellectual prop-
erty rights.9Consistent with the general trade liberalization objectives of the WTO, 
these procedures are required to be “applied in a manner as to avoid the creation 
of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse”.10
The terms “counterfeiting” and “piracy” in relation to goods, refer to the manufac-
ture, distribution and sale of copies of goods which have been made without the au-
thority of the owner of the intellectual property. These goods are intended to appear 
to be so similar to the original as to be passed off as genuine items. This includes use 
of famous brands on pharmaceutical products, clothing, perfumes, and household 
products, not manufactured by or on behalf of the owner of the trade mark, as well 
as exact copies of CDs containing music or software, which are traded in a form 
intended to be indistinguishable to ordinary consumers from the genuine product.
In a criminal law context, intellectual property counterfeiting and piracy is defined 
as contraband activities which centre on the illegal production and sale of goods 
tional Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from US Firm-Level Panel Data, quarterly Journal of 
Economics, No.121, 2004, pp. 321–349.
7  Andersen, B, If “Intellectual Property Right is the Answer”, What is the Question? Revisiting the Patent 
Controversies,Economics of Innovation and New Technology, No.13, 2004, pp. 417–442.
8  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - TRIPS Agreement is Annex 
1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, 
Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
9  Drahos, P., Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS and the GATT, Prometheus, 
No.11, 1995, pp. 6–19.
10  Infringements of Designs Protected by Design Law and Copyright, Knowledge and Awareness Building 
Conference, OHIM, Alicante, 18-20 November 2015, p. 21.
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which are intended to pass for the real product. In this context “contraband” 
is goods whose importation, exportation or possession is forbidden. Dealings in 
contraband invariably involve smuggling, where the manufacturers and distribu-
tors of these products also seek to evade taxes on the production and wholesaling 
of these products.11
Article 61 TRIPS provides that Members shall provide for criminal procedures 
and penalties “to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting 
or copyright piracy on a commercial scale”. Among the criminal sanctions which 
are listed in the Article are: “imprisonment, and/ or monetary fines sufficient to 
provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for fines of a 
corresponding gravity”.
Also in appropriate cases, Article 61 TRIPS provides for “the seizure, forfeiture 
and destruction of the infringing goods and any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence”. Article 61 
TRIPS also provides for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other 
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, “in particular where they are 
committed willfully and on a commercial scale”. A consequence of providing for 
“criminal procedures” in the case of certain willful infringements is that a higher 
standard of proof will apply than that which is required in civil proceedings. In 
systems of justice derived from the British model the standard will be beyond 
reasonable doubt. The burden of proof will usually be carried by the prosecution. 
Where defenses exist, the defendant will usually carry the burden of making out 
the defense, usually on the balance of probabilities.
Article 61 TRIPS permits the institution of criminal penalties in the case of willful 
infringement. As a matter of practice it is not uncommon in intellectual property 
disputes for a complainant to send a cease and desist notice to an alleged infringer 
to put them on notice that they may be infringing the complainant’s intellectual 
property rights. This may, however, be unrealistic in cases of large-scale copyright 
piracy and trademark counterfeiting, particularly where the perpetrators may be 
involved in organized crime.12
A particular problem in proving the willfulness of corporate defendants is in iden-
tifying the persons whose state of mind is relevant to the culpability of the cor-
poration. Generally speaking, a company is liable for the acts and knowledge of 
11  Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A., The globalization of intellectual property rights: Four learned lessons and four 
thesis, Journal of Global Policy, No.1, 2010, pp.137-149.
12  Jarrett, H. M., Chandler, C. G., Hagen, E., Sharrin, A., Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes, Fourth 
Edition, Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 2012, p.26.
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persons who could be described as part of the directing mind and will of the 
company. These would include the board of directors, the managing director and 
other superior officers who carry out the functions of management and who speak 
for the company. The persons who are treated in law as the company are to be 
found by identifying those natural persons who by the memorandum and articles 
of association, or as the result of action taken by the directors, or by the company 
in general meeting pursuant to the articles, are entrusted with the exercise of the 
powers of the company.
The degree of willfulness or deliberation in the infringing conduct will have a 
bearing on the size of any pecuniary penalties which are imposed. Also relevant as 
a quantification factor will be the multiplicity of offences by a defendant and the 
recurrence of similar offences.13
Article 61 also refers to the deterrent effect of penalties. This will involve a consid-
eration of 36 the capacity of the defendant to pay, the incentives for wrongdoing 
and the likelihood of recurrence.
3.  LEGAL PROTECTION Of IPR IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Several recent articles have focused on specific legislative initiatives from the Eu-
ropean Commission in the field of intellectual property. In 2009, the European 
Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy was established by the European Com-
mission, as part of its DG Internal Market and Services, to support the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights and to help combat the growing 
threat of intellectual property infringements.14
The European Commission’s aim is to prevent the infringement of intellectual 
property rights. The Commission is seeking stronger cooperation between au-
thorities at all levels in the fight against intellectual property infringement. Legal 
instruments, such as the Directive on enforcement already exist in the EU to 
prevent the infringement of intellectual property rights.15In December 2015 the 
Commission published a consultation on the evaluation and modernization of the 
legal framework for the enforcement of IPR. 
13  Nuth, M. S., Crime and technology – Challenges or solutions? Taking advantage of new technologies: For 
and against crime, Computer Law and Security Report, No.24, 2008, pp.437– 446.
14  Cook, T., Revision of the European Union regime on customs enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, No.18, 2013, pp. 485-49.
15  Directive 2006/114/EC of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
(codified version) [2006] OJ L 376, p. 21.
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The Commission sought views from all interested parties, in particular are right 
holders, the judiciary and legal profession, intermediaries, public authorities, con-
sumers and civil society, on the question if the legal enforcement frame work is 
still fit for purpose. Also, the Commission committed to undertake a set of target 
edactions which aim to foster the cross-border digital economy but also aim to 
ensure a safe online environment for business operators and consumers.
The Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights such as copyright 
and related rights, trademarks, designs or patents was adopted in April 2004.16The 
Directive requires all EU countries to apply effective and proportionate remedies 
and penalties against those engaged in counterfeiting and piracy, and aims to cre-
ate a level playing field for right holders in the EU. It means that all EU countries 
should have a similar set of measures available for right holders to defend their 
intellectual property rights.
Successively, Regulation 386/2012217 entrusted the Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market (OHIM) with tasks related to the enforcement of IPR, in-
cluding the setting up of the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellec-
tual Property Rights. According to the Regulation (recital 20), the Office should 
facilitate and support the activities of national authorities and Union institutions 
relating to the enforcement of IP rights.
In the area of patents, attention remains currently focused, and is likely to contin-
ue to be so for some time to come, on the process of implementing the European 
Patent with unitary effect and the Unified Patent Court.18
In March 2013, Europol19 Focal Point ‘COPy’s’ mandate to investigate counterfeit 
products was expanded to include substandard and dangerous goods.20Europol’s 
Serious Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2013 identified counter-
feit goods violating, health, safety and food regulations and substandard goods as 
a recommended priority crime area as part of the EU Policy Cycle 2014-2017.
16  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights [2004], OJ L 157..
17  Regulation (EU) No 386/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on entrusting the Office 
for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) with tasks related to the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, including the assembling of public and private-sector representa-
tives as a European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights [2012] OJ L 129/1.
18  Cook, T., The progress to date with the Unitary European Patent and the Unified Patent Court for Europe, 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, No. 18, 2013, pp. 584-588.
19  Council Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police Office (Europol) [2009] OJ L 
121/37
20  Focal Points are teams formed by specialists and analysts supporting Member States operations related 
to specific areas of crime that are included in the above Council Decision.
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Key findings of the European study “Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Indus-
tries: contribution to economic performance and employment in Europe”21reveal 
that approximately 89 % of the EU’s total external trade and 39 % of total eco-
nomic activity in the EU (EUR 4.7 trillion annually) is generated by IPR-inten-
sive industries. Regarding the breadth of the problem, poor quality counterfeit 
clothing and accessories of luxury brands were, until recently, the most commonly 
observed products. However, the involvement of sophisticated networks of crimi-
nals seeking to make enormous profits has led to mass production of high qual-
ity imitations. Criminal groups are no longer purely confined to the duplication 
of apparel and accessories. Counterfeited goods now include all sectors, such as 
pharmaceuticals, electronic goods, household products, cosmetics, automotive 
spare parts, pesticides, food and beverages, etc. The European Commission (DG 
TAXUD) reports that in 2013, 25.2 % of the products detained were for daily use 
and would be potentially dangerous to the health and safety of consumers.
Research carried out for Situation Report on Counterfeiting in the European 
Union shows that the source country for over two thirds of counterfeit goods 
circulating in the EU is China, and that most goods – both legal and counterfeit 
– are produced there.22
Evidence suggests23 that organized crime groups frequently use Free Trade Zones 
(FTZs) to tranship, label and obscure the port of origin of illegal goods. There are 
approximately 3 000 FTZs in 135 countries. They are “designated areas within ju-
risdictions in which incentives are offered to support the development of exports, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and local employment. These incentives include 
exemptions from duty and taxes, simplified administrative procedures, and the 
duty free importation of raw materials, machinery, parts and equipment“.24
Several reports analyzing FTZs highlight the lack of IT system coordination be-
tween customs administration and the FTZs administration, allowing criminals to 
easily re-document shipments by concealing the origin, contents and destinations 
of shipments.25According to some opinions, the development and expansion of 
21  Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Industries: contribution to economic performance and employ-
ment in the European Union, Industry-Level Analysis Report, September 2013.
22  2015 Situation Report on Counterfeiting in the European Union, Joint project between Europol and 
the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, April 2015, p.14.
23  See Jankovic, D., Differentiation Between The Police Activities And Evidence Collection In Criminal Pro-
ceeding, In: Thematic Conference Proceedings of International Significance, Academy of Criminalistic 
And Police Studies, International Scientific Conference “Archibald Reiss Days, Belgrade, 2015, pp. 
247-259.
24  FATF Report, Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade Zones, March 2010.
25  BASCAP, The role and responsibilities of FTZs, 2011.
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new FTZs, in particular the Port of Tanger Med (15 km from the EU) could pro-
vide additional opportunities for OCGs to produce, manufacture, label, tranship 
and export counterfeit goods into the EU. Although the majority of counterfeit 
products in circulation in the EU are manufactured outside the EU, research has 
highlighted domestic EU production originating from Belgium, the Czech Re-
public, Spain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and the UK.
As counterfeiters look for new ways to expand their illegal businesses, the security 
of business supply chains becomes increasingly important.
4.   PREVIEW Of THE CASE LAW Of THE REPUbLIC Of SERbIA 
IN RELATION TO THE OffENSES AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTy
Taking into account criminal offenses against intellectual property rights defined 
in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, it can be noted that the most fre-
quent crime in the jurisprudence of the courts of general jurisdiction is the crime 
of Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Work or other Work Protected by Similar 
Right, Article 199 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia. The object of 
the legal protection is the work of authorship or a related right.
Data obtained by examining the court records of the Basic Court in Nis26, for the 
period of time2004 to 2014, show that the largest number of prosecutions for the 
specified criminal act were initiated in 2005, a total of 85 procedures. An interest-
ing fact is that in 2005 the greatest number of proceedings ended with convic-
tions, 64 of them. Even though a suspended sentence was imposed in most of the 
cases, in a certain number of cases the Court imposed a fine and imprisonment. 
This tendency continued during the year 2006 and later, so it can be noticed that 
the activity of the court was almost proportional to the number of prosecuted 
cases. Therefore, the court, dealing according to the applied charging documents, 
completed almost all the procedures and cases with final judgments, whereby pris-
on sentences, fines and suspended sentences were imposed in a stable percentage.
The important feature of the crime of the unauthorized use of the work of au-
thorship or the objects of related rights, according to the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Serbia, Article 199, is that the unauthorized use, in various ways, of a 
work of authorship or an object of related right simples the execution of the crime. 
Whereas, the author owns the copyright and has the exclusive right to authorize 
26  Court registers of criminal cases of the Basic Court in Nis, Serbia, for the years 2004 to 2014.
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or prohibit the marketing of copies of his/her work, or his/her publication, per-
formance, presentation, transmission, broadcasting, recording and reproduction.
The first and basic form of this offense exists (Article 199, paragraph 1 Criminal 
Code of the Republic of Serbia), if the perpetrator publishes, records, multiplies 
or otherwise publicly discloses, in whole or in a part, a work of authorship or an 
object of related rights without authorization. This includes a work of author-
ship, interpretation, phonogram, videogram, broadcasts, computer program or 
database. Therefore, the basic incrimination act is an unauthorized reproduction 
of the work of authorship.
The second basic form (Article 199, paragraph 2, Criminal Code of the Republic 
of Serbia) of this offense performs the offender who puts on the market or with 
the intention of putting into circulation without authorization keeps amplified or 
already put into circulation unauthorized copies of works of authorship, interpre-
tations, phonograms, videograms, broadcasts, computer program or database. In 
this case, the basic incrimination act is an unauthorized circulation of the works 
of authorship.
This offense appears, in most of the charges, in the second form, which, at the 
same time, represents its most common form. From the point of view of the 
imposed court judgments and the indictments, this offense is mostly preformed 
in the form of an unauthorized circulation of copies of works of authorship. The 
object of the offense are the works of authorship, usually movies recorded on CDs 
which are illegally sold and exposed for sale, often at the car markets, markets and 
public places with a large frequency of passers-by and customers.
In some cases, the courts dealt with the unauthorized reproduction of the works 
of authorship without copyright on the specific works of authorship from the dis-
tributing companies. For example, the unauthorized reproduction was performed 
at home or at some other place and the copies were put on the market in video 
and DVD clubs where they were listed in special catalogues and sold at prices in 
a separate price list. 
There is an interesting case,K.br.201/05, completed with the final judgment before 
the Basic Court in Nis, in which the owner of a print store at the Faculty of Phi-
losophy in Nis was convicted for unauthorized photocopying of textbooks, written 
by the professors at the specific faculty, without the permission of copyright owners. 
The Court in this case held that photocopying of textbooks, in order to sell them 
and make them available to a greater number of people, represents the reproduction 
of copies of the works of authorship, and the fact that the defendant owned regis-
tered print shop does not relieve the guilt. Particularly, the fact that the defendant 
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owned registered print shop cannot be equated with the right to produce and sell the 
copies of textbooks, which are the works of authorship, without the authorization of 
the copyright holders, especially when the fact that the authors were available to the 
defendant and that he could provide their consent is taken into account.
The other forms of this offense as well as the other offenses against the intellectual 
property are not going to be discussed here since their frequency in the jurispru-
dence is inconsiderable. Article 199, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2Criminal Code 
of the Republic of Serbia defining the two forms of the offense of unauthorized 
use of the works of authorship or the objects of related rights stipulates that the 
punishment for its violation is a sentence of up to three years of imprisonment. 
But, if this offense was committed with the intention in acquiring illegal material 
benefit for himself or another person, then according to the article 199, paragraph 
3. Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, the offender can be sentenced to 
imprisonment in the range of six months to five years. In all these cases, the law 
stipulates the mandatory imposition of security measures such as dispossession 
and destruction of the unauthorized copies of the works of authorship. 
This has been mentioned, because the criminal policy of the courts in the Republic 
of Serbian determining the type and level of criminal penalties for alleged crimi-
nal offenses takes into account particular circumstances of each case, particularly 
the personality of the offender and the level of the infringement of the protected 
good, whether the offender previously committed the same offenses as well as the 
quantity and the extent of the infringement of the protected object.
Thus, if the offender led decent life i.e. if he was not convicted, if he was a good 
worker, a good father of the family, if he was honest and appreciated in the com-
munity where he lived, then these circumstances indicated the person who was not 
morally deviant and socially maladjusted and that the application of more lenient 
penalty could achieve the purpose of punishment. However, in case of recidivist, 
especially if it is a special recidivism i.e. the perpetrator who had previously been 
sentenced to a more lenient punishment for the same or similar criminal offense, 
it was estimated that such criminal sanctions had not achieved their purpose, 
therefore severe penalties, such as fine or even a prison sentence, were imposed. 
The above mentioned as well as the large number of suspended sentences im-
ply that most of the offenders had not been previously convicted, most of them 
were members of young population aged up to 25 years, students or unemployed 
persons with secondary education, family people, people who were not prone to 
criminal behaviour nor recidivists after imposed suspended sentences. In a few 
cases a greater criminal risk was detected, which was rated by taking into account 
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the personality of the offender and the way of the offense execution, the previous 
life of the offender, persistence in the offence execution as well as the seriousness of 
the consequences as the result of the committed offense, so the court found it nec-
essary to impose prison sentences, which was done in a certain number of cases. 
Subject of special consideration are criminal acts of organized crime, which are 
pending before the Special Division of the High Court in Belgrade. The verdict 
of the High Court in Belgrade, Special Department K.Po1 108/10 reached on 
12.07.2010.drew great attention. It was mostly upheld by the Appellate Court 
in Belgrade Kž1 PO1 22/10 on 11.02.2011.when the final verdict was reached. 
Criminal proceedings were conducted against six defendants charged with the 
criminal offense of criminal association (Forming a Group for the Purpose of 
Committing Criminal Offences Article 346 of the Criminal Code of the Republic 
of Serbia) and with a crime of forging value tokens according to Article 226, para-
graph 2 referring paragraph 1, Forging Value Tokens Article 226 of the Criminal 
Code of the Republic of Serbia27. All of them are sentenced to a compound im-
prisonment sentence, the first accused as the initiator of the criminal association is 
sentenced to the imprisonment in duration of four years, the second accused to the 
imprisonment in duration of three years, and the other accused are also sentenced 
to the imprisonment in a shorter length than the first two accused. Although, 
according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia a criminal offense of 
forging value tokens belongs to the category of crimes against the economy, this 
case has been stated bearing in mind that it is similar to the cases considering the 
protection of intellectual property rights, production of counterfeit products or 
their unauthorized multiplication. 
In this particular case, the court found that the first accused organized a criminal 
group for the purpose of acquiring financial profits. The first accused as the initia-
tor of the criminal group engaged printers the second accused and the third ac-
cused to print counterfeited value tokens28 - a variety of revenue and excise stamps 
(among other Slovak revenue stamps with a nominal value of 1,000 crowns). The 
forth accused was engaged for the pre-press ordering and for the distribution of 
the counterfeited value tokens in order to be used by another person. They also 
printed the counterfeited value tokens in their own pressrooms and then distrib-
uted them to Hungary and other countries. The aim of this group was to acquire 
financial benefit since the distribution of the counterfeited value tokens provided 
27  Criminal Code, Оfficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” No. 85/2005, 88/2005, 107/2005, 
72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012 and 104/2013.
28  Value tokens are made on the basis of the law and their issuing means that a certain amount of money 
has been paid, in fact they replace the payment of that amount in Stojanović Z. Comment on the Crim-
inal Code, Official Gazette, Belgrade, 2009, 550.
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the financial profit, which the first accused, as the initiator of the group, was tak-
ing for himself and a part of it shared to the other members of the group according 
to predetermined roles.
The first accused, as the initiator of the group, as well as the other members of the 
criminal group were aware that both revenue stamps and excise stamps represent 
the value tokens and that can be printed in the authorized printing rooms only, on 
the ground of the specific laws and regulations of the domicile country. The Court 
found that the first accused, as the initiator of the crime group, and the other ac-
cused, as the members of a criminal group, were involved in the production of 
counterfeited value tokens i.e. revenue and excise stamps in order to be used by 
another person by putting them legally on the market in those countries in which 
the original value tokens serve as the proof of payment. 
The court also found that all the accused acted with direct intent of performing 
the action of forging value tokens  according to Article 226, paragraph 2 of the 
Criminal Code, as they consciously created false revenue and excise stamps that 
in their domicile countries serve as a proof of payment and that they were fully 
aware that these value tokens can be made only on the basis of the approval of 
the competent state authorities and special powers based on law. In addition, the 
intention of the accused was to transfer the counterfeited value tokens to another 
person as the original ones in order to achieve financial benefit.
5.  PIRACy IN THE INTERNET AGE
The Internet has created boundary-less territories and has helped in evolving a 
unique method to share and transfer information, growth of e-commerce and in 
creating a global platform for all nations and its citizens. Online piracy is a major 
flipside to this development.29
Infringement of copyright on the Internet has become a common phenomenon. 
Infringement either can take place wilfully or through ignorance. There is a close 
nexus between intellectual property (IP) and the Internet and their convergence 
in the digital era is inevitable.30The IP - Internet nexus can be looked at from three 
perspectives – the author, the user and the service provider.31An author creates a 
29  Brenner, S. W., Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law Enforcement? Rutgers 
Computer and Technology Law Journal, No. 30, 2004, pp. 1-104.
30  Richet, J.L., From Young Hackers to Crackers, International Journal of Technology and Human Inter-
action, No. 9, 2013, pp.53-62.
31  Dörr, D., Janich, S.,The Criminal Responsibility of Internet Service Providers in Germany, Mississippi Law 
Journal, 80 Miss. L.J. 1247, 2011, 1247-1261.
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piece of work and registers it under the existing IP laws to enjoy certain benefits, 
but the digital world hinders the complete enjoyment of these rights. Copyright 
owners perceive Internet as threat to their exclusive rights due to the following 
reasons:(1) wide distribution is relatively simpler and quicker on the Internet; (2) 
anyone can distribute it to a mass audience; (3) the quality of copies is virtually 
indistinguishable from the original; (4) distribution is almost costless; and 4) users 
can easily and cheaply obtain copyright material on the Internet.32
Over the past years, the idea of how to reconcile intellectual property rights and 
the Internet technologies and platforms has become a pivotal point of all Internet 
governance discussions.33With the emergence of the Internet as a means of com-
munication, creativity, innovation and ideas and with the increasing accessibility 
to information, traditional concepts of intellectual property appear increasingly 
antiquated and inapplicable in a space where information is democratized, people 
become increasingly more empowered to create exchange and distribute content 
and innovation and creativity proliferate.34Internet has spawned new forms of 
crimes and made old crimes easier to commit, cyber-stalking, identity theft, child 
pornography, fraud and scams, copyright violations, hacking and creating mali-
cious code, the list goes on and on.35
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 36 estab-
lishes minimum rights that all countries agree to.37The United States of America 
has extended its copyright law and enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA)38 which came into force in 1998. The Act contains six exceptions 
to infringement including educational research, encryption research, protection 
of minors, reverse engineering, privacy of individuals and security testing. The 
32  Hemmige, N., Piracy in the Internet Age, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, No. 18, 2013, pp 
457-464. 
33  Brenner, S. W., Koops, B.-J., Approaches to cyber crime jurisdiction, Journal of High Technology Crime, 
No. 15, 2004, pp. 1-46.
34  Hunton, P., The stages of cybercrime investigations: Bridging the gap between technology examination and 
law enforcement investigation, Computer Law & Security Review, 27, 2011, pp. 61-67.
35  Holt, T. J., Exploring the Intersections of Technology, Crime and Terror, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
24(2), 2012, pp. 337-354.
36  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed 
at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 
1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 
and at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979.
37  Kahandawaarachchi,T., Liability of Internet Service Providers for Third Party Online Copyright Infringe-
ment: A Study of the US and Indian Laws, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights No. 12, 2007, pp. 
553-561. 
38  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, US Copyright Office Summary December 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 1998.
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DCMA added Section 512 specifically to the Copyright Act which brought forth 
the limitation of liability on the service providers in case of online copyright in-
fringement and assigned rules in case of non-profit educational institutions.
Louis Vuitton successfully sued Akanoc Solutions Inc., Managed Solutions Inc. and 
Steven Chen39 for “their role in hosting websites that directly infringed Louis Vuit-
ton’s trademarks and copyrights”. Although the websites did not directly sell the 
counterfeit merchandise, they listed an email address allowing customers to initiate 
a transaction. Louis Vuitton was able to prove wilful intent, as they had sent the 
defendants 18 notices of trademark and copyright infringement. The jury awarded 
Louis Vuitton USD 10.5 million in statutory damages for wilful trademark infringe-
ment of the 13 trademarks against each defendant, for a total of USD 31.5 million, 
plus USD300 000 for statutory damages for wilful copyright infringement and in-
fringement of 2 copyrights against each defendant, totalling USD 900 000.40
In United Kingdom came into force in June 2012 the Digital Economy Act of 
201141 and covered subjects that deal with digital encroachment of intellectual 
property, namely, copyright infringement, television services, radio services, regu-
lation of the same, etc. The Act with respect to copyright involves two major par-
ties – the ISPs and copyright holders.
Despite various laws protecting IPR, it is still an enormous task to keep a check on 
the copyright infringers on the Internet.
5.1.  The “Tomato Garden” Software Internet Piracy Case
The “Tomato Garden” is an internet piracy case in China. The “tomato garden” 
version software was made by the defendants Zhang Tianping, Hong Lei and Li-
ang Chaoyong under the instruction of Sun Xianzhong.42
The following facts were confirmed by the Huqiu Court in the hearing. Between 
December 2006 and August 2008, Wanglian Ad Co and Gongruan Co, for the 
purpose of making profits, without Microsoft’s permission, reproduced Windows 
39  Case Nos. 10–15909, 10–16015 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., Managed 
Solutions Group, Inc.,Steven Chen [2011] United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Decided: 
September 09, 2011.
40  More details of this case can be found through the publication United States Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit case number: 10- 15909 D.C. No. 5:07-cv-03952-JW and No. 10-16015 D.C. No. 
5:07-cv-03952-JW Opinion, 9 September 2011.
41  Digital Economy Act of 2010, UK National Archive.
42  Ma, Zhong-fa., Gao, Wei-na., Impact of the ‘Tomato Garden’ Software Internet Piracy Case on Combating 
Copyright Infringement in China, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights Vol 17, January 2012, pp 27-36.
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XP software and made several ‘tomato garden’ version software on the basis of 
XP software with minor modifications.By ways of modifying the browser’s home 
page, providing default search page, bundling software of other companies and 
so on, the defendants allowed netizens to freely download the ‘tomato garden’ 
version software with commercial plugins of many companies, including Baidu 
Times Network Technology (Beijing) Co Ltd (Baidu) and other information tech-
nology corporations, from the ‘tomato garden’ website and ‘Redu’ website.
The court held that the action of reproducing computer software by slightly modi-
fying relevant procedures without permission of the copyright owners, distribut-
ing it online for other people to download with other software or plug-ins bun-
dled together, thus receiving profits including advertisement fee, shall be regarded 
as ‘reproducing and distributing’ ‘for the purpose of making profits’ provided by 
Article 217 of Criminal Law.
After the thorough trial, the judgment was that all the defendants involved - one 
legal entity (Gongruan Co) and four natural persons - were to be punished to 
certain degree. Gongruan Co was fined RMB 8,772,861.27 yuan, Sun Xianzhong 
was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months with a fine 
of RMB 1,000,000 yuan, Zhang Tianping was sentenced to fixed-term imprison-
ment of 2 years with a fine of RMB 100,000 yuan, Hong Lei was sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months with a fine of RMB 1,000,000 
yuan and Liang Chaoyong was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 2 years 
with a fine of RMB 100,000 yuan. 43
The Tomato Garden case was the most serious copyright infringement concerning 
Windows software in networks where the Business Software Alliance on behalf 
of Microsoft Corporation complained to the National Copyright Administration 
and the Ministry of Public Security and requested them to protect Microsoft’s 
rights and interests by the way of seeking criminal liability of the infringers in 
China, to which had been attached so much importance in the industry of infor-
mation technology. 
According to an investigation made by a nongovernmental organization, ‘tomato 
garden’ version software was very popular and downloaded by 19 per cent netizens 
(about 10 million), and the amounts of illegal gains and number of downloaded 
illegal copies confirmed by Huqiu Court were huge.44 Therefore, it may be reason-
43  Ma et al., op. cit. note 44, p. 28. 
44  Kecheng, L., The principal criminals were sentenced to the prison for three and a half years, The Oriental 
Morning Newspaper, 20 August 2009. 
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able to regard this case as the gravest networking copyright infringement and one 
of the most severe copyright infringements till date in China.45
Also significant is the fact that Microsoft proved that it had not authorized any 
person or company to make software modified or reproduced copies. The court 
ascertained that the ‘tomato garden’ version Windows software was a reproduc-
tion based on the core procedures of Microsoft Windows software made without 
authorization.
5.2.  IPR and Digital Currency 
The nature of digital currencies is difficult to apprehend, the underlying technol-
ogy is complicated, their operations are conducted in a decentralised way, and 
they are almost unregulated. No-one can predict if a particular digital currency 
may become a direct competitor for existing currencies in the distant future, or if 
it might just collapse overnight.46
However, some danger might arise for intellectual property and payment systems, 
including reputational damage for systems which are not directly exposed to vir-
tual currencies. The most problematic field is consumer protection, as there are no 
safety nets, such as deposit guarantee funds, available to alleviate losses.
The criminals use technological advancements to distance themselves from their 
illegal activities and profits through use of virtual banking and electronic mon-
ey transfer systems, which allow criminals to buy, sell, and exchange counterfeit 
goods without any physical interaction.47New digital, virtual currencies, such as 
Bitcoin48, add yet another layer of anonymity by allowing users to transfer value 
45  yi, Z., The Judgment of first trial for ‘Tomato Garden’ case has developed huge alarms to copyright infringers, 
but the burden of protecting intellectual properties is still heavy and the road is long, Wenhui Daily, 21 
August 2009. 
46  Tu, K. V., Meredith M. W., Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation In The Bitcoin Age, Washington Law 
Review, No. 90, 2015, pp.270-347.
47  Bennett, D, The Challenges Facing Computer Forensics Investigators in Obtaining Information from Mo-
bile Devices for Use in Criminal Investigations, Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, No 
3, 2012, pp.159-168.
48  Bitcoin was introduced on 31 October 2008 to a cryptography mailing list, and released as open-
source software in 2009. Bitcoin or cryptocurrency is a form of digital currency, created and held 
electronically. No one controls it. Bitcoins are not printed. Bitcoin is invented by an unidentified pro-
grammer, or group of programmers, under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto.Despite many efforts, the 
identity of Satoshi remains unknown to the public and it is not known whether Satoshi is a group or 
a person. Satoshi in Japanese means “wise” and someone has suggested that the name might be a port-
manteau of four technology companies: SAmsung, TOSHIba, NAKAmichi, and MOTOrola. Others 
have noted that it could be a team from the National Security Agency (NSA) or an e-commerce firm. 
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without the collection of any personally identifiable information.49Regulations of-
ten fail to affect such virtual currencies due to lack of foresight by the regulation 
writers, creating a legal grey area. Thus, criminals can continue to capitalize on 
technological innovation to bolster their illegal activities.50
The system is peer-to-peer and transactions take place between users directly, with-
out an intermediary.51 Bitcoin is different from normal currencies. It can be used 
to buy things electronically. In that sense, it is like conventional dollars, euros, or 
yen, which are also traded digitally. Bitcoin’s image is polarized. Some view it as a 
tool used by criminals to commit crimes, whereas others view it as a tool for a legal 
system of currency that is free from unlawful government interference.52
Its proponent argue that Bitcoin has many properties that could make it an ideal 
currency for mainstream consumers and merchants. For example, bitcoins are 
highly liquid, have low transaction costs, can be used to send payments quickly 
across the internet, and can be used to make micropayments. This new currency 
allowing organizations to receive donations and conduct business anonymously.53 
On the other hand, bitcoin’s decentralization and peer-to-peer infrastructure al-
lows it to be virtually immune to the risks of server raids or the loss of a central 
database to hackers. 
However, bitcoins are like money, and money can be used for both lawful and 
unlawful purposes. Due to the possibility of its use for nefarious activities such as 
money laundering, Bitcoin’s pseudonymous network negatively impacted the im-
age of emerging virtual currency systems, and some authorities view Bitcoin solely 
as a platform for criminals.54
One of the most well-known criminal uses of Bitcoin was on the Silk Roadweb-
site55, a black-market often used to trade illicit drugs and counterfeit goods.
49  Krohn-Grimberghe, A., Sorge. C, Bitcoin: Anonym Einkaufenim Internet?University of Paderborn, De-
partment 3 – Wirtschaftsinformatik Analytische Informationssysteme und Bl, Germany, 2012, p. .3.
50  Bryans, D., Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, Indiana Law Journal, 
No.89, 2014, pp. 441-472.
51  Nakamoto, Satoshi, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
 URL=https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Accessed 1 January 2017.
52  Ron, G. D, Shamir, A., Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction, Quantitative Analysis of 
the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The 
Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel, 2012, pp.1-19.
53  Grinberg, Reuben, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, yale Law School, Hastings Sci-
ence & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2011, pp.160-208.
54  Kaplanov, N. M., Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Againstits Regulation, 
Loyola Consumer Law Review 111, No. 25, 2012, pp.111-174.
55  Silk Road is anonymous online “black market” goods. See: James, M., Lost On The Silk Road: Online 
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One of the most common initial questions about Bitcoin is whether the online cur-
rency is legal, given the government’s monopoly on issuing legal tender.56Current 
law and regulation does not envision a technology like Bitcoin, so it exists in 
something of a legal grey area. This is largely the case because Bitcoin does not 
exactly fit existing statutory definitions of currency or other financial instruments 
or institutions, making it difficult to know which laws apply and how.
The legal status of digital currency varies substantially from country to country 
and is still undefined or changing in many of them.57 
In October 2015, the European Court of Justice ruled that bitcoin transactions are 
exempt from consumption tax similarly as traditional cash. Europe’s highest court 
ruled in response to a request by Swedish tax authorities digital (Case Skatteverket 
v David Hedqvist)58, who had argued bitcoin transactions should not be covered 
by a European Union directive exempting currency transactions from value added 
tax (VAT).The court ruled that bitcoins should be treated as a means of payment, 
and as such were protected under the directive. ”Those transactions are exempt 
from VAT under the provision concerning transactions relating to ‘currency, bank 
notes and coins used as legal tender”, the ECJ concluded.59
Bitcoin crimes are likely to emerge as an important significant phenomenon there-
by forcing the relevant stakeholders to look at appropriate legal frameworks which 
can effectively regulate certain activities.
5.3.   Cyber Piracy - criminal offences, competent authorities and organization 
and cooperation in the Republic of Serbia
The Republic of Serbia signed both the Convention and the Protocol in Helsinki 
on 7 April 2005, at the time of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and the 
Drug DistributionAnd The ‘Cryptomarket’, Criminology and Criminal Justice: An International Journal, 
2014, pp. 351-367.
56  He, D., Habermeier, K., Leckow, R., Haksar, V., Almeida, y., Kashima, M., Kyriakos-Saad, N., Oura, 
H., SaadiSedik, T., Stetsenko, N., Verdugo-yepes, C.,Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Consid-
erations, IMF Staff Team, International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets, Legal, and 
Strategy and Policy Review Departments, 2016, p.16.
57  Financial Action Task Force-FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies, FATF, 
Paris, 2015, p.12.
58  Case C -264/14 Skatteverket v David Hedqvist, [2015] Court of Justice of the European Union.
59  Bitcoin currency exchange not liable for VAT taxes: top EU court, Reuters, 22 October 2015,
  URL= http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-tax-eu-idUSKCN0SG0X920151022. Accessed 6 
January 2017.
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National Parliament of the Republic of Serbia ratified both documents in 200960 
The compulsory application of the Convention commenced in August 2009. 
The mentioned documents served as a legal basis for domestic laws and stan-
dards, as well as for establishing specialized state bodies to combat cybercrime in 
general.61Those laws provide civil law protection of intellectual property rights, 
and are in accordance with the standards and requests of the European Union and 
the World Trade Organization. Until recently, two aspects of the legal protection 
of the intellectual property – penal and administrative protection – have not been 
meeting requirements of the European law and TRIPS Agreement in their entire-
ty. The most important regulations adopted and adjusted to the provisions of the 
Convention include: the Criminal Code62, the Law on the Liability of Legal Enti-
ties for Criminal Offences63, Criminal Procedure Code64, the Law on Special Mea-
sures for the Prevention of Crimes against Sexual Freedom Involving Minors65, the 
Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime66, and the Law on 
Special Authorizations for Efficient Protection of Intellectual Property67.
Serbia has set up specialised units (high-tech crime prosecutor, police cyber unit, 
specialised customs unit, tax unit and tax police) aimed at enforcing the legislation 
in this area. The length of investigations has been shortened. It fully updated an 
electronic database of customs offences in the field of intellectual property rights 
and introduced electronic handling of requests for protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
Along with the development of information technologies, the issue of legal regu-
lations that can prevent and sanction cybercrime has gained significance.68The 
60  Act of Formal Confirmation of the Convention on Cybercrime, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, No. 19/2009
61  Spasić, V., Savremeni oblici piraterije u autorskom i srodnom pravu, Pravni život 56 (513), 207, pp 293-
309. 
62  Criminal Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No.85/2005, 88/2005, 107/2005, 72/2009, 
111/2009, 121/2012, 104/201, 108/2014, 94/2016.
63  Law on the Liability of Legal Entities for Criminal Offences, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 
no.97/2008.
64  Criminal Procedure Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 72/2011, 101/2011, 
121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 and 55/2014.
65  Law on Special Measures for the Prevention of Crimes against Sexual Freedom Involving Minors, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 32/2013.
66  Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia” No. 32/2013
67  Law on Special Authorizations for Efficient Protection of Intellectual Property, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia” No. 46/2006 and 104/2009 .
68  Vida M. Vilić, Criminal Law Protection of Personality: Implementation of Council of Europe’s Convention 
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Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia regulated criminal offences regarding 
violation of computer data security, thus clearly contributing to a more efficient 
fight against cybercrime. Still, this regulatory framework did not fully embrace 
the deviant forms of behaviour manifested as misuse of computer technologies 
and computer systems (e.g. Internet harassment, unauthorized alteration of the 
contents published on the Internet, etc.).
Cybercrime Unit has been established within the Ministry of Interior of the Re-
public of Serbia: Cybercrime Unit for combating cybercrime. The Unit acts upon 
requests of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, in accordance with the law Within 
the Cybercrime Unit were established also Department for Electronic Crime and 
Department for Combating Crime in the area Intellectual Property as organiza-
tional parts for performing duties in regard to more specific areas of cybercrime 
combating.
The Higher Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade has the jurisdiction for the territory of 
the Republic of Serbia to proceed in cybercrime matters. The Higher Prosecutor’s 
office established special cybercrime department - Special Prosecutor’s Office. The 
Higher Court in Belgrade shall establish a Cybercrime Department which has 
first-instance jurisdiction in cybercrime matters for the territory of the Republic 
of Serbia. 
Besides criminal offences that are listed in Criminal Code of the Republic of Ser-
bia, Law on the organization and competences of government authorities combat-
ing cybercrime69 also regulates this legal matter and, additionally, widens the scope 
of criminal offences which are deemed to be cybercrime, and those are criminal 
offences against intellectual property, property, economy and legal instruments, 
where computers, computer systems, data and products thereof appear as the ob-
jects or the means of committing a criminal offence and if the number of items 
of copyrighted works is over 2000, or the amount of the actual damage is over 
1.000.000,00 RSD, as well as criminal offences against freedoms and rights of 
man and citizen, sexual freedoms, public order and constitutional system and 
security, which can be consider, due to the manner in which they are committed 
or tools used, as cybercrime offences.
In Serbia the most common forms of cybercriminal are related to Internet auction 
sites (e-shop), abuse of credit cards, phishing and identity thefts, “Nigerian” or 
on Cybercrime No. 185 Of 2001 Into Serbian Legislative, International Scientific Conference on Ict and 
E-Business Related Research, Doi: 10.15308, Sinteza, 2016, pp. 66-73
69  Law on the organization and competences of government authorities combating cybercrime ,“Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 61/2005 and 104/2009”.
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“419” scam, and the most common infringements by Internet frauds are copy-
rights. In the Republic of Serbia, more than half perpetrators of cybercrimes are 
young persons under 35 years old. The great part of perpetrators, 35.48% has 
technical and technological knowledge while 24.52% of them have no occupa-
tion. 58% of perpetrators are unemployed.70In Serbia cybercriminals are increas-
ingly focusing on Adobe PDF and Flash files, to infect victims with malware. In 
addition, they use rich content applications such as Flash files to distribute mali-
cious code. Flash-based ads on the Web, because their binary file format, enable 
the cybercriminals to hide their malicious code and later exploit end-user browsers 
to install malware. Hackers have been breaking into Facebook and MySpace and 
implanting malware to distribute to a victim’s social network. Serbian IT profes-
sionals are already aware of this risk.
Also, Serbia has a long way to go in bringing a comprehensive legislation on the li-
ability of ISPs in cases of copyright infringement in digital context. It is of utmost 
importance for a country such as Serbia with an increasing number of Internet us-
ers and thereby increasing the threat to infringing the rights of copyright holders. 
At the same time, Serbia is becoming digitalized and if new laws are not brought 
in to protect ISPs from copyright infringement by subscribers and the related as-
pects, it would adversely affect the ISP industry as a whole though cases regarding 
the same are yet to come before any court of law in Serbia. Moreover, it is also 
important for Serbia to update their laws regarding this aspect to be in competi-
tion with other European countries.71
5.  CONCLUSION
The paper finds that: (1) intellectual property protection is essential to encour-
aging creative expression and the development of new products in a number of 
industries, (2) the development of intellectual property-based products is gener-
ally far more expensive than their manufacture or duplication, (3) inadequate IPR 
protection leaves firms and consumers vulnerable to infringement, causing them 
to risk their investment and reputations.
Technology is now deeply enmeshed within the fabric of society. Criminals under-
stand that technology is a highly effective force multiplier which can be abused to 
enable illicit activity, and leveraged to facilitate access to a global constituency of 
victims living online. Our collective dependency on technology makes this threat 
70  Domazet, S., Piraterija – “vampir” savremene privrede, Pravo: teorija i praksa Vol. 24, No. 3/4, 2007, 
pp. 39-40.
71  Milovanovic, G., Barac, N., Andjelkovic, A., Cybercrime - A Treat for Serbian Economy, SecuritateaIn-
formatională, ConferinţaInternaţională, ediţia a VII-a, 15-16, 2010, pp 111-114.
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extremely difficult to eliminate. The relative ease with which offenders engage 
in new scopes of crime, and the high gains afforded to perpetrators, ensures that 
motivation for recidivists remains strong. 
Manifestations of crime emanating from the IPR domain are among the most for-
midable challenges for workers in criminal justice systems worldwide. As society 
evolves and technology goes forward our understanding of the origins of criminal-
ity must be continuously revised. The persistence, prevalence and seriousness of 
IPR and cybercrime offending demands a greater response from the international 
community.
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ABSTRACT
The founding treaties set out two procedures where the Court of Justice may impose financial 
sanctions on EU Member States which fail to comply with their obligations under EU law. 
The first procedure is laid down in Article 260(2) TFEU, concerning cases when a Member 
State has failed to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court. The second option is a new 
legal solution introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in Article 260(3), under which the Court may 
impose sanctions on a Member State that has failed to notify the Commission about the na-
tional measures for transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure. If the Court 
finds that the Commission’s allegations are true, it may impose penalty payment or a lump sum. 
Pursuant to Article 260(2), the Court is free to determine the sanction amounts, whereas the 
penalty payment or lump sum imposed pursuant to Article 260(3) must not exceed the amount 
specified by the Commission.
Keywords: Article 260 TFEU, Court of Justice, penalty payment, lump sum, judgment, mea-
sures transposing a directive. 
1.  INTRODUCTION
The Maastricht Treaty introduced an important novelty in Article 171 by envisag-
ing the possibility of imposing financial sanctions upon Member States which do 
not comply with the judgments of the Court of Justice (hereinafter: Court). The 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice simply renumbered Article 171 of the 
EC Treaty into Article 228 without introducing any changes. In the Lisbon Treaty, 
i.e. the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter: TFEU), Article 228 of 
the EC Treaty became Article 260 of the TFEU and its content was modified in 
some respects. 
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The TFEU amended the procedure set out in the second paragraph of Article 
260 (ex 228) and added a completely new paragraph 3, concerning failure to 
notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure. The 
TFEU kept the essence of paragraph 2 and only removed the pre-litigation stage 
of issuing a reasoned opinion. Thus, the rules on types of sanction for non-com-
pliance with the judgment and the method of calculating their amounts were not 
amended, but the sanctioning procedure was simplified and accelerated. The new 
paragraph 3 provides that where a Member State has failed to fulfill its obligation 
to notify measures transposing a directive, the Commission may suggest to the 
Court, even in an action launched under Article 258 TFEU, to impose the lump 
sum or penalty payment on the breaching Member States. If the Court finds that 
the alleged infringement exists, it may impose requested sanctions, which shall not 
exceed the amount specified by the Commission.
The first part of this paper describes the procedure under Article 260(2), followed 
by examination of the scope and procedure under Article 260(3). Further on, we 
analyze the sanctions under paragraph 2 of Article 260 and explore the types of 
envisaged sanctions as well as the criteria and methods of their calculation. The 
last part of the paper discusses the specificity of sanctions under paragraph 3 of 
Article 260, as compared with the sanctions set out in paragraph 2 of that article.
2.  THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 260(2) TfEU
Similarly to Article 258 TFEU, the procedure regulated by Article 260(2) TFEU 
consists of the pre-litigation and a judicial phase. The pre-litigation phase involves 
only the Commission and the Member State which allegedly failed to enforce 
the judgment. If the Commission considers that the State did not take the neces-
sary measures to enforce the judgment, it should send a letter of formal notice to 
the non-compliant State.1 In that notice, the Commission must provide specific 
reasons for non-compliance and give the State the opportunity to submit obser-
vations and present its arguments. Generally speaking, the purpose of the pre-
litigation procedure is to give the State concerned the opportunity to comply with 
its obligations under EU law and enable it to use the right to defend itself against 
the Commission’s complaints.2
1  In practice, prior to this formal step, the Commission and the Member State have informal negotia-
tions, aimed at adjusting their views on the alleged failure to enforce judgments and on measures to 
rectify such a situation; Radivojević, Z.; Knežević-Predić, V., Institucionalni mehanizam Evropske unije 
posle Lisabonskog ugovora, Punta, Niš, 2016, p.162.
2  Case C-456/03 Commission v. Italy [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:388, par. 36.
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In the letter of formal notice, the Commission has to determine reasonable period 
for enforcement of the judgment.3 It should be noted that the Commission must 
leave sufficient time for the Member State to enforce the judgment. Otherwise, 
the Commission runs the risk that the Court rejects its subsequent action.4 
The TFEU simplified the administrative phase by abolishing the Commission’s 
obligation to send a reasoned opinion to the defaulting State, and thus introduced 
the “fast-track administrative procedure”.5 This amendment notably shortened 
and accelerated the procedure, without significantly reducing the Member State’s 
rights of defense.6 
If the administrative stage is unsuccessful, Article 260(2) empowers the Com-
mission to refer the case to the Court.7 In the new complaint, the Commission 
may request the Court to declare that the Member State did not comply with the 
original judgment and concurrently request a lump sum or penalty to be imposed 
on the non-compliant State.
It should be stressed that under Article 260(2) the Commission is not obliged to 
bring the case to the Court. As in Article 258, the Commission enjoys full discre-
tion in deciding whether to launch action against State which failed to obey the 
judgment.8 But, if the Commission lodges an action, it must specify the amount 
of sanctions. Given the mandatory nature of the modal verb “must” in Article 
260(2), the Commission has no discretion on this point.9 So, the Commission 
shall ask for at least one type of sanction in every case.
The Court considers the procedure laid down in Article 260(2) as a “special judi-
cial procedure for the enforcement of judgments, in other words, as a method of 
enforcement”10; consequently, all the general principles developed by the Court 
3  Wenneras, P., Sanctions against Member States Under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, But Not Kicking?, Com-
mon Market Law Review, Vol.49, No.1, 2012, p.148.
4  Case C-278/01 Commission v. Spain [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:635, pars. 27-31.
5  Wenneras, P. op.cit. note 3, p.47.
6  Arnull, A., The European Court of Justice after Lisbon, in: Trybus, M. Rabini, L. (eds.), The Treaty of 
Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northamp-
ton, 2012, p.39.
7  The Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under Article 260 TFEU.
8  Unfortunately, the exercise of that discretion is not always based on the merits of the case but also on 
political considerations; Jack, B., Enforcing Member States Compliance with EU Environmental Law: A 
Critical Evaluation of the Use of Financial Penalties, Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. XXIII, No.1, 
2011, p.79.
9  Theodossiou, A. M., An analysis of the recent response of the Community to non-compliance with Court of 
Justice Judgements: Article 228 E.C., European Law Review, Vol. XXVII, No.1, 2002, p.29.
10  Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:444, par. 92.
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with regard to Article 258 should apply fully to Article 260(2).11 First, the subject 
matter of dispute in the pre-litigation phase and judicial phase must be identical, 
meaning that “the Commission, in its application, cannot extend the subject-
matter of the dispute by putting forward new complaints which were not included 
in the reasoned opinion12 in which the Commission specified the points on which 
the Member State concerned had not complied with the judgment”.13 Second, in 
the action under Article 260(2), the Commission may charge the State only for 
failure to fulfill the obligations which the Court has declared in judgment issued 
on the basis of Article 258.14 However, it should be noted that under Article 258 
the Commission does not have to bring an action for each and every infringement 
of EU legal act, but it may join them together into a single action and ask the 
Court to declare that the State has breached relevant EU rules in a general and 
persistent manner.15 Third, the Commission has the burden of proof and it must 
prove each aspect of its claim in the proceedings under Article 260(2).16
Acting upon the complaint, the Court has to decide whether the Member State 
enforced the previous judgment or failed to do so. After the Lisbon Treaty abol-
ished the reasoned opinion, “the reference date for assessing whether there has 
been an infringement for the purpose of Article 260 is the date of expiry of the 
period prescribed in the letter of formal notice”.17 If the Courts finds that there 
was an infringement, it may impose financial sanctions.
3.  THE SCOPE AND PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 260(3) TfEU
Article 260(3) TFEU is a completely new instrument introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty. It allows the Commission to seek financial sanctions earlier, at the first 
stage of the infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, in cases involving 
a failure to “notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative 
procedure”.
11  Prete, L,; Smulders, B., The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.47, No.1, 2010, p.49.
12  The claims are now included in the letter of formal notice (noted by Z. R., N. R.).
13  Case C-457/07 Commission v. Portugal [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:531, par.56.
14  Case C-457/07, op.cit. note 13, par.47; Case C-95/12 Commission v. Germany [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:676, par.23.
15  For example: Case C-494/01 Commission v. Ireland [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:250; Case C-135/05 
Commission v. Italy [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:250; Case C-196/13 Commission v. Italy [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2407, par. 33.
16  Case C-197/98 Commission v. Greece [1999] Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:1999:597, pars. 23-24.
17  Case C-241/11 Commission v. Czech Republic [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:423, par.23.
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Current Article 260(3) is an exact replica of Article III-362(3) of the failed Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe.18 The background for this novelty is the 
persistent and widespread problem of untimely transposition of directives, which 
not only threatens the uniform application of EU law but has also taken a dispro-
portionately high toll on the Commission’s enforcement recourses.19 The treat of 
sanction at the early stage of the infringement procedure should have a consider-
able preventive effect, inducing the Member States to rapidly end non-compliance 
with the obligation to transpose directives.20 According to the Commission, the 
purpose of this new paragraph is to give a stronger incentive to Member States to 
transpose directives within the prescribed deadlines and thus ensure that EU leg-
islation is genuinely effective, considering that “prompt transposition of directives 
is essential in safeguarding the general interests pursued by Union legislation… 
and protecting European citizens who enjoy individual rights under this law”.21
However, there are several open questions concerning the function and place of the 
newly-created paragraph 3 of Article 260 TFEU. The first issue which should be 
clarified is “whether the new mechanism is meant to penalize directly the failure to 
transposition directive or, contrary, the non-implementation of judgments hand-
ed down by Court declaring Member States to be in breach of their obligation to 
notify transposition measures”.22 The wording of the new provision suggests that 
it only introduces the sanction mechanism which, in standard infringement pro-
ceedings, allows the Commission to seek an additional order, asking the Court to 
impose financial sanctions upon the defaulting Member State. The Commission 
seems to have accepted that interpretation,23 a also proposed by some authors.24 
If that is so, “the new paragraph would seem a odd place to locate a mechanism 
to penalize failures to notify transposition measures...Such a provision essentially 
constitutes derogation (or variant) from Article 258 TFEU. As such, it would have 
been more logically placed in a new paragraph added to Article 258 TFEU”.25
18  Lisbon Treaty – Comments and preparatory works for the Reform Treaty November 2009, available at 
URL=http:// www.lexnet.dk/law/download/treaties/Ref-2007.pdf. Accessed January 2017.
19  Commission Communication, Application of Article 228 of the EC Treaty, SEC (2005) 1658, (here-
inafter: 2005 Communication), par.20.
20  Wenneras, P. op.cit. note, p.166. 
21  Commission Communication, Implementation of Article 260(3) TFEU, SEC (2010), 1371 final 
(hereinafter: 2010 Communication), par.7.
22  Wahl, N.; Prete, L., Between Certainty, Severity and Proportionality: Some Reflections on the Nature and 
Functioning of Article 260 (3) TFEU, European Law Reporter, No.6, 2014, p.171.
23  2005 Communication, par.6.
24  Kilbey, I.C., The Interpretation of Article 260 TFEU (ex 228 EC), European Law Review, Vol.35, No.3, 
2010, pp. 383-384.
25  Wahl, Prete, op.cit. note 22, p.172. Some authors consider that paragraph 3 of the Article 260 essen-
tially constitutes a revision of Article 258 TFEU; see: Raičević, N.; Đorđević, S., The Controle of Com-
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On the other hand, there are legal scholars suggesting a different interpretation 
of the new Treaty provision.26 According to their opinion, the fact that the new 
mechanism is found in Article 260(3) shows that it constitutes an option of the 
procedure under Article 260(2). In the judgment rendered pursuant to Article 
258, the Court anticipates the effects of the ruling under Article 260(2) concern-
ing the specific type of infringement covered by the new provision. This leads 
these authors to conclusion “that Article 260(3) TFEU lays down a mechanism 
for enforcing judgments, just like Article 260(2) TFEU, rather than a mechanism 
for immediately imposing sanctions for failure to notify transposition measures”.27
The application of Article 260(3) depends on two conditions: first, the Member 
State must have failed to notify measures for transposing a directive (first condi-
tion); the directive in question must have been adopted under a legislative proce-
dure (second, conditions). 
In the first place, the new mechanism can be used by the Commission when it 
brings a case against a State for failure to fulfill its obligation to notify transposi-
tion measures. yet, the precise meaning of this condition is not easy to understand. 
“The EU Treaties do not place Member States under any obligation to notify mea-
sures transposing directives. Such an obligation has regularly included within the 
final provision of each directive”.28 Most directives contain a general clause stating 
that the Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with the directive within a certain time limit 
and immediately inform the Commission thereof. “This includes the normative 
and organizational aspect of transposition, i.e. absorbing the substantive content 
of directive into national law and creating the legal and administrative framework 
necessary for its application and enforcement. Failure to notify such measures 
clearly falls within the scope of Article 260(3) TFEU”.29 
The next question relates to the notion of failure to notify measures transposing a 
directive. Does it imply “the Member States’ substantive failure (that of not trans-
posing a directive)” or “a procedural failure (that of not communicating the trans-
position measures to the Commission)”. In any case, the latter obligation must 
pliance with the Judgments of the EU Court of Justice, in: M.Lazić, S.Knežević (ed.), Legal, Social and 
Political Control in National, International and EU Law, Collection of papers from the International 
Scenitific Conference, Niš, 2016, p. 276, note 7.
26  Garcia, R.A., Lisbon and the Court of Justice of the European Union, Working Papers on European Law 
and Regional Integration, WP IDEIR, No.1, 2010, p.18.
27  Wahl, Prete, op.cit. note 22, pp.171-174.
28  Ibid., p.174.
29  Wenneras, P., op.cit. note 3, pp.166-167.
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be “ancillary to the former, serving only to facilitate a proper verification of the 
fulfilment of substantive obligation”.30 On the contrary, it be possible that “finan-
cial sanction might be imposed on a Member State which actually implemented a 
directive, but has simply failed to notify the Commission of the implementation 
measures. It seems unlikely that Court would impose a sanction31 in case of such 
procedural failure without analyzing the substantial obligation. In such a case, the 
“Court should probably consider to merely declare the failure without however 
imposing any sanction upon the defaulting Member State”.32 
The Commission’s Communication suggests that it implies not only a total failure 
to notify any measures to transpose a directive but also cases of partial notification 
of transposition measures. The complete failure to communicate national mea-
sures is usually regarded as an indication that the State has not adopted any trans-
position measure at all. The instance of partial notification “might occur either 
where the transposition measures do not cover the whole territory of the Member 
State or where the notification is incomplete with respect to the transposition 
measures corresponding to a part of the directive”.33 The Commission contends 
that both such cases fall within the scope of Article 260(3).
Concurrently, it appears that Article 260(3) is not intended to apply to cases in 
which the Member State has prima facie fulfilled its obligation to notify measures 
for transposing a directive, but where the transposition turns out to be substan-
tively incorrect. The Commission considers that such instances must be dealt with 
in ordinary infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.34
However, “drawing a line between partial or incomplete transposition mea-
sures and the notification of incorrect transposition measures does not appear 
straightforward”.35 This is reflected in the Commission’s Communication, which 
reveals the complexity awaiting “where the Member State has provided all neces-
sary explanations on how it believes it has transposed the entire directive, the 
Commission may consider that the Member State has not failed to meet its ob-
ligation to notify of transposing measures, and therefore Article 260(3) does not 
apply”.36 Hence, it seems “that the Commission will apply some form of bona 
fides test when determining whether the infringement should be characterized as a 
30  Wahl, Prete, op.cit. note 22, p.174.
31  Arnull, op. cit. note 6, pp. 39-40. 
32  Wahl, Prete, op. cit. note 22, p.187, note 36.
33  2010 Communication, par.19.
34  Ibid.
35  Wenneras, op.cit. note 3, p.167.
36  2010 Communication, par. 19.
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instance of incomplete (or partial) notification falling within the scope of Article 
260(3), or as incorrect transposition to be pursued in regular infringement pro-
ceedings under Article 258 TFEU”.37 
This approach of bringing separate infringement proceedings for ipartial and 
incorrect transposition measures was challenged in the legal doctrine. Some au-
thors believe that “the first condition in Article 260(3) is only satisfied in cases 
which concern total failure to notify any national measures transposing a direc-
tive. Where a Member State has fulfilled its duty to communicate to the Com-
mission the transposition measures adopted, the question whether those measures 
constitute a complete and correct transposition is a matter to be resolved under 
Article 258 TFEU”.38 Thus, when a dispute arises between the Commission and 
a Member State “due to the sufficiency of the transposition measures” adopted, a 
financial sanction can be imposed only following the regular procedure.39 
As for the second condition, the Article 260(3) is applicable with regard to failure 
concerning directives adopted under a legislative procedure. There is no doubt as 
to the types of legislatives instrument covered by this provision. 
Transposition of directives which are not adopted under a legislative procedure 
thus falls outside the scope of Article 260(3). This Article excludes directives ad-
opted under the Commission’s delegated powers and directives implementing leg-
islative acts without modifying the scope of their basic obligations. Such directives 
normally do not require any notification of transposition measures. On the other 
hand, “their exclusion from Article 260(3) owe to the fact that, in comparison 
with legislative directives, they generally have more limited impact on private or 
public interests”.40
In practice, the Commission has brought twenty four claims for penalty payments 
in accordance with Article 260(3). Most of these claims were withdrawn after the 
Member States notified the relevant transposition measures prior to the Court’s 
hearing. In fact, only one case dealing with the proposal for penalty payment has 
so far remained open before the Court.41 It should be noted that these complete 
transpositions of directives were achieved at the very late stage of judicial proce-
dure. Thus far, the Commission has not made proposals to the Court to impose 
37  Wenneras, op.cit. note 3, pp.167-168.
38  Wahl, Prete, op. cit. note 22, p.177.
39  Gáspár-Szilágyi, G., What Constitutes “Failure to Notify“ National Measures?, European Public Law, Vol. 
Vol.19, No.2, 2013, p.287.
40  Jack, B., Article 260 (2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial procedure for the Enforcement of Judgements?, Euro-
pean Law Journal, Vol. XIX , No.3, 2013, p.407.
41  Case C-683/15, Commission v. Poland.
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a lump sum payment, nor has the Court of Justice had the opportunity, as yet, to 
pronounce its judgment under Article 260(3) TFEU.42 
4.  THE SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 260(2) TfEU
Article 260(2) empowers the Commission to require from the Court to impose a 
“lump sum or penalty payment” upon the Member State that failed to enforce a 
judgment. A lump sum is determined in a fixed amount of money which implies 
a single one-time payment. On the other hand, penalty payment is the sum of 
money which must be paid periodically, starting from the moment of imposing 
the penalty to the moment of enforcing the judgment.
Initially, the Commission required from the Court to impose penalty payment 
only, considering that the daily increase of sanctions would exert more pressure on 
the State to enforce the judgment. Consequently, in the Memorandum (1996)43 
and the Communication (1997)44, the Commission adopted rules only for calcu-
lating the penalty payment. Until 2005, the Court had accepted the Commission’s 
requests and imposed only penalty payment. yet, in the case C-304/02, the Court 
departed from its previous practice and imposed both penalty payment and a 
lump sum concurrently.45
France and 12 intervening Member States opposed the imposition of both sanc-
tions. They asserted that the conjunction “or” in Article 228(2) had a disjunctive 
meaning, and that the Court may not cumulate two sanctions. Further, they con-
sidered that the imposition of both sanctions was contrary to the principle ne bis 
in idem, which prohibits being punished twice for the same conduct. These States 
also argued that, in the absence of the Commission guidelines for calculation of 
the lump sum, imposition of such sanctions by the Court would be contrary to 
the principles of legal certainty and transparency.46 Тhe respondent Government 
and a number of interveners argued that the Court could not impose a sanction 
42  Wenneras, P., Making Effective Use of Article 260 TFEU, 2016. Forthcoming in A. Jakab and D. Koche-
nov, The Enforcement of EU law and Values; available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821032, 
p.19.
43  Commission Memorandum on applying Article 171 of the EC treaty, OJ EC, No. C 242/6 (hereinaf-
ter: 1996 Memorandum).
44  Commission Communication, Method of Calculating the Penalty Payments Provided For Pursuant to 
Article 171 of the EC Treaty, OJ EC, No. C 63/2 (hereinafter: 1997 Communications).
45  The Court ordered France to pay €57,761,250 for each six-month period of delay and a lump sum of 
€20 million.
46  Case C-304/02 02 [2004] Commission v. France, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2004:274, par.78-79.
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that had not been proposed by the Commission because it would go beyond the 
parties’ claim (extra petita).47 
The Court rejected all of these arguments. It pointed out that the conjunction “or” 
could, linguistically, equally be understood in the cumulative and the alternative 
sense, and that the context and objective of Article 228(2) require that it should be 
understood in a cumulative sense. In the Court’s opinion, simultaneous application 
of both penalties is not contrary to the principle ne bis in idem since each penalty 
has its own function. The Court clearly stressed that the absence of Commission 
guidelines for calculating a lump sum is not an obstacle for imposing this sanction, 
given that “the exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Article 228(2) EC 
is not subject to the condition that the Commission adopts such rules, which, in 
any event, cannot bind the Court”.48 Finally, the Court dismissed the argument on 
acting extra petita, stating that “the procedure provided for in Article 228(2) EC is 
a special judicial procedure, peculiar to Community law, which cannot be equated 
with a civil procedure”, and that the imposition of sanctions “is not intended to 
compensate for damage caused by the Member State concerned, but to place it un-
der economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the breach established”.49
As a result of the Court’s approach, the Commission supplemented its guidelines, 
establishing the method for calculating the lump sum.50 Thereafter, the Commis-
sion changed its practice and now it generally requests a penalty payment and 
lump sum concurrently. 
The Court has frequently imposed both sanctions, justifying it by their different 
objectives. As the Court points out, the imposition of penalty payment is intend-
ed to compel the Member State to stop breaching EU law as soon as possible, i.e. 
to comply with the previous judgment;51 it is the so-called persuasive effect.52 The 
aim of that penalty is to force the State to comply with the judgment by exerting 
economic pressures on it. In contrast, the lump sum is imposed on a State because 
of harmful effects of non-compliance with original judgment to public and private 
interests.53 A lump sum is a dissuasive measure designed to prevent repetition of 
future similar infringements of EU law.54 
47  Ibid., par.88.
48  Ibid., pars.84-85, 94-97.
49  Ibid., par. 91.
50  2005 Communication.
51  Ibid., par. 81.
52  Case C-304/02 [2004] Commission v. France, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2004:274, par.41.
53  Ibid., par. 81.
54  Case C-121/07, Commission v. France [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:695, par.69.
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The Court is not bound by the Commission’s suggestions concerning sanctions. 
Thus, the Court may decide not to impose any sanction at all even though the 
Commission has requested them. This discretion arises directly from Article 
260(2) which provides that the Court “may” impose a lump sum or a penalty pay-
ment, which clearly demonstrates that the Court has a discretion to finally decide 
whether sanctions should be imposed or not. If the Commission at any stage of 
the judicial proceedings considers that the imposition of the proposed sanction is 
not necessary, it is not the reason for cessation of the proceedings.55 In such a case, 
the Court may continue the proceedings and impose sanctions.56
As regards the amounts of these sanctions, Article 260(2) TFEU and its predeces-
sors only required the Commission to “specify the amount of penalty payment or 
a lump sum to be paid by the Member State”, without any concrete criteria for de-
termining the amounts. In the absence of Treaty guidance, the Commission filled 
in the gap by issuing soft-law communications in which it set out in detail how it 
would calculate the amount of fines which would be proposed to the Court.57 The 
first guidelines were made in 199658 and 1997.59 The current version was adopted 
in 2005,60 which was first updated in 201061 and, from then onwards, it has been 
updated annually.62 
In the aforementioned documents, the Commission pointed out that the calcu-
lation of the financial sanctions should be based on three fundamental criteria: 
a) the seriousness of the infringement; b) duration of the infringement; and c) 
the need to ensure that the penalty itself is a deterrent to further infringements. 
Besides, in the 2005 Communication, the Commission stressed that sanctions 
must be foreseeable and calculated respecting the principle of proportionality and 
principle of equal treatment of Member States.63 If there is any risk of a repetition 
of the failure to comply with the judgments, financial sanctions must be set at a 
higher level.64
55  Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:432, par.22.
56  Lenaerts, K.; Maselis, M.; Gutman, K., EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 
213.
57  Kornezov, A., Imposing the Right Amount of Sanctions under Article 260(2) TFEU: Fairness v. Predicta-
bility, or How to “Bridge the Gaps”, Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol.20, No.3, 2014, p.284.
58  1996 Memorandum.
59  1997 Communication.
60  2005 Communication.
61  Commission Communication - Application of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, SEC(2010) 923/3.
62  The last version was adopted in August 2016 (OJ EU, No. C 290/3).
63  Pars.6-7.
64  1996 Memorandum, par.8.
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The Commission has specified the above general criteria and principles in order to 
establish methods for calculating the amounts of individual sanctions. In the 2005 
Communication, the Commission identified specific formulas for calculating the 
penalty payment and the lump sum, which are similar.
The formula for calculating penalty payment payable per day is:
Dp = (bfrap x Cs x Cd) x n
where: “Dp” is the daily penalty payment; “Bfrap” is the basic flat-rate amount for 
“penalty payment”; “Cs” is the coefficient of seriousness; “Cd” is the coefficient of 
duration; and “n” is the factor indicating a Member State’s capacity to pay.65
The basic flat rate is an amount set annually by the Commission at the fixed rate 
applicable to all Member States. The latest flat-rate determined in 2016 is €680.
The coefficient of seriousness is determined on the basis of the gravity of infringe-
ment and it is applied on a scale between a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 20. 
When determining the seriousness of the infringement, the Commission takes 
into account two criteria: the importance of the breached rule and the conse-
quences of the infringement to general and particular interests.66
The second criterion, coefficient of duration of the infringement, depends on the 
time elapsed between the delivery of the previous judgment (rendered under Article 
258) and the date of th Court’s oral hearing in the second proceeding.67 The coef-
ficient varies between 1 and 3, calculated at a rate of 0.1 per elapsed month. This 
method has a significant disadvantage because all the breaches that exceeded 29 
months have a coefficient of 3, regardless of whether they lasted for 30 or 50 months.
The “n” factor is a fixed coefficient determined by the Commission in advance for 
each Member State. It is calculated on the basis of the Member State’s gross do-
mestic product68 as well as the number of votes they have in the Council.69 Hence, 
65  2005 Communication, par. 18.2.
66  2005 Communication, par.16.
67  Case C-177/04 [2006] Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2006:173, par.71.
68  There is an opinion that the Commission should have used gross national product per capita as a more 
accurate reflection of a country’s wealth rather than gross domestic product; Theodossiou, op. cit. note 
9, p. 34.
69  Some scholars criticize this solution, pointing out that taking into account the number of votes in the 
Council when determining factor “n” brings a political element into calculating the amount of finan-
cial sanctions for non-compliance; Jack, B., op. cit. note 8, p. 90. As a result of political arrangements, 
some Member States are either over- or under-represented in the Council in comparison to their actual 
population and/or economic strength. Linking the number of votes in the Council with the Member 
State’s wealth is questionable; (Kornezov, op. cit. note 57, p. 305). 
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taking into account the State’s ability to pay, the amount of sanctions to be paid 
for the identical breach may be significantly different, depending on the wealth of 
the defaulting State. Currently, the “n” factor is the smallest for Malta (0.35) and 
the highest for Germany (20.79).70
Finally, the total amount of penalty payment is calculated by multiplying the 
amount of daily penalty payment with the number of days that elapsed from the 
date of delivering the second judgment until the date when the Member State 
brings the infringement to an end.
The method of calculating the lump sum is similar to the method of calculating 
the penalty payment. The Commission uses the following formula:
Ls = bfals x Cs x n x dy
where: “ls” is the total amount of the lump sum payment; “Bfals” is the basic 
flat-rate amount for “lump sum payment”; “Cs” is the coefficient of seriousness; 
“n” is the factor indicating a Member State’s capacity to pay; “dy” is the number 
of days the infringement persists.
The total amount of the lump sum which the defaulting State has to pay is the 
result of multiplying the daily amount by the number of days of infringement. 
The daily amount for determining the lump sum is obtained by multiplying the 
pre-determined basic flat-rate by the coefficient of seriousness (from 1 to 20), and 
then by the “n” factor. 
The basic flat-rate for lump sum is also predetermined annually. It is significantly 
lesser than the basic flat-rate for penalty payment, and it currently stands at €230. 
By contrast, the coefficient of seriousness of infringement and the factor “n” are 
the same for calculating lump sum and the penalty payment. 
The coefficient of duration is not applied in the calculation of the lump sum 
because duration is already taken into account under the “dy” factor. Lump sum 
should be calculated by reference to the number of days, starting from the date 
of delivery of the judgment in proceedings under Article 258 until either the date 
of its enforcement or the date of oral hearing before Court in proceedings under 
Article 260(2).71 
The Commission set out the so-called minimum lump sum for each Member 
State, which implies that states cannot pay below that amount, regardless of the 
70  Communication from the Commission [2016] OJ No. C 290/3.
71  Kilbey, op. cit. note 24, p.372.
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seriousness of the infringement.72 The purpose of fixed minimum lump sum is 
to prevent “purely symbolic amounts which would have no deterrent effect and 
could undermine, rather than strengthen, the authority of Court judgments”.73
The Court has full discretion to decide on the type and amount of sanction. There-
fore, it is not bound either by the Commission proposal on the type of sanction 
or by the suggested amounts. Wishing to retain full autonomy in determining the 
amount of penalties, the Court pointed out in the early cases that it is not bound 
by the Commission’s proposals given in the complaint, nor by its guidelines,74 
stressing that “...the Commission’s suggestions cannot bind the Court and merely 
constitute a useful point of reference”. In a recent judgment, the Court stated that 
the Commission’s suggestions “are merely guidance” and are not binding for the 
Court.75 Thus, the Court may impose higher or lower lump sums and penalty 
payments other than those suggested by the Commission. The Court noted that, 
when determining the penalty payment and the lump sum, it takes into consid-
eration all the circumstances of the individual case,76 fixing the amount so as to 
induce the Member State to comply with the judgment as swiftly as possible and 
preventing similar infringements of EU law in the future.77 
When fixing the penalty payment, the Court considers three criteria identified by 
the Commission.78 In calculating the penalty payment, in some cases the Court 
applied the Commission’s formula but in others the Court calculated the penalty 
payment without reference to this formula.79 When applying the three criteria, 
the Court takes into particular account the effects of the infringement on public 
and private interests, and the urgency of exerting pressure on the Member State to 
fulfill its obligations. 80
The Court has applied the general principle of proportionality in determining 
the penalty payment proportionate to the specific infringement. The Court ascer-
tained that imposition of fixed penalty payment “is neither appropriate to the cir-
72  According the 2016 Communication, Malta may not pay less than €197.000, Croatia €699.000, and 
Germany €11.721.000. 
73  2005 Communication, par.20.
74  Case C-387/97 Commission v. Greece [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:356, par.89.
75  Case C-533/11 Commission v. Belgium [2013] EU:C:2013:659, par.52.
76  Ibid., pars.49, 68.
77  Case C-407/09 Commission v. Greece [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:196, par.29; Case C-496/09 Com-
mission v. Italy [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:740, par.36.
78  Case C-533/11, par.69; Case C-610/10 Commission v. Spain [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:781, par.119.
79  Jack, B., op.cit note 40, p.409.
80  Case C-304/02, par.104; Case C-177/04, par.62; Case C-70/06 Commission v. Portugal [2008] 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:3, par.39.
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cumstances nor proportionate to the breach which has been found”, and acknowl-
edged that “in order for the penalty payment to be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of the case and proportionate to the breach, the amount must take 
account of progress made by the defendant Member State in complying with the 
judgment”.81 Thus, the Court held that the amount of penalty payment can be 
reduced by taking into account the gradual compliance with the judgment.82 
When fixing the lump sum, the Court considers the effects of the infringement on 
public and private interests, duration of infringement,83 and conduct of the Mem-
ber State in the procedure initiated pursuant to Article 260(2) TFEU.84 However, 
in many cases, the Court refused to apply the Commission’s formula and numeri-
cal coefficients; instead, by using its broad discretionary rights, it autonomously 
determined the amount of the lump sum.85 In these situations, the Court simply 
stated that the determined amount of sanction is appropriate to circumstances 
of the case, without any further explanation. The Court usually states that the 
sanctions are “just” or “fair” in the circumstances of the case.86 Round figures of 
the lump sums in some cases show that they are not a result of mathematical op-
erations, but rather a result of the Court’s ex aequo et bono assessment.87 In some 
cases, the Court even imposed lump sums below the minimum predetermined by 
the Commission.88 
Although Article 260(2) does not explicitly recognize the Court’s right to delay 
the application of sanctions, the Court has inherent right to act in this manner.89 
For example, using this possibility, the Court deferred the penalty payment im-
posed on Greece until one month after delivery of the judgment,90 thus granting 
81  Case C-278/01, pars.49-50.
82  See Case C-496/09 Commission v. Italy [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:740.
83  Case 304/02, par.81.
84  Case C-610/10, par.141. 
85  This is the correct approach of the Court because, under Article 260(2), the Commission is one of the 
parties in the proceedings, just like the defendant State. If the Court always accepts the Commission’s 
methodology, it would violate the principle of equality of arms; Kornezov, op. cit. note 57, p.299.
86  Case C-270/11 Commission v. Sweden [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:339, par. 59; Case C-241/11, par.55; 
Case C-533/11, par.62; Case C-576/11 Commission v. Luxembourg [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:773, 
para.66.
87  Kornezov, op. cit. note 57, p. 294.
88  Case C-567/08 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:342; Case C-241/11.
89  Peers, S., Sanctions for Infringement of EU Law after the Treaty of Lisbon, European Public Law, Vol. 
XVIII, No.1, 2012, p.47.
90  Case C-369/07 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:428. 
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to the defaulting State a grace period to rectify the infringement and thereby avoid 
any penalty payment.91
5.  SPECIfICITy Of SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 260(3) TfEU
The rules on imposing sanctions contained in Article 260(2) generally apply to 
Article 260(3). But, the sanction envisaged in Article 260(3) differs in some as-
pects from the general rules contained in Article 260(2).92
First, unlike paragraph 2, under paragraph 3 the Commission is not obliged to 
propose financial sanctions. The used phrase “it may, when it deems appropriate” 
means that the Commission can bring a case to the Court without proposing any 
sanctions. The Commission has full discretion to decide whether to ask the Court 
to impose financial sanctions on the State which has failed to notify the measures 
for transposing a directive, or to use “the regular procedure” pursuant Article 258 
TFEU. The Commission took the view that it would, in principle, use the proce-
dure set out in Article 260(3) in all cases involving States’ failure to notify about 
the taken transposition measures, but it recognised that there might be special 
cases in which it would not deem it appropriate to seek penalties under Article 
260(3).93
Second, Article 260(3) provides that Court may not impose financial sanctions ex-
ceeding the amount specified by the Commission in its complaint. In other words, 
penalties imposed by the Court must be within the limits proposed by the Com-
mission. Like procedure set out in Article 260(2), the Court enjoys full discretion 
to decide whether or not to impose a sanction, and it can refuse to levy proposed 
sanction(s). But, if it decides to impose sanctions, its discretion concerning their 
amount is limited. The Court may impose only the same or a lower amount of 
sanctions than the amount proposed by the Commission.
As for the amount of sanction, the Commission will use the same formula and 
criteria that are applicable under Article 260(2),94 in accordance with 2005 Com-
munication. The only difference is the starting date for calculating the duration 
of infringement. Under Article 260(2), the reference date is the delivery of the 
previous judgment, while pursuant to Article 260(3) the duration of infringement 
91  Kilbey, op. cit. note 24, p. 374.
92  Wenneras, P., op. cit. note 42, p.18.
93  2010 Communication, para.17.
94  Peers, op. cit. note 89, p.44.
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starts from the day following the expiry of the deadline for transposition provided 
in the concerned directive.95
With regard to the aforementioned limitation, it is questionable whether the 
Court may impose sanction which was not proposed by the Commission. Some 
scholars argue that the Court “cannot impose a type of sanction that has not 
been requested by the Commission”.96 But, others consider that the wording of 
Article 260(3) does not prevent the Court from “assessing the appropriateness of 
imposing sanctions which the Commission has not specified”.97 yet, it seems that 
the text of Article 260(3) does not allow the Court to impose a sanction that the 
Commission has not proposed. If the Court is not allowed to impose a higher 
amount of sanction than that requested by the Commission, it is even less entitled 
to impose the sanction that is not proposed at all.
It is indisputable that the Commission may propose both sanctions (penalty pay-
ment and a lump sum) cumulatively.98 The Commission explicitly promulgated 
this approach in its 2010 Communication, stating that the wording of Article 
260(3) “does not preclude the possibility of combining both types of penalties in 
the same judgment.”99 It came to this conclusion by using analogy with the case 
law on Article 260(2).100 But, at the same time, the Commission indicated that it 
would normally propose only a penalty payment, hoping that this sanction will 
prove sufficient to achieve full notification on the transposition measures. How-
ever, the Commission reserves the possibility to seek the lump sum for instances 
in which this sanction is warranted by the circumstances of the case.101 Such policy 
enables States to procrastinate the notification of transposition measures until im-
minently prior to the Court’s hearing and thus escape any sanctions.102 The prac-
tice has shown that States widely used this possibility. In 23 out of 24 proceedings 
under Article 260(3), Member States completed notification at the last stage of 
judicial proceedings and thus avoided penalties despite their delay in notification. 
Therefore, the Commission should amend its policy and regularly start requesting 
a lump sum, as it has done under Article 260(2).103 
95  2010 Communication, para.27.
96  Wahl, Prete, op. cit note 22., p.185.
97  Wenneras, op.cit. note 42, p.19.
98  Wenneras, op.cit. note 3, p.168.
99  2010 Communication, par.20.
100  Peers, op. cit. note 89, p.38.
101  2010 Communication, par.21.
102  Wenneras, op.cit. note 3, p.168.
103  Wenneras, op.cit. note 42, p.19.
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Third, Article 260(3) gives explicit authority to the Court to determine the day 
when the payment obligation imposed by the judgment shall take effect. Thus, 
the Court has opportunity to delay the effect of its judgment. As the Commission 
noted, Article 260(3) “allows the Court to set the date of effect as either the day 
on which the judgment was handed down or a subsequent date”.104 Notably, such 
an option is not totally new “since the Court has inherent jurisdiction to delay the 
application of its Article 260(2) judgments as well”.105
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The mechanism of sanctions provided in Article 260 TFEU certainly contributes 
to better implementation of EU law. Besides the direct pressure on the countries 
on which sanctions are imposed, it acts preventively to all other Member States. 
Improvements made by the Lisbon Treaty further contribute to achieving these 
effects. Removing the reasoned opinion in Article 260(2) contributes to a faster 
imposition of sanctions for non-compliance with judgments, whereas the new 
paragraph 3 speeds up and simplifies the procedure for imposing sanctions in 
cases of the Member States’ failure to notify the Commission about the national 
transposition measures within the prescribed time-limits. 
As for Article 260(2), the case law has mainly clarified dilemmas regarding its ap-
plication. However, the method of calculating the amount of sanctions remains 
ambiguous. The lack of binding rules in this area leads to frequent disagreement 
between the Commission and the Court on this matter, which is detrimental to 
the legal certainty and transparency.
There is much more uncertainty concerning Article 260(3) because of the lack of 
case law on this matter. yet, we may still anticipate some developments regarding 
its application. It is almost certain that the Commission will soon start propos-
ing penalty payment and lump sum cumulatively under Article 260(3), just as it 
has done under Article 260(2), in order to preclude the Member States’ delayed 
notification of implementation measures, which is often given in the last stage of 
judicial proceedings, thus enabling the States to avoid any sanctions despite being 
in default. It can be expected with considerable certainty that the Court will not 
often use the possibility of postponing the enforcement of the imposed sanctions. 
Finally, having regard to the linguistic interpretation of paragraph 3, the Court 
should not be expected to impose a sanction that has not been proposed by the 
Commission. 
104  2010 Communication, par.29.
105  Peers, op. cit. note 89, p.47
Zoran Radivojević, Nebojša Raičević: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS AGAINST MEMBER STATES ... 189
It should be noted that, thus far, the Commission has acted in both proceed-
ings under Article 260, primarily taking into account the political circumstances 
which have been used as guidelines in deciding whether to initiate proceedings, 
when to lodge a complaint, and what kind of sanctions to propose. By contrast, 
as an independent judicial authority, the Court has managed to keep the political 
circumstances aside and acted solely on the basis of legal criteria.
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THE PRELIMINARy RULING PROCEDURE AND 
THE IDENTITy REVIEW
ABSTRACT
Constitutional identity, as enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU might theoretically open up the 
possibility for EU Member States to refuse fulfilling certain obligations under EU law by ref-
erencing certain, as if yet not clearly defined elements of constitutional identity. Member States’ 
constitutional identity, which is to be respected by the EU does not appear in positive law. 
Having regard to multilevel constitutionalism, it may be assumed that national constitutional 
identity will be elaborated in dialogues between national (constitutional) courts and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. Based on previous practice however, the national and Euro-
pean interpretations of identity differ significantly. To achieve necessary convergence, the Court 
of Justice and national courts must cooperate in interpreting the concept of constitutional iden-
tity. This raises the necessity of examining whether the procedural prerequisites of this coopera-
tion are given in national and EU public law. The questions to be examined are 1) whether 
the preliminary ruling procedure has already been used in identity-related cases, 2) what the 
position of constitutional courts/supreme courts (courts engaged in constitutional interpreta-
tion) is regarding the preliminary ruling procedure and 3) whether this may be considered 
the appropriate procedure when applying Article 4(2) TEU or would it require modification?
Keywords: constitutional identity, identity clause, preliminary ruling, judicial dialogue
1.  INTRODUCTION
Constitutional identity, as stipulated in Article 4 (2) TEU, require a dialogue be-
tween the CJEU and the constitutional courts of Member States. This dialogue 
may be the institutionalized form of preliminary ruling procedure. This paper 
examines the role of preliminary ruling procedure in the application of Article 
4 (2) TEU. The apropos of the research is that the German constitutional court 
turned to the CJEU in 2014, for the first time, with a preliminary ruling request, 
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and its Hungarian counterparts, when finally delivered a decision on the limits 
of EU law in November 2016, it has not even mentioned the possibility of the 
application of the preliminary ruling procedure.For doing so, an overview on the 
preliminary ruling procedure is offered. A summary on the case law and scholarly 
views on constitutional identity, the role of this procedure in the European con-
stitutional law of Member States, and its appearance in practice follows. Against 
this background, a rough assessment can be made regarding its suitability of being 
a communication channel when Article 4 (2) TEU is applied. 
2.  THE PRELIMINARy RULING PROCEDURE
As our paper focuses on the possible avenues of judicial dialogue in the EU vis-
à-vis the concept of national identity, we need to briefly look at the function 
and characteristics of the only formalised channel of communication between the 
CJEU and national courts: the preliminary ruling procedure. 
2.1.  The preliminary ruling procedure in EU law 
The preliminary ruling procedure is a crucial element of the functioning of the 
EU legal order. The procedure enables national courts applying EU law to ask the 
Court of Justice for a ruling on (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; or (b) the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union. According to Article 267 TFEU, if such a question is raised before 
“any court or tribunal of a Member State”, that court or tribunal may request the 
Court to give a ruling. The national court itself may decide whether it considers 
that a preliminary ruling on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment 
or not. The essential function of the procedure according to the Court of Justice is 
to prevent the occurrence of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of EU 
law1 within the European Union, as this would jeopardise the aims of integration 
by law, and thus to ensure uniform interpretation of EU law.2 Secondly, the pro-
cedure also serves as a possibility for reviewing secondary EU law in the light of 
(written or unwritten) primary EU law, and in some circumstances, international 
law binding on the European Union.
The importance of the procedure is unquestionable as it served as the means for 
the Court of Justice not only to interpret EU law, but also to develop it – the ‘con-
stitutionalisation’ of the EU legal order in the Court’s jurisprudence took place 
1  Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1974] ECR 0033.
2  Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di GavardoSpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 03415
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largely (though not exclusively) via preliminary rulings, especially as far as the re-
lationship between national law and EU law is concerned.3 It is important to note 
that the preliminary ruling procedure does not establish a relationship of subordi-
nation between the courts concerned: each judicial institution acts within its own 
jurisdiction.4  The preliminary ruling itself is binding on the referring national 
court and not a mere opinion.5 Preliminary rulings regarding the validity of sec-
ondary EU law are binding on the referring court, as the national court is bound 
to refrain from applying the secondary act in question as a result of a judgment 
of the Court declaring it to be void – the ruling is directly only addressed to the 
referring court, however, such a ruling “is sufficient reason for any other national 
court to regard that act as void for the purposes of a judgment which it has to 
give.”6 National courts themselves on the other hand have no jurisdiction to de-
clare void secondary EU law.7 Preliminary rulings regarding the interpretation of 
EU law (whether primary or secondary) are also binding in the case at hand, and 
may further be regarded as ‘quasi-precedents’ and can thus be taken into account 
by national courts. This forms the basis of the acteéclairé doctrine; according to 
the Court, the ‘authority’ of a previous preliminary ruling on interpretation may 
even absolve the national court from the obligatory initiation of the procedure es-
pecially when the “question raised is materially identical with a question which has 
already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case.”8 The Court even 
extended the doctrine somewhat by stating that the need to submit references to 
the Court of Justice may be unnecessary where the Court has already dealt with 
the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which 
led to those decisions, even if the questions at issue are not strictly identical.9 By 
3  See e.g. Dehousse, R.: The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration, Macmillan, 
London, 1998, pp. 36-45 or Stone Sweet, A.: The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 64-107.
4  As the Court of Justice has emphasized, the procedure requires „the national court and the Court of 
Justice, both keeping within their respective jurisdiction, and with the aim of ensuring that Communi-
ty law is applied in a unified manner, to make direct and complementary contributions to the working 
out of a decision.” Case 16/65Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1965] ECR 00877
5  „The purpose of a preliminary ruling by the court is to decide a question of law, and that ruling is 
binding on the national court (…)”Case 52/76 Luigi Benedetti v MunariF.llis.a.s [1977] ECR 00163, 
paragraph 21
6  Case 66/80 SpA International Chemical Corporation v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato 
[1981] ECR 01191,  par. 13-19.
7  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 04199.
8  Joined Cases 28-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v Nether-
lands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 00031.
9  Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di GavardoSpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 03415, par. 
13-14.
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doing so, the Court of Justice invited the national courts – any national court – to 
refer to and apply its previous rulings. 
From the point of view of our more specific topic, it can be stated that as regards 
its characteristics and effects, the preliminary ruling procedure seems adequate to 
be applied in the judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court of Jus-
tice on questions of national constitutional identity: references may made to the 
Court of Justice regarding the validity of secondary EU law which from the point 
of view of the national court seems to be ultra vires and/or contrary to Article 4 (2) 
TEU, and on the interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU in general, though only if it 
is applicable in the case at hand. But are constitutional courts supposed to initiate 
preliminary ruling procedures?
2.2.   The preliminary ruling procedure in the practice of national constitutional 
courts
The question whether Constitutional Courts may or should submit references for 
preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice is a debated one even after more than 
sixty years of European integration. From the point of view of the Court of Justice, 
the right to submit references is tied to the concept of ‘national courts’: the Treaties 
do not specify further which courts may or may not submit references, and also 
does not dwell on what exactly ‘court’ is supposed to mean in this context. That is 
why the Court of Justice has developed its jurisprudence pertaining to this issue, 
laying down requirements which an institution needs to fulfil in order to qualify 
as a ‘court’ in the meaning of Article 267 – namely: (1) is the body is established 
by law; (2) is it permanent; (3) is its jurisdiction compulsory; (4) is its procedure 
adversarial (inter partes); (5) does it apply rules of law; (6) is it independent; and 
(7) does it give decisions of a judicial nature.10
Constitutional courts should have no trouble satisfying these criteria – what is 
more, they would even be considered courts against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law and thus obliged to initiate preliminary ruling 
procedures according to Article 276 TFEU, sentence 3 – save for the requirement 
of deciding in an adversarial procedure.11 This criterion is however not of an abso-
lute nature, as the Court of Justice itself notes that the TFEU does not make pre-
liminary references contingent upon the national proceedings in question being 
10  Summarized e.g. in Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesell-
schaft Berlin mbH [1997] ECR I-04961. For analysis of the criteria see e.g. Kaczorowska-Ireland, A.: 
European Union Law (Fourth Edition), Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames, 2016, pp. 398-403.
11  For further elaboration see Claes, M., The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution. Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2006, pp. 438-451.
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inter partes.12 If we look at the Hungarian Constitutional Court for instance, it 
is debatable whether it would qualify as applying an adversarial procedure: before 
the latest reform of the HCC in 2011, it was argued that the HCC does not fulfil 
this criterion13, but recent changes imply a shift from ex post abstract review of 
laws to the adjudication of constitutional complaints, granting remedies in indi-
vidual cases where fundamental rights of a person are violated (even if the consti-
tutional complaint procedure is not adversarial in the classic sense).14Furthermore, 
depending on the kind of competence under which the constitutional courts pro-
ceed, there may arise a question as to whether the decision to be taken by them 
is of a ‘judicial nature’ or not (e.g. in the case of an abstract review of constitu-
tionality of a norm). Once again however the practice of the Court of Justice has 
been unclear about what judicial nature is supposed to mean, the Court has rather 
emphasized that the decision should not be of an administrative nature.15
In practice, the Court of Justice has to the best of our knowledge never refused a 
reference from a national constitutional court, perhaps signalling also its readiness 
to engage in judicial dialogue.16
Another question is whether constitutional courts themselves are willing to initi-
ate preliminary ruling procedures. In general terms, such courts are less obvious 
actors in the procedure than national courts as they are not faced directly with 
individual disputes where the application and/or interpretation of EU law is the 
question: constitutional courts do not essentially “need” EU law to perform their 
tasks17, as they are the institutional safeguards of constitutionality, interpreting 
their respective national constitutions and ruling on the conformity of laws or ju-
12  See inter alia JCase C-210/06 Cartesio Oktatóés Szolgáltató Bt. [2008] ECR I-09641, par. 56-61.
13  See Fazekas, F., A magyar Alkotmánybíróság viszonya a közösségi jog elsőbbségéhez egyes tagállami alkot-
mánybírósági felfogások tükrében, University of Debrecen, Debrecen, 2009, pp. 341-344. The author 
does not however consider the non-absolute nature of the requirement of an adversarial procedure.
14  Gárdos-Orosz, F., Preliminary Reference and the Hungarian Constitutional Court: A Context of Non-Ref-
erence, German Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 06, 2015, p. 1575
15  Forexample, courts deciding on the allocation of a surname to a child or the registration of a com-
pany have been held not to be in a position to request a preliminary ruling reference, wheres where a 
court hears an appeal against such a decision, its decision will be considered to be of a judicialnature. 
Chalmers, D.; Davies, G.; Monti; G., European Union Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010, 154.
16  Though it was noted by Claes that perhaps the Court of Justice didn’t even realize when the first ever 
reference from a constitutional court had reached it from Belgium, initiated by the Belgian constitu-
tional court (which was at the time still called Courd’arbitrage), as neither the Advocate General nor 
the Court mentioned this no doubt important fact. See Claes, M., Luxembourg, Here We Come? Con-
stitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure, German Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 6, 2015, 
p. 1337. 
17  Stone Sweet, op. cit. note 3. p. 81.
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dicial decisions therewith. yet a number of constitutional courts have already initi-
ated preliminary rulings: the Austrian, Belgian, German Lithuanian, and Spanish 
constitutional courts, the French Conseil Constitutionnel and the High Court of 
Ireland have all submitted such requests, whereas the approach of others (the Pol-
ish Constitutional Tribunal, the Slovak and the Czech Constitutional Courts) is 
less clear.18 But if and when a request for a preliminary ruling (from whichever 
court) references national identity, does the Court of Justice seize the opportunity?
Notwithstanding important references to the clause, we are yet to see the identity 
clause elaborated upon in more general terms and in a broader context by the 
Court of Justice. Looking at references made by the Court of Justice to Article 
4 (2) TEU,  the identity clause has been expressly mentioned in nine prelimi-
nary rulings, an infringement procedure, and an action for annulment19before 
the General Court.20 Though not explicitly, but the Court of Justice has already 
demonstrated its willingness to protect Member States’ national identity in the 
Omega case21, what is more it has effectively already placed national identity 
before internal market freedoms in a concrete case in its judgment in the pre-
Maastricht Groener case22 (both were preliminary rulings). It is apparent that the 
majority of references to Article 4 (2) until now stem from preliminary ruling 
cases, reinforcing the idea that this ‘communication channel’ between national 
courts and the Court of Justice has potential to serve as tool in clarifying the scope 
and true meaning of the identity clause. Until now the Court of Justice however 
mostly relied on the identity clause as a supporting or subsidiary argument. In 
the most recent relevant judgment for instance (Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff), 
the Court of Justice used the identity clause as a subsidiary argument: it held that 
the German prohibition on titles of nobility should be considered an element of 
18  For an overview see Claes, M., op. cit. note 16, pp. 1331-1342.
19  CaseT-529/13 Balázs-ÁrpádIzsák and Attila Dabis v European Commission [2016] EU:T:2016:282. 
The application was dismissed, the appeal by the applicant is still pending before the Court of Justice 
(Case C-420/16 P).
20  Data extracted from the curia.eu database. The identity clause was further mentioned in a Case 
C-253/12 JS, a reference for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech 
Republic, but the case was deleted from the registry as the referring Czech court withdrew its request 
for a preliminary ruling [see: Ordonnance du Président de la Première Chambre de la Cour (27 mars 
2013), EU:C:2013:212]. A further relevant action for annulment was found to be inadmissible by the 
General Court [see: Order of 6 March 2012,Case T-453/10Northern Ireland Department of Agricul-
ture and Rural Development v European Commission [2012] EU:T:2012:106.
21  Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I–9609
22  Case C-379/87 Anita Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Education-
al Committee [1989] ECR I–3967 – as noted by Besselink, L. F.M., Case C-208/09, IlonkaSayn-Witt-
genstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgement of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 
2010, nyr. Common Market Law Review, Vol. 49, 2012, p. 681
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the national identity of Germany in the sense of Article 4(2) TEU, which may be 
taken into account as an element justifying a restriction on the right to freedom of 
movement of persons recognised by EU law.23 It would seem from this reasoning 
that national (constitutional) identity serves as an underlying rationale of justified 
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law based on public 
policy; thus serving as one of the possible public policy exceptions. From Article 
4(2) TEU itself however it seems more that public policy may be an element of na-
tional identity as such, and not vice versa. Article 4(2) TEU should be regarded as 
possessing independent legal significance: as shown by the wording “shall respect”, 
Article 4(2) TEU is construed as a legal obligation of the EU, not just a statement 
of principle with a mere interpretative function.24
In our view, in order for the preliminary ruling procedure to serve as an appropri-
ate channel25 for formalised judicial dialogue regarding national identity, a num-
ber of puzzle pieces need to fall into place (apart from the necessary situations 
having to present themselves of course as the Court of Justice does not rule on 
hypothetical questions26):
-    National constitutional courts need to be willing to submit questions to the 
Court of Justice on issues related to national constitutional identity27;
-    The Court of Justice needs to undertake a more thorough analysis of the 
content and limits of Article 4 (2) TEU and clarify its place and function in 
the legal order of the EU;
-    The Court of Justice needs to be receptive in principle towards accepting the 
reasoning of the national constitutional courts;
-    National constitutional courts need to accept preliminary rulings as authen-
tic, final and binding interpretations of EU law without any reservations.28
23  Case C-438/14 Bogendorff von Wolffersdorffv Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe [not yetreported], par. 
64.
24  Von Bogdandy, A; Schill, S.: Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, p. 27
25  We must note also that the identity clause could have relevance in actions for annulment as well, as 
member states could potentially use it in their argumentation against an EU norm which is perceived 
as interfering with national identity – of course, states would have to formulate their reasoning to fit 
one of the four annulment grounds stipulated by Article 263 TFEU; it seems quite possible however 
to link identity protection with lack of competence, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law 
relating to their application, or misuse of powers. 
26 Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello[1980] ECR 00745
27  For a missed opportunity see for example Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.)of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, reviewed below.
28  For a discussion of the dangers of the relativisation of the legal effects of a preliminary ruling see the 
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3.   CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, IDENTITy REVIEW, AND 
THE PRELIMINARy RULING PROCEDURE
3.1.  The German practice 
The German Court took the lead in employing the identity review. It was this 
court which, in its OMT reference, for the first time, made an empty promise of 
using the identity review. It claimed in its petition (2014)29 that even if the CJEU 
would consider the OMT decision in accordance with the EU law, the constitu-
tional court could examine if it was indeed in conformity with the Grundgesetz 
(GG) and did not infringe its identity as it is defended by Article 79.3 GG.30 Its 
reason is that, due to the German Lisbon decision, democracy, thus a constituent 
element of the identity of the GG would be violated if the Parliament renounced 
the budgetary autonomy as it ‘could no longer exercise its budgetary autonomy 
under its own responsibility’.31 While the constitutional court, in the Lisbon de-
cision took the position that ‘the guarantee of national constitutional identity 
under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand,’32 it emphasized their 
difference in its OMT reference decision. The CJEU in the Gauweiler case33ruled 
that the OMT decision of the Central Bank was issued within its competence, 
therefore this particular piece of legal measure was not ultra vires. It also noted 
that the decision of the CJEU in the preliminary ruling procedure is obligatory 
forthe Member State.34 The decision of the CJEU was, however, not followed by 
the ‘promised’ action of the German Constitutional Court, but on the contrary: 
it refused a constitutional complaint that was filed against the OMT decision of 
the Central Bank, and it based its ruling on the Gauweiler decision.35 If it had 
been the end of the judicial dialogue between the courts, it would have meant 
that it was the CJEU that had the final say in identity issues. yet, the CJEU took 
the requirement of sincere cooperation seriously and engaged in a judicial consti-
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalon in Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher 
Bundestag. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón [2015] EU:C:2015:7
29  BVerfG, Jan 14. 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13, URL=https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/DE/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813.html, hereinafter: OMT reference decision. 
See also Wendel, op. cit. note 11, p. 285.
30 OMT reference decision [103], Wendel, op. cit. note 11, p. 285.
31  OMT reference decision [102]
32 German Lisbon decision, point 5.
33  Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag [2015] EU:C:2015:7
34  Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag [2015] EU:C:2015:7, par.16; 
Claes, M.; Reestman, J.-H., The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European 
Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, German Law Journal Vol.16, No. 4, 2015, p. 918.
35  Judgment of 21 June 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 
13/13.
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tutional dialogue and lately, it seems that the CJEU is willing to offer an ‘inter-
pretative method’ to the Members States when it comes to the application of the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW). At the beginning of 2016, it was to be seen how 
higher courts of Member States would consider the message the German Consti-
tutional Court had sent in its order of 15 December 2015 when it first applied 
the constitutional identity test.36 In its order, the Court refused the application 
of the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant. It claimed that the 
application in the concrete case would qualify as disrespect of the constitutional 
identity of Germany, more precisely, the unchangeable provision on human dig-
nity, stemming from some Articles of the Grundgesetz (Arts. 79.3, 1.1).37 This 
action generated a judicial constitutional dialogue between national courts and 
the CJEU. The Aranyosi and Căldăraru case (5 April 2016),38 even though consti-
tutional identity was not mentioned therein, can be seen as a good example. The 
Higher Regional Court of Bremen, Germany, was uncertain as to the execution of 
the two European Arrest Warrants issued by Hungary and Romania due to poor 
prison conditions (overcrowding in prisons) which have already been condemned 
by, among others, the ECtHR.39 In its decision, in the preliminary ruling proce-
dure, the CJEU apparently offered an alternative interpretative method or another 
toolkit of legal arguments. Using them would make unnecessary the activation 
of the national constitutional identity review because the common application 
of the Charter (Articles 1 and 4) and the ECHR (Article 3) may reach the same 
goal without jeopardizing the unity and supremacy of EU law. The preservation 
and respect of human dignity in conjunction with the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, a right that has utmost importance in, but 
not exclusively, Germany, could prevail. 
3.2.  The Hungarian experience 
According to the decision 22/2016 (XII.5) of the Constitutional Court,there are 
two main limits for the conferred or jointly exercised competencies, under Article 
E) (2): it cannot infringe the sovereignty of Hungary (sovereignty review) and 
the constitutional identity of Hungary which is based on the historical constitu-
36  2 BvR 2735/14
37  The subject of the EAW, due to some rules of the Italian criminal proceedings, would not have right to 
appeal in its case as the sentence was issued in absentia.
38  Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosiand Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bre-
men [2016] EU:C:2016:198
39  Varga and Others v. Hungary, Nos 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 
64586/13, of 10 March 2015, Voicu v. Romania, No 22015/10; Bujorean v. Romania, No 13054/12; 
Mihai Laurenţiu Marin v. Romania, No 79857/12, and Constantin Aurelian Burlacu v. Romania, 
No 51318/12
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tion (identity review).40 The Court, through Article E) (2), based the identity 
review on Article 4 (2) TEU. Even though the Court holds that the constitutional 
identity of Hungary does not mean a list of exhaustive enumeration of values, it 
still mentions some of them. For example: freedoms, the division of power, the 
republican form of state, respect of public law autonomies, freedom of religion, 
legality, parliamentarism, equality before the law, recognition of judicial power, 
protection of nationalities that are living with us. These equal with modern and 
universal constitutional values and the achievement of our historical constitution 
on which our legal system rests. According to the Court, the protection of consti-
tutional identity may also emerge in connection with areas which shape the citi-
zens’ living conditions, in particular the private sphere of their own responsibility 
and of political and social security, protected by fundamental rights, and in areas 
in which the linguistic, historical and cultural involvement of Hungary can be 
detectable.In the German Lisbon decision, which the Court reproduces without 
any reference, however, all these are formulated in connection with ‘the political 
formation of the economic, cultural and social living conditions’, i.e., the exercise 
of the state power.41The Court holds that the constitutional identity of Hungary is 
a fundamental value that has not been created but only recognized by the FL and, 
therefore, it cannot be renounced by an international treaty. The defense of the 
constitutional identity of Hungary is the task of the Constitutional Court as long 
as Hungary has sovereignty. 
The Court confirms that ‘the objects of these tests are not directly the EU law or 
its validity’.42The question emerges, then, what is the object of the review? How 
can the Court establish whether a piece of EU legislation infringes the sovereignty 
or the identity of Hungary, if it does not examine, at least to some degree, the EU 
law, for which it clearly does not have the competence, and there is no established 
institutional mechanism in place for initiating a preliminary ruling procedure? 
The Court has not even noticed it could use the preliminary ruling procedure in 
this present or any future case.43 It is also unclear, what are the consequences of 
infringement.Moreover, the identity review as a legal review is settled somewhere 
else in the German decision.44 It is also ambiguous what ‘defense of the constitu-
tional identity of Hungary’ precisely means, because the Court has not established 
40  Drinóczi, T.: The Hungarian Constitutional Court on the Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal Sys-
tem, URL=http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-on-the-limits-
of-eu-law-in-the-hungarian-legal-system/. Accessed 9 January 2017.
41  Point 4 of the decision of the Lisbon decision of the German Court, or its marginal note 249.
42  Decision [56] 
43  This opportunity was only mentioned by Judge István Stumpf in his consenting opinion at paragraph 
[103] of the decision.
44  Point 5 of the decision of the Lisbon decision of the German Court, or its marginal note 240.
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any legal consequences of the declaration of a conflict between EU law and na-
tional law under any of the reviews and it remains silent regarding the object of 
the reviews as well. Furthermore, the achievements of our historical constitution 
are far from clear. It is still a question what steps will the Hungarian state make 
if its constitutional identity is endangered: continue with non-compliance to EU 
law, or comply with it despite its conflicting nature with the identity protected in 
the constitution? Ultimately, the question is whether the referral to constitutional 
identity provides a constitutional basis for Hungary to exit the EU. 
All this will make it difficult for the EU institutions, including the CJEU, to ad-
equately consider the idenity of Hungary under Article 4 (2). It also does not help 
that the preliminary ruling procedure is not mentioned in the decision and there 
is no legal mechanism available for the Court to use this process. Nevertheless, the 
‘European constitutional dialogue’ is a permanent reference in the interpretation 
of the Court in this case. It seems as if the Court would conceive it as an obligation 
that must be respected, or as a strong and almost sole legal argument for justifying 
the reviews created in this decision instead of developing a national constitutional 
law based reasoning, which is supported by some comparative law oriented justi-
fications.45 And yet, it has not considered the possibility of the application of the 
preliminary ruling procedure in this or regarding any future cases. 
4.   CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITy AS APPLIED IN EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION: THE IDENTITy Of THE CONSTITUTION
Based on the case law, we apply the following assumption: the ‘constitutional 
identity’ in the sense of Article 4 (2) TEU means the identity of the constitution.46
The German Constitutional Court constantly uses the phrase ‘identity of the GG’– 
which is defended by Article 79.3 GG – in its Lisbon decision and OMT reference 
45  It attributed high importance to the constitutional dialogue within the EU. Therefore it examines 
the standpoints of Member States concerning the fundamental right-reservation and ultra vires acts. 
Then, it lists and even quotes several case laws of the national courts (Estonia, France, Ireland, Latvia, 
Poland, Spain, Czech Republic, England, Wales, UK, and Germany) on the relationship between the 
EU law and national law. In connection with the UK Supreme Court, it says: in one of its decision, the 
Supreme Court of the UK – complying with the requirement of constitutional dialogue between the 
Member States – referred to one of the rulings of the German Constitutional Court. Again, the Court 
mentions that the CJEU respects the competences of the Member States and considers their constitu-
tional needs in the framework of the European constitutional dialogue.
46  German, French case law: 2 BvR 2735/14, Judgment of 21 June 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 
2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13Decision n° 2004-498 DC of July 29th 2004, 
para. 6.
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case.47In France, constitutional identity refers to some individual components of 
the French constitution (and not that of the state) which do not have matching 
counterparts in EU law. In the decision on the Bioethics Act, the Constitutional 
Council refused to examine the question of whether or not certain provisions of 
this Act, which implements a directive, constitute a violation of the Constitu-
tion, including the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 (freedom of 
speech). The reason was that the freedom of speech is also ’protected as a general 
principle of Community Law’ via Article 10 of the ECHR.48
As for doctrinal views, Biljana Kostadinov49 for example sees constitutional iden-
tity in Croatia as a special form of national identity which embodies the provisions 
on the right of the people to decide on and pass the constitution in a free and 
democratic procedure, i.e., decisions concerning the state structure, the state of 
government, and the procedure in which these decisions are passed.50
It is also obvious that there is a significant gap between the identity concept 
emerging fromthe case law of the CJEU, the identity-interpretation of the (con-
stitutional) courts and the opinion of the scholarly literature. The reason is, on 
the one hand, that there are only a few cases available in which the CJEU ac-
knowledged the invocation of constitutional identity as enshrined in Article 4 (2) 
TEU by a Member State. On the other hand, it should not be disregarded that, 
due to the different position and role of the CJEU and national (constitutional) 
courts, the basis, framework, and scope of their interpretation practiceabout the 
nature, content, subject and extent of constitutional/national identity varies. Thi-
sis true even if the interpretation is about how and why to apply the same treaty 
provision,Article 4 (2) TEU. In searching for the legally relevant meaning of Ar-
ticle 4 (2) TEU , the national constitutional or high court considers the constitu-
ent power and reveals the features and possibilities of the constitution-amending 
power that is drafted in or shaped by the constitution. As a following step, it 
examines the challenged competences to see which of them it cannot allow being 
jointly exercised with others Member States or the EU because it would amount 
to imperiling the preservation and protection of the identity of the constitution. 
German constitutional court has been the only one to theorize and apply this ap-
proach. Especially in the light of the recent practice of the German constitutional 
court, scholarly opinions taking the position that Article 4 (2) TEU has to apper-
47  See e.g,.BVerfG, Jan 14. 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13, URL=https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813.html, hereinafter: OMT refer-
ence decision. See also Wendel, op. cit. note 11, 285.
48  Decision n° 2004-498 DC of July 29th 2004, 6.point.
49  Kostadinov, B. Constitutional identity Iustinianus, Primus Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, p. 10. 
50  Ibid., pp. 10, 17-18.
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tain to the most basic elements of national identity, which comprise the form of 
state, the form of government and ‘a little more’51seem to be unfounded. It is also 
an apparently disputable statement that the ‘structure’ in Article 4 (2) TEU refers 
to the most significant attributes, among others – beyond those mentioned – the 
written or unwritten nature of the constitution, the majority or proportionality 
structure of the electoral system and the nature of the constitutional review.52 Nev-
ertheless, these considerations that evolve during the constitutional development 
of a particular state53 may be the basis of the legal definition of the identity of the 
constitution under the scope of application of Article 4 (2) TEU.54
The following summary can be made of the identity of the constitution.
The practice of interpretation concerning the identity of the constitution is typi-
cally integration-friendly, and the identity review barely happens. Itcan, in certain 
fundamental rights-related cases, be protected by a general reference to the EU 
legal order, even without invoking Article 4 (2) TEU. In this way, i.e., when there 
is a genuine judicial constitutional dialogue,55 the constitutional identity, as ex-
pressed in Article 4 (2), does not purport to breach the absolute primacy of EU 
law, or at least, by a proper interpretation exercise, it can be avoided. For this, see 
point 3 below. 
The following are needed for upholding the identity of the constitution. First, 
the state needs to remain a state. The state can substantively apply comptences in 
which the supreme power is manifested. It means that the exercise of these compe-
tences cannot be emptied. See, e.g., the German differentiation regarding the con-
51  Di Federico, G., Identifying constitutional identities in the case law of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, p. 47, URL=http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferenc-
es/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws9/w9-federico.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2017.
52  Lehman, W., European democracy, constitutional identity and sovereignty Study, July 2010. PE 425.618, p.11, 
URL=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/425618/IPOL-AFCO_
NT(2010)425618_EN.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2017.The opinion of Besselink, according to which 
Article 4 (2) TEU does not defend those constitutional revisions, which are not fundamental and as 
such cannot contribute to the definition of constitutional identity, seems also to be an evasive state-
ment. Besselink, L., ‘National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon’ Utrecht Law Review 
Vol, 6, No. 3, 2010,p. 48.
53  Jacobsohn, G. J.,Constitutional identity, Harvard University Press, 2010; Rosenfeld, M., Constitutional 
identity, in Rosenfeld, M. – Sajó, A.eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
54  Cf. Grewe, C., Methods of identification of national constitutional identity,in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and 
Carina Alcoberro Llivina, eds., National constitutional identity and European integration, Intersentia 
2013, p. 45.
55  Besselink holds that there is a need for cooperation between the justices of the CJEU and the consti-
tutional courts of the Member States to determine what constitutional identity is and what it means 
within the special EU law context. Besselink, op.cit.note 52, at p. 45. 
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trol and the locus of the decision-making competence of the military forces. The 
German constitutional court distinguishes between the deployment of the army, 
which is in the exclusive power of the parliament, and as such, it cannot be trans-
ferred, and the possible supranational coordination of the armed forces. The com-
petence regarding this latter specific coordination can thus be shared.56Second, the 
state can differentiate itself from other states due to the ‘constitutionalization’ of 
its individual and unique values and principles exclusively featuring that particular 
state that emerged and evolved in the courses of constitutional development or 
constitutional interpretation. This unique identity of its constitution makes it pos-
sible for the state to find its different and distinct markers in a community which 
is based on common constitutional traditions, values, and principles and which 
the given state created or, by accepting and complying with the set minimum 
requirements, joined. The national identity, as the ‘collective identity of the con-
stitutional subject’, which is constructed and re-constructed during constitutional 
development, is shown in the constitution (identity of the constitution), in the 
guise of, e.g., the eternity clauses, which renders a unique character for both the 
constitution and the state itself. These eternity clauses can be altered neither by the 
common exercise of competences with the EU or the Member States. Third, there 
are integration-proof decision-making competences among those which specify 
the principles and the values constituting the identity of the constitution. Invoca-
tion of them, however, due to the legal consequences they may trigger, can hap-
pen only as a last resort or as an ultima ratio. Fourth, if the Member State takes 
‘identity’ in the sense of Article 4 (2) TEU seriously, and if interpretation cannot 
resolve the conflict between the national and the EU law, it should apply legal 
consequences. They may be, as stated by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal,57 the 
following: the constitution prevails; constitutional amendment will occur; the EU 
law will be amended; or the Member State leaves the EU to sustain the identity of 
the constitution. 
It may be concluded thus, that it is necessary to enable dialogue between the CJEU 
and the national courts, and this seems to be realizing. The decision of 22/2016 
(XII. 5) of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, however, due to the lack of 
56  Lisbon decision of Germany, [254], [255]. This view facilitates to answer the question of some scholars 
regarding whether national identity (from the perspective of the EU law) and constitutional identity 
(from the perspective of the Member States) embodies cultural or just legal considerations. The rea-
son for raising this issue was that cultural and linguistic diversity was relocated to Article 3 TEU (see 
Konstadinies, T., The constitutionalisation of national identity in EU law and its implications, 2013, 
pp. 3-4, URL=http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318972, URL=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2318972, 
URL=http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/konstadinides.pdf ), but one cannot deny the cultural 
aspects when reading Article 4 (2) TEU (see Besselink, op.cit. note 52, pp. 41,44).  
57  Decision K 18/04, 11 May 2005.
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institutional and procedural mechanisms, does not fit in. Despite the commonly 
detected reluctance of the constitutional courts of the Member States in relation 
to the use of the preliminary ruling procedure, even the German Constitutional 
Court turned to the CJEU in 2014, for the first time in its history, regarding the 
OMT program of the European Central Bank.58 As for the others, the Belgian 
constitutional court used the preliminary ruling procedure for the first time, and 
it is the most regular user of the procedure. Other constitutional courts which 
have already been ready for engaging in a formal constitutional dialogue with the 
CJEU are the Austrian, Lithuanian, Spanish, Italian, French, and Slovenian.59 In 
the Hungarian decision on the limits of the EU law, however, this possibility has 
not even been mentioned. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The actual application of the identity review by the German constitutional court 
has almost occurred twice. It is interesting to see that it asked in its OMT refer-
ence decision whether a legal measure of an EU institution was ultra vires, but 
it, due to the CJEU decision, did not deliver any identity review but complied 
with and applied this preliminary ruling. However, when the Court refused the 
execution of the EAW because it infringed the constitutional identity of the GG, 
it did not implement a decision of a Member State that was based on EU law. 
Since the AranyosiandCăldăraru case, for similar cases and to achieve the same 
scope, another approach has been available. It is based more on the EU law and 
its principles and endangers its unity less, as compared to the constitutional law 
oriented, thus Member State-based reasoning with respect to identity. Against 
this background, we can observe that, as of today, it seems that ’constitutional 
identity review’ in the case law of the CJEU has a somewhat marginal role while 
it has a more fundamental mission in the jurisprudence of the national courts. 
The invocation of constitutional identity against the application of EU legislation, 
however, is still a theoretical one, as it has only been Germany which actually ap-
plied this test and refused the execution of an EAW. It has not remained unnoted 
by the CJEU which, within the framework of the judicial constitutional dialogue, 
offered an alternative legal approach towards the protection of human dignity and 
related prohibitions.
Nevertheless a procedural issue with the preliminary ruling procedure as a channel 
of judicial dialogue may be raised: following the request for a ruling, the national 
58  Thiele, A.,Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic” Referral of the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Re-
garding the ECB’s OMT Program, German Law Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, 2015, p. 241
59  See Claes, M., op.cit. note 16, pp. 1331, 1337-1339.
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court does not take part in the procedure in any form; the member state of the 
court is represented by the Government in the procedure, thus the judicial dia-
logue can easily turn into more of a monologue.60 A recent request by the Italian 
constitutional court61brings to mind a further possibility, however: requesting the 
clarification of a CJEU judgment. According to Article 43 of the Statute of the 
Court62, if the meaning or scope of a judgment is in doubt, the Court of Justice 
will provide it on application by  any  party  or  any  institution  of  the  EU 
establishing  an  interest therein.63 This possibility could serve a further tool of 
communication between the courts – perhaps even as a last resort before apply-
ing any national constitutional identity-defence mechanism by a Member State 
constitutional court.64
The not always clear criteria applied by the Court of Justice regarding the defini-
tion of national courts as bodies entitled to submit preliminary ruling references 
perhaps also needs reconsideration in light of the growing willingness of constitu-
tional courts to initiate such procedures. As we have seen, some of the criteria are 
somewhat malleable anyway, and Article 267 TFEU does not define ‘courts’ in a 
binding way, so the adjustment of the relevant practice to clearly include consti-
tutional courts as possible initiators seems manageable and not explicitly contrary 
to earlier case law. 
60  Claes, M., op. cit. note 16, p. 1342.
61  Pollicino, O.; Bassini, M., When cooperation means request for clarification, or better for “revisitation” – 
The Italian Constitutional Court request for a preliminary ruling in the Taricco case. https://blogs.eui.eu/
constitutionalism-politics-working-group/2017/01/29/cooperation-means-request-clarification-bet-
ter-revisitation-italian-constitutional-court-request-preliminary-ruling-taricco-case/.  Accessed 01 
February 2017.
62  Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
63  Such an application for interpretation must be made within two years after the date of delivery of 
the judgment or service of the order. The  Court  gives  its  decision  after  having  given  the  parties 
anopportunity  to  submit  their  observations  and  after  hearing  the  Advocate General. See Article 
158 of the Rules of Procedure [Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 (OJ 
L265, 29.9.2012), as amended on 18 June 2013 (OJ L173, 26.6.2013, p.65) and on 19 July 2016 (OJ 
L 217,12.8.2016, p.69).]
64 See Pollicino, O.; Bassini, M., op. cit. note 61.
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PROCEDURES REGARDING NATIONAL IDENTITy 
CLAUSE IN THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT’S AND THE CJEU’S CASE-LAW
ABSTRACT
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of scholars, a new era 
in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon Treaty and its so-called ‘’national 
identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine 
the national identity of Member States, in order to determine it, our starting point should be 
its constitution, or, more precisely, certain principles of its constitution or a set of core values, 
principles and rules. A second important phase in this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s 
case law. In this context, particularly important role play decisions regarding the relationship 
between the law of the European Union and domestic constitutional law. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court has developed the most elaborate jurisprudence on constitutional iden-
tity. This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other constitutional 
courts, and very possible will be aslo inspiration for future Croatian Constitutional Court 
position in this context. As it arises from the analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems 
that Article 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU law 
obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple.
Keywords: national identity, constitutional identity, constitutional court, Court of Justice of 
the European Union
1. INTRODUCTION
Although the idea of national identity is far from being new,1 it is well known that 
especially in the last few years ‘’national identity’’ is really á la mode.2 And yet, 
1  Moreover, constitutional theorizing about identity has really deep historical roots. As G. J. Jacobsohn em-
phasises, ‘’In Book III of The Politics Aristotle asked, ‘’On what principle ought we to say that a State has 
retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different State?’’ His answer 
requires that we distinguish the physical identity of a state from its real identity, Thus, ‘The identity of a 
polis is not constituted by its walls.’ Instead, it is constituted by it constitution, which for Aristotle refers 
to the particular distribution of the offices in a polis – what the moderns imply by sovereign authority – as 
well as the specific end toward which the community aspires.’’ Jacobsohn, G. J., Constitutional Identity, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2010, p. 7.
2  Claes, M., National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina 
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despite its history and significance, there is no agreement what ‘’national identity’’ 
means or refers to. As a consequence, many questions still have no clear answers 
and remain quite unclear, such as: ‘’What exactly is national identity?’’, ‘’What 
does ‘identity’ means?’’, ‘’Who is allowed to identify national identity?’’, or ‘’Is 
there a difference between national and constitutional identity?’’.
Albeit the scope and meaning of the national identity seem quite unclear and un-
determined, academic literature has been all over the notion of national identity, 
especially after the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, 
incorporated the so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ in Article 4(2) TEU and after 
the famous German Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty of 30 
June 2009. 
According to Rideau, currently only three Member States of the European Union 
do explicitly endorse constitutional identity: Germany, France and Poland, the no-
tion is implied in Spain, Italy, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while this con-
cept is blurred or absent in the remaining Member States.3 One of this ‘’remaining 
Member States’’ is Republic of Croatia.
2. WHAT IS ACTUALLy ‘’NATIONAL IDENTITy’’?
Starting with the point that national identity is a concept far from being new and 
yet far from being clear, we may also add that is a concept far from being simple. 
We could also say that it is closely linked to terms ‘’identity’’ or ‘’constitutional 
identity’’, so close that it is ‘’common to use indiscriminately the terms ‘’national 
identity’’ and ‘’constitutional identity’’, because both refer to the same thing, con-
stitution or domestic law.’’4
The concept of national or constitutional identity has been addressed by many con-
stitutional lawyers, scholars, students. According to Rosenfeld, one of the leading 
American experts in the field, constitutional identity is ‘’an essentially contested 
concept as there is no agreement over what it means or refers to. Conceptions of 
constitutional identity range from focus on the actual features and provisions of a 
constitution – for example, does it establish a presidential or parliamentary system, 
a unitary or federal state – to the relation between the constitution and the culture 
(eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp 
– Portland, 2013, p. 109.
3  Rideau, J., The Case-law of the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts on National Identity 
and the ‘German Model’, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Iden-
tity and European Integration op.cit. note 2, p. 243.
4  Flores Amaiquema, J. A., National Constitutional Identity in the European Union and the Principle of 
Primacy, LL.M. Final Thesis in Natural Resources and International Environmental Law, 2015, p. 77.
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in which it operates, and to the relation between the identity of the constitution 
and other relevant identities, such as national, religious, or ideological identity.’’5
In elaborating the idea of constitutional identity, Marti writes about several mean-
ings of the idea of constitutional identity: the identity of a constitutional text, the 
identity of a constitutional practice and tradition, the identity of the core values 
and principles of a constitution, the identity of the constitutional subject, the 
national identity, the (non-necessarily-national) identity of a political commu-
nity, the religious, ethnic and cultural identity of the whole society or of some 
subgroups in the society, etc. 6 Marti writes that all this different meanings can be 
restated to a basic distinction between two different ideas of constitutional iden-
tity: the identity of the constitution and the identity of the people.7 Additionally, 
Marti points out that ‘’the elements of the constitutional identity of a particular 
country are so fundamental that they should be specially preserved and protected 
from change. And that it is why they are often entrenched within the constitution 
itself.’’8
Smerdel writes that the core of the concept refers to certain principles of the na-
tional constitutions and that it can refer to different notions of ‘’identity’’: to what 
which essentially makes the constitution (and the state it governs) into what it is, 
and to what in which a constitution (and the states it governs) is different from 
some other constitutions. It might also mean the limits of the community author-
ity over the legal system of a Member State and in particular its constitution.9
Constitutional identity, according to Núňez Poblete, ‘’expresses some sort of me-
ta-constitution, understood as a set of norms or pre-constitutional principles that 
define the meaning of other constitutional norms, eventually coinciding, at a tex-
tual level, with other norms of different political communities.’’10
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of 
scholars, a new era in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon 
Treaty and its so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. 
5  Rosenfled, M., Constitutional Identity, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 756.
6  Luis Marti, J., Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the 
People, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European 
Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, 2013, p. 19.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., p. 20.
9  Smerdel, B., In Quest of a Doctrine: Croatian Constitutional Identity in the European Union, Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 64, No.4, 2014, p. 515.
10  quoted from: J. A. Flores Amaiquema op.cit. note. 4, p. 27.
Anita Blagojević: PROCEDURES REGARDING NATIONAL IDENTITY CLAUSE IN THE ... 213
Having in mind that the obligation that exist for the EU to respect national iden-
tity of its Member States has its history before Article 4(2) TEU – namely, in Arti-
cle F(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (‘’The Union shall respect the national identities 
of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principle 
of democracy.’’’11), and then in Article 6(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty (‘’The Un-
ion shall respect the national identities of its Member States.’’12) – we could say 
that Article 4(2) TEU is quite longer and more descriptive than its predecessors. 
Namely, Article 4(2) provides: ‘’The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and loal 
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’’13 
The link between national identity clause and the ‘’fundamental political and con-
stitutional structures’’, is the reason why we may say that this distances the notion 
of national identity in Article 4(2) TEU from cultural, historical or linguistic cri-
teria and turns to the content of national constitutional orders.14 In our view, this 
is the reason why we may understand the Article 4(2) TEU as national – repectively 
constitutional identity clause. This corresponds with the understanding of national 
identity introduced since 1970s by national constitutional courts who use nation-
al identity as constitutional, not cultural concept.15
Additionally, since earlier versions of the identity clause were not subject to the ju-
risdiction of the CJEU, this implies a great difference when it comes to comparing 
it to Lisbon Treaty which ‘’institutionally increases the importance of the identity 
clause and further develops its content’’.16
11 Treaty on European Union, available on: 
  URL=http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision_making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on:european_union/treaty_on_
european_union_en.pdf
12  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the Europe-
an Communities and Certain Related Acts, URL=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/
amst-en.pdf
13  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 
  URL=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN
14  Von Bogdandy, A., Schill S., Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, p. 1427.
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid., p. 1422.
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Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member 
States, there have been some controversies about such questions as to what the 
Union should respect, what this ‘’identity’’ precisely consist of, and who decides 
on the identity of Member States. However, Von Bogdandy and Schill write that 
although Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member 
States, ‘’it establishes, by referring to ‘fundamental political and constitutional 
structures, including regional and local self-government’, criteria for the elements 
and self-understandings that may be protected under Article 4(2) TEU. EU law 
therefore sets up criteria that can be of relevance for the notion of national iden-
tity under Article 4(2) TEU. Thus, only elements somehow enshrined in national 
constitutions or in domestic constitutional processes can be relevant for Article 
4(2) TEU.’’17
Without any doubt, this revised identity clause could be seen through the prism 
of a new era in the conceptualisation of the relationship between EU law and na-
tional law.18 According to Von Bogdany and Schill, it can help to reconceptualize 
the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law and ‘’guide the 
way to a more nuanced understanding beyond the categorical position of the ECJ 
on the one side, which supports the doctrine of absolute primacy of EU law even 
over the constitutional law of Member States, and that of most domestic consti-
tutional courts on the other, which largely follow a doctrine of relative primacy in 
accepting the primacy of EU law subject to certain constitutional limits.’’19
3.  DETERMINATION Of THE NATIONAL, RESPECTIVELy 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITy
Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national, respectively constitution-
al identity of Member States, we could say that there is no specific rule to follow 
to determine it. Accordingly, we could also say that of particular importance for 
determining the content of national constitutional identity are (relevant) constitu-
tional provisions, (relevant) national constitutional court’s case law and (relevant) 
CJEU’s case law.
3.1.1 Relevant constitutional provisions
In order to determine the content of constitutional identity of some Member 
State, our starting point should be its constitution, or, more precisely, certain 
17  Ibid., p. 1430.
18 Claes, M., op.cit note 2, p. 121.
19  Von Bogdany, A., Schild, S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1418.
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principles of its constitution or a set of core values, principles and rules. Almost 
all Member States of the EU enjoy a written Constitution, with the exception of 
the UK. Of course, not every constitutional element can be considered as part of 
the constitutional identity within the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU. This is why 
it is important to pay attention on constitutional provisions that prevent the leg-
islature from making certain constitutional changes or that subject constitutional 
amendments to a specifically difficult procedure.20
In its writing on methods of identification of national constitutional identity, 
Grewe writes that there are principally three conceptions of constitutional amend-
ments in European countries: (1) the substantial or material conception of the 
revision, that establishes a true hierarchy within the Constitution and that means 
that some provisions are excluded from any possibility of amendment (such as 
Article 79 paragraph 3 of the German Basic Law21 or Article 288 of the Portuguese 
Constitution22)23; (2) the procedural conception, that refers to a differentiation 
within the Constitution of two ways to amend the constitution, the total and 
the partial revision (such as the case with the three Baltic States, where the areas 
subjected to a total revision comprehend the first Chapter of the Constitution, 
in addition to the amendment provisions), and (3) the formal conception, that 
ignores any differentiation within the Constitution, so there is only one procedure 
for constitutional amendments and no provision is excluded from possible mod-
ification, and this is why in the framework of this conception is not possible to 
20  Ibid., p. 1432.
21  Article 79 paragrapf 3 of the German Basic Law: ‘’Amendment to this Basic Law affecting the division 
of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the princi-
ples lais down in Article 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.’’
22  Article 288 of the Portuguesse Constitution: ‘’Constitutional revision laws shall respect: a. National 
independence and the unity of the state; b. The republican form of government; c. The separation 
between church and state; d. Citizens’ rights, freedoms and guarantees; e. The rights of workers, wor-
kers’ committees and trade unions; f. The coexistence of the public, private and cooperative and social 
sectors in relation to the ownership of the means of production; g. The requirement for economic 
plans, which shall exist within the framework of a mixed economy; h. The elected appointment of 
the officeholders of the bodies that exercise sovereign power, of the bodies of the autonomous regions 
and of local government bodies by universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage; and the proportional 
representation system; i. Plural expression and political organisation, including political parties, and 
the right to democratic opposition; j. The separation and interdependence of the bodies that exercise 
sovereign power; l. The subjection of legal rules to a review of their positive constitutionality and of 
their unconstitutionality by omission; m. The independence of the courts; n. The autonomy of local 
authorities; o. The political and administrative autonomy of the Azores and Madeira archipelagos.
23  Beside Germany and Portugal, six other Member States of the EU prohibit certain amendments: Cy-
prus, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy and Romania.
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draw any conclusion relating to the core of the Constitution (such as the case of 
Croatia24).25
In general, we may say that the principles that are constitutionally protected be-
long to the following categories: the protection of basic principles of State organ-
ization, State sovereignty and the principle of democracy, State symbols, State 
aims, the protection of human dignity, fundamental rights and the principle of 
law.26 
Additionally, in order to define constitutional core, it is important to examine 
the introductory provisions of Member States’ constitutions. Although the length 
and the style of preambles are quite varied, we may say that preambles have two 
principal functions. While the firts one consists of situating the Constitution in its 
time, the second one is interesting for the determination of constitutional identity 
because it consists of evoking the essence or the core of the Constitution.27 The 
content of the ‘’introductory part’’ of the Constitution – whether or not have been 
provided with a special title such as Preamble, General Principles, Fundamental 
Principles, or Historical Foundations in Croatian case – contains two different 
provisions: the first refer to the constitutive elements of the State in a large sense 
(institutional or ‘’sovereigntist’’ content) and the second address the constitution-
alism (constitutionalist or substantive content).28
If we choose to analyze the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,29 which was 
adopted on 21 December 1990 and it has been repeatedly amended and adapted 
to the exigencies of the time (in 1997, 2000, 2001, 2010 and 2013), we may first-
ly say that, of course, not every constitutional element can be considered as part 
of the constitutional identity within the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU. This is why 
it is important to pay attention on constitutional provisions that prevent the leg-
islature from making certain constitutional changes or that subject constitutional 
amendments to a specifically difficult procedure. In this sense, it is important to 
note that Croatian Constitution is not one of those which contain prohibition 
of changing some of the constitutional norms. Consequently, this is why in the 
24  Beside Croatia, ten other Member States of the EU are implicated: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
burg, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Irelan, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
25  Grewe, C., Methods of Identifications of National Constitutional Identity, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcober-
ro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 2, pp. 40-44.
26  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1432.
27  Grewe, C., op.cit. note 25, p. 44.
28  Ibid., p. 45.
29  The Consitution of the Republic of Croatia - Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Oficial Gazette nos. 56/90, 
135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10, 85/10 – consolidated text, 5/14 – Decision by the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia
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framework of this formal conception is not possible to draw any conclusion re-
lating to the core of the Constitution. However, we agree with Kostadinov who 
strongly believe that nothing prevents us from finding this ‘’eternal clause’’ in the 
text of the Constitution. Here we share the opinion of Prof. Constance Grewe 
who stressed that ‘’nothing prevents us from finding the boundaries in the text, 
even if they are not explicitly deemed inviolable, and nothing prevents constitu-
tional judges to change their jurisprudence and to declare themselves entitled to 
protecting constitutional identity, even in the case of constitutional changes. Even 
if some legal system does not go as far as to determine the inviolable core of its 
Constitution, it will try to protect it because it represents its identity.’’30 
In this sense, we believe that constitutional identity of Croatia is determined in 
the constitutional text, more precisely – in three constitutional provisions and in 
Historical Foundations of the Constitution.
Firstly, at the beginning of constitutional text, Article 1 defines the Republic of 
Croatia as a unitary and indivisible democratic and social state, while Article 3 
establishes the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Cro-
atia, as the grounds for the interpretation of the entire constitutional text as well 
as its institutional provisions. The list of eleven highest values – freedom, equal 
rights, national equality, equality of genders, love of peace, social justice, respect 
for human rights, inviolability of ownership, conservation of nature and the envi-
ronment, the rule of law and democratic multiparty system – certainly represents 
the list of fundamental constitutional principles which have priority over all other 
constitutional norms.31
Secondly, we stress Article 17 paragraphs 3 of the Constitution which stipulates 
that ‘’Not even in the case of an immediate threat to the existence of the State may 
restrictions be imposed on the application of the provisions of this Constitution con-
cerning the right to life, prohibition of torture, cruel or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, on the legal definitions of punishable offences and punishments, or on freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.’’ According to Kostadinov, exactly this com-
pliance with the prohibition to limit the application of law, even in the cases of 
immediate threat to the existence of the State from Article 17, paragraph 3 of 
the Constitution, logically and theologically necessarily involves the inviolable 
30  Constance Grewe, lecture on 22eme Cours Internationale de Justice Constitutionnelle Hiérarchie en-
tre druits fondamentaux, Université Paul-Cézanne Aix-Marseille III, 8 and 9 September 2010, quoted 
from: Kostadinov, B., Constitutional Identity, Iustinianius Primus Law Review, Vol. 3:1, 2012, p. 16, 
URL=http://law-review.mk/pdf/04/biljana%20kostadinov.pdf
31  Smerdel, B., Ustavnost izmjena Ustavnog zakona o pravima manjina (NN 80/2010) i Zakona o izboru 
zastupnika (NN 145/2010), Političke analize, No. 8, 2011, p. 68.
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constitutional ban to annual those rights, and therefore the constitutional identity 
of the Republic of Croatia. This prohibition to limit the application and thus the 
annulment of the obligation to respect human dignity, the essence of the rule of 
law’s principles and the free democratic order is unalterable as a norm of Croatian 
Constitution.32 Since human rights can be limited by law in ordinary conditions 
(according to Article 16 of the Constitution33) and in extraordinary conditions 
(according to Article 17 paragraphs 1 and 234), this constitutional exemption via 
Article 17 paragraph 3 could be seen as the inviolable essence of the Constitution, 
or the material core of the Constitution, which is directed towards the protection 
of constitutional identity.
And finally, we stress the importance of the Historical Foundations of the Consti-
tution, or its preamble, which has great (primarily) historical, but also symbolic 
and political, significance. In the context of constitutional identity, we point out 
that its part on national sovereignty which states that ‘’...the Republic of Croatia is 
hereby founded and shall develop as a sovereign and democratic state in which equal-
ity, freedoms and human rights are guaranteed and ensured, and their economic and 
cultural progress and social welfare promoted.’’ This provision has served out as one 
of the most important grounds and guidelines for the interpretation of individual 
constitutional provisions and the Constitution as a whole.35 
3.2.  Relevant national constitutional courts’ case law
As a starting point in determination of the content of constitutional identity, the 
constitutional provisions only give a first indications. A second important phase in 
this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s case law. In this context, particularly 
32  Kostadinov, B., op.cit. note 30, p 17.
33  Acording to Article 16 of the Constitution, freedoms and rights may only be restricted by law in order 
to protect freedoms and rights of others, public order, public morality and health. Any restriction of 
freedoms and rights shall be proportional to the nature of the necessity for restriction in each individ-
ual case.
34  Article 17 paragraph 1 of the Constitution stipulates that individual constitutionally-guaranteed free-
doms and rights may be restricted during a state of war or any clear and present danger to the inde-
pendence and unity of the Republic of Croatia or in the event of any natural disaster. Such curtailment 
shall be decided upon by the Croatian Parliament by a two-thirds majority of all representatives or, if 
the Croatian Parliament is unable to convene, by the President of the Republic, at the proposal of the 
Government and upon the counter-signature of the Prime Minister. According to Article 17 paragraph 
2, the extent of such restrictions must be adequate to the nature of the threat, and may not result in the 
inequality of citizens with respect to race, colour, gender, language, religion, national or social origin.
35  Smerdel, B., The constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia on the twentieth anniversary of the ‘’Christ-
mas Constitution’’. The Constitution as a political and legal act, in: The Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia, Novi informator, Zagreb, 2010, p. 95.
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important role play decisions regarding the relationship between the law of the 
European Union and domestic constitutional law.36 
According to Rideau, currently only three Member States of the European Union 
do explicitly endorse constitutional identity: Germany, France and Poland, the 
notion is implied in Spain, Italy, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while this 
concept is blurred or absent in the remaining Member States.37 
The beginnings of the development of the notion of constitutional identity in the 
constitutional courts’ case-law of respective Member States can be traced back to 
1970s. The German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the most elabo-
rate jurisprudence on constitutional identity. It referred to the concept of consti-
tutional identity for the first time in its 1974 Solange I38 decision and then later in 
a follow up judgment Solange II (1986). Whereas in the two Solange judgments 
the German Federal Constitutional Court had concentrated on the guarantees for 
the protection of fundamental rights in the Euro- pean (Economic) Community, 
in its 1993 Maastricht judgment it shifted its attention to institutional guarantees 
regarding the conferral of sovereign competences and the democratic legitimacy 
of EU action.39 The famous Lisbon judgement on the compatibility of the Treaty 
of Lisbon with the German Basic Law of 30 June 2009 ‘’proceeded with great im-
petus to the concretisation of the Constitution’s identity on which some positions 
adopted by the Court have relied until now’’.40 The Federal Constitutional Court 
reviewed whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the 
Basic Law (pursuant to Article 23.1 third sentence) in conjunction with Article 
79.3 of the Basic Law is respected. In this context, the Court held the following: 
‘’The exercise of this review power, which is rooted in constitutional law, follows 
the principle of the Basic Law’s openness towards European Law (Europarechtsfre-
undlichkeit), and it therefore also does not contradict the principle of sincere co-
operation (Article 4.3 Lisbon TEU); otherwise, with progressing integration, the 
fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign Member States, 
which are recognised by Article 4.2 first sentence Lisbon TEU, cannot be safe-
guarded in any other way. In this respect, the guarantee of national constitutional 
identity under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand in the Euro-
pean legal area. The identity review makes it possible to examine whether due to 
the action of European institutions, the principles under Article 1 and Article 20 
36  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1433.
37  See note 3.
38  BverfGE, Judgement of 29 May 1974
39  Kiiver, P., The Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court: A Court-Ordered Strenghtening of 
the National Legislature in the EU, European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2010, p. 580.
40  Rideau, J., op.cit. note 3, p. 246.
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of the Basic Law, declared inviolable in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law, have been 
violated. This ensures that the primacy of application of Union law only applies 
by virtue and in the context of the constitutional empowerment that continues 
in effect.’’41 In this case the German Federal Constitutional Court explicitly made 
reference to Article 4(2) TEU and considered that Germany’s constitutional iden-
tity ‘’was defined by the so-called ‘eternity clause’ in Article 79(3) of the German 
Constitution’’,42 which, as mentioned previously, prevents the legislature from 
making certain changes to the German Basic Law. Additionally, it is important 
to note that besides the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 of the German 
Basic Law (in particular human dignity, democracy, rule of law, federalism), the 
Court mentioned eight further fields that are particularly relevant to constitution-
al identity: (1) citizenship, (2) the civil and the military monopoly on the use of 
force, (3) revenue and expenditure including external financing, (4) deprivation 
of liberty in the administration of criminal law or placement in an institution, (5) 
cultural issues, (6) the shaping circumstances concerning family and education, 
(7) the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press and of association, and (8) the 
dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.43 
This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other consti-
tutional courts. The French Constitutional Council, for example, started to use 
the concept of constitutional identity in its decision of 27 July 2006,44 when it 
reviewed the constitutionality of the Act pertaining to copyright and related rights 
in the information society and decided that ‘’the transposition of a Directive can-
not run counter to an rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of 
France, except when the onstituting power consents thereto.’’
With decision 1146/1988,45 the Italian Constitutional Court explicitly dealt with 
the problem of the existence of some supreme principles excluded from consti-
tutional revision. It explicitly determined that ‘’the Italian Constitution contains 
some supreme principles that cannot be subverted or changed in their essential 
content neither by constitutional laws of revision nor by constitutional laws. These 
41  BverfGE, Judgement of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, at 240, URL=http://www.bverfg.de/e/es2009 
0630_2bve.00008en.html
42  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1438.
43  López Bofill, H. What is not Constitutional Pluralism in the EU, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina 
(eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 2, p. 229.
44  Decision No. 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, URL=http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/con-
seil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2006540DCen2006_540dc.pdf
45  Decision of Italian Constitutional Court No. 2006-540 DC dated July 27th 2006, URL=http:// 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2006540D-
Cen2006_540dc.pdf
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principles are explicitly provided by the Constitution as absolute limits to power 
of constitutional revision, as the republican form of government (Art 139 of the 
Constitution) as well as the principles which, although not expressly mentioned 
among those not subject to the constitutional revision process, belong to the val-
ues upon which the Italian Constitution is founded.’’
The Spanish Constitutional Court in its Declaration 1/200446 addresses the is-
sue of the compatibility of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Treaty of 
the European Union. The limits to the integration process were summarised as 
follows: ‘’These material limits, which are not expressly included in the constitu-
tional provision (Article 93), but which implicitly derive from the Constitution 
and from the essential meaning of the precept itself, are understood as respect for 
the sovereignty of the State, our basic constitutional structures and the system 
of fundamental principles and values established in our Constitution, in which 
fundamental rights acquire their own substantive nature’’. According to P. Pérez 
Tremps, thies brief formula provides the basis for ascertaining the content and 
scope of constitutional identity as defined by the Constitutional Court.47 In this 
sense, writes Pérez Tremps, constitutional identity includes a safeguard for the 
State itself, which encompasses two formally different contents: the essential ele-
ments of the State and the essential elements of the Constitution.48
The Polish Constitutional Court in its 24 November 2010 decision on the con-
stitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty,49 ‘’manifestly inspired by the German model 
to which it moreover openly refers’’,50 manifested its will to defend constitutional 
identity. The Constitutional Court shared the view expressed in the doctrine that 
the competences, under the prohibition of conferral, manifest about a constitu-
tional identity, and thus they reflect the values the Constitution is based on. There-
fore, ‘’constitutional identity is a concept which determines the scope of “excluding 
– from the competence to confer competences – the matters which constitute (...) 
‘the heart of the matter’, i.e. are fundamental to the basis of the political system of 
a given state” , the conferral of which would not be possible pursuant to Article 
46  Tribunal Constitutional 13.12.2004, Declaration 1/2004, available in English on URL=http://www.
tribunalconstitutional.es/es/jurisprudentia/restrad/Paginas/DTC122004en.aspx
47  Pérez Tremps, P., National Identity in Spanish Constitutional Court Case-law, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. 
Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 4, p. 
270.
48  Ibid.
49  Constitutional Court, Judgement of 24 November 2010 – Ref. No. K 32/09 (Constitutionality of the 
Lisbon Treaty), available on: URL=http://www.tribunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_32_09_
EN.pdf
50  Rideau, J., op.cit. note 3, p. 252.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES222
90 of the Constitution. Regardless of the difficulties related to setting a detailed 
catalogue of inalienable competences, the following should be included among the 
matters under the complete prohibition of conferral: decisions specifying the fun-
damental principles of the Constitution and decisions concerning the rights of the 
individual which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the 
requirement of protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, the principle 
of statehood, the principle of democratic governance, the principle of a state ruled 
by law, the principle 203 of social justice, the principle of subsidiarity, as well as 
the requirement of ensuring better implementation of constitutional values and the 
prohibition to confer the power to amend the Constitution and the competence 
to determine competences.’’ Thus, ‘’the guarantee of preserving the constitutional 
identity of the Republic of Poland has been Article 90 of the Constitution and the 
limits of conferral of competences specified therein.’’
The Hungarian Constitutional Court in its 20 July 2010 decision on the consti-
tutionality of the Act of promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty,51 interpreted the rele-
vant articles of the Constitution on sovereignty, democracy, rule of law and Euro-
pean cooperation. According to the Court, the so-called European clause cannot 
be interpreted in a way that would deprive the clauses on sovereignty and rule of 
law of their substance. The Court referred however to its former jurisprudence on 
the free limitation of the exercise of attributes of sovereignty by the holder of the 
sovereignty, i.e. in fact by the legislator. The Constitutional Court emphasized 
that material and procedural rules were duly observed during the adoption of the 
Act of promulgation and the Parliament gave its consent to the content of the 
Lisbon Treaty on its free will. To summarize, ‘’the Constitutional Court came to 
the conclusion that even if the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty were of paramount 
importance, they did not change the situation that Hungary maintains and enjoys 
her independence, her rule of law character and her sovereignty. Consequently, 
the application was rejected in all its elements.’’ 
The position of the Czech Constitutional Court on the constitutional identity is 
present in its decisions Lisbon I and Lisbon II. In its 2008 Lisbon I decision,52 the 
Constitutional Court examined a petition from the Senate of the Parliament of 
the Czech Republic, seeking review of whether the Treaty of Lisbon amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
is consistent with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. As regards the 
51  Constitutional Court, 20 July 2010, Decision 143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Hungary on the constitutionality of the Act on promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Press release in English, available on URL=http://www.mkab.hu/admin/data/file/797_143_2010.pdf
52  Constitutional Court, 2008/11/26 – Pl. US 19/08: Treaty of Lisbon, available on URL=http://www.
usoud.cz/en/decisions/20081126-pl-us-1908-treaty-of-lisbon-i-I
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sixth group of the Senate’s objections (the Senate questioned whether Art. 2 of 
the TEU is consistent with Art. 1 par. 1 and Art. 2 par. 1 of the Constitution (the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people), ‘’the Constitutional Court stated that 
the values mentioned in Art. 2 and 7 of the TEU are fundamentally consistent 
with the values on which the material core of the Czech constitution rests (cf. Art. 
1 par. 1, Art. 5, Art. 6 of the Constitution, Art. 1, Art. 2 par. 1, Art. 3, Chapter 
Four of the CFRF). Therefore, in this regard as well the Treaty of Lisbon is consist-
ent with the untouchable principles protected by the Czech constitutional order. 
Insofar as the Senate relies on state sovereignty in this regard, the Constitutional 
Court stated that in a modern, democratic state, governed by the rule of law, state 
sovereignty is not an aim in and of itself, in isolation, but is a means for fulfilling 
the fundamental values on which the construction of a constitutional state gov-
erned by the rule of law, stands. Therefore, the Constitutional Court summarized 
that the Treaty of Lisbon changes nothing on the fundamental concept of current 
European integration, and that, even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lis-
bon, the Union would remain a unique organization of an international law char-
acter.’’ Accordingly, we may say that the Czech Constitutional Court considered 
the rule of law (Article 1(1) of the Constitution, free competition among political 
parties (Article 5 of the Constitution), the principle of non-discrimination (and 
protection of national minorities (Art 2 and 3 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Basic Freedoms) as part of the constitutional core. A year later, in 
its 3 November 2009 Lisbon II decision,53 the Constitutional Court examined a 
petition from a group of senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Re-
public for review of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community for conformity with the 
constitutional order. The Constitutional Court did not consider itself authorised 
to establish material limits to the transfer of competences: ‘’However, the Consti-
tutional Court does not consider it possible, in view of the position that it holds 
in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, to create such a catalogue of 
non-transferrable powers and authoritatively determine “substantive limits to the 
transfer of powers”, as the petitioners request. It points out that it already stated, 
in judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08, that “These limits should be left primarily to the leg-
islature to specify, because this is a priori a political question, which provides the 
legislature wide discretion.” Responsibility for these political decisions cannot be 
transferred to the Constitutional Court; it can review them only at the point when 
they have actually been made on the political level. For the same reasons, the Con-
stitutional Court does not feel authorised to formulate in advance, in an abstract 
53  Constitutional Court, 2009/11/03 – Pl. US 29/09: Treaty of Lisbon II, available on URL=http://www.
usoud.cz/en/decision/20091103-pl-us-2909-treaty-of-lisbon-ii-1.
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context, what is the precise content of Article 1(1) of the Constitution, as request-
ed by the petitioners, supported by the president, who welcomes the attempt “in a 
final list to define the elements of the ‘material core’ of the constitutional order, or 
more precisely, of a sovereign democratic state governed by the rule of law”, and 
states (in agreement with the petitioners) that this could “limit future self-serving 
definition of these elements based on cases being adjudicated at the time.”
This brief overview of national constitutional courts case-law demonstrates fol-
lowing: first, the German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the most 
elaborate jurisprudence on the constitutional identity and the judgements of this 
Court seem to serve as a reference point for other constitutional courts in Europe; 
second, this is the reason why – despite some differences in the jurisprudence of 
national constitutional courts – we may see a ‘’remarkable overall convergence’’,54 
and third, most of these constitutional courts have developed certain constitution-
al limits with regard to the protection of the statehood, the protection of the form 
of government and of the central principles of State organization, the protection 
of democracy, of the rule of law and, of course, of fundamental rights.55
With regard to the Republic of Croatia, in the case law of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia reference to constitutional identity has appeared 
and discussed only recently. First reference of the Croatian Constitutional Court 
to constitutional identity can be found in its Decision U-I-3597/2010 et al., from 
July 2011,56 where the Court states that the constitutional identity of the Republic 
of Croatia is determined in paragraph 2 of the Historical Foundations of the Con-
stitution: ‘’…the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croa-
tian people and the state of the members of national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrian, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Bosniaks, 
Slovenians, Montenegrins, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others, who are its citizens, 
who are guaranteed equality with citizens of the Croatian nationality and the realisa-
tion of national rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the UN and the 
lands of the free world.’’ This principle of equality of members of national minori-
ties with citizens of the Croatian nationality as a part of Croatian constitutional 
54  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14,  p. 1433.
55  Ibid., p. 1440.
56  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Nos. U-I-3597/2010, U-I-
3847/2010, U-I-692/2011, U-I-898/2011, U-I-994/2011, Zagreb, 29 July 2011, point 
30.1, availabe on: URL=http://  http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksWen.nsf/e540ceb6cd1e4ec-
0c1257de1004aa1f3/477e6dbf66aeaa69c1257e5f003d81f8/$FILE/U-I-3597-2010.pdf. In this case 
proceedings have been instituted to review conformity with the Constitution and Article 1 of the 
Constitutional Act on Amendments to the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities. 
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identity was certainly a first step towards the Croatian theory of constitutional 
identity.
A second important step has been made two years later in the framework of Con-
stitutional Court Communication on the citizen’s constitutional referendum on 
the definition of marriage.57 This Communication was issued on the occacion of 
the citizens’ initiative “In the Name of the Family” (U ime obitelji) of mid 2013 
requesting the calling of a national referendum to amend the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia whereby the definition of marriage as a living union be-
tween a man and a woman would be introduced into the Constitution.58 In the 
case of the referendum on the definition of marriage, voting was conducted and 
a decision rendered in the Croatian Parliament to dismiss the proposal for the 
Croatian Parliament to act on Article 95 of the Constitutional Act on the Con-
stitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia59 (acording to which at the request 
of the Croatian Parliament, the Constitutional Court shall, in the case when ten 
percent of the total number of voters in the Republic of Croatia request calling 
a referendum, establish whether the question of the referendum is in accordance 
with the Constitution and whether the requirements in Article 8 paragraphs 1-3 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia for calling a referendum have been 
met) and file a request with the Constitutional Court on those two questions. By 
rendering a decision to dismiss the proposal for the Croatian Parliament to act 
on Article 95 of the Constitutional Act, the Croatian Parliament expressed its 
legal will that it deemed the content of the referendum question on the defini-
tion of marriage to be in conformity with the Constitution and confirmed that 
the constitutional requirements had been met to call a referendum on that ques-
tion. However, pursuant to Article 125.9 of the Constitution and Article 2.1 in 
conjunction with Article 87.2 of the Constitutional Act, the Constitutional Court 
has the general constitutional task to guarantee respect of the Constitution and 
to oversee the conformity of a national referendum with the Constitution, right 
up to the formal conclusion of the referendum procedure. Accordingly, after the 
Croatian Parliament had rendered a decision to call a national referendum on 
the basis of a citizens’ constitutional initiative, and it had not prior to that acted 
57  Constitutional Court, Communication on the citizens’s constitutional referendum on the definition of 
marriage, No. SuS-1/2013, Zagreb, 14 November 2013, 
  availabe on:  URL=http:// sljeme.usud.hr/usud/prakswen.nsf/.../$FILE/SuS-1-2013.doc.
58  The national referendum was requested by 683,948 voters, that is more than 10 percent of the total 
number of voters in the Republic of Croatia, At its session held on 8 November 2013, the Croatian 
Parliament adopted the Decision to call a national referendum, which was published in the Official 
Gazette no. 134 of 9 November 2013, and came into force on the day it was adopted.
59  Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, consolidated text, Official 
Gazette No. 49/02.
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on Article 95.1 of the Constitutional Act, the Constitutional Court’s general su-
pervisory authority over the conformity with the Constitution of a referendum 
called in this way does not ceased. However, out of respect for the constitutional 
role of the Croatian Parliament as the highest legislative and representative body 
in the state, the Constitutional Court believed that it is only permissible to make 
use of its general supervisory authorities in that situation as an exception, when 
it establishes the formal and/or substantive unconstitutionality of a referendum 
question, or a procedural error of such severity that it threatens to destroy the 
structural characteristics of the Croatian constitutional state, that is, its constitu-
tional identity, including the highest values of the constitutional order of the Re-
public of Croatia (Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution). The primary protection 
of those values does not exclude the authority of the framer of the Constitution 
to expressly exclude some other question from the circle of permitted referendum 
questions (point 5 of the Communication).
It is interesting that other Constitutional Courts’ reflections on constitutional 
identity can be found in some other cases connected with the citizen-initiated 
referendum.
In this context, also in 2013 the citizens’ initiative ‘’Headquarters for the De-
fence of Croatian Vukovar’’ (‘’Stožer za obranu hrvatskog Vukovara’’) succeeded in 
collecting the necessary number of signatures for the referendum to amend the 
Constitutional Act on the Right of National Minorities.60 More precisely, the aim 
was to change minority language rights in the sense that existed provision (Article 
12 of the Consitutional Act) ‘’equal official use of the language and script used 
by members of a national minority shall be realised in the area of a unit of local 
self-government when members of an individual national minority comprise at 
least one third of the population of such unit” change to ‘’at least one half’’ of the 
population of such unit. At the request of the Croatian Parliament, the Consti-
tutional Court decided in its Decision U-VIIR-4640/201461 that the referendum 
question was constitutionally inadmissible. For us is interesting point 13.1 of the 
respective Decision, which states that ‘’Article 12.2 of the Constitution should 
be understood as a public law expression of the particular importance which the 
Constitution gives to the language and script of national minorities, these univer-
sal and permanent values which define the identity of the Croatian constitutional 
state.’’ Exactly this declaration - that the respect for minority languages makes part 
60  Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, Official Gazette nos. 155/02, 47/10 – de-
cision by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 80/10 and 93/11 - decision by the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
61  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No U-VIIR-4640/2014, Zagreb, 12 August 2014
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of the Croatian constitutional identity – was one of the most prominent features 
of this case.
In 2014, two more citizens’ initiative by several trade unions (the first one de-
manded a referendum on preventing the outsourcing of non-core services in the 
public sector, while the second one demanded a referendum against the mone-
tisation of the Croatian motorways) also succeeded in collecting the necessary 
number of signatures, but the Constitutional Court decided that respective ref-
erendums questions were (also) constitutionally inadmissible. In first case con-
cerning the outsourcing,62 the Court has repeated its statement from point 5 of 
the Communication on the citizen’s constitutional referendum on the definition 
of marriage and stated that whith regard to the revision of the Constitution, it is 
the obligation of the Constitional Court to permit referendum ‘’when it establishes 
the formal and/or substantive unconstitutionality of a referendum question, or a pro-
cedural error of such severity that it threatens to destroy the structural characteristics of 
the Croatian constitutional state, that is, its constitutional identity, including the high-
est values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia (Articles 1 and 3 of the 
Constitution)’’ (point 34.4.). In second case concerning the monetisation of Croa-
tian motorways,63 the Court declared that constitutional principle from Article 
49 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which states that entrepreneurial and market 
freedom shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Croatia, and 
which must be seen together with the Article 3 of the Constitution, is especially 
linked to the conception of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights which 
builds the identity of Croatian constitutional state (poin 43.1.). 
To sum up: in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cro-
atia reference to constitutional identity has appeared and discussed only recently 
and the Court has defined following parts of the Croatian constitutional identity: 
first, Article 1 and Article 3 of the Constitution (the highest values of the con-
stitutional order of the Republic of Croatia); second, constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights, including respect for minority languages and entrepreneurial 
and market freedom, and third, the Historical Foundation of the Constitution, 
especially its paragraph 2 on equality of national minorities with citizens of the 
Croatian nationality.
On the other hand, as to the identity clause and as to the subsidiarity of the EU 
law in Croatian legal order in general, there is still no relevant case-law of the 
Croatian Constitutional Court. However, according to the former President of 
62  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No. U-VIIR-1159/2015, Zagreb, 8 April 2015
63  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No. U-VIIR-1158/2015, Zagreb, 21 April 2015
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES228
the Croatian Constitutional Court Jasna Omejec, it is reasonable to presume that 
the relevant legal standpoints of the German Federal Constitutional Court will be 
carefully considered by the Croatian Constitutional Court in the coming period. 
This is primarily related to the ‘’standpoints of the German BVerfG that is obliged 
to intervene if a measure under EU law were to represent a clear or structurally 
significant ultra vires act, or if it were detrimental to Germany’s constitutional 
identity as protected under Article 79.3 of the Basic Law, including the minimum 
standard of protection of fundamental rights demanded by the Basic Law.’’64 
Consequently, the Croatian Constitutional Court will, in the coming period, have 
to define the fundamental meaning of the subsidiarity of the EU law in the Croa-
tian constitutional order and also clearly define its constitutional identity. This has 
not been done to date. Concerning the constitutional basis of Croatian Constitu-
tions’ supremacy over EU law, it would not be hard to construe it by an objective 
interpretation – there is Article 2 of the Constitution (‘’The sovereignty of the Re-
public of Croatia is inalienable, indivisible and non-transferable’’), Article 3 of the 
Constitution (the highest values of the constitutional order) and Article 5 of the 
Constitution (‘’In the Republic of Croatia laws shall conform to the Constitution, 
and other rules and regulations shall conform to the Constitution and law’’). The 
EU derives its democratic legitimacy in Croatia within the meaning of Articles 
143-146 of the Constitution (‘’European Union Law’’) in connection with Article 
1 of the Constitution (‘’The Republic of Croatia is a unitary and indivisible demo-
cratic and social state. Power in the Republic of Croatia derives from the people 
and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal citizens. The people 
shall exercise this power through the election of representatives and through direct 
decision making’’). Therefore, according to Omejec, ‘’the Constitutional Court 
could see itself as being obliged to monitor at least those actions that arbitrarily 
exceed the limits of the EU programme of integration, that is, the constitutional 
powers transferred to the EU, and, if necessary, to find such legal acts to be inap-
plicable in Croatia.’’65 Until now the Constitutional Court has issued only one 
general legal standpoint concerning EU law. Namely, in the mentioned 2015 De-
cision on the monetization of Croatia motorways, the Court first established that 
a proposed Act on Amendments to the Roads Act was not in conformity with the 
Constitution and subsequently concluded that it was necessary to further review 
the conformity of referendum question with EU law in substance ‘’because the 
Constitution by its own legal force has supremacy over EU law’’ (point 60.). 
64  Omejec, J., Study on European Constitutional Courts as the Courts of Human Rights. Assessment, chal-
lenges, perspectives, Zagreb, 2016, p. 26, URL=http:// bib.irb.hr/datoteka/796420.OMEJEC_-_Euro-
pean_Constitutional_Courts_as_the_Courts_of_Human_Rights.pdf
65  Ibid., p. 27.
Anita Blagojević: PROCEDURES REGARDING NATIONAL IDENTITY CLAUSE IN THE ... 229
Having all this in mind, we strongly hope that Croatian Constitutional Court will 
actively participate in European constitutional pluralism exactly via constitutional 
protection of Croatian constitutional identity.
3.3.  Relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
Although the CJEU made a reference to the notion of national identity even before 
the Lisbon Treaty (for example, the notion of national identity was mentioned in 
several opinions of advocates general,66 but in all of these cases ‘’ reference was to 
the protection of the national cultural identity of the relevant States rather than 
to the more political form of it’’67), the case Sayn-Wittgenstein68 was the first that 
cited Article 4(2) TEU in relationship with primary law (in this case Article 21 
TFEU) and national law (in this case Law on the Abolition of the Nobility). The 
case concerned the question whether the decision of Austrian authorities to change 
the surname of Austrian citizen residing in Germany (on the ground of the Law 
on the Abolition of the Nobility) from ‘’Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein’’ (‘’Prin-
cess of Sayn-Wittgenstein) into ‘’Sayn-Wittgenstein’’ was in breach of Article 21 
TFEU. While the Austrian Government has pointed out that ‘’the provisions at 
issue in the main proceedings are intended to protect the constitutional identity 
of the Republic of Austria. The Law on the abolition of the nobility, even if it is 
not an element of the republican principle which underlies the Federal Constitu-
tional Law, constitutes a fundamental decision in favour of the formal equality of 
treatment of all citizens before the law’’, the ECJ found that ‘’the refusal, by the 
66  For example, Advocate General Maduro was one of the first to remark pre-Lisbon in Spain v. Eurojust 
(2005) and later in Michinaki case (2008). In Spain v. Eurojust, Maduro informs that ‘’In a Union 
intended to be an area of freedom, security and justice, in which it is sought to establish a society cha-
racterised by pluralism, respect for linguistic diversity is of fundamental importance. That is an aspect 
of the respect which the Union owes, in the terms of Article 6(3) EU, to the national identities of the 
Member States’’ and that ‘’language is not merely a functional means of social communication. It is 
an essential attribute of personal identity and, at the same time, a fundamental component of national 
identity.’’ (Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delievered on 16 December 2004, avai-
lable on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=49769&doclang=EN). In Michinaki 
case, Advocate General Maduro points that ‘’even in cases that fall within their scope, the provisions 
on freedom of movement do not replace domestic law as the relevant normative framework for the 
assessment of conflicts between private actors. Instead, Member States are free to regulate private con-
duct as long as they respect the boundaries set by Community law.’’ (Opinion of Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro delievered on 23 May 2007, available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.
jsf?docid=62533&doclang=en). We may see that in the first mentioned case it is stated that respect to 
national identity can be employed on grounds on nationality, while in the second as a means of dero-
gating from EU free movement provisions.
67  Claes, M., op.cit. note 2, p. 130.
68  Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:806,  availabe on: URL=http://curia.eu-
ropa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62009CJ0208&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=
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authorities of a Member State, to recognise all the elements of the surname of a 
national of that State, as determined in another Member State – in which that 
national resides – at the time of his or her adoption as an adult by a national of 
that other Member State, where that surname includes a title of nobility which 
is not permitted in the first Member State under its constitutional law cannot be 
regarded as a measure unjustifiably undermining the freedom to move and reside 
enjoyed by citizens of the Union.’’ The ECJ held that measures which restrict a 
fundamental freedom may be justified on public policy grounds only if they are 
necessary for the protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and 
only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures. 
The ECJ also accepted that, in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the 
Law on the abolition of the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be 
taken into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate interests and 
the right of free movement of persons recognised under European Union law. In 
this context, the Court has interpreted the constitutional background of the Law 
in questions as an element of Austria’s public policy and stressed that ‘’the concept 
of public policy as justification for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must 
be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each 
Member State without any control by the European Union institutions’’. Finally, 
in order to clarify the concept of public policy as a justification for restrictions 
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the EU law, the ECJ also pointed out 
that ‘’in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the 
national identities of its Member States, which include the status of the State as 
a Republic.’’ As emphasized by Von Bogdany and Schill, this case helps to clarify 
the understanding of Article 4(2) TEU in following ways: ‘’First, the ECJ noted 
the connection between the concept of national identity and the constitutional 
background of the interests that Austria’s measures protected. Second, the ECJ 
held that the status of the State as a republic formed part of national identity, thus 
intensifying the nexus between national identity and fundamental constitutional 
principles. Finally, the Court embedded the respect for national identity in the 
present proceedings into its general jurisprudence on the relationship between 
fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights.’’69
Explicit mention of Article 4(2) TEU has been also made in case Malgožata Rune-
vič-Vardyn,70 that concerned a Lithuanian national (first applicant), member of the 
Polish minority (with Polish forename ‘’Małgorzata’’ and surname ‘’Runiewicz’’), 
69  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1425.
70  Case C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardy [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:291,
  available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62009CJ0391&lang1=en&type=TX-
T&ancre=
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married to a Polish national (second applicant) who complained, after the refusal 
of the Vilnius Civil Registry Division to change her forename and surname, as 
they appear on her birth certificate, namely ‘’Malgožata Runevič’’, to be changed 
to ‘’Małgorzata Runiewicz’’,  that there had been discrimination on the grounds of 
race and invoked the enforcement of Article 21 TFEU and the Directive 2000/43. 
According to the Lithuanian Law, entries on certificates of civil status must be 
made in Lithuanian. Forenames, surnames and place names must be written in 
accordance with the rules of the Lithuanian language. ( Article 3.282 of the Civil 
Code) and this rule has been confirmed by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court – 
this Court declared that a person’s forename and surname had to be entered on a 
passport in accordance with the rules governing the spelling of the official national 
language in order not to undermine the constitutional status of that language. In 
this case the ECJ states that ‘’it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that 
the official national language is protected in order to safeguard national unity and 
preserve social cohesion. The Lithuanian Government stresses, in particular, that 
the Lithuanian language constitutes a constitutional asset which preserves the na-
tion’s identity, contributes to the integration of citizens, and ensures the expression 
of national sovereignty, the indivisibility of the State, and the proper functioning 
of the services of the State and the local authorities.’’ We may see that the Court 
has expressly relied on Article 4(2) TEU and affirmed that the EU should respect 
national identity of its Member States, which includes protection of a State’s of-
ficial national language. The Court also stressed that this objective pursued by 
national rules constitutes, in principle, ‘’a legitimate objective capable of justifying 
restrictions on the rights of freedom of movement and residence provided for in 
Article 21 TFEU and may be taken into account when legitimate interests are 
weighed against the rights conferred by European Union law. Measures which re-
strict a fundamental freedom, such as that provided for in Article 21 TFEU, may, 
however, be justified by objective considerations only if they are necessary for the 
protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and only in so far as 
those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures.’’
Another interesting case concerning Article 4(2) TEU is case O’Brien,71 concern-
ing the refusal of the Ministry of Justice to pay Mr. O’Brien (queen’s Council and 
former Crown Court recorder) a retirement pension calculated pro rata temporis 
on the retirement pension payable to a full-time judge taking retirement at age 65 
which has performed the same work. In this case some important questions were 
raised: first, who define the concept of workers who have on employment contract 
71  Case C-393/10, O’Brien [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:110,
  available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0393&lang1=en&type=TX-
T&ancre=
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or an employment relationship and who determine whether judges fall within 
that concept – and here the ECJ emphasized that ‘’ it is for the Member States to 
define the concept of ‘workers who have an employment contract or an employ-
ment relationship’ in Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
and, in particular, to determine whether judges fall within that concept, subject to 
the condition that that does not lead to the arbitrary exclusion of that category of 
persons from the protection offered by Directive 97/81 and that framework agree-
ment. An exclusion from that protection may be permitted only if the relationship 
between judges and the Ministry of Justice is, by its nature, substantially different 
from that between employers and their employees falling, according to national 
law, within the category of workers’’, and second, if according to national law, 
judges fall within the concept of ‘’workers who have an employment contract or 
an employment relationship’’ in Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-
time work, whether the latter must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes, 
for the purpose of access to the retirement pension scheme, national law from 
discriminating between full- and part-time judges, or between different kinds of 
part-time judges - the ECJ answered that the Framework Agreement on part-time 
work must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes, for the purpose of access 
to the retirement pension scheme, national law from establishing a distinction be-
tween full-time judges and part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid basis, 
unless such a difference in treatment is justified by objective reasons, which is a 
matter for the referring court to determine. The ECJ also argued on the argument 
of Latvian Government (intervening in the case) that the application of European 
Union law to the judiciary has the result that the national identities of the Mem-
ber States are not respected, contrary to Article 4(2) TEU. The Court held that the 
application, with respect to part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid ba-
sis, of Directive 97/81 and the Framework Agreement on part-time work cannot 
have any effect on national identity, but merely aims to extend to those judges the 
scope of the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes one of the objectives 
of those acts, and to protect them against discrimination as compared with full-
time workers. Accordingly, in this case we have seen that Article 4(2) TEU can be 
used by by various actors, not only by the parties in the proceeding, but also by 
the intervening parties.
As it arises from the above analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems that 
Article 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU 
law obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple. It is obvious that 
Member States should be allowed some kind of discretion to develop the concept 
of constitutional identity, especially because, as it was stressed is Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
‘’the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
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policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another’’. 
However, the Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of public policy as justi-
fication for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly, 
so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the European Union institutions.
4. CONCLUSION
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of 
scholars, a new era in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon 
Treaty and its so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. 
Having in mind that the obligation that exist for the EU to respect national iden-
tity of its Member States have its history before Article 4(2) TEU, we could say 
that Article 4(2) TEU is quite longer and more descriptive than its predecessors. 
Namely, Article 4(2) provides: ‘’The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and loal 
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’’
Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member States, 
we could say that there is no specific rule to follow to determine it. Accordingly, 
we could also say that of particular importance for determining the content of 
constitutional identity are (relevant) constitutional provisions, (relevant) national 
constitutional court’s case law and (relevant) ECJ’s case law.
In order to determine the content of constitutional identity of some Member 
State, our starting point should be its constitution, or, more precisely, certain 
principles of its constitution or a set of core values, principles and rules. In general, 
we may say that the principles that are constitutionally protected belong to the 
following categories: the protection of basic principles of State organization, State 
sovereignty and the principle of democracy, State symbols, State aims, the protec-
tion of human dignity, fundamental rights and the principle of law.
As a starting point in determination of the content of constitutional identity, the 
constitutional provisions only give a first indications. A second important phase in 
this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s case law. In this context, particularly 
important role play decisions regarding the relationship between the law of the 
European Union and domestic constitutional law. The German Federal Consti-
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tutional Court has developed the most elaborate jurisprudence on constitutional 
identity. This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other 
constitutional courts, and very possible will be also inspiration for future Croatian 
Constitutional Court position in this context.
As it arises from the analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems that Ar-
ticle 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU 
law obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple. It is obvious that 
Member States should be allowed some kind of discretion to develop the concept 
of constitutional identity, especially because, as it was stressed is Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
‘’the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another’’. 
However, the Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of public policy as justi-
fication for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly, 
so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the European Union institutions.
In order to determine Croatian constitutional identity, our starting point was the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Having in mind that Croatian Constitu-
tion is not one of those which contain prohibition of changing some of the consti-
tutional norms, and this is why in the framework of this formal conception is not 
possible to draw any conclusion relating to the core of the Constitution, we stress 
that constitutional identity of Croatia is determined in the constitutional text, 
more precisely – in three constitutional provisions and in Historical Foundations 
of the Constitution. Firstly, we stress Article 17 paragraph 3 of the Constitution 
which stipulates that ‘’Not even in the case of an immediate threat to the existence 
of the State may restrictions be imposed on the application of the provisions of this 
Constitution concerning the right to life, prohibition of torture, cruel or degrading 
treatment or punishment, on the legal definitions of punishable offences and punish-
ments, or on freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’’ Secondly, at the beginning 
of constitutional text, Article 3 establishes the highest values of the constitutional 
order of the Republic of Croatia, as the grounds for the interpretation of the entire 
constitutional text as well as its institutional provisions. And finally, we stress the 
importance of the Historical Foundations of the Constitution, or its preamble, 
which has great (primarily) historical, but also symbolic and political, significance.
On the other hand, in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia reference to constitutional identity has appeared and discussed only re-
cently. The Court has defined following parts of the Croatian constitutional iden-
tity: first, Article 1 and Article 3 of the Constitution (the highest values of the con-
stitutional order of the Republic of Croatia); second, constitutionally guaranteed 
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fundamental rights, including respect for minority languages and entrepreneurial 
and market freedom, and third, the Historical Foundation of the Constitution, 
especially its paragraph 2 on equality of national minorities with citizens of the 
Croatian nationality. 
As to the identity clause and as to the subsidiarity of the EU law in Croatian legal 
order in general, there is still no relevant case-law of the Croatian Constitutional 
Court. However, according to the former President of the Croatian Constitutional 
Court Jasna Omejec, it is reasonable to presume that the relevant legal standpoints 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including on constitutional identity 
issue, will be carefully considered by the Croatian Constitutional Court in the 
coming period. 
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bODy fOR THE SETTLEMNT Of PATENT 
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ABSTRACT
The Unified Patent Court is established by the Agreement on Unified Patent Court, signed in 
February 2013 by twenty five EU Member States. The Agreement will enter into force after the 
ratification of thirteen Member States, including France, Germany and United Kingdom. The 
Unified Patent Court is a judicial body for the settlement of disputes relating to the European 
Patents and European Patents with unitary effect. European patent means a patent granted 
under the provisions of the European Patent Convention (EPC), which does not benefit from 
unitary effect by the virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of the creation of the unitary patent protection. European patent with unitary effect means 
a patent granted under the provisions of the EPC which benefits from unitary effect by the 
virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012. Taking into consideration a number of attempts to 
create a unified patent protection system within the EU, the first part of the article represents 
an overview to the history of establishment of the unified patent litigation system. The second 
part analyses legal bases, sources of law and structure of the Unified Patent Court. The special 
attention is devoted to the relation between the Unified Patent Court and the European Court 
of Justice. In the third part, the author examines challenges that will face the users of the new 
court for the settlement of disputes relating to the European Patents and European Patents with 
unitary effect.
Keywords: Unified Patent Court, European patent, unitary patent, European Union, Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
1.  INTRODUCTION
In Europe, patent protection currently can be obtained in three ways: first, trough 
national patent offices which grant national patents based on the national patent 
law valid for the respective national territory; second, by the European Patent Of-
fice, which grants European patents based on the European Patent Convention 
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(EPC);1 and third, on the base of Patent Cooperation Treaty under which only the 
procedure of examination of patentability of inventions is centralized, while the 
patents are indeed granted by national patent offices (Patent Cooperation Treaty 
is open not only to European countries, but also to the other countries outside the 
Europe and because of that it is not a subject of our interest in this paper).2
Under the EPC, the contracting states transfer their sovereign right to examine a 
patent application and to grant a patent with effect for their territory to an inter-
governmental organization, the European Patent Organization (EPO).3 So, with 
one single application, patent protection can be obtained in all EPO Member 
States. But, once a European patent is granted by the European Patent Office for 
all Member States, it has to be validated in each EPO Member State for which 
protection is being sought. As regards translation requirements, renewal fees and 
enforcement national laws are to be applied. 
Therefore, Europe has a well-functioning and successful centralized application 
and granting procedure for all EPO Member States, but the European patent is 
not a unitary title. After granting, the European patent breaks down into a bundle 
of national patents, each governed by the national law of the Member State Coun-
try designed by the patent owner. The lack of a unitary post-grant procedure rep-
resents a substantial drawback of the EPO system. This has been criticized since 
the creation of the EPO.4
As a consequence, the terms of the exclusive rights, which they confer upon their 
owner, are determinate by the various national laws. It is to remedy this territori-
ally fragmented and more or less diverse protection that, since about half century, 
the European Union attempts to establish an autonomous system of unitary patent 
protection of its own design, but has failed to achieve it whichever way it chose.5
In its paper, issued in 2007, the European Commission states that actions for 
infringement, invalidity counterclaim or revocation for the ‘bundled’ European 
patent are still subject to national laws and procedures. The existing system har-
1  The European Patent Convention [2016] OJ EPO 6/2016.
2  Patent Cooperation Treaty, URL=http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm.  Accessed 10 
February 2017.
3  European Patent Office, URL=http://www.epo.org. Accessed 10 February 2017.
4  Hilto, R., Jager, T., Lamping, M., Ullrich H., Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax law on the 2009 Commission Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified 
Patent Judiciary, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, No. 7, 2009,  p. 
817.
5  Ullrich, H., Harmonizing Patent Law: the Untamable Union Patent, Max Planck Institute for Intellec-
tual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 12-03, 2012, p.1.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES240
bours the danger of multiple patent litigations, which weakens the patent system 
in Europe and fragments the single market for patents in Europe. This has serious 
consequences for European competitiveness facing challenges from the US, Japan 
and emerging economic powers such as China.6
The major shortcomings of the existing European patent system are related to 
translation and publication costs, renewal fees, administrative complexity, legal 
uncertainty, etc.7 All those characteristics can be summarized under two major 
drawbacks: the costs and the enforcement of the European patent.
On one hand, the EPO Member States aware of the high costs caused by valida-
tion requirements after a European patent entered into the national phase negoti-
ated the so-called London Agreement in 2000.8 The contracting states agree to 
waive the requirements for translation of European patents in a way that patent 
applications are to be only in one of the EPO’s three languages (English, French 
or German). However, the patent claims are still published in all three languages. 
It is also provided the right to demand that a patent owner provide translations 
in an official national language for a conflicting patent in case of a legal litigation 
remains unchanged by the Agreement. The London Agreement has significantly 
contributed to reducing the translation costs in the contracting states.
On the other hand, as regards the enforcement of European patents, neither uni-
fied regulations nor a single jurisdiction for patent disputes dealing with issues 
which go beyond the borders of an EPO Member State exist. Any infringement, 
invalidity counterclaim or revocation regarding a European patent may well be 
subject to multiple and diverse national laws and procedures. It may also involve 
costly translation requirements as each national court has its own official court 
language(s). Claimants and defendants risk costly, long term, multiple litigations 
in multiple EPO Member States regarding the same patent issue.9
This fragmentation of patent litigation involves the possibility of substantive pat-
ent law being applied and interpreted differently when enforcing a patent. As a 
6  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enhancing the 
Patent System in Europe [2007] 165 Final.
7  Machek, N. How Unitary’ is the Unitary Patent? URL=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2407357.  Accessed 9 February 2017.
8  Agreement on the Application of the Article 65 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents 
(London Agreement) [2001] OJ EPO 12/01.
9  Addor, F., Mund, C., A Patent Court for Europe– What’s at stake for users? URL=https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236470&rec=1&srcabs=2117835&alg=1&pos=10. Accessed 6 
February 2017.
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result, it is possible to have contradicting case law within national patent courts 
which might undermine the value of the European patent.
The way the European patent system is set up makes a danger of multiple patent 
litigation and costly procedure. So, there were a number of attempts to create 
a unified patent protection system within the EU. One cannot understand the 
unitary patent package as it is shaped today without a brief look back on its his-
tory. Thus the first part of the article represents an overview to those attempts that 
preceded the singing of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court. The legal 
bases, sources of law and structure of the Unified Patent Court are analyzed in the 
second part of the article, while the third part is devoted to the challenges that will 
face the users of the new court for the settlement of patent disputes in Europe.
2.   THE HISTORy Of ESTAbLISHMENT Of THE UNIfIED 
PATENT LITIGATION SySTEM IN EUROPE
The current European patent system is dangerous in the way that multiple patent 
litigations may occur and procedures become very costly. Taking into consider-
ation all possible negative consequences of this system on the competitiveness of 
the European innovation area, there were several attempts for establishing a reli-
able, cost-efficient patent litigation system that is highly effective and offers legal 
certainty for the territories of all EPO Member States. 
2.1.  The European Patent Litigation Agreement 
In 1999 the French government called an intergovernmental conference of the 
ECP contracting states to discuss the shortcomings of the EPO system and pos-
sible solutions. On that occasion a Working Party on Litigation was set up with 
a task to present a draft optional protocol to the EPC which would commit sig-
natory EPO States to an integrated judicial system, including uniform rules of 
procedure and a common court of appeal. That protocol was supposed to define 
the terms under which a common judicial entity could be established for any liti-
gation relating to validity and infringement of European patents. 
In the following years the EPO Working Party on Litigation drew up the Draft 
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA). It was provided the establishment 
of a new international organization, independent from the EPO, composed of 
two bodies: a European Patent Court and an Administrative Committee. The 
Court would comprise court of first instance with a central division and various 
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regional ones. As regard s Administrative Committee, the representatives of all 
contracting states would be presented in it.10
According to the ELPA, the European Patent Court would be competent only for 
litigations concerning the infringement and validity of European patents effective 
in the territory of the contracting state. As regards the language of the proceedings 
of the European Patent Court, EPO’s language regime (with English, French and 
German as official languages of the proceedings) would be applied. 
When it comes to the application of the Community law (in particular, the Brus-
sels Convention11 and the Council Regulation 44/200112), the European Patent 
Court could request the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: ECJ) to issue 
preliminary ruling. That preliminary ruling would be binding for the European 
Patent Court as pertaining to decisions with the effect in an EU Member State.
The ELPA was the first substantial approach towards a unified patent litigation 
system in Europe. It was drafted as an optional protocol, which means that it 
would be open for accession by all EPO Member States. 
Users groups from industry, legal professions and patent judges have strongly sup-
ported the ELPA because the ELPA would be able to meet users’ needs for an 
efficient court delivering fast, high quality first instance decisions at an affordable 
price. Additionally, the ELPA was expected to significantly reduce the number of 
cases and provide more legal certainty.13
However, in December 2005, the EPO Working Party on Litigation ceased its 
work. Namely, the European Commission announced its intention to engage in 
dialogue in order to ensure a sound IPR framework in EU. Despite the Commis-
sion’s declaration that the ELPA was “a promising route towards a more unitary 
jurisdiction”, it highlighted some institutional obstacles in the document. Intro-
duction of the legal basis for the establishment of a Community patent jurisdic-
tion in the Treaties14 and the adoption of Directive 2004/48/EC15 transfer the 
competence for establishing a unitary patent litigation system for the EU to the 
10  Ćeranić, J., O upostavljanju jedinstvenog postupka rešavanja patentnih sporova u Evropi, Pravo i privreda, 
7-9/2014,  pp. 74-75.
11  Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [1979] 
OJ C59.
12  Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L012. 
13  Addor, Mund, op.cit. note  9.
14  Articles 229a and 225a TEC (Nice). 
15  Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [2004] OJ L195/16.
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European Commission. Furthermore, with the adoption of Council regulation on 
a Community patent, Member States would no longer have the right to act indi-
vidually or even collectively to undertake obligations with non-Member Coun-
tries which affect those rules. Therefore, the EPO Working Party on Litigation 
decided to suspend the work in view of the parallel work of the EU in this field. 
In spite of its lack of success, ELPA was important for the shift it brought about 
EU discussions. ELPA highlighted the importance of designing a judiciary for 
patent enforcement, so that this issue moved from a mere side issue to becoming 
a core focus. Accordingly, ELPA set a number of facts straight that formed the 
basis for the way ahead afterwards: ELPA showed that the EPO system urgently 
required a more effective litigation structure to better exploit the economic value 
and legal potential of EPO patents.16
2.2.  The European and EU Patent Court
In December 2009, the EU agreed on the establishment of the unified litigation 
system. The draft agreement also included jurisdiction over the new EU patent. 
Because of the double competence of a new judiciary body (for European patents 
and future EU patents), the EU did not choose the regular legislative procedure 
of issuing an EU regulation to establish a new patent judiciary in Europe. It es-
tablishment was based on an international treaty according to Art. 218 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Since the proposed European and EU Pat-
ent Court (EEUPC) was to deal exclusively with disputes of European patents as 
well as future EU patents, the agreement was open not only to EU but to all EPO 
Member States.
As regards the institutional structure of the EEUPC, it was quite similar to the 
ELPA. However, there was one crucial difference – the exclusive jurisdiction for 
infringement and nullity actions over future EU patents. For that reason it was 
necessary to ensure the primacy of EU law by introducing preliminary rulings 
of the ECJ on the interpretation of the Treaty and the validity or interpretation 
of acts of EU institutions. Moreover, the ECJ’s decisions would be binding on 
the EEUPC. So, it was not clear whether non-EU Members would have been 
obliged to accept the binding effects. And even had that been the case, whether 
they would have even accepted and joined the EEUPC under this condition, since 
they had not been involved in the drawing up of the EEUPC.
16  Jaeger, T., What’s in the Unitary Patent package?, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
Research Paper  No. 14-08, 2014,  p. 5.
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Despite the obligation for non-EU Members to comply with the ECJ’s decisions 
and the dubiousness of acceptance, the EEUPC was a promising proposal to de-
velop a pan-European patent litigation system with 27 EU Member States17 as 
well as the 11 non-EU EPO Member States. It would have successfully eliminated 
some of the shortcomings that users of the patent system still have to face in Eu-
rope. The EEUPC would have brought lower costs, greater effectiveness and en-
hanced legal certainty through an integrated, two-level judicial system for patent 
litigations related to infringement and validity of European and EU patents, and 
with uniform rules of procedure and a common Court of Appeal.18
Nevertheless, with the EEUPC, not all concerns regarding the fragmentation of 
the patent litigation system in Europe were dismissed. The obligation to comply 
with the EU law as well as the unpredictable political will by interested non-EU 
EPO Member States in accepting the primacy of EU law when accessing the EE-
UPC could lead to the situation in which a patent owner or a third party involved 
in a patent conflict could still be confronted with the multiple patent litigations. 
The EEUPC, as an international agreement, provided the establishment of an 
international court outside the legal EU framework. This court had exclusive juris-
diction to deal with infringement and revocation of EU patents. But the question 
regarding the compatibility of the EEUPC with the EU Treaties was open recently 
after the signing of the Agreement. 
Thus, on 24 April 2009, the Council of the EU requested an opinion by the ECJ 
regarding the compatibility of the mentioned agreement with the EU law. On 
March 2011, the ECJ issued Opinion 1/09, finding that the EEUPC was not 
compatible with the EU Treaties. The ECJ based its opinion on the following 
considerations:19
   Under the current agreement, the EEUPC is an institution which is outside 
the institutional and judicial framework of the EU with a distinct legal per-
sonality under national law;
   The draft agreement confers on the EEUPC exclusive jurisdiction to hear a 
significant number of actions brought by individuals in the field of patents. 
To that extent, the courts of the EU Member States are divested of that ju-
risdiction;
17  By that time, the Republic of Croatia was not a Member State of the EU.
18  Addor, Mund, op. cit. note 9.
19  EJC Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the Creation of a European and Community Patent Court [2011].
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   The creation of the EEUPC would deprive national courts the power of, as 
the case may be, the obligation to refer questions to the ECJ for a prelimi-
nary ruling in the field of patents;
   The EEUPC has, unlike other international judicial systems on which the 
ECJ has ruled in the past, the duty to interpret and apply not only the envis-
aged international agreement, but also provisions of European Union law;
   If a decision of the EEUPC were to be in breach of EU law, it could not be 
the subject of infringement proceedings nor could it give rise to any financial 
liability on the part of one or more Member States.
The ECJ observed that the agreement would alter the essential character of powers 
conferred on the institutions of the EU and EU Member States, powers which are 
indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of EU law. In consequence, 
the ECJ concluded that the envisaged agreement on the creation of the EEUPC 
was not compatible with the provisions of EU law. 
3.  THE UNIfIED PATENT COURT
After the Opinion 1/09 of the European Court of Justice, the Council started to 
revise the Agreement on the creation of the EEUPC according to the consider-
ations of the Court. In 2011 the European Commission presented a solution for a 
unified patent litigation system in response to Opinion 1/09 and a large majority 
of Member States endorsed it. It was agreed that a Unified Patent Court (UPC) 
should be established by an agreement creating a jurisdiction common to EU 
Member States only.20
The question of compatibility of a new unified patent litigation system with the 
EU law was raised once again in October 2012. Namely, a group of professors of 
law and lawyers launched an initiative, considering necessary to draw attention to 
the situation of a project for European Court System, specifically for patents. In 
that initiative they expressed the opinion that the compliance of the new patent 
litigation system with the provisions of the EU law should be reexamined.21
In their initiative they stated that the system would be the result of a treaty to be 
agreed between the majority of EU Member States. The aim of the treaty, at that 
time still at the draft stage, was to create a new court of an international nature 
20  Unified Patent Court, URL=https://www.unified-patent-court.org/.  Accessed 10 February 2017.
21  Motion on the project on European Patent Court by Law professors and lawyers, URL=http://www.uni-
tary-patent.eu/content/motion-project-european-patent-court-law-professors-and-lawyers. Accessed 9 
February 2017.
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to give rulings on the validity and infringement of European patents and future 
unitary patents. The jurisdiction of this proposed court would take precedence 
over that of national courts.
On 8 March 2011, the ECJ gave a negative opinion on the draft treaty submit-
ted by the Council. It declared this draft incompatible with the European Union 
Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Thereafter the 
draft treaty was amended with particular regard to the objections made by the 
Court. Nevertheless, serious doubts had been expressed on the conformity of the 
new draft with these objections.
In the main these doubts arise from the fact that the draft deprives the national 
courts of their own jurisdiction on those matters under consideration, hence de-
priving those taking legal action (companies) from being judged by them while, 
according to the Court, the European Union judicial system is founded upon 
joint cooperation between EU and national courts.22
It is also interesting to mention that the opinion of the Legal Department of the 
Council was sought on the compatibility of the modified draft with that of the 
Court. Public access to the complete wording of this opinion has been prohibited. 
If this opinion concluded that the modified project conformed to the Treaties, it 
was not apparent why the content was inaccessible to the public. The secrecy rein-
forced the doubts expressed beforehand and elsewhere. 
Despite the great impact of this initiative in public, its initiators did not achieve 
what they pleaded for.23
Shortly after, in December 2012 the European parliament and the Council ad-
opted the unitary patent package consisted of three components: two regulations 
(Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of the creation of the unitary patent protection24 and Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the creation of the unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable 
translation agreements25) and the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court.26 
22  Ibid.
23  Ćeranić, J., Jedinstveni patentni sud – novi pravosudni organ za rešavanje sporova u vezi sa evropskim i 
unitarnim patentom, Strani pravni život, No. 3/2013, 2013, pp. 124-125. 
24  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European parliament and of the Council implementing en-
hanced cooperation in the area of the creation of the unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L361. 
25  Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of the unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation agreements [2012] OJ L361.
26  The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, URL=https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/
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3.1.  Legal basis
In contrast to the ELPA and the EEUPC, a new patent litigation system is based 
on an international treaty among EU Member States only: the Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court (UPC) and the Draft Statue. According to the Agreement 
the UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction in respect to infringement or revocation 
actions over both European patents and future unitary patents – European patents 
with unitary effect. The exclusive competence is however subject to exceptions 
during the transitional period. The UPC’s rulings will have effect in the territory 
of those Contracting Member States having ratified the UPC Agreement at the 
given time. The UPC will not have any competence with regard to national pat-
ents.
The UPC Agreement is open to accession by any Member State of the EU. Name-
ly, the Agreement is also open for EU Member States which do not participate in 
the enhanced cooperation in the field of patent protection (i.e. and Spain). At the 
same time, it is not be open to the accession for EU Member States that are EPO 
members (such as Switzerland, Turkey or Norway). As a result, decisions by the 
UPC regarding unitary patents will only be binding on the EU Member States 
participating in the enhanced cooperation while decisions regarding ‘classic’ Eu-
ropean patents will only be binding on contracting Member States of the UPC.27
The Agreement on a UPC was concluded on 19 February 2013. Up to date, the 
Agreement was signed by all EU Member States, except: Spain, Poland and Croa-
tia. Even though negotiated under the ambit of the Council, the Agreement was 
concluded outside of the EU legal framework and therefore would be organiza-
tionally separated and essentially independent from both the national and the 
European Union’s judicial system.28
It is provided that this agreement shall enter into force on 1 January 2014 or on 
the first day of the fourth month after the deposit of the thirteenth instrument of 
ratification or accession in accordance with Article 84, including the three Mem-
ber States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in the year 
preceding the year in which the signature of the Agreement takes place or on the 
first day of the fourth month after the date of entry into force the amendments to 
files/upc-agreement.pdf.  Accessed 10 February 2017 (UPC Agreement).
27  Addor, Mund, op. cit. note 9.
28  Ćeranić, J. Unitarni patent, Institut za uporedno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, 
Beograd 2015, pp.63-65.
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the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 concerning its relationship with this Agree-
ment, whichever is the latest.29
3.2.   The Primacy of Union Law, Liability and Responsibility of the contracting 
Member States
The agreement includes a new chapter on the Primacy of Union Law, Liability and 
Responsibility of the contracting Member States. This chapter was introduced in 
order to take account of the ECJ’s negative Opinion 1/09, in which it stated that 
the creation of the European and Community patent Court was incompatible 
with the EU law if – while applying EU law – it was outside of the EU’s legal or-
der. Thus important amendments have been introduced in the UPC Agreement. 
According to the Agreement the Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and 
shall respect the primacy.30 Therefore, the Agreement addresses the recognition of 
the absolute primacy of EU law and the contracting Member State’s obligation to 
ensure that the UPC complies with EU law. 
The Agreement also contains provisions for preliminary rulings by the ECJ which 
are binding on the UPC and for the rules governing the responsibilities of the 
contracting states. As a court common to the contracting Member States and as a 
part of their judicial system, the Court shall cooperate with the Court of Justice of 
the European Union to ensure the correct application and uniform interpretation 
of Union law, as any national court, in accordance with the Article 267 TFEU in 
particular. Decisions of the ECJ shall be binding on the Court.31
As regards liability for damages in the case of infringement of EU law, it is pro-
vided that contracting Member States are jointly and severally liable for damage 
resulting from an infringement of Union law by the Court of Appeal, in accor-
dance with Union law concerning non-contractual liability of Member States for 
damage caused by their national courts breaching Union law.32
The Agreement on UPC will be supplemented by separate Rules of procedure 
(RoP), which will lay down the details of the procedure for the UPC. Work on a 
preliminary draft for the RoP started in 2009.
29  Art. 89 UPC Agreement.
30 Art. 20 UPC Agreement.
31 Art. 21 UPC Agreement,.
32 Art. 22 UPC Agreement.
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3.3.   Sources of law
The sources of law applied by the UPC are precisely enumerated by the Agree-
ment. It is provided that the Court shall base its decisions on:33
   Union law, including Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 and Regulation (EU) 
No 1260/2012;
   The Agreement on UPC;
   The EPC;
   Other international agreements applicable to the patents and binding on all 
the contracting Member States; and
   National laws.
3.4. Structure
The Agreement on the UPC provides the institutional structure of the UPC. The 
Court shall comprise a Court of the First Instance, a Court of Appeal and a Reg-
istry.34
The Court of First Instance shall comprise a central division as well as local and 
regional divisions.35
The central division shall have its seat in Paris, with sections in London and 
Munich.36Section in London37 shall deal with human necessities and chemistry, 
including pharmaceuticals, while Munich section shall deal with mechanical engi-
neering. The central division in Paris shall deal with cases concerning performing 
operations; transporting, textiles, fixed constructions, physics and electricity. 
A local division shall be set up in a contracting Member State upon its request in 
accordance with a Statue. A contracting Member State hosting a local division 
shall designate its seat.38 The Agreement also provides a possibility of establishing 
33 Art. 24 UPC Agreement,.
34 Art. 6(1) UPC Agreement,.
35 Art. 7(1) UPC Agreement.
36 Art. 7(2) UPC Agreement. 
37  The Brexit has also influenced the Unitary Patent System. It is to be seen whether the United Kingdom 
would ratify the Agreement. And even if a way is found to keep the United Kingdom in the Unitary 
Patent System after the Brexit, it is questionable whether London can keep its seat as a of a central 
division of UPC. Milan is often mentioned as a possible solution for the seat of a central division of 
UPC (the European Patent Office in 2015 granted 2476 patents to Italian patentees, ranking Italy in 
3rd position in the European Union after Germany and France and before the United Kingdom).
38 Art. 7(3) UPC Agreement
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additional local divisions. An additional local division shall be set up in a con-
tracting Member State upon its request for every one hundred patent cases per 
calendar year that have been commenced in that contracting Member State during 
three successive years prior to or subsequent to the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement. The number of local divisions in one contracting Member State shall 
not exceed four.39Given that in Germany there is a sufficiently high case count, 
it is likely that altogether four local divisions will be set up, seated in Dusseldorf, 
Mannheim, Hamburg and Munich.40According to the Agreement any panel of 
a local division in a contracting Member State where, during a period of three 
successive years prior or subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, less 
than fifty patent cases per calendar year on average have been commenced shall sit 
in a composition of one legally qualified judge who is a national of the contract-
ing Member State hosting the local division concerned and two legally qualified 
judges who are not nationals of the contracting Member State concerned and are 
allocated from the Pool of judges.41 For local divisions that deal more than fifty 
patent cases per calendar year, it is provided that the panel comprises two national 
judges and one foreign judge. This third judge shall serve at the local division on 
a long term basis, where this is necessary for the efficient functioning of divisions 
with a high work load.42
A regional division shall be set up for two or more contracting Member States, 
upon their request in accordance with the Statue. Such contracting Member State 
shall designate the seat of the division concerned. The regional division may hear 
cases in multiple locations.43The Agreement does not list which countries are go-
ing to set up local or regional divisions. The first of such regional divisions was 
however considered by Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
The panels of regional divisions will comprise two judges from participating Mem-
ber States that are hosting the division and a third judge from another Member 
State.44
The Court of Appeal, located in Luxembourg, shall sit in a multinational composi-
tion of five judges. It shall sit in a composition of three legally qualified judges who 
are nationals of different Contracting Member States and two technically qualified 
judges with qualifications and experience in the field of technology concerned.45
39 Art. 7(4) UPC Agreement. 
40 Machek,op. cit. note 7.
41 Art. 8(2) UPC Agreement. 
42 Art. 8(3) UPC Agreement. 
43 Art. 7(5) UPC Agreement. 
44 Art. 8(4) UPC Agreement. 
45 Art. 9(1) UPC Agreement.
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The Registry shall be set up at the seat of the Court of Appeal, i.e. in 
Luxembourg.46The training centre for the judges shall be in Budapest and the 
Patent Arbitration and Mediation Centre shall be divided between Lisbon and 
Ljubljana. 
3.5.  The entry into force of the UPC Agreement
The Preparatory Committee is composed of all the Signatory States to the Unified 
Patent Court Agreement. All these states undertook to establish the new court 
and the Preparatory Committee’s function is to oversee the various work streams. 
There are five major work streams which will constitute the work which needs to 
be completed. These are: legal framework, financial aspects, information technol-
ogy, facilities, and human resources and training.
The Preparatory Committee will exist until the Court is established. Currently 
this is expected to last two years and during this time it will have its own Rules by 
which it is governed. 
The Preparatory Committee is now working under the assumption that the Pro-
visional Application Phase will start end of spring 2017, presumably in May, and 
that the Agreement on the UP can enter into force and the Court become opera-
tional in December 2017.
4.  CHALLENGES Of A NEW PATENT LITIGATION SySTEM 
The long-term objective of effective patent protection and a final goal of a unified 
patent litigation system in Europe is to remedy the drawbacks of the European 
patent system in the long run, and to meet users needs. However, there are some 
believes that a new patent litigation system is not addressing the current draw-
backs of the European patent successfully or in a suitable way because it only 
partially covers the European territory. Significant players within the innovation 
market, such as Switzerland and Spain or growing players like Turkey are kept on 
the side. Instead of creating a pan-European patent system, the UPC would ulti-
mately perpetuate fragmentation of patent litigation. Such a situation would not 
be for the benefit of the innovative industry in Europe.47
Therefore the question is which challenges would face the users of the unitary pat-
ent protection system if UPC, as it is provided by Agreement, remains exclusively 
46 Art. 10(1) UPC Agreement. 
47 Addor, Mund, op. cit. note 9.
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a court for the EU Member States? And what would happen if the Agreement is 
amended in a way that it becomes open for all EPO Member States?
4.1.  UPC –only EU Member States 
If the UPC remains a court only for the EU Member States, the consequences are 
different when it comes to European patent and European patent with unitary 
effect – unitary patent.
In the first case, national courts of the EPO Members outside the EU would re-
main competent for patent disputes regarding European patent. Therefore, neither 
would they have to respect the primacy of EU law nor would the UPC’s decisions 
be binding on these national courts. In the other words, there is no conflict of law.
In the second case, the jurisdiction of the UPC over the unitary patent would 
bring much more legal certainty in patent litigation for all system users seeking 
patent protection in the area of the enhanced cooperation. In this case, the UPC 
clearly carries significant advantages for businesses in Europe in terms of reduced 
costs, simplified procedures and enhanced legal certainty.
However, the lack of legal certainty would remain an essential obstacle for ‘clas-
sic’ European patents which have been validated in non-EU EPO Member State 
(i.e. Switzerland, Turkey or Norway) or country not participating in the enhanced 
cooperation (i.e. Spain). The situation will be worse if these countries do not have 
special national courts with the legal and technical expertise needed to deal with a 
complex patent litigation in due time and with acceptable costs. Equipping EPO 
Member States with effective and reliable national patent courts within their juris-
diction is a big step towards legal certainty. However, owners of European patents 
with effect in these countries still face the disadvantages of an un-harmonized 
EPO patent landscape.48 In the other words, fragmentation will be a crucial fea-
ture of the European patent landscape, if the IPC remains a court only for EU 
Member States. 
4.2.  UPC – all EPO Member States
It is interesting to examine what would happen if a step forward is taken in a way 
that non-EU Members were to be invited and wished to sign the UPC Agree-
ment? There are, at least, four questions to be answered.
48 Ibid. 
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First, when it comes to European patents, taking into consideration the binding 
effect of the UPC’s decisions, the national courts outside the EU would have to 
respect the jurisdiction of the UPC. Since some national patent laws in non-EU 
countries are different from EU law, the binding effect of the UPC’s decisions 
would lead to an indirect harmonization of the patent law in Europe.
Second, keeping in mind that non-EU EPO Member States had not been in-
volved in setting up of the UPC, would they be politically willing to access the 
UPC and its institutional framework?
Third, when it comes to judges from non-EU EPO Member States, could they 
participate in the UPC (and under what conditions in terms of immunities or 
privileges)? Another issue is whether non-EU EPO Member States would be al-
lowed to build up additional regional courts of first instance. 
And forth, as regards financing, how much would non-EU EPO Member States 
have to contribute to the costs of the UPC if participating in this new judiciary?
5.  CONCLUSIONS
The decision of the EU Member States to create a unitary patent and a Unified 
Patent Court is undoubtedly a step forward to improving patent protection in 
Europe. The intention was to create a solution that fits the EU in terms of insti-
tutional structure and political feasibility. But such an approach resulted in frag-
mentation of the European patent landscape. Namely, a common patent litigation 
system for all countries participating in the European patent area was not created. 
System users are the ones that would have to swallow the bitter pill of this frag-
mentation, which implies forum shopping, patent torpedoes and legal uncertainty 
for European patents.49
However, the system provided by the UPC Agreement is undoubtedly a step for-
ward. It will not be a unified court for all European countries, but still it will be a 
single court for 25 EU Member States. Furthermore, the UPC Agreement brings 
the European bundle patent a large step closer to becoming a self-contained sys-
tem of protection, and therefore, reinforces its position vis-à-vis the European 
Union’s own patent system.50
The way things stand today, it seems that in foreseeable future the UPC Agree-
ment will enter into force (December 2017). Anyway, at the moment, when uni-
49 Ibid.
50  Ullrich, H., Select within the System: the European Patent with Unitary Effect, Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 12-11, 2012,  pp. 22-23.
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tary patent protection has not been implemented yet, it is premature to evaluate 
whether a new unitary patent and the UPC will contribute to the competitiveness 
of the EU industry by providing more effective and less expensive patent protec-
tion in Europe. The time will show whether this new patent litigation system can 
satisfy the needs of the users.
REfERENCES 
bOOKS AND ARTICLES 
1.   Ćeranić, J. Unitarni patent, Institut za uporedno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj 
Luci, Beograd 2015, pp.63-65.
2.   Ćeranić, J., Jedinstveni patentni sud – novi pravosudni organ za rešavanje sporova u vezi sa evrop-
skim i unitarnim patentom, Strani pravni život, No. 3/2013, 2013, pp. 124-125.
3.   Ćeranić, J., O upostavljanju jedinstvenog postupka rešavanja patentnih sporova u Evropi, Pravo i 
privreda, No. 7-9, 2014, pp. 74-75.
4.   Hilto, R., Jager, T., Lamping, M., Ullrich H., Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellec-
tual Property, Competition and Tax law on the 2009 Commission Proposal for the Establishment 
of a Unified Patent Judiciary, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, No. 7, 2009, p. 817.
5.   Jaeger, T., What’s in the Unitary Patent package?, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition Research Paper No. 14-08, 2014, p. 5.
6.   Ullrich, H., Select within the System: the European Patent with Unitary Effect, Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 12-11, 2012, 
pp. 22-23.
7.   Ullrich, H., Harmonizing Patent Law: the Untamable Union Patent, Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, 2012-03, p. 1.
COURT Of JUSTICE Of THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1.   Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the Creation of a European and Community Patent 
Court [2011].
EU LAW 
1.   Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and certain related acts [2001] OJ C80/01.
2.   Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L012. 
3.   Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [2004] OJ 
L195/16.
Jelena Ćeranić: THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT – A NEW JUDICIAL BODY FOR THE ... 255
4.   Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European parliament and of the Council implement-
ing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of the unitary patent protection [2012] 
OJ L361. 
5.   Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of the unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation agree-
ments [2012] OJ L361.
6.   Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters [1979] OJ C59.
7.   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, En-
hancing the Patent System in Europe [2007] 165 Final.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.   The European Patent Convention [2016] OJ EPO 6/2016.
2.   Agreement on the Application of the Article 65 of the Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents (London Agreement) [2001] OJ EPO 12/01.
WEbSITE REfERENCES
1.   Addor, F., Mund, C., A Patent Court for Europe – What’s at stake for users? URL=https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236470&rec=1&srcabs=2117835&alg=1&pos=10. 
Accessed 6 February 2017.
2.   Machek, N. How ‘Unitary’ is the Unitary Patent?, URL=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2407357. Accessed 9 February 2017.
3.   Patent Cooperation Treaty,
      URL= http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm. Accessed 10 February 2017
4.   Motion on the project on European Patent Court by Law professors and lawyers, URL=http://
www.unitary-patent.eu/content/motion-project-european-patent-court-law-professors-and-
lawyers. Accessed 9 February 2017.
5.   The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 
      URL=https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/upc-agreement.pdf. Accessed 
10 February 2017.
6.   European Patent Office 
      URL=www.epo.org. Accessed 10 February 2017.
7.   Unified Patent Court ,
      URL=https://www.unified-patent-court.org/. Accessed 10 February 2017.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES256
Tunjica Petrašević, PhD, Assistant Professor 
Faculty of Law Osijek, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Croatia 
Stjepana Radića 13, Osijek
tpetrase@pravos.hr
Mato Krmek, LLM, Attorney
Attorney’s office ‘’Primorac and partners’’, Zagreb, Croatia
Kennedyjev trg 6b, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
mato.krmek@primorac-partners.com
THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIAbILITy Of THE EU  
– CASE STUDy Of ŠumelJ CASE
ABSTRACT
The EU is in obligation to cover the damage to member states and individuals on behalf of the 
institution that caused it. There is contractual and non-contractual liability of the EU. The 
aim of this paper is to discuss the non-contractual liability of the EU with special reference 
to joint liability of the EU and member states. In that sense, we will discuss the case “Šumelj 
and Others v Commission”, which is the first Croatian case before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The action was brought before the General Court on 20 October 
2013. The applicants claimed that the Commission had breached its obligation to monitor 
the implementation of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the 
European Union, under Article 36 to the Act of Accession. The General Court recently issued 
a negative decision. The applicants lodged an appeal to the Court of Justice but the Court con-
firmed General Court’s decision So, we analyse the judgment of the General Court.
Keywords : “Šumelj and Others v. EU’’, CJEU, non-contractual liability
1. INTRODUCTION
The EU is in obligation to cover the damage caused to member states and individ-
uals, on behalf of the institution that caused it. There is contractual and non-con-
tractual liability of the EU. The aim of this paper is to discuss the non-contractual 
liability of the EU with special reference to joint liability of the EU and member 
states. In that sense, we will analyse the case Šumelj and Others v Commission.1
The paper is divided into four parts. Following the introductory first part, the sec-
ond part will describe non-contractual liability of the EU for damage and review 
1  See case:  T-546/13 - Šumelj and Others v Commission [2016] ECLI:EU:T:2016:107.
Tunjica Petrašević, Mato Krmek: THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE EU ... 257
the relevant Articles 340(2) TFEU and 268 TFEU. In terms of substantive condi-
tions of liability, Article 340(2) refers to general principles common to the laws of 
member states. Seeing as how Treaty itself does not define the conditions, it is at 
the discretion of the CJEU to define them through case law. The second part of 
the paper will thus analyse the above two Treaty articles, but also the relevant case 
law of the CJEU to answer the following questions: who has active legal standing 
(locus standi) to bring an action; who is the action brought against; within what 
time limit; what constitutes a claim; which court is the action brought before; 
what are the conditions of liability for damage, with particular focus on the legal 
concept of the so-called joint liability. We will also reflect on the interrelation of 
this action and actions for annulment and actions for failure to act.2
The third part of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 3.1 outlines the 
facts of the case that lead to bringing both the actions for damage before national 
courts and to bringing the action for damage before the General Court pursuant 
to Article 340(2) TFEU. In section 3.2, we considered it necessary to describe the 
proceedings before the national courts. In section 3.3 we analyse the decision of 
the General Court. Even though a complaint was lodged against the decision of 
the General Court to the Court of Justice, the latter rejected the complaint and 
confirmed the findings of the General Court. We will thus analyse only the deci-
sion of the General Court and point to the contradictions in the decision itself. 
Lastly, the final, fourth part of the paper, will give concluding remarks and suggest 
possible further legal steps.
2. NON-CONTRACTUAL LIAbILITy fOR DAMAGE
It is necessary to distinguish between contractual and non-contractual liability of 
the Union for damage. Article 340(1) TFEU governs contractual liability for dam-
age that is regulated by the law applicable to the concerned contract.3 The discus-
sion on contractual liability will be omitted given that the subject of our interest 
is non-contractual liability, as stipulated under Article 340(2): 
2  This paper is partly based on a chapter of the book Postupci pred Sudom EU. See: Petrašević, T., Postupci 
pred sudom EU in Ljubanović, B. et al. Procesno-pravni aspekti prava EU, Faculty of Law in Osijek, 
Osijek, 2016. The research was complemented by the contribution of the co-author Mato Krmek, who 
was a representative in the case T-546/13 – Šumelj and Others v Commission.
3  For more on contractual liability of the EU see: Hartley, T.C, Foundation of EC Law, Pravni fakultet 
Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 2012. (version translated in Croatian), pp. 443-447, Petrašević, T., op.cit., note 2, 
p. 54 and Barents, R.; Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts (Bresese, Helen E., ed.), Walters 
Kluwer, 2012., pp. 324-325.
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In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the member states, make good any dam-
age caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
The above article should be read in conjunction with Article 268 TFEU:
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes 
relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second and third para-
graphs of Article 340.
Below we will analyse the two articles, but also the relevant case law of the CJEU 
to answer to the following questions: who has active legal standing (locus standi) 
to bring an action; who is the action brought against; within what time limit; 
what constitutes a claim; which court is the action brought before; what are the 
conditions of liability for damage, with particular focus on the legal concept of the 
so-called joint liability. We will also reflect on the interrelation of this action and 
actions for annulment and actions for failure to act.  
As regards active legal standing, an action may be brought by member states and 
natural and legal persons. It should be noted that the disputes between civil ser-
vants of the EU and the EU itself (i.e. its institutions), including the issue of com-
pensation for damage, are regulated under the separate Article 270 TFEU and are 
under first-instance jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal.4 Civil servants thus 
do not have active legal standing under Article 268 TFEU.5
Passive legal standing is that of the Union, i.e. of the institution that is ascribed 
with the conduct that caused the liability of the EU for damage. If a joint act is 
involved (e.g. of the Council of the EU and the Parliament), they are jointly (co-)
liable.6 Passive legal standing should be distinguished from the power (i.e. right) 
of representation of EU before the courts. As regards representation before EU 
courts, the Union is regularly represented by the Commission. If the damage was 
caused by the European Central Bank (ECB), pursuant to Article 340(3) TFEU, 
the action is then brought directly against the ECB and not the EU.7 Interestingly, 
4  The reform of the CJEU that foresees the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal is ongoing. See: Reg-
ulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2015 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2015] 
OJ L 341, pp. 14–17, par. 9.
5  Petrašević, op.cit.note 2, p. 54.
6  Ibid., p. 55.See also: Hartley, op.cit. note 3,  p. 451.
7  Art. 340(3) TFEU: ‘Notwithstanding the second paragraph, the European Central Bank shall, in accord-
ance with the general principles common to the laws of the member states, make good any damage caused by 
it or by its servants in the performance of their duties.’’
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the time limits for bringing actions are not defined under the Treaty itself, so that 
the relevant provision here is that of Article 46 to the Statute of the CJEU stating 
that the right of action expires after a period of five years from the occurrence of 
adverse events giving rise to such action.8
The action is brought against a respective institution of the EU for compensation 
of damages caused by unlawful conduct or failure to act. Thus, the damage may 
arise from unlawful conduct or failure to act. 
Article 256 TFEU implicitly provides that the competent court for actions of in-
dividuals (natural and legal persons) is the General Court, and for the actions of 
member states the Court of Justice.9
Whereas earlier prevalent understanding was that actions for damage compensa-
tion had to be based on a previously established violation that gave rise to an ac-
tion for annulment or for failure to act, the position adopted by the Court of Jus-
tice today is that it involves an independent action. Such action in fact represents 
a supplement to the mechanism of protection of the individual that allows him to 
bring such an action and have legal standing therefor even if he did not have legal 
standing for an action for annulment of an act of the EU or an action for failure 
to act.10 Of course, this leaves room for manipulation in the sense that individuals 
might bring such actions in cases where they could not prove active legal standing 
that gave rise to the action for annulment or action for failure to act, or when they 
failed to bring an action in the strict statutory period of two months. 
As regards the criteria (conditions) of liability, the Treaty (Article 340) refers to 
general principles of rights common to the legal systems of member states. This 
gave a considerable freedom to the CJEU to define the conditions of liability. 
According to settled case law for liability of the Union for damage, several cumu-
lative conditions are required. Primarily, the conduct of the institution must be 
illegal. Further, the damage to an individual must exist and there must be a causal 
link.11 Where one of the conditions is absent, the CJEU will not examine the 
8  Petrašević, T., op. cit. note 2, p. 54.. See also: Hartley,op.cit. note 3, p. 451.
9  See: Art. 256 TFEU. See: Petrašević, op.cit. note 2, p. 55.
10  See: Petrašević, op. cit. note 2, p. 54 and Meškić, Z., Samardžić, D., Pravo Evropske unije I, GIZ, Sara-
jevo, 2012, p. 444.
11  Regarding the criteria of liability see the following cases: Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC,26/81 
[1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:318, par. 16. and T-383/00 Beamglow v Parliament and Others [2005] 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:453, par. 95. See also a more recent case T-309/10 Christoph Klein v Commission 
[2011] ECLI:EU:T:2011:262(not yet published) and appeal C-120/14 P Klein v Commission [2014]
ECLI:EU:T:2014:19.
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remaining conditions.12 The CJEU is also not obliged to examine the existence of 
the conditions in a specific order.13
Of particular interest to us is the so-called concurrent liability or joint liability of 
the EU and one or more member states that exists where the EU had not taken 
adequate measures to prevent violation of the EU law by the national authorities 
of a member state. This thesis was developed by the CJEU in the case Lütticke.14 In 
this paper, we are most interested in cases of inadequate supervision of the Com-
mission over the proper application of the EU law at a national level.15
In terms of joint liability, it is important to note that it is not possible to bring a 
single/joint action against the EU and a member state before the same court, since 
the national court has jurisdiction over determining the liability of the state and 
the CJEU the liability of the EU. It is thus necessary to bring two separate actions. 
The position of the CJEU is that the applicant would first have to exhaust the legal 
remedies available in national law. This however does not exclude simultaneously 
bringing actions to the national court and the EU courts.16 In our particular case 
Šumelj and Others v Commission (T-546/13), the applicants used that very possi-
bility and brought an action for damages before the CJEU (concretely to General 
Court) and not the national judiciary, for the reason that they deemed the General 
Court would decide the case faster and – more importantly – be impartial therein. 
The only proceedings that the applicants initiated before national courts were 
those before the Constitutional Court in which they challenged the constitution-
ality of laws that terminated their service, but nothing related to compensation 
for damages.17
As regards the liability of the Union for damage, the key question is that of dis-
cretion enjoyed by the respective/liable institution. The CJEU has a different ap-
proach depending on whether the respective body did or did not have discretion 
in their actions. Where one institution had reduced discretion or none at all, 
the very violation of the EU law can suffice for determining the existence of a 
12  See case; C-146/91, KYDEP v Council and Commission[1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:329, par. 81 and 
T-170/00 Förde-Reederei v Council and Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:34, par. 37.
13  See case: C-257/98Lucaccioni v Commission [1999]ECLI:EU:C:1999:402 , par. 13.
14  See case: Joined cases 31/62 and 33/62Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lütticke 
GmbH v Commission of the EEC [1962] ECLI:EU:C:1962:49.
15  See: Kawczyńska, M., Concurrent Liability of the EU and member states, URL=http://eulaw.pl/data/
documents/M.-Kawczynska_CONCURRENT-LIABILITy-OF-THE-EUROPEAN-UNION.pdf. 
Accessed 1. Febraury 2017,
16  See: Barents, R., op. cit., note 3, pp. 334-335.
17  Please note that the public bailiffs (71 of them) were not unified and not all chose to bring an action 
to the General Court; those who did, did not have the same legal representative. 
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sufficiently flagrant violation.18 Where the body did have discretion, the decisive 
factor is whether the EU institution manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits 
of its discretion.19 It was precisely the first Croatian case before the CJEU (T-
546/13 Ante Šumelj and Others v European Commission) that raised the question 
of whether the Commission overstepped the limits of its powers. We will analyse 
the case in more detail below, but we would first like to point out that the CJEU 
in the case Kampffemeyer20 already commented on the discretion enjoyed by the 
Commission. Where a body has no discretion, the very failure to act or failure to 
fulfil obligations is sufficient to give rise to liability for damage. 
Key to determining liability of the Union, regardless of whether discretion was en-
joyed or not, is the existence of the criterion of “a sufficiently flagrant violation.”21
The fact that the Commission adopted a formal measure for approving a national 
measure or conduct contrary to EU law goes in favour of the individual/the in-
jured party. But, to avoid the injured party being insufficiently or excessively com-
pensated by the national court and the CJEU, the rule is that the CJEU will not 
decide on the application until the national court delivers its final decision of on 
the amount of damage. The position of the CJEU is to wait for the decision of 
the national court on compensation. Thus, in accordance with the decision of the 
CJEU in the case Kampffmeyer22, clearly the EU can be liable for damage (together 
with the member state) if it authorized a measure of national authorities that is 
contrary to EU law. We believe that this is analogous to the situation in the case 
Šumelj and Others v European Commission as analysed below. 
18  In case Schöppenstedt the CJEU developed the test for establishing non-conractual liability which uis 
further extended and explained in case Bergaderm. See: and C-352/98 P - Bergaderm and Goupil v 
Commission [2000]ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, par. 43 and 44.In Bergaderm, the Court of Justice equilized 
the conditions under which Union institutions incur liability with conditions for liability of Member 
States. See more in: Mlinarić, M., Sufficiently Serious Breach Requirement for Obtaining Reparation of 
Damages in Union Law, diploma paper, Pravni fakultet Zagreb, 2016, p. 14-16. More about flagrant 
violations/serious breach see: Craig, P., De Burca, G., EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth edi-
tion, Oxford, 2011., pp.561-563.
19  See case: C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:226 and T-28/03 - Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 
20  See case: Firma E. Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the EEC [2005]ECLI:EU:T:2005:139, 
Joined cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24-66 [1967] ECLI:EU:C:1967:31. 
21  Petrašević, op.cit., note 2, p. 56.
22 Op.cit., note 20.
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3.    ANALySES Of CASE T-546/13 - ŠUMELJ AND OTHERS V. 
COMMISSION
3.1.  background of the Case
With their action brought to the General Court on 20 October 2013, the ap-
plicants sought that the General Court deliver an order to the EU to cover dam-
age (material and non-material) to Mr. Šumelj and other applicants, which they 
suffered on the basis of non-contractual liability of the EU in accordance with 
Article 340(2) TFEU. They argued that the European Commission had breached 
its obligation to monitor the implementation of the Treaty concerning the acces-
sion of the Republic of Croatia to the EU under Article 36 of the Act of Accession 
(Annex VII, par. 1)regarding the introduction of the public bailiff service in the 
legal system of the Republic of Croatia.
The background of the case is as follows. As part of accession negotiations (Chap-
ter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), the Republic of Croatia undertook 
the obligation to reform its judiciary. To this end, in December 2010 the Croatian 
Parliament adopted the 2011-2015 Judicial Reform Strategy”.23 To improve the 
enforcement system, a new legislative framework had been adopted. A number 
of acts were passed, but the key is the Public Bailiffs Act24 that was passed in No-
vember 2010 and was expected to enter into force on 1 January 2012. The said 
Act provided for the transfer of enforcement powers from the courts to the public 
bailiffs. The applicants passed the public bailiff exam and the Minister of Justice 
appointed them to the function of public bailiffs. These bailiffs had legitimate ex-
pectations of commencing their new duties beginning of 2012. In the meantime, 
the Accession Treaty25 was signed on 9 December 2011. In its Article 36, the Act 
of Accession, which forms an integral part of the Treaty of Accession, provides 
for the monitoring by the Commission of the commitments undertaken by the 
Republic of Croatia during the accession negotiations, including the obligation 
to establish a public bailiff service and to establish all conditions necessary for the 
full implementation of that service. However, the exact opposite happened. On 
22 December 2011, the Croatian Parliament postponed the entry into force of the 
disputed Act until 1 July 2012 and then until 15 October 2012. Following this, 
on 15 October 2012 the Croatian Government proposed the Act Repealing the 
Public Bailiffs Act and abolished the public bailiff service. This decision was taken 
23  See: The Judicial Reform Strategy 2011-2015 (OG 145/10).  
24  See: Public Bailiffs Act (OG 139/10).
25  See: Treaty of Accession between the member states of the European Union and the Republic of Cro-
atia [2012] OJ L 112.
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without reasonable explanation and without proposals for compensation and by 
stating tacit approval of the Commission.
The position held by the applicants (and supported by the authors)is the fact that 
one of the conditions for closing “Chapter 23” was the introduction of public 
bailiffs in the legal system of the Republic of Croatia. 
Furthermore, another important fact is that in September 2012, Mr Šumelj (as 
the main applicant in this case) sent a letter to the Commission, in which he invit-
ed the Commission to take necessary measures to warn the Croatian Government 
of their failure to meet obligations under the Accession Treaty.26 Therefore, the 
Commission was called upon to act, but the letter did not produce an adequate 
response of the Commission. Given that the facts came into occurrence prior to 
formal accession, the Commission could not bring an action against the member 
state for violation of EU law before the CJEU, but we do hold that the Commis-
sion might and should have warned the Croatian Government of not fulfilling its 
obligations. 
The General Court accepted the action and two years later found that the Com-
mission (i.e. EU) was not liable for any damage.27 The applicants lodged an appeal, 
but on 1 February 2017 the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as unfounded.
We are truly surprised by the decision of the Court of Justice as we expected that 
the Court would examine the case in more detail than the General Court.28 Given 
that the Court of Justice only confirmed the findings of the General Court, we 
will analyse the decision of the General Court. But we consider it necessary to first 
state what is (and had been) happening before the national courts. 
3.2.  Proceedings before National Courts 
After the Public Bailiffs Act was repealed, Ante Šumelj applied for constitutional 
review of several acts: the Enforcement Act, the Act Repealing the Public Bailiffs 
Act and the Act Repealing the Public Bailiff Fees Act. By its ruling of 23 April 
2012, the Constitutional Court dismissed the application for constitutional re-
view, but acknowledged the violation of legitimate expectations of 71 persons 
appointed public bailiffs by the Minister of Justice under the Public Bailiffs Act, as 
26  Letter is mentioned in par. 20 of the judgment in case Šumelj, infra n. 27.
27  Judgment of the General Court of 26 February 2016. Please note that the General Court joined cas-
es T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14 and issued a joint decision.
28  See: Order of 1st February 2017, C-239/16 P Šumelj and Others v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C: 
2017:91.
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well as their right to redress in a lump sum net amount of 18,000.00 HRK.29 The 
said amount is certainly disproportionate to the damage they suffered. However, 
the Constitutional Court said that “the redress does not affect the general right of each 
person appointed public bailiff to seek in court proceedings damages incurred pursuant 
to the general rules of the law on obligations. The redress shall not be included in the 
calculation of that possible court indemnity.”30
Importantly, the Constitutional Court further stated that this was a case of viola-
tion of the acquis.31
As a result, public bailiffs brought individual applications for damages incurred to 
national courts. These proceedings are pending. To our knowledge, thus far only 
one court requested data for the purposes of a financial expertise by the Ministry 
of Justice. There is however an interim judgment of the court in Varaždin that 
established liability of the Republic of Croatia for damage, but did not decide on 
amount of damages.32 Presumably, the national court waited for the decision of 
the Luxembourg courts. 
In the particular case ‘’Šumelj’’, the applicants decided to bring the action for 
damages to the General Court first. 
3.3.  Commentary on the Decision of the General Court 
Below we will give a critical review of the decision of the General Court and point 
out discrepancies and contradictions. 
First, the General Court claimed that it did not find any provisions in EU law 
establishing liability of the Commission: “The applicants have therefore failed 
to establish that the Commission had caused them to have a legitimate expectation 
and had thus, by its failure to act, breached the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations.”33 The General Court further concluded that there was no wrongful 
29  Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-I-5612/2011 and others of 23 
January 2013.
30 Ibid., part III.
31 Ibid., par. 22. 
32  An action brought by Marko Lapaine, claiming damages of 1.6 mil HRK from the state. In addition to 
damages, Lapaine is claiming annuity until his retirement on the grounds of loss of expected profit. In 
anticipation of commencement of his public bailiff duties, Lapaine deregistered from the Bar Associa-
tion, but has not been allowed re-admission to the Association to this day. The proceedings are pending 
before the Supreme Court and the authors are not familiar with the status thereof. See: URL=http://
www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/javni-ovrsitelj-dobio-tuzbu-drzavu-cekaju-milijunske-odstete-923880. Ac-
cessed 1 March 2017. 
33 Ibid., par. 77.
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omission by the Commission as one of the three conditions of liability for dam-
age.34 Consequently, there is no liability of the EU for damage.35
We agree that the Commission did not directly create any legitimate expectations 
for applicants, but the Croatian Government, i.e. the Croatian Parliament did by 
adopting the Public Bailiffs Act. The violation was undoubtedly committed by the 
Croatian Government, but the Commission turned a blind eye to this omission. 
The question is: why? Had there really been a tacit agreement between the Gov-
ernment and the Commission? 
In our view, this case is a classic example of joint liability of the EU and a member 
state. Firstly, the Croatian Government undoubtedly committed a violation and 
the Commission approved it. The joint liability of the Commission is twofold. On 
the one hand, the Commission did not take adequate steps to prevent a breach 
of EU law by national authorities. In this regard, the breach was constituted by 
tacit consent of the Commission.36 On the other hand, the Commission adopted 
a more formal measure – the Final report, thereby approving the illegal national 
action. It is thus clear that the Commission legitimized the unlawful conduct of 
the Croatian Government both by failing to take adequate action as well as by is-
suing a positive report on the fulfilment of all obligations in negotiations, which 
was the basis for signing the Treaty of Accession..   
Secondly, not only did the General Court not acknowledge the legitimate expecta-
tions of the public bailiffs and establish liability of the Commission for damage, 
but it also aggravated their legal position in the proceedings before the national 
courts. We will explain our viewpoint. As previously, mentioned,(parallel) pro-
ceedings for damages are pending before national courts. In its decision, the Con-
stitutional Court concluded that there had been a violation of legitimate expecta-
tions under the acquis, or in other words – that a violation of the rights under EU 
law existed. In par. 51, the General Court states the following: “Commitment 1 
therefore does not give rise to any obligation for the Croatian authorities to establish the 
office of Public Bailiff.”37 The General Court thus very clearly concludes that there 
34  See par. 77: ‘’It follows from all of the foregoing that the Commission cannot be criticised for any wrongful 
omission.’’
35  See par. 78:  ‘’It follows that one of the three cumulative conditions of EU liability is not satisfied and that 
the present actions must therefore be dismissed, without there being any need to examine the other conditions 
that must be satisfied in order for such liability to be incurred.’’
36  As already noted, the fact that the Commission could not initiate proceedings due to a violation of EU 
law goes in its favour.
37  Under Annex VII to the Act of Accession, entitled ‘Specific commitments undertaken by the Republic 
of Croatia’ in the accession negotiations (referred to in Article 36(1), second subparagraph, of the Act 
of Accession)’’, Commitment I provides: “To continue to ensure effective implementation of its Judicial 
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has been no violation by the national authorities. The Croatian Government could 
use this as defence in the proceedings before the national court and claim that the 
General Court itself concluded that there had been no violation (as confirmed by 
the Court of Justice on appeal). In our opinion, the General Court overstepped 
the limits of its jurisdiction, because it was asked to determine whether the EU 
had been obliged to compensate damage, and not to decide on the liability of the 
member state, which it would be authorized to do only in the context of an action 
under Article 258 TFEU (the so-called infringement procedure). 
Thirdly, in the pending national proceedings, the competent court could refer a 
preliminary question on interpretation of relevant provisions of the Act of Acces-
sion.38 This begs the question: in confirming the decision of the General Court by 
dismissing the application, had the Court of Justice pre judged its decision on the 
preliminary question?
Fourthly, a particularly controversial issue in the case was whether the Commis-
sion had discretionary power to “interfere with” the contractual provisions of the 
Act of Accession(to authorize reinstating of agreed special obligations to the ju-
dicial enforcement system) and what degree of discretion it enjoyed. If the Com-
mission did have the said discretionary power (which does not follow from any of 
the provisions of the Accession Treaty or any of the provisions of EU law), was it 
obliged to take into account the EU values and violation of a higher principle of 
law (legal certainty, legitimate expectations), its obligations under the Accession 
Treaty, the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 2, 13 
and 17 TEU? 
In our view, the Commission as the “guardian of the Treaty” should have and was 
allowed to act only within the limits of the powers as conferred to it under the 
Treaties, to enjoy the discretion only in negotiations (which ceased upon conclu-
sion of the Accession Treaty). But even if the Commission (contrary to Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention) did have the discretion to negotiate with Croatia 
amendments to the Accession Treaty (as concluded with member states of the 
EU), the liability for damage caused to the public bailiffs would still exist given 
the “sufficiently grave violation of higher principles of law for the protection of 
individuals.”
Reform Strategy and Action Plan.” See par. 2 of judgment in Joined cases Šumelj and Others v Commis-
sion T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14, op.cit. note 26.
38  We found this possible because in its nature the Act of Accession is an international treaty and Court 
of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret international treaties in the course of preliminary ruling proce-
dure.For more about preliminary ruling procedure in general see: Petrašević T., Prethodni postupak pred 
Sudom EU, Pravni fakultet u Osijeku, Gradska tiskara d.d., Osijek, 2014.
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Fifthly, it remains unclear why the CJEU (both General court and Court of Jus-
tice) gave perfunctory or no answers to one of the most important questions. 
Namely, Article 36 to the Act of Accession as an integral part of the Treaty of Ac-
cession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union indisputably provides 
for obligation of the Commission to monitor all commitments undertaken by 
Croatia in the accession negotiations, including those which must be achieved 
before or by the date of accession and to focus such monitoring in particular on 
commitments undertaken by Croatia in the area of the judiciary and fundamental 
rights (Annex VII). As an integral part of its regular monitoring and report tables 
preceding the accession of Croatia, the Commission issued six-month assessments 
of the commitments undertaken by Croatia in these areas. In the proceedings 
before the General Court, the Commission did not present any serious/valid rea-
sons to Croatia that would underlie the Commission’s approval to change the 
agreed special commitments (a legal concept of extrajudicial enforcement that 
was not given the opportunity to prove its effectiveness) by introducing a judicial 
enforcement system, seeing as how the introduction of public bailiffs was one of 
the reasons for closing Chapter 23, whereon the Commission insisted and which 
it financed within the IPA 2010 “Improvement of the Enforcement system in the 
Republic of Croatia.” Thus, the key and manifest violation of contractual obliga-
tions was by no means explained, much less sanctioned by the CJEU.
We will point at the contradictions in the decision of the General Court below. 
In par. 57 of its decision, the view of the General Court is as follows: ‘’It therefore 
does not follow from any of the commitments in Annex VII to the Act of Accession 
on which the applicants rely that the Republic of Croatia was under an obligation to 
establish the profession of public bailiff, or that the Commission was under any obliga-
tion to have recourse, on that basis, to the means of action provided for in Article 36 of 
the Act of Accession in order to prevent the repeal of the Public Bailiffs Act.’’ 
yet in par. 52, the General Court (directly contrary to the views of par. 47 to 51 
and par. 57) concludes: ‘’It cannot be inferred, however, that the Croatian authori-
ties, including those in place as a result of a new political majority, as was the case of 
the authorities who postponed and then repealed the Public Bailiffs Act, had unlimited 
discretion to amend the Judicial Reform Strategy 2011-2015 and the 2010 Action 
Plan. In view of the provisions of the Act of Accession, in particular Article 36 and 
Annex VII, those authorities were required to comply not only with commitment 1 but 
also with all the other commitments referred to in that annex, including commitments 
2, 3, 6 and 9, on which the applicants rely.’’
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES268
Thus, par. 57 reads as the Croatian Government not having had an obligation 
to establish the profession of public bailiff, whereas in par. 52 the General Court 
states that the very same authorities did not have discretion to change the “Strat-
egy” and that they were obliged to comply with their commitments, primarily 
Commitment I. It is unclear to us what the General Court implied by that. The 
vagueness of the decisions of the CJEU in general has already been pointed out by 
some authors such as Hartely.39
Moreover, in par. 47 to 51 of its decision, the General Court – contrary to fun-
damental principles of law in our view – states that Commitment 40 is not aimed 
at a specific judicial reform strategy and action plan that were in force at the time 
of conclusion of negotiations up to abolishing of the act governing the public 
bailiff service. This was explained by the fact that the Commission identified in 
several later documents a different judicial reform strategy and action plan that no 
longer provided for public bailiffs. The General Court thus did not acknowledge 
the fact that the applicants were appointed as public bailiffs at the time of closing 
of Chapter 23, i.e. upon adoption of the Judiciary Reform, part of which were 
the public bailiffs. We gather that, precisely by conclusion of negotiations and 
the Treaty of Accession of Croatia to the EU; bearing in mind Article 26 to the 
Vienna Convention,41 the applicants did have legitimate expectations in terms of 
the commencement of their chosen profession. 
Lastly, the General Court in par. 55 states that the applicants do not indicate any 
specific violation other than breach of the principle of protection of legitimate ex-
pectations, even though they did refer to the principle of non-discrimination, the 
violation of the right to labour and invoked legal security throughout the entire 
proceedings. 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the facts of the case Šumelj and Others v the Commission as presented 
herein, it must have seemed more than logical to bring two actions – one before 
the national court against the Republic of Croatia and one before the General 
Court against the Commission (i.e. the EU). Albeit the applicants did not explic-
itly indicate joint liability in their application, it can be inferred indirectly. What 
39  See:Hartley, T.C, op.cit. note 3, p. 58. For more details on the reasoning of the decisions of the CJEU, 
see: Beck, G., The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2012.
40  Op. cit. note 26.
41  Article 26 refers to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
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the General Court could have done is stay the proceedings pending the decision 
of the national court, but instead it examined the merits. 
The applicants based the action for damages on the provisions of Article 340(2) 
TFEU from which it clearly follows that in terms of non-contractual liability, the 
Union is obliged, in accordance with general principles of rights common to the 
legal systems of member states, to make good any damage caused by its institu-
tions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. Thus, bearing in mind 
the previously cited provision, it emerges unequivocally that the EU, and not the 
member states, is liable for any damage caused by its institutions, i.e. that no dis-
tinction is made between damage caused to nationals of a member state of the EU 
and damage caused to nationals of a non-EU country. The above finding is logical 
when keeping in mind that the EU respects and promotes legal values; it would 
therefore be inconceivable for the EU to discriminate against persons based on the 
principle of holding a nationality of a member state of the European Union, i.e. 
for the liability for damage to be borne only toward nationals of member states 
of the EU. It is the very sense of the provision of Article 340(2) TFEU that the 
EU bear any damage in terms of non-contractual liability, and toward all, without 
exception, whom the damage was caused to as a result of unlawful or wrongful 
conduct of its body (in this particular case the Commission), provided that it 
meets the remaining conditions of liability for damage.
There was a founded concern that the General Court might dismiss the applica-
tion rationae temporis, and such decision would find a foothold in the case law. 
Such was the position of the General Court in the case Ynos.42 It involved a pre-
liminary question of a Hungarian court that was rejected by the CJEU because the 
case was out of scope rationae temporis. The CJEU gave a very brief decision stat-
ing inadmissibility because the facts of the case in the main proceedings preceded 
Hungary’s accession to the EU.43 In view of the above, the General Court did the 
right thing and granted the application. 
Our conclusion is that the “breach” was constituted by the Croatian Government 
by abolishing the institution of public bailiffs and that the Commission legiti-
mized this by not taking adequate measures and by issuing a positive report on the 
42  See case: C-302/04Ynos kft v János Varga [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:9.
43  Petrašević, T., Implementation of Preliminary Ruling Procedure in the legal systems of New member states 
and experiences for future member states as Croatia, in  Cross-border and EU legal issues: Hungary - 
Croatia / Drinoczi, T., Takacs, T. (eds.) Osijek-Pecs: Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University; 
Pecs: Faculty of Law, University of Pecs, 2011, p. 558. For detailed analysis of case and critique on the 
CJEU see: Horvàthy, B., After the First Lessons and Experiences – Cases Concerning Hungary before ECJ 
(2004-2007), 49 Acta Juridica Hungarica, No. 1, 2008, p. 93.
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fulfilment of all obligations, based on which the Republic of Croatia signed the 
Association Agreement. Their joint liability undoubtedly exists.
We believe that the decisions of the General Court and the Court of Justice (on 
appeal) do not contribute to strengthening of the protection of the rights of the in-
dividual, but rather the opposite. Croatian citizens had greater expectations from 
the accession to the EU. They expected more “justice” and a stronger discipline 
of the “country.” The CJEU not only did not award damage compensation, but 
also potentially aggravated their legal position in the proceedings before national 
courts, for the reasons explained above. But after the negative decisions of the Eu-
ropean courts it only remains to wait for decision of national court(s). 
REfERENCES:
bOOKS AND ARTICLES:
1.   Barents, René; Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts (Bresese, Helen E., ed.), Walters 
Kluwer, 2016.
2.   Beck, G., The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
2012.
3.   Craig, P., De Burca, G., EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth edition, Oxford, 2011.
4.   Ćapeta T., Rodin S., Osnove prava Europske unije, Narodne novine, Zagreb 2010.
5.   Ćapeta, T., Sudska zaštita u Europskoj uniji nakon Lisabonskog ugovora, u Ćapeta et.al. Reforma 
Europske unije – Lisabonski ugovor, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2009.
6.   De Visser, M., The concept of concurrent liability and its relationship with the principle of ef-
fectiveness a one-way ticket into oblivion, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 2004.
7.   Hartley, T.C, Foundation of EC Law, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 2012. (version trans-
lated in Croatian)
8.   Oliver, P., Joint Liability of the Community and the Member State, in: Heukels/McDonnell 
(eds.), The Action for Damages in Community Law, The Hague, 1997.
9.   Petrašević T., Prethodni postupak pred Sudom EU, Pravni fakultet u Osijeku, Gradska tiskara 
d.d., Osijek,  2014.
10.   Petrašević, T., Implementation of Preliminary Ruling Procedure in the legal systems of New mem-
ber states and experiences for future member states as Croatia, in  Cross-border and EU legal 
issues: Hungary - Croatia / Drinoczi, T., Takacs, T. (eds.) Osijek-Pecs: Faculty of Law, Josip 
Juraj Strossmayer University; Pecs: Faculty of Law, University of Pecs, 2011.
11.   Petrašević, T., ‘’Postupci pred sudom EU’’ in Ljubanović, B. et al. Procesno-pravni aspekti 
prava EU, Faculty of Law in Osijek, Osijek, 2016
Tunjica Petrašević, Mato Krmek: THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE EU ... 271
COURT Of JUSTICE Of THE EU
1.   Case T-546/13 Šumelj and Others v Commission [2016] ECLI:EU:T:2016:107
2.   Case 26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC [1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:318, 
3.   Case T-383/00 Beamglow v Parliament and Others [2005] ECLI:EU:T:2005:453, 
4.   Case C-120/14, P Klein v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:19.
5.   Case C-146/91 KyDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:329 
6.   Case T-170/00 Förde-Reederei v Council and Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:34, 
7.   Case C-257/98 Lucaccioni v Commission [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:402
8.   Joined cases 31/62 and 33/62, Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lüt-
ticke GmbH v Commission of the EEC [1962] ECLI:EU:C:1962:49.
9.   Case C-352/98 P - Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, 
10.   Joined cases T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14 Šumelj and Others v Commission [2016]
ECLI:EU:T:2016:107 and C-239/16 P Ante Šumelj and Others v European Commission 
[2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:91
11.   Case C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities 
[2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:226 
12.   Case T-28/03 - Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission [2005]ECLI:EU:T:2005:139
13.   Case C-302/04, ynos kft v János Varga [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:9
14.   Case T-309/10, Christoph Klein v Commission [2006] ECLI:EU:T:2011:262 (not yet pub-
lished) 
15.   Case C-239/16 P Šumelj and Others v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:91
16.   Joined cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24-66, Firma E. Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the 
EEC [2005,1967] ECLI:EU:T:2005:139, ECLI:EU:C:1967:31.
LIST Of NACIONAL REGULATION AND JUDGMENTS
1.   The Judicial Reform Strategy 2011-2015, OG 145/10 
2.   Public Bailiffs Act, OG 139/10
3.   Law on enforcement, OG 139/10
4.   Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no. U-I-5612/2011 and others 
of 23 January 2013.
WEbSITE REfERENCES
1.  Sahlstrand, J., The Non-Contractual Liability of the EC,
     URL=http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1561678&fileO
Id=1565714. Accessed 1February 2017.
2.   Kawczyńska, M., Concurrent Liability of the European Union and the Member States, 
URL=http://eulaw.pl/data/documents/M.-Kawczynska_CONCURRENT-LIABILITy-OF-
THE-EUROPEAN-UNION.pdf. Accessed1 Febraury 2017.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES272
3.   Mlinarić, M., Sufficiently Serious Breach Requirement for Obtaining Reparation of Damages in 
Union Law, diploma paper, Pravni fakultet Zagreb, 2016.
      URL=https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Sufficiently_serious_breach.pdf.
Accesed5 February 2017.
Topic 4
EU individual and  
institutional procedures

Adrijana Martinović: APPLYING THE BURDEN OF PROOF RULES IN GENDER ... 275
Adrijana Martinović, PhD, Assistant Professor
Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka
Hahlić 6, HR-51000 Rijeka
adrijana@pravri.hr
APPLyING THE bURDEN Of PROOf  
RULES IN GENDER DISCRIMINATION CASES:  
THE CROATIAN EXPERIENCE
ABSTRACT
All EU anti-discrimination directives contain basically identical provision on the burden 
of proof in anti-discrimination cases: Member States are to take the necessary measures, in 
accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider 
themselves wronged because of the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them 
establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimi-
nation, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle 
of equal treatment. The wording of the two main anti-discrimination laws in Croatia, the 
Anti-Discrimination Act and the Gender Equality Act, on the burden of proof slightly differs, 
which may lead to inconsistent interpretation. The aim of this article is to explore the current 
Croatian gender discrimination case law concerning the application of the burden of proof 
rules and to investigate whether the required standard has been correctly applied in practice, as 
well as whether further legislative amendments are needed.
Keywords: burden of proof, EU anti-discrimination law, gender equality, Anti-Discrimina-
tion Act, Gender Equality Act
1.  INTRODUCTION
In the Croatian civil procedure law, it seems that the burden of proof rules are 
marginalized. In general, each party is obliged to provide facts and present evi-
dence on which his or her claim is based or to refute the statements and evidence 
of his or her opponent.1In other words, to win the case, claimant will have to pro-
vide enough evidence to prove his/her claim. To repudiate the claim, respondent 
will have to provide enough evidence to the contrary. The court shall decide, at 
its discretion, which facts it will find proved, after conscientious and careful as-
1  Article 219(1) Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku), Official Gazette No. 53/91, 91/92, 
58/93, 112/99, 88/01, 117/03, 88/05, 02/07, 84/08, 123/08, 57/11, 148/11, 25/13, 89/14. This ob-
ligation falls upon both parties, and includes the duty to present facts on which their request is based 
(onus proferendi), as well as the duty to present evidence substantiating those facts (onus probandi). See 
Triva, S.; Dika, M., Građansko parnično procesno pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2014, p. 498.  
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sessment of all the evidence presented individually and as a whole and taking into 
consideration the results of the entire proceedings.2
That is why the obligation to provide facts and present evidence is considered 
not as an obligation towards the court or the opposing party, but as a specific 
obligation towards oneself – an obligation which enables the party to succeed in 
litigation.3
Lawyers tend to intuitively recognize the burden of proof rules as the rules de-
termining which party has to prove what facts in order to succeed in litigation 
(‘subjective burden of proof ’).4But the burden of proof rules may also refer to 
the method the court is obliged to follow in order to prevail the situation of un-
certainty about the facts (‘objective burden of proof ’).5The latter understanding 
seems to prevail in the Croatian civil procedure law.
The main provision regarding the burden of proof in the Civil Procedure Act is 
contained in its Article 221.a:6if the court cannot establish a fact with certainty on 
the basis of the evidence proposed, it shall rule on the existence of the fact apply-
ing the burden of proof rule. Specific burden of proof provisions are to be found in 
legislation governing certain fields of law.7In order to resort to the burden of proof 
rules and reach a conclusion on the existence of certain facts, two requirements 
have to be met: 1. all evidence has been presented; and 2. based on the evidence 
presented, the court cannot establish a decisive fact with certainty.8In other words, 
this provision becomes applicable and relevant only at the end of evidentiary pro-
ceedings, as an instrument to overcome uncertainty about relevant facts. Accord-
ing to Dika, the standard of ‘certainty’ as to the existence of a fact means that 
there is no reasonable doubt in the regularity of the court’s conclusion about its 
2  Article 8 Civil Procedure Act.
3  Triva, Dika, op. cit. note 1, p. 498.
4  Uzelac, A., Teret dokazivanja, doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 
1998, p. 70.
5 Ibid, p. 69; Triva, Dika, op. cit. note 1, p. 499.
6  Article 221.a was inserted into the Civil Procedure Act of 1976 in 1990 (Službeni list SFRJ No. 27/90 
of 16 May 1990). See more on the reasons for introducing this provision in Uzelac, op. cit. note 4, p. 
278 -279. The purpose of this provision is basically to instruct the judge how to proceed when he/
she is not certain as to the existence of a decisive fact, taking into account all evidence presented and 
the margin of appreciation in the decision-making process. The allegation of the party which is not 
substantiated with sufficient evidence cannot be taken as true. It is based on the maxim idem est non 
esse aut non probari (not to be proved and not to exist is the same). Triva, Dika, op. cit. note 1, p. 499. 
This boils down to the objective understanding of the burden of proof rules. 
7  For example, Article 135 Labour Act (Zakon o radu; Official Gazette No. 93/14) regulates the burden 
of proof in labour disputes. 
8  Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Rev-1276/2007, Judgement of 4 June 2008.
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(non)existence.9 The standard of ‘probability’, on the other hand, requires a lower 
degree of the court’s conviction and is therefore an exception for rendering a deci-
sion on the merits.10 This consideration is particularly important when assessing 
the burden of proof rules (and consequently, the shifting of the burden of proof ) 
in anti-discrimination cases. 
2.   SHIfTING THE bURDEN Of PROOf: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
CASES
Without going further into the theoretical considerations regarding the burden of 
proof,11 it is safe to say that the Croatian courts are not normally (too) (pre)occu-
pied with the role and significance of the burden of proof rules. However, when it 
comes to anti-discrimination law, the burden of proof rules play a pivotal role and 
have to be adequately applied from the outset of the proceedings. Croatian anti-
discrimination legislation is based on and implements the EU anti-discrimination 
law.12 All of the main equal treatment directives contain a standard clause on bur-
den of proof in anti-discrimination cases.13 Member States have to take adequate 
9  Dika, M., Sudska zaštita u diskriminacijskim stvarima, in Crnić, I. et al.(eds.), Primjena anti-diskrimi-
nacijskog prava u praksi, Centar za mirovne studije, Zagreb, 2011, pp. 69-95, p. 84.
10 Ibid, p. 84.
11  Primarily concerning the legal nature and different theoretical conceptions of the burden of proof in 
continental and Anglo-Saxon legal theory, as well as differentiation of burden of proof as the burden 
of persuasion or burden of production of evidence, among other. For the most comprehensive and in-
depth account of the burden of proof rules in the Croatian legal theory in comparative perspective see 
Uzelac, op. cit. note 4. See also Triva, Dika, op. cit. note 1, pp. 498-501.
12  Primarily Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation (recast), [2006] OJ L 204/23 (Gender ‘Recast’ Directive), 
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment be-
tween persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L 180/22 (Race Directive), Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L 303/16 (Framework Directive) and Council Directive 
2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services, [2004] OJ L 373/37 (Goods and Services 
Directive). For the sake of simplicity, this paper will refer to all four directives collectively as “EU an-
ti-discrimination directives”, without prejudice to other directives and instruments forming the corpus 
of EU anti-discrimination law. 
13  The standard clause reads as follows: “Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in 
accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves 
wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a 
court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct 
or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the 
principle of equal treatment.” See Article 19(1) of the Gender ‘Recast’ Directive, Article 10(1) of the 
Race Directive; Article 9(1) of the Goods and Services Directive and Article 10(1) of the Framework 
Directive.
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measures to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because 
the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a 
court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there 
has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove 
that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. In other words, 
the burden of proof in discrimination cases is shifted, but not completely reversed. 
The claimant is still required to establish the facts from which it may be presumed 
that direct or indirect discrimination occurred. Theoretically, this shift is justified 
by the need to assist the persons claiming to be the victims of discrimination in 
court proceedings.14 After all, to use the words of Advocate General Mengozzi, 
“discrimination has the reputation of being particularly hard to substantiate”.15
From the wording of the burden of proof clause in EU anti-discrimination direc-
tives, it is evident that only a prima facie evidence of discrimination is needed to 
shift the burden to the opposing party. Prima facie evidence (known as Anscheins-
beweis in German legal theory) is a legal standard which has not been known or 
applied in the Croatian legal theory and practice.16 Uzelac identifies prima facie evi-
dence in the German legal theory as a concept adjacent to the burden of proof, but 
excluded from its field by the dominant theory, because it does not require a non 
liquetsituation.17To put it more simply, prima facie evidence is oriented towards the 
standard of probability. Its function is precisely to avoid non liquet situations,18i.e. 
to allow the judge to draw conclusions from the facts which are taken as probable, 
based on experience. On the other hand, the burden of proof in its objective under-
standing cannot be triggered without the non liquet situation. Prima facie evidence 
involves the creation of a preliminary standpoint on the existence of discrimination, 
based on typical developments, which, according to the rules of experience, refer to 
a causal connection with the discriminatory behaviour or liability for such behav-
iour.19 The facts will therefore have to show, objectively and in line with the typical 
life experience, predominant probability that less favourable treatment occurred 
14  See e.g. Ellis, E.; Watson, P., EU Anti-Discrimination Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012, p. 157; Potočnjak, Ž.; Grgurev, I.; Grgić, A., Dokazivanje prima facie diskriminacije, in: Uzelac, 
A.; Garašić, J.; Maganić, A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Mihajlo Dika, Pravni fakultet u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 
2013, pp. 323-347. 
15  Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier 
Systems GmbH [2012] EU:C:2012:8, par. 1.
16  Dika, op. cit. note 9, pp. 85-86.
17  Uzelac, op. cit. note 4, p. 59. Non liquet refers to a situation in which a judge cannot establish a certain-
ty of a fact even after presentation of all the evidence.  
18  Uzelac, op. cit. note 4, p. 60.
19  Dika, op. cit. note 9, p. 86.
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because of discrimination.20By lowering the required standard for presentation of 
evidence, the task of the party bearing the (initial) burden of proof is facilitated.21
Let us transfer these theoretical considerations to the practice and reality of anti-
discrimination case-law. 
3.  EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CASE-LAW
The Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter: CJEU or the Court) has interpreted 
the burden of proof clause in EU anti-discrimination directives basically in line 
with the theory of prima facie evidence.22This is evident even from the early case-
law which precedes the explicit introduction of the burden of proof clause in the 
EU anti-discrimination legislation.23 In case Danfoss,24where the claim was about 
gender pay discrimination, the initial burden of proof was on claimants to prove 
20  Similarly recent German jurisprudence, see e.g. BAG, Judgement of 17 August 2010, 9 AZR 839/08; 
BAG, Judgement of 17 December 2009, 8 AZR 670/08: “Dies ist der Fall, wenn die vorgetragenen 
Tatsachen aus objektiver Sicht nach allgemeiner Lebenserfahrung mit überwiegender Wahrscheinlich-
keit darauf schließen lassen, dass die Benachteiligung wegen der Behinderung erfolgte.” It is not about 
whether a certain allegation is ‘true’, but whether it is ‘suspected true’. 
21  Dika, op. cit. note 9, p. 86.
22  Accordingly, all EU anti-discrimination directives refer to prima facie evidence as a prerequisite for 
shifting the burden of proof in their recitals. Compare e.g. Gender ‘Recast’ Directive, Preamble, Recit-
al 30: “The adoption of rules on the burden of proof plays a significant role in ensuring that the prin-
ciple of equal treatment can be effectively enforced. As the Court of Justice has held, provision should 
therefore be made to ensure that the burden of proof shifts to the respondent when there is prima facie 
case of discrimination…” It is interesting to note, however, that the official Croatian translations of 
the four EU anti-discrimination directives, contain four very different translations of the same part of 
the sentence “…when there is prima facie evidence…” used in the recitals. For example, in the Race 
Directive (OJ Special Edition in Croatian, Chapter 20 Volume 001, p. 19 – 23) the Croatian transla-
tion is “…u slučaju pretpostavke postojanja diskriminacije…”, in the Goods and Services Directive (OJ 
Special Edition in Croatian, Chapter 05 Volume 001 p. 101-107), the Croatian translation is “…ako 
se radi o očitom slučaju diskriminacije…“, in the Framework Directive (OJ Special Edition in Croatian, 
Chapter 05 Volume 001, p. 69 – 75) it reads „…kod očite diskriminacije…“ and in the Gender Recast 
Directive (OJ Special Edition in Croatian, Chapter 05 Volume 001, p. 246-259) „…u slučajevima gdje 
postoji pretpostavka diskriminacije…“. One does not have to be a language purist to note this striking 
inconsistency, which is not just completely unnecessary and frustrating, but can also lead to false con-
clusions. This is especially true for the translation of prima facie case evidence as “očita diskriminacija” 
(Eng. ‘obvious discrimination’), because it may lead to conclusion that only direct discrimination is 
caught by the burden of proof rules.    
23  The first directive specifically dedicated to the burden of proof was the Council Directive 97/80/EC of 
15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, [1998] OJ L 14/6. 
This Directive was repealed with effect from 15 August 2009 by virtue of Directive 2006/54 (Gender 
‘Recast’ Directive), but the identical wording of its provision on the burden of proof (Article 4(1) 
Directive 97/80) is kept in all EU anti-discrimination directives in force. 
24  Case C-109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 
acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] EU:C:1989:383.
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that a relatively large proportion of women received lower remuneration than 
men. ‘Thanks’ to a complete lack of transparency of the pay system, claimants 
were unable to prove their assertion with certainty, but this was enough for the 
court to conclude that the burden of proof has shifted to employer/respondent 
to show that there was no discrimination.25In Enderby,26 claimants established a 
prima facie case by showing that speech therapists, predominantly female, were 
paid less by the British NHS system (National Health Service) than pharmacists, 
a predominately male profession. This relatively clear occupational segregation 
along gender lines allowed the burden of proof to be shifted to the respondent.27 
On the other hand, in a line of cases concerning a pay disparity between part-time 
and full-time employees, the court held that there is no prima facie case, unless 
it is first established that there is different treatment for part-time and full-time 
employees, and that this difference affects considerably workers of one sex only.28
Other cases pre-dating the explicit burden of proof clauses in the EU anti-discrimi-
nation directives concerned primarily equal pay cases, but the principles established 
therein were later extended to all other aspects of sex discrimination.29Therefore, 
the burden of proof clause was formulated and established in accordance with the 
principles developed in case-law. The rationale behind the Court’s interpretation 
is found in the principle of effectiveness: the need to guarantee the alleged victims 
of discrimination effective means of enforcing the principle of equal treatment 
before the national courts. 
Subsequent case-law offers further important guidelines for the interpretation 
of the burden of proof rules. An important segment of the judgement in case 
Brunnhofer30 is devoted to the interpretation of the burden of proof. The Court 
25  “In those circumstances, […] the Equal Pay Directive must be interpreted as meaning that where an 
undertaking applies a system of pay which is totally lacking in transparency, it is for the employer to 
prove that this practice in the matter of wages is not discriminatory, if a female worker establishes, in 
relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay for women is less than for men.” 
Danfoss, par. 16.
26  Case C-127/92 Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health 
[1993] EU:C:1993:859.
27  “[…] at least where two jobs in question are of equal value and the statistics describing that situation 
are valid”. Enderby, para. 16.  
28  See, e.g. Joined Cases C-399/92, 409/92, 34/93, 50/93 and 78/93 Stadt Lengerich v Angelika Helmig 
and others [1994] EU:C:1994:415, par. 23; Case C-297/93, Rita Grau-Hupka v Stadtgemeinde Bremen 
[1994] EU:C:1994:406; see also, Ellis, Watson, op. cit. note 14, pp. 160-161. 
29  Ibid, p. 161; see also Joined Cases C-63/91 and 64/91  Sonia Jackson and Patricia Cresswell v Chief Ad-
judication Officer [1992] EU:C:1992:329; and Case C-189/91 Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal 
[1993] EU:C:1993:907.
30  Case C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] EU:C:2001:358; 
par. 51-62.
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highlights the importance of providing prima facie evidence on ‘comparability’ of 
work performed by a female and male worker: “If the plaintiff in the main pro-
ceedings adduced evidence to show that the criteria for establishing the existence 
of a difference in pay between a woman and a man and for identifying comparable 
work are satisfied in this case, a prima facie case of discrimination would exist and 
it would then be for the employer to prove that there was no breach of the prin-
ciple of equal pay.”31Comparability is therefore an important issue in equal pay 
cases. However, where a job classification system exists and the length of service 
criterion is applied, employer does not have to justify recourse to that criterion, 
because it is considered to be appropriate to attain the legitimate objective of re-
warding experience of the worker.32 Therefore, it is the worker who will have to 
provide evidence capable of raising serious doubts in that regard – length of service 
criterion cannot serve as prima facie evidence of discrimination.       
In more recent cases Meister33 and Kelly,34 the Court addressed the difficult issue 
of access to information, as the lack of relevant data can seriously undermine the 
claimant’s attempt to show even the probability that discrimination occurred. In 
Meister, a job applicant claimed discrimination on grounds of sex, age and ethnic-
ity, her application for the same job having been rejected twice within a relatively 
short time period, without even being invited for an interview. In Kelly, a male ap-
plicant claimed that he was discriminated on grounds of sex, his application for a 
master’s degree course having been rejected in the selection process. In both cases, 
claimants sought access to information about successful applicants, because other-
wise they had nothing but their allegations. In both cases the Court clearly stated 
that the burden of proof clause does not create an entitlement to disclosure of 
documents or access to information. However, the refusal of disclosure or refusal 
to grant access to information may be one of the factors to take into account in the 
context of establishing facts from which it may be presumed that there has been 
direct or indirect discrimination.35 Otherwise the provisions on the burden of 
proof might be rendered completely ineffective and their objective compromised.
Statistical evidence plays a particularly important role in proving prima facie case 
of indirect discrimination.36
31 Brunnhofer, para. 60.
32  See Case C-17/05 B. F. Cadman v Health & Safety Executive [2006] EU:C:2006:633, par. 38 and 
Danfoss, par. 24-25.
33  Case C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH  [2012] EU:C:2012:217.
34  Case C-104/10 Patrick Kelly v National University of Ireland (University College, Dublin) [2011] 
EU:C:2011:506.
35 Kelly, para. 34; Meister, para. 47.
36  See, e.g. Case C-171/88 Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG [1989] 
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Case-law concerning racial discrimination also contains important pointers as to 
the shifting of the burden of proof. Thus, a homophobic statement by a third 
party (majority shareholder of a football club) may shift the burden of proof on 
the club to prove that it does not have a discriminatory recruitment policy.37 Even 
where there is no actual individual person claiming less favourable treatment, em-
ployer’s statement that he will not employ persons of a certain ethnic origin pres-
ents a prima facie evidence of discriminatory recruitment policy.38
4.  CROATIAN LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
So, what have we learned from the EU anti-discrimination case law? Croatia has 
implemented the EU anti-discrimination directives as part of its obligations dur-
ing the process of accession to the EU primarily through the general Anti-Dis-
crimination Act and through the Gender Equality Act.39
EU:C:1989:328; Case C-184/89 Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] EU:C:1991:50; 
Case C-33/89 Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1990] EU:C:1990:265; Case C-343/92 
M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and others [1994] EU:C:1994:71; Case C-196/02 Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Or-
ganismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados [2005]  EU:C:2005:141; Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Hilde 
Schönheit v Stadt Frankfurt am Main and others [2003] EU:C:2003:583. See also Handbook on Euro-
pean non-discrimination law, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010, URL=http://
fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1510-FRA-CASE-LAW-HANDBOOK_EN.pdf, p. 129-
133. Accessed 15 February 2017. 
37  Case C-81/12 Asociaţia ACCEPT v Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării [2013] 
EU:C:2013:275.
38  Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] 
EU:C:2008:397. One has to draw a parallel here to a recent Croatian case, in which a member of the 
Executive Board of the Croatian Football Association publicly declared that “gays could never play 
in his national football team”. It was only in the revision procedure that the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Croatia reversed all previous judgements of lower and appellate courts, which found that 
the statement was not discriminatory because it represented merely a value judgement by a person 
who is not in a position to have any influence on the choice of players in a national football team, and 
that there was no less favourable treatment. The judgement in the revision proceedings determined the 
statement as discriminatory on grounds of sexual orientation. There was no mention of the burden of 
proof, because there was never any dispute as to whether and what the respondent actually said and 
whether any less favourable treatment actually occurred, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning relies 
heavily on the Feryn judgement (mistakenly identified by the Supreme Court as the judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights). Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Rev-300/13, Judge-
ment of 17 June 2015.
39  Anti-Discrimination Act (Zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije) entered into force on 1 January 2009 
(Official Gazette No. 85/08 and 112/12; hereinafter: ADA). The first Gender Equality Act, which 
entered into force on 30 July 2003, was repealed for reasons of procedural deficiencies in its adoption 
by the Decision of the Constitutional Court (U-I-2696/2003 of 16 January 2008) with effect from 15 
July 2008, when it was replaced by the Gender Equality Act (Zakon o ravnopravnosti spolova) currently 
in force (Official Gazette No. 82/08; hereinafter: GEA). The Gender Equality Act specifically aims at 
protection and promotion of gender equality as a fundamental value of the Croatian constitutional 
order and defines and regulates methods of protection against discrimination based on sex, while also 
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4.1.  burden of proof in the Anti-Discrimination Act
The main horizontal legislative instrument in Croatia regulating equal treatment 
and protection against discrimination based on 21 discriminatory grounds is the 
Anti-Discrimination Act. Under Article 20 ADA, if a party in court or other 
proceedings claims that his/her right to equal treatment has been violated, he/she 
shall make it probable40 that discrimination has taken place. In that case, it shall be 
for the respondent to prove that there has been no discrimination.41 Therefore, the 
required standard or degree of conviction is that of probability, not certainty that 
the discrimination occurred. The claimant has to prove the probability of facts, on 
which the right to equal treatment and its violation depend. These facts need not 
to be proven with the degree of certainty normally required from the party who 
bears the burden of proof.42Presenting prima facie evidence of discrimination trig-
gers the shifting of the burden of proof: the respondent has to prove the contrary 
with sufficient degree of certainty. Failing this, it is considered that the right to 
equal treatment was violated.43
The 2012 Supreme court judgement in a high-profile case contributed to the in-
terpretation of this standard in practice. Whereas the lower court found no evi-
dence of discrimination and dismissed the claim as unfounded, the Supreme court 
correctly applied the required standard of probability. The case, namely, involved a 
statement of a then President of the Croatian Football Association that homosex-
ual football players will not play in a national football team as long as he was the 
president of the national football association and that only “healthy” people play 
football. Several associations representing the interests of persons of homosexual 
orientation filed a claim against him for discrimination (representative action). 
Whereas the first-instance county court found that the claim was unfounded, the 
Supreme court in appellate procedure was of the opinion that prima facie evidence 
of discrimination exists. It concluded that the purposive meaning of that state-
ment was self-evident: humiliation and degradation of that category of persons. 
creating equal opportunities for men and women (Article 1 GEA). The Anti-Discrimination Act is a 
horizontal, ‘umbrella’ act in the field of prohibition of discrimination and creation of equal opportuni-
ties, and includes an exhaustive list of 21 prohibited discriminatory grounds (sex, race, ethnic origin, 
skin colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, trade 
union membership, education, social status, marital or family status, age, health, disability, genetic 
heritage, gender identity and expression and sexual orientation; Article 1(1) ADA).
40  Cro. ‘…dužna je učiniti vjerojatnim”
41  Article 20 ADA.
42  Dika, op. cit. note 9, p. 85; Uzelac, A., Postupak pred sudom, in: Šimonović Einwalter, T. (ed.) Vodič 
uz zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije, Ured za ljudska prava Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, 2009, pp. 
93-105, p. 101.
43  Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Gž-25/11 of 28 February 2012.   
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In such case, it was for the respondent to prove that he did not discriminate that 
category of persons, which he failed to do.44The Supreme court ordered the re-
spondent’s apology to be published together with the complete text of the judge-
ment in daily newspapers, so hopefully this standard will in the future be applied 
by lower courts as well. 
Therefore, the two conditions for satisfying prima facie evidence of either direct 
or indirect discriminations are that the claimants have to establish existence of a 
comparable situation and existence of a disadvantage.45 In a case involving a claim 
of unequal treatment based on age and union membership, the County Court in 
Bjelovar interpreted Article 20(1) ADA, stating that a party claiming discrimina-
tion does not have to prove it with a degree of certainty, but that it suffices to make 
it probable that discrimination occurred. “The standard of probability presumes 
that the party claiming discrimination has to prove that he/she is treated less fa-
vourably and that it is possible that the less favourable treatment is the result of 
direct or indirect discrimination based on the grounds established in Article 1(1) 
ADA.”46 The claimant established that he is the Union representative and that his 
employment contract was not transferred to the new employer (an outcome he 
desired), but he did not make it plausible that he was treated less favourably on the 
ground of either Union membership or age. Apparently, the claimant here failed 
to establish the existence of a comparable situation (one of the employees whose 
contracts were transferred was even older than him; furthermore, he was not very 
assertive or active Union member). However, the courts rarely ever elaborate their 
reasoning by systematically analysing the presented facts in this manner, and 
mostly just cite the relevant burden of proof provision and presented evidence in 
one sentence. It is therefore extremely hard to conclude what eventually tipped or 
did not tip the balance of probabilities. Furthermore, the decisions of lower courts 
are rarely published and accessible, their reasoning is only available indirectly and 
in a very limited manner through the published Supreme court decisions.  
For example, in one Supreme Court judgement it is stated that the first-in-
stance court carried out relevant evidence after claimant presented facts and 
evidence which made it probable that discrimination occurred and respondent 
presented facts and evidence to the contrary, and concluded that there was no 
discrimination.47However, it is not clear from the presented order of facts how the 
44  Compare this to the Supreme Court case Rev-300/13, described in note 38 above.
45  Farkas, L., How to present a discrimination claim: Handbook on seeking remedies under the EU 
non-discrimination directives, URL=http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/present_a_dis-
crimination_claim_handbook_en.pdf, p. 52-53. Accessed 15 February 2017.
46  County Court in Bjelovar, Gž-458/2012, Judgement of 3 May 2012.
47  Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Revr-498/2014, Judgement of 13 May 2014.
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first-instance court determined prima facie evidence of discrimination. It seems 
that the claimant substantiated his claim initially by claiming that he was trans-
ferred to a lower paid position because of his nationality. If this was the case 
indeed, then the standard for shifting the burden of proof was interpreted too 
lightly.
4.2.  burden of proof in the Gender Equality Act
Pursuant to Article 30(4) GEA a party claiming that his/her right has been vio-
lated has to present facts which justify suspicion that discriminatory behaviour 
has occurred;48 the burden of proof then shifts to the opposing party who has 
to prove that there has been no discrimination. The syntagm ‘shall present facts 
which justify suspicion’ is a literal translation from Croatian, but also the one 
which describes the most accurately the meaning of this provision. Available unof-
ficial translations of the Croatian GEA into English use the syntagm ‘shall present 
facts from which it may be presumed’,49probably to accommodate the wording 
of the burden of proof clause from the EU anti-discrimination directives. In our 
opinion, the latter translation of the Croatian text is not quite suitable, because ‘to 
justify suspicion’ and ‘to presume’ do not convey the same meaning or standard 
of proof.  
The wording of the burden of proof provision in the GEA was probably influenced 
by the identical wording contained in the provision on the shifting of the burden 
of proof from the old Labour Act 1995, at the time when anti-discrimination 
provisions were contained in the labour act.50
Analysing the above provisions of the ADA and GEA, Potočnjak, Grgurev and 
Grgić do not consider that the Croatian legislation places heavier burden on the 
claimant in proving prima facie discrimination than envisaged in the EU anti-dis-
48 Cro. ‘...dužna je iznijeti činjenice koje opravdavaju sumnju...’
49  See e.g. translation available on the web site of the Office for Gender Equality of the Republic of 
Croatia: URL=https://ravnopravnost.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/Letak_Zakon%20o%20
ravnopravnosti%20spolova%20engl.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2017.
50  Old Labour Act of 1995 (Official Gazette No. 38/95, 54/95, 65/95, 17/01, 82/01, 114/03, 142/03, 
30/04 and 137/04 – consolidated version), Article 2d (inserted by the Act on Amendments to the 
Labour Act in 2003, Official Gazette No. 114/03 – valid from 2003 to 2010): „If a person seeking 
employment or employee in case of a dispute presents facts which justify suspicion that employer acted 
contrary to Article 2 of this Act, employer has the burden of proof to prove that there has been no 
discrimination i.e. that he acted in accordance with Article 2a of this Act.“ Compare Dika, op. cit. note 
9, p. 76, who states that the burden of proof provision in the GEA is “oddly” construed and repeats the 
same mistake from the old Labour Act. 
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crimination directives, despite the different wording.51 However, they draw atten-
tion to the fact that Article 20(1) ADA uses the wording the Croatian legal system 
is familiar with, whereas the wording used in Article 30(4) GEA is unknown in 
the Croatian civil procedure law.52
This is debatable, because, as already mentioned the burden of proof provision in 
the GEA echoes the provision from the previous Labour Act of 1995, which is no 
longer in force. In fact, since there is no available case-law on interpretation of the 
burden of proof clause in the GEA, the case-law analysed here includes mostly 
the interpretation of the burden of proof clause from the old Labour Act of 1995.
For example, in a case involving a claim of sexual harassment at work, the claim-
ant was required to present facts which ‘justify suspicion’ that the employer was 
acting contrary to the prohibition of discrimination.53 The court found that this 
standard was satisfied because the claimant provided a letter from a third party 
(a telecom operator) confirming her allegations that she was exposed to obscene 
and vulgar phone calls of sexual content at her workplace, a service which was not 
agreed either between her and her employer, nor between the employer and the 
telecom operator. The court concluded that the burden of proof that there was no 
discrimination was shifted to respondent.
Is the standard of ‘justifying suspicion’ from the GEA equal to ‘probability’ from 
the ADA?Dika argues that this wording can be interpreted to mean that it is suf-
ficient for the alleged victim of discrimination to present facts, which, in them-
selves, if true, would raise the suspicion that discriminatory behaviour occurred, 
which is an even lighter burden than proving the probability.54So, unlike the ADA, 
the GEA would not require any link to typical rules of experience, so that a mere 
allegation of discrimination by claimant would be enough to shift the burden of 
proof to the respondent.   
According to the available case-law, however, there is no fear that the Croatian 
courts might take this provision too lightly. quite the opposite, the real danger 
lies in the possibility of excessively stringent application of the standard for the 
shifting of the burden of proof, so that the claimants will practically have to prove 
that discrimination occurred right from the outset.55Part of the ‘blame’ here lies 
not just on the courts, but also on the parties and their legal representatives, who 
51  Potočnjak, Grgurev, Grgić, op. cit. note 14, p. 328-329.
52 Ibid.
53  County Court in Bjelovar,Gž-2000/2012, Judgement of 11 October 2012.
54  Dika, op. cit. note 9, p. 76.
55  See, for example, Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Revr-856/2012, Judgement of 27 March 
2013.
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fail to make a clear and systematic allegation of discrimination in the first place. 
In a case involving a claim of unequal treatment in access to promotion and pay 
(apparently based on political belief, nationality and family status), the appel-
late court interpreted correctly that the burden of proof rules from the EU anti-
discrimination legislation, as well as those applied before the European court of 
Human Rights require a person claiming discrimination to prove that he/she was 
placed in a less favourable position in comparison with other employees, from 
which it can be concluded, based on experience and basic indications that direct 
or indirect discrimination occurred.56However, applying that understanding to 
the facts of the case, that court concluded that prima facie evidence of discrimi-
nation does not exist, since internal rules of the respondent prescribe that pay is 
a category defined by results of actual work and responsibilities of an employee, 
and that “the title of the work place does not automatically grant the right to 
equal pay”.57So, basically, the court concluded that pay system is not discrimina-
tory because the difference in pay is prescribed in internal acts of the employer. 
There is no mention about the transparency of the pay system, which is exactly 
what triggered the shifting of the burden of proof in the CJEU Danfoss case, for 
example.58What evidence would in this case convince the court in the existence 
of prima facie discrimination? From the court’s reasoning, it seems that anything 
shorter of the employer’s acknowledgement of discrimination would miss that 
target.59
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case-law on the burden of proof in anti-discrimination cases in Croatia is too 
scarce and practically anecdotal to draw any definite conclusions, but it does show 
a certain lack of consistency. This is not just due to insufficient knowledge and in-
terpretation of prima facie evidence in court proceedings. The fact that the burden 
of proof clause in the GEA is expressed differently than the burden of proof clause 
in the ADA is certainly capable of contributing a great deal to this confusion. 
As stated above, all EU anti-discrimination directives contain almost identically 
worded provision on the burden of proof. There was no reason whatsoever for 
the two crucial Croatian acts in the anti-discrimination field to contain divergent 
56  County Court in Zagreb, Gžr-330/14, Judgement of 6 October 2014, as cited in the Constitutional 
Court decision U-III-7490/2014 of 13 April 2016.
57 Ibid.
58 See above at note 24.
59  The Constitutional Court also concluded that the claimant failed to prove discrimination, and that 
the burden of proof was on her, because a “subjective assessment of the claimant […] is not enough to 
establish unequal treatment.”  U-III-7490/2014 of 13 April 2016.
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provisions, particularly having in mind the importance of a uniform and correct 
application of this standard in practice. Not only is the wording of these two 
provisions divergent when compared to each other, but both of them are different 
from the wording used in the EU anti-discrimination directives. Implementation 
of directives does not require literal transposition of their particular provisions. 
However, it defies logic to have different wording for provisions which should 
express the same standard. Despite of the differences in Member States regarding 
the approach and regulation of the civil procedure, there is no denying that the 
burden of proof rule from the EU anti-discrimination directives should be inter-
preted uniformly and in line with the CJEU case-law. This may be more readily 
accepted by the courts applying the GEA. The GEA, namely, expressly contains 
an EU-friendly interpretation clause or non-regression clause in Article 4, guar-
anteeing that provisions of that Act ‘shall not be interpreted or implemented so 
as to restrict or diminish the content of warranties on gender equality enshrined 
in the universal rules of international law [and] the acquis communautaire of the 
European Community, […]’. This article could serve as a recourse to overcome 
any inconsistencies in the wording of the burden of proof clause in the GEA, 
which, if not interpreted correctly, might have adverse consequences not only on 
the position of the claimant, but also on the respondent in anti-discrimination 
proceedings. 
Undoubtedly, a simple, clear and consistent wording would do the anti-discrimi-
nation case-law in general a better service. Not least because the relevant case-law 
in the field of gender equality, or better said, lack thereof, does not convey the real 
situation regarding the prevalence of gender (in)equality issues in the Croatian 
society. 
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THE POSITION Of THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH THE LENS Of THE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to question the position the individual has in the European legal sphere, 
understanding it as a fundamental topic within the frame of general international law. Since 
the positive international law lacks a normative definition of the subject, partly because of the 
inherent complexity of the problem, and partly because of the terminological inconsistency, this 
work aims to point on the major theoretical and practical dimensions of the issue at hand, fo-
cusing on the European region. The author will pay special attention to the procedural level of 
the individual’s position, embodied by the right of individual to access justice in the European 
Union. The author will question the capacity for action, which is the ability of individual to 
initiate proceeding of judicial and other relevant authority. Inevitably, the attention will be 
given to the interrelation between the ECtHR and the ECJ with regard to the status individual 
has before two major judicial bodies in Europe. The paper aims to offer significant scientific 
and social contribution to enlightening the controversies over the traditional understanding of 
the individual`s position in positive international law, and to offer a new approach, especially 
with the relation to the standing of the domestic and regional legal theory and practice, as well 
as the consequences such new approach entails. 
The author will use the following scientific methods in the project: comparative method, meth-
od of analysis and synthesis, historical legal method and sociological method.
Keywords: Individual, European Union, European Court of Human Rights, European Court 
of Justice
1. INTRODUCTION
The controversy over the position of the individual in international law is noth-
ing less current now than it was in late 20s when Professor Spiropoulos deliv-
ered his lecture at The Hague Academy of International Law titled “L’individu 
et le droit international”, starting with the thought: “Le problème de la position de 
lˈindividudans la vie juridique internatonale est a l´heure actuelle un des problems 
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les plus discutes de notre discipline”.1As one of the timeless problems of the inter-
national legal doctrine, debate over the legal status of the individual still occupies 
legal scholars from all around the globe. Moreover, we are still as far from reaching 
the unique standing on it as ever before. 
The position of the individual in a legal system, international or regional, is a vast 
topic, examined through centuries, and yet sorely controversial. Legal scholars 
since the very beginning of the development of the international legal thought 
questioned legal status of the individual in internal and external legal frames, 
questioning the possession of the recognised constituent elements of the notion 
of subjectivity. Traditionally, it has been widely accepted that only sovereign states 
and international organisations possess full legal personality and subjectivity in 
international law. The massive change in understanding of the legal status of the 
individual came under the spotlight again in the recent years. 
Whether the individual is or is not subject of international law is an age-old is-
sue. We tend to agree with Professor Brownlie when he wrote that “[i]t is common 
for writers to pursue problems relating to the status of the individual in international 
law in terms of the large theoretical question“2, which might not be the only way 
in assessing the individual´s position. Since the question previously proposed de-
mand a broad analysis, in this contribution we intend to approach one particular 
element inherent to the international legal personality, which is the procedural 
level of the individual’s position, embodied by the right of individual to access to 
justice. In accordance with the general topic of the Conference, our focus will be 
directed specifically to the European legal sphere. 
questioning only active capacity of the individual, and leaving all other elements 
aside, we indent to prove that the ability of individual to “directly, by his own ac-
tions, start international mechanism for protection of his rights and interests”3, which 
presents an active dimension of the international subjectivity, is of decisive im-
portance for the assessment of the individual’s position. Main motive for this re-
search is to question the importance of the individual´s access to justice for its 
overall position in the given legal system. In most of the academic considerations 
to this topic, the authors identified major constituent elements of the subjectivity, 
amongst which the ability to protect himself before the courts and other bodies 
has the important place. Even though the individual is still far from being granted 
1  Spiropoulos, J., „L’individu et le droit international“, Recueil des cours, vol. 30, 1929, pp. 192 – 270.
2  Brownlie, I., The individual before tribunals exercising international jurisdiction, International and Com-
parative Law quarterly, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1962, p. 702.
3  Kreća, M., Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2016, p. 133. 
(translated by author)  
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the full procedural capacity on the international level, due to the dominant un-
derstanding of the central role of the State, inherited from the classical law, there 
are, however, some strong arguments in support of the ongoing evolution of the 
individual´s position. Specifically, the European region, embodied by the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, leads in the progressive steps towards full and 
efficient protection of the human being.
2.  WHy IS THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE RELEVANT fOR THE 
ASSESSMENT Of THE POSITION Of THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL SPHERE?
Without imposing a unique view on the status of the individual in international 
law, Shaw subtly highlights that the “essence of international law has always been its 
ultimate concern for the human being”.4Even though primarily developed under the 
auspices of human rights law, in the present reflections on the subject, the issue of 
the individual´s status exceeds the human rights field and goes well beyond it.5 In 
other words, not only human rights law governs the individual-related issues, but 
also some other fields of pubic international law. For instance, it is widely accepted 
that apart of possession of rights and duties in international law, the individual 
could also be held responsible for the breach of legal norms that constitute part of 
the international criminal law, etc. 
Furthermore, the legal status of any entity in international law could not be as-
sessed fully without taking into the consideration its procedural capacity. In spite 
of the fact that the individual does not possess full procedural capacity in the 
general international law, it is reasonable to conclude that this capacity represents 
one of key constitutive elements of subjectivity. If there is one factor to be deter-
mined for the effective protection of the individual´s interests and rights, that 
would be the ability of the individual to initiate proceedings against any state or 
international organisation before national and international juridical bodies. Ef-
fectiveness of the legal regime guaranteeing individual rights could be maintained 
only if the individual who suffered from the injury has capability of initiating the 
judicial mechanism against anyone that caused the injury.
According to Professor Cançado Trindade, “the right of access to justice (comprising 
the right to an effective domestic remedy and to its exercise with full judicial guarantees 
of the due process of law, and the faithful execution of the judgement), at national and 
4  Shaw, M., International law, 7th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 188.
5  For the overall analysis of the legal status of the individual beynd human rights, see: Peters, A., Beyond 
Human Rights: the legal status of the individual in international law, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2016, pp. 602.
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international levels, is, in effect, a fundamental cornerstone of the protection of hu-
man rights.”6Especially at the regional level, where the individual has capacity to 
initiate proceeding before variety of bodies, the right of access to justice represent 
substantial guarantee of the effective legal regime.  
3.  ACCESS Of THE INDIVIDUAL TO EUROPEAN JUSTICE
European community of states has, through centuries, been characterised by sev-
eral different ways of merger. After the World War II, the Churchill´s idea of unit-
ing and rebuilding the European nation has been implemented in two ways. One 
of them represent the most advanced organisation for the promotion and protec-
tion  of human rights in the contemporary world, Council of Europe (CoE), con-
sisted of 47 European states and the other represents the European Union (EU), 
the economic and political union of 28 states, already members of the CoE.
It is beyond any doubt that for the sake of gaining effective protection of its rights, 
every individual has to have an access to justice starting with the national, up to 
supranational level. Since all the Member States of the EU are already being mem-
bers of the CoE and therefore signatories to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR, the Convention), every individual has a right to seek for a remedy 
against the actions of his own state before the Strasbourg Court, in accordance 
with the Convention. Besides the power to initiate proceedings against his state, 
the individual has to possess the same power against the international organisa-
tion, especially in cases when the actions of that organisation have direct effect on 
the individual, as in the case of the EU. Since, in the words of professor Peters, EU 
enjoys a special position among numerous international organisations,7 our re-
search will be focused mainly on the ability of individual to start direct complaint 
procedure against EU institutions and bodies. 
3.1. European Union
3.1.1.  historical background
Direct access of the individual to the judicial bodies was inherent to European 
communities since the beginning of the development of first integration project 
after the World War II. Already at the time, the individual could submit the ap-
plication to the Court under the same conditions as Member States, or the com-
6  Cançado Trindade, A. A., Some Reflections on the Right of Access to Justice in Its Wide Dimension, Con-
temporary Developments in International Law, Essays in Honour of Budislav Vukas (ed. R. Wolfrum, 
M. Seršić, T. M. Šošić), Brill Nijhof, Leiden, 2016, p. 458.
7  Peters, A., op. cit. note 5, p. 490.
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munity bodies. Thus, the idea of placing individual in the almost equal position 
to other entities before the European court, on a higher level than national, had 
its proponents in the early 50s. Furthermore, the individual had been granted an 
access to the supranational court in the field that goes beyond human rights, since 
none of the first European communities dealt with the human rights in any way. 
Surely, from the historical prospective, the procedural capacity of the individual 
was a progressive idea as such. However, one has to bear in mind that the detail 
requirements for the access to the Court were given in the treaty establishing the 
respective community and were far from the ideal state of matter. 
The first Court of Justice was established by the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, as 
a principal judicial institution of the then founded European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC).8 Even though the ECSC was highly specialized and substantially 
related to the heavy industry, with the Court whose competence was limited to 
coal and steel disputes, or in other words whose jurisdiction was to “ensure the rule 
of law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty constituting the Community 
and of its implementing regulations”9, for the purpose of our study it is worth notic-
ing that the individuals were given the locus standi before the Court. According 
to Art. 66, para 5.2 of the Treaty “actions can be brought by any person directly 
affected”.10 It might be worth noticing that in the abovementioned case, the term 
individual was related to the coal and steel producers or even buyers in some cases, 
rather than any interested person.11
When summarizing the principal functions of the Court, Lagrange inter alia stip-
ulates that the Court was “entrusted with the protection of individual rights against 
the arbitrary and the illegal action of the Administration”, which was of a decisive 
importance for the individual since national judges did not have that competence 
after establishing the ECSC.12 As a matter of fact, it was obvious that the individu-
als, together with the associations and enterprises, initiated proceedings against 
8 Traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier,
  URL=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11951K/TXT&from=EN. 
Accessed 5 February 2017.
9 Brownlie, I., op. cit. note 5, p. 712.
10  Valentine, D. G., The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1955, p. 132.
11  As an illustration, Gormley quotes the case from 1954, when „the Court rejected the complaint of an 
association of consumers for the reason that it had no standing before the Court under the terms of the Treaty 
permittingonly associations of producers to appear as litigants“.  Gormley, W. P., The Procedural Status of 
the Individual before International and Supranational Tribunals, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, 
pp. 142 – 143.
12  Lagrange, M., The role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as seen through its case law, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 1961, pp.404 - 405. 
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the High Authority more often than Member States. The reasoning behind that 
might be the fact that the States’ interests were less likely to collide with the inter-
est of the ECSC, unlike individuals who represented most commonly opposing 
economic and social group.13
In the upcoming years, the idea of European unity has taken on a wider scale and 
culminated with the adoption of Treaties of Rome in 1957, and the establishment 
of two other communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).Under the same treaties, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities was created, soon becoming 
a unique body with jurisdiction in matters relevant to all three, then existing, 
communities.14“The Rome Treaty provides that the Court of the European Economic 
Community may review the legality of the decisions of the Council and of the Com-
mission. Individuals and private corporations may appeal to the Court under the same 
conditions as a member State, the Council and the Commission.”15In other words, the 
individual could seek protection against actions of the Community institutions in 
the same way as governments. They had direct access to the Court, of course, with 
some limitations but without any need for the activation of the diplomatic protec-
tion mechanisms, which were still necessary in case of individual protection at the 
international level. That is why some authors from that time tend to conclude that 
“the individual is a subject of Community law, though he does not possess the status 
equal to that of Member States”.16
When comparing the relevant provisions from all three treaties, related to the locus 
standi of the individual before the joint Court of the Communities, it is evident 
that the drafters of the first treaty establishing ECSC reached by far the most fa-
vourable solution for the individual. Thus, according to Article 33 of the ECSC 
Treaty, Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, and Article 146 of the EURATOM Treaty, 
the procedural capacity has been recognized to all persons.17 The main difference, 
however, lies in the additional criteria that had to be met, according to each treaty. 
While under the ECSC Treaty the only condition on the side of the applicant 
was that he was “affected by” the action against which he is appealing or “deem to 
13 Ibid., p. 405.
14  The Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities, which was 
signed on the same day sa the Rome Treaties, established that the ECJ was to replace the 
Court of the ECSC. Further information on the history of the Court of Justice available at: 
URL=http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-08/histoire_en.pdf.  Accessed 5 
February 2017.
15  Brownlie, I., op. cit. note 5, p. 712.
16  Gormley, W. P., op. cit. note 11, p. 135.
17 Ibid, p. 147.
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involve an abuse of power affecting them”18, the wording of the latter two treaties 
consist of a bit restrictive solution. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty reads as follows: 
“Any natural or legal person may ... appeal against a decision addressed to him or 
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed 
to another person, is of direct and specific concern to him.”19 As mentioned above, 
under the treaties establishing the EEC and EURATOM, the applicant had to be 
directly, personally affected by the action against which he is appealing. What it 
meant being individually concerned the Court explained already in 1962, in Plau-
mann & Co v Commission, stating that“[p]ersons other than those to whom a decision 
is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them 
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances 
in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors 
distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed.”20 Ever since 
this case, the Court introduced restrictive approach in the interpretation of the 
capacity to bring an action before it.
It is considered that the main reason behind previously quoted solution was the 
intent of the Member States to narrow the Court´s jurisdiction. Gormley believes 
that this solution “must sadly be conceded to represent a clear intention on the part of 
the Member Governments to return to the traditional object theory of classical inter-
national law, for under Article I73 the States have been given a favoured position.”21
3.1.2.  The individual in the eu after lisbon
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought massive change in the overall 
status of the individual within the legal scope of the EU. Even though, regarding 
recognition and protection of human rights, the EU took the opposite way than 
usual, with having Court recognised human rights in its case law before having 
them formally implemented to a treaty22, it was still necessary to adopt, we might 
say, a proper human rights document. That has happened in 2000, by adoption 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, even 
adopted, the Charter did not come into the force until the 2009 and the entering 
into the force of the Lisbon Treaty. According to the words of a former president 
18 Art. 33 of the ECSC Treaty.
19 Art. 173 of the EEC Treaty.
20  Case 25-62 Plaumann & Co v Commissionof the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 1963, p. 
107.
21  Gormley, op. cit. note 11, p. 150.
22  For the detail analysis of fundamental rights as judge-made law, see: Rossas, A., The EU and Funda-
mental Rights/Human Rights, International protection of Human Rights: A textbook (ed. Krause, C.; 
Scheinin, M.), Institute for Human Rights, Turku/Åbo, 2009, pp. 443 – 474.
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of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, a goal of the Lisbon reform 
was to “put citizens at the centre of the European project”.23Hence, it was rightly 
expected that the Lisbon reform foster advancement of the environment in which 
individuals can use Union law to enforce their rights.
The Treaty of Lisbon, consisted of two renewed treaties, Treaty on European 
Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (further reference: 
TEU and TFEU), entered into force on 1 December 2009.24 It has introduced “a 
new nomenclature”25 for the judicial system of the European Union. As from Sep-
tember 2016, the judicial institution of the EU consists of two bodies: the Court 
of Justice and the General Court. The Civil Service Tribunal, established in 2004, 
has ceased to operate on 1 September 2016 after its jurisdiction was transferred to 
the General Court.26
Generally speaking, the competence of the Court of Justice relates to the review 
of the lawfulness of the Community measures, with recognised ability of the in-
dividuals to access the Court in case of the infringement of their rights. It might 
be worth noticing that the Court of Justice, unlike the Court in Strasbourg, does 
not recognize any specific human rights remedy, but the individual could initiate 
the usual proceeding, in a manner stipulated by the Treaties.  yet, having in mind 
the specific nature of the European Union as an international organisation, such 
legal status of the individual shouldn’t be surprising. As professor Von Bogdandy 
stressed with eloquence, “[t]he European legal order started as functional legal order: 
it was set up in order to integrate the European peoples and States, mainly through 
an integration of their national economies. European law has been an instrument for 
political and social transformation of completely new dimensions for democratic societ-
ies, not meant to protect, but rather to change them with a view toward a common 
European future.”27
Anyhow, the individual found its way to the European justice. As stated in litera-
ture, “two roads lead to Luxemburg. One goes straight, the other takes a detour via 
23  quoted in: Peters, A., op. cit. note 5, p. 490.
24  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union are reproduced in [2016] O.J. C 202,  pp. 1–388.
25  Barents, R., The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 4, Issue 
3, 2010, p. 709.
26  General presentation of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available at URL=http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/en/. Accessed 2 February 2017.
27  Von Bogdandy, A., The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core 
of the European Union, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37, Issue 6, 2000, p. 1308.
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the national courts.”28 In this paper, we are focusing on the most effective one, the 
right of direct appeal.
With regard to the right of direct appeal of individuals, the only relevant provi-
sion, and method available to the individual, is stipulated in Article 263 (4) TFEU 
(ex Article 230 (4) TEC): 
“Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that 
person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regu-
latory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing 
measures.”29
Therefore, according to the wording of the previously quoted article, any indi-
vidual may bring action against an act as long as the act concerns that person 
directly and individually. At the same time, all actions brought by individuals 
against Community could be declared inadmissible if the Court finds that the 
abovementioned requirement is not fulfilled.30 Individuals, as co-called “non-
privileged applicants”31, are facing few possible scenarios. Either they are being 
addressees of the act against which they are initiating the proceeding, or the act is 
of direct and individual concern to them (this provision is nothing new, since it 
has been the same since the Rome Treaty), or, as a last case scenario, they are chal-
lenging the regulatory act that is (1) of direct concern to them and (2) does not 
entail implementing measures. 
As it may be seen, the wording of the new article suffers from many ambiguities. 
Many questions arose from the final part of the provision stated above. Starting 
with the scope of the term “regulatory act”, all the way to the already mentioned 
“direct concern” and “implementing measures”. Not even legal doctrine nor prac-
titioners are entirely convinced in the meaning of the controversial article. Ad-
ditionally, the case law of the Court, relying on not-so-convincing arguments in 
several cases, does not help in clarifying the ambiguity completely. 
28  Schwensfeier, H. R., Individuals´ Access to Justice under Community Law, University of Groningen, 
doctoral thesis, 2009, p. 13.
29  Article 263 (4) TFEU (Lisbon), ex Article 230 (4) TEC
30  As a matter of fact, some authors argue that nearly all action brought by individuals against Communi-
ty regulations failed because of the un fulfilment of this condition. See: Barents, R., The Court of Justice 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, Common Market Law Review, Vol 47, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 722 – 724.
31  Schwensfeier, H. R., op. cit. note 28, p. 43.
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A former ECJ judge, Everling, claims that all kinds of regulations, including leg-
islative acts fall within the scope of the abovementioned article.32 On the other 
hand, there are others who tend to understand the meaning of the provision nar-
rowly and argue that the direct challenge is limited to non-legislative acts only.33 
However, if we bear in mind that the reasoning behind the article 263 (4) TFEU 
was to promote judicial protection of the individual, as well as the fact that the 
language used in the Treaty suggests that the term “regulatory act” should be taken 
broadly, since the term “non-legislative acts” has been used in the Treaties else-
where34, than we are closer to the conclusion that the individual could directly 
challenge both kinds of acts before the Court.
yet, even though our conclusion might be more favourable for the overall position 
of the individual in the EU legal sphere, it does not mean that it is being sup-
ported by the appropriate case-law. In the Inuit case Court proposed restrictive 
view and stated that “it is apparent from the third limb of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU that its scope is more restricted than that of the concept of ‘acts’ used 
in the first and second limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in respect of 
the characterisation of the other types of measures which natural and legal persons may 
seek to have annulled.”35 Therefore, according to the Court´s view, the “regulatory 
act” cannot mean any type of act, but only non-legislative acts of general applica-
tion, since any other understanding “would amount to nullifying the distinction 
made between the term ‘acts’ and ‘regulatory acts’ by the second and third limbs of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.”36 It seems that the Court did not take into 
the consideration the fact that many authors had pointed to, that there is also a 
distinction made in the Treaties between regulatory acts and non-legislative acts 
of general application.37
The other path available to the individual, mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, is the possibility of the individual to challenge the Union acts indirectly, 
through the procedure of the national court. As suggested before, this option is 
32  Everling, U., Rechtsschutz in der Europäischen Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Europarecht, 2009; 
reffered by: Balthasar, S., Locus Standi Rules for Challenges to Rgulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The 
New Article 263 (4) TFEU, European Law Review, vol. 35, 2010, p. 544.
33 Ibid.
34  Some of provisions that refer to „non-legislative acts of general application“ are consisted in Article 290 
(1) and Article 297 (2) TFEU; referred by: Balthasar, S., op. cit. note 32, p. 545.
35  Case C-583/11 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [2013] ECR, par. 58.
36  Ibid.
37  Van Malleghem, P. A.; Baeten, N., Before the law stands a gatekeeper – Or, what is a „regulatory act“ in 
Article 263 (4) TFEU? Inuit Tapiriit Kannatami, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, Issue 4, 2014, 
p. 1198, 1204.
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more demanding and definitely less certain than the direct access to the Court. 
Still, it means additional support for the individuals’ position in the EU. Accord-
ing to the view of the Court in UPA case from 2002, “[u]nder that system, where 
natural or legal persons cannot, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down 
in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, [now, article 263 TFEU, op. a.] 
directly challenge Community measures of general application, they are able, depend-
ing on the case, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts before the Commu-
nity Courts under Article 184 of the Treaty or to do so before the national courts and 
ask them, since they have no jurisdiction themselves to declare those measures invalid 
[…] to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity.”38
Uncertainty of the proposed alternative is the most visible through the dominant 
role of the national court that decides on the formulation of the question, as well 
as the possibility of the national court to refuse to refer to the ECJ.39 Also, the 
indirect procedure could require more time and finances.40
Even though we are not fully convinced that the view proposed by the Court in 
UPA case, that the remedy available before the national court is as effective as 
direct access to the Court of Justice, we admit that the subsidiarity does not neces-
sarily lower the procedural capacity of the individual. According to Article 19(1)
of the TEU, „Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law.“41 In the multi-level juridical system, 
as the one in the EU, “the level at which the rights are established and the level at 
which legal protection is granted institutionally are often not the same”.42 However, 
it should be noted that the indirect path leading to justice could be strewn with 
thorns and reaching light at the end of the tunnel questionable. 
3.2.  The individual in the Council of Europe
3.2.1.  historical overview 
In the aftermath of the World War II, when creation of the first regional organisa-
tion on European ground took its place, the position of the individual in inter-
national law was stilling shadow of the idea of absolute sovereignty of the state, 
especially in the human rights field. By proposing mechanisms for supervision of 
38  Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR 2002 
I-06677, par. 40.
39  Van Malleghem, P. A.; Baeten, N., op. cit. note 37, p. 1215.
40 Ibid.
41  Article 19 (1) TEU; reffred by: Peters, A., op. cit. note 5, p. 483.
42  Ibid.
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the implementation of the European convention on Human Rights, open for the 
direct access of the individual, the Member States of the Council of Europe have 
begun to create a unique system of human rights protection.
The first phase of development of the system of human rights protection within 
the Council of Europe lasted until the adoption of the Protocol XI and was un-
favourable for the individuals since there was no possibility of direct application 
to the Court. Individual petitions had to be assessed before the Commission and 
only after the Commission carried out the procedure on the merits, the case could 
come before the Court. The role of the Court in this period was vividly expressed 
by Frowein, former Vice President of the Commission, describing it as a “sleep-
ing beauty, frequently referred to but without much impact.”43Fortunately, with the 
entry into force of Protocol XI, the Court has become the main body monitoring 
the implementation of the provisions of the Convention in the territories of all 
Member States of the Council of Europe.
Since the individual petition system of the ECtHR has been discussed widely, 
in this contribution we intend to point to the major characteristic and obstacles 
faced by not only individuals but also the system itself. It is well known that the 
human rights system under the auspices of Council of Europe provides protection 
for around 800 million people in Europe. In time when the national state fails to 
protect or even breach someone´s rights, the fact that there is a mechanism that 
challenge the national court´s decision often means the last hope for the indi-
vidual. 
3.2.2. Direct access to the eCthR
According to Article 34 of the Convention, “any person, nongovernmental organ-
isation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the 
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols”44 
could refer to the Court directly. Thus, the right to institute proceedings before 
the Court is not reserved only for the nationals of the Contracting States, but this 
right belongs to all persons whose rights have been violated by a State Party. The 
key is a violation of the provisions of the Convention.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess both the substantial and procedural 
aspects of the Convention system regarding the status of the individual before the 
43  quoted in: Janis, M. W., European Court of  Human Rights, International Courts for the Twenty-First 
Century (ed. Janis, M. W.), Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992, p. 135.
44 Article 34 ECHR
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Strasbourg Court. Therefore, we will make brief reference to some of the most 
disputable aspects of it.
One of admissibility criteria for submitting the application by the individual to 
the ECtHR is a victim status. The main reason behind this criteria is to prevent ac-
tion popularis in Court proceedings. However, the concept of victim cause numer-
ous uncertainties. In the case of Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, the Court gave an 
interpretation of the notion of victim stating “[a]ccording to the Court’s established 
case-law, the concept of “victim” must be interpreted autonomously and irrespective of 
domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act. (…) The word 
“victim”, in the context of Article 34 of the Convention, denotes the person or persons 
directly or indirectly affected by the alleged violation.”45 Thus, in order to lodge an 
application to the Court, the person has to demonstrate that ether he is directly 
affected by the measure he is complaining to, or to be able to act as an “indirect 
victim”, the notion that has been thoroughly assessed in the Court´s case-law.46 
In other words, when the direct victim is prevented from accessing the Court, the 
person that belongs to category of indirect victims may do so.
Former greatest achievement of the Council of Europe, the individual’s right to 
direct protection before the Court, now threatens to become a stumbling block 
of the entire system. According to the numerous scholars who devoted their work 
to the assessment of the Strasbourg human rights system, for most of its first 30 
years the Court has received only 800 individual petitions per year, mainly due 
to “ignorance”.47 Over the years, the Court manage to build confidence of the 
individuals in the system of human rights protection, and according to Professor 
Cançado Trindade “has contributed, in its own way, to the gradual strengthening 
of the procedural capacity of the complainant at international level”.48However, the 
Court´s overload due to numerous individual petitions nowadays largely slows 
down the process of achieving individual justice. In 2016, for instance, there have 
been almost 80 000 pending applications.49 Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
Court has become a matter of profound debates between legal scholars and prac-
45  Judgment Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (2013) [GC], par. 47.
46  List of cases containing explanation of the notion of „indirect victim“ provided in: European Court 
of Human Rights, Practical guide on admissibility criteria, 2014, URL=http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2017.
47  Greer, S.; Williams, A., Human Rights in Council of Europe and the EU: Towards ˈIndividualˈ, ˈConsti-
tutionalˈ or ˈInstitutionalˈ Justice?, European Law Journal, No. 4, 2009, p. 464.
48  Cançado Trindade, A. A., The Access of Individuals to International Justice, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 27.
49  Statistical data available at: URL=http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_pending_2016_ENG.
pdf. Accessed 15 February 2017.
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titioners. The general conclusion is that the ongoing reforms of the Strasbourg 
system regarding the individual petitions has to be supported by the better im-
plementation of the Convention by national authorities, so that the number of 
clearly inadmissible applications, or repetitive applications get reduced.50
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We might conclude this paper with the last though of Professor Spiropoulos in the 
abovementioned contribution from the 1929: “Espérons seulement que les efforts 
conjugués de pensées amies arriveront à hâter l’heure ou l’individu se verra assurer, dans 
l’ordre international, la place qui répond au développement récent de l’organisation du 
monde.“ Among all aspects of its legal status, the access to justice undoubtedly 
deserves significant place. 
The assessment of the individual´s procedural capacity in the European region, 
with proposed emphasis to the European Union system, was supposed to point 
to the basic differences between the systems itself. A striking difference in systems 
under CoE and EU regarding the individual lies in the nature of the two subjects 
of international law. CoE imposes rights and duties indirectly and therefore the 
individual can appeal only after the unsatisfactory solution in the national state, 
while the EU can impose various rights and duties directly through the activity 
of its institutions and the secondary law, so there must be an opportunity for the 
individual to appeal directly to the Court. The second point of divergence lies in 
the scope of jurisdiction and fields covered by both organisations. While the CoE 
serves as the best established human rights forum in the international community, 
the EU embodies primarily economic integration, which has a substantial influ-
ence on reasons for which an individual may lodge an application. „An economic 
institution must carry out its assigned tasks rather than becoming overly involved with 
political-type questions. Consequently, a clear sphere of authority is left to the Council 
of Europe, even though concurrent jurisdiction may arise.“51
Despite all the pros and cons inherent to both systems, by observing the global 
picture of the individual´s position, it is safe to conclude that the individual in 
Europe has forged the path to the regional justice. 
50  For the assessment of the Court´s efficacy see: Mahoney, P., The European Court of Human  Rights and 
its ever-growing caseload: Preserving the mission of the Court while ensuring the viability of the individual 
petition system, The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents (ed. Flogaitis, S.; Zwart, T.; 
Fraser, J.), Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 18 – 25.
51  Gormley, W. P., op. cit. note 11, p. 158.
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THE SOVEREIGNTy Of THE MEMbER STATES Of 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIzATIONS WITH SPECIAL 
fOCUS ON EUROPEAN UNION
ABSTRACT
This paper will discuss issues of possible limitations of sovereignty in the so-called deliberative 
organizations (UNESCO, Council of Europe, OSCE), the United Nations (with respect to 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Chapter VII of the Charter), 
and the European Union. Special focus will be on the supranational system of the European 
Union.
The term „supranational“ means that it is a legal concept, and refers to issues of superiority 
and direct applicability of the rules of the European Union on the territory of the Member 
States. The traditional view of sovereignty is replaced by the new concept of sovereignty and the 
interdependence of the countries.
The competencies of the European Union overcome national borders and interests. This implies 
that the EU can make binding decisions not only for Member States, but also for legal entities 
and individuals in the Member States. That makes the biggest difference between European 
Union and all other international organizations. Membership in such organization is reduc-
ing the sovereign rights of member states.
The successor states of the former Yugoslavia will join the EU faster than it is now assumed. 
That is why it is even more necessary to clarify the superiority of EU law in relation to the 
national laws of states, and to point out the sovereignty of the member states of international 
organizations, especially of the European Union.
Keywords: Sovereignty of the member states, Deliberative International Organizations, Su-
pranational Organizations, Chapter VII of the UN Charter
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sovereignty means supreme authority within a territory. Each element of this defi-
nition highlights an important aspect of the concept of sovereignty. First, a holder 
of sovereignty possesses authority. Second, sovereignty is not a matter of mere au-
thority, but of supreme authority. And third, territoriality is a principle by which 
members of a community are to be defined. It specifies that their membership 
derives from their residence within borders.1
However, EU Member States have relinquished part of their sovereignty to EU 
institutions. This paper will discuss issues of possible limitations of sovereignty 
in the so-called deliberative organizations, the United Nations (with respect to 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Chapter VII of 
the Charter), and the European Union. Special focus will be on the supranational 
system of the European Union.
International law divides international organizations according to different crite-
ria, but the most important one for the jurists is their division by the degree of au-
thority and range of decisions of their organs. Thus the international organizations 
can be divided into deliberative and supranational. Deliberative organizations are 
for instance UNESCO, the Council of Europe or OSCE, while supranational 
organization is as of now only the European Union.2
The basic hypothesis of the paper is that the sovereignty of member states of su-
pranational organizations is much more limited than the sovereignty of states 
members of deliberative organizations. In addition to the basic hypotheses an ad-
ditional auxiliary hypothesis is set up:
-   Supranational organizations have in strictly narrow responsibilities delegated 
authorities to take decisions from its member states to the joint organization 
bodies. The decisions made in this way are binding not only for all member 
states, but also for individuals and legal entities within them.
The fundamental goal of the research is to point out the level of authorization 
and the range of decision making of the bodies of supranational and deliberative 
1  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/. Accessed 
17 March 2017.
2  Nedžad Smailagić states that there is a third category of international organizations which is called 
operational organization. According to him, operational international organizations are authorized 
to carry out specific issues and projects so as to act independently in all aspects of the enforcement 
of assigned tasks, while the general policy and principled solutions are decided by the member states. 
(Smailagić, N., Međunarodne organizacije, Država, politika i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini: analiza 
postdejtonskog političkog sistema, Gavrić, S. (ed.), University press, Magistrat, Sarajevo, 2011, pp. 550)
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international organizations. The goal is also to point at influence that a creation 
of one supranational entity (European Union) had on the erosion of the classic 
concept of sovereignty. Membership in the EU is doubtless leading to the giving 
up of a measure of sovereignty. Related to the goals of the research is the stated and 
fundamental research question of whether or not we are the witnesses of the cre-
ation of the identity of the European Union that will replace the existing national 
identity of the Member States.
To reach the previously listed goals of research, we combined several scientific 
methods. Normative approach aims at determine legal regulations of the Acquis of 
the European Union. The comparative method is used to point out the difference 
between these two kinds of international organizations regarding the sovereignty 
of their member states. A special emphasis will be given to the United Nations 
with regard to the authorization of the Security Council of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.
2.  SOVEREIGNTy Of THE MEMbER STATES Of DELIbERATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIzATIONS
Deliberative international organizations are the most common forms of lasting 
cooperation between the countries. The bodies of these organizations discuss the 
issues on the agenda, which are of common interest. On the meetings, the mem-
bers’ points of view are being adjusted, and in the end decisions are being made 
by majority vote.3 The decisions of these organizations are important, but they are 
usually only in the form of recommendations. The success of their implementa-
tion depends on the member states. 
The deliberative international organizations include, for example, OSCE, Coun-
cil of Europe and UNESCO. These international organizations are dealing with 
global issues of importance such as human rights, democracy, rule of law, conflict 
prevention, combating the crisis and post-conflict reconstruction of the countries. 
Mostly their member states have equal status and decisions are made by consen-
sus. The sovereignty of the member states of such organization is untouched. As a 
part of the organization they retain its authority over its territory and its citizens. 
This authority is not subject to anyone’s control and not dependent on any other 
authority. Deliberative organizations make decisions that are binding for their 
member states, but which must be transformed into a national law in order to be 
3  Ibid.
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directly applicable on the territory of member states, especially to be directly ap-
plicable for legal and physical entities.4
2.1.  The powers of the Security Council of the United Nations in connection to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
Globalization and interdependence of states at the global level lead to joint deci-
sion-making in many issues. Each state tends to achieve its interests, and common 
way of decision-making will lead to the fact that the strongest states are deciding 
in the name of all. It will lead to presenting national interests of the strongest ones 
as international. Less developed states will be forced to abide by such decisions. 
The interests of small states are in international co-operation in the form of an in-
ternational organization because it often provides a basis for access by developing 
states to the playing field of the stronger states. 
We tend to speak of sovereignty in a too narrow sense, without taking into ac-
count things that has taken place in the world in recent. Interests of all states in 
conditions of globalization consist in working together for the purpose of achiev-
ing common goals.5 In globalizing world state acting alone cannot achieve gover-
nance interests. 
The United Nations is the world’s largest and most important international orga-
nization. As noted above, it is in a group of deliberative international organiza-
tions. The bodies of the United Nations make decisions that are usually in the 
form of recommendations. United Nations Security Council still has the power to 
bring binding decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
but the member states dictate the choice of the manner of execution of these deci-
sions. Therefore, although limited, the Security Council has the authority to make 
4  See for example: Röben, V., The Enforcement Authority of International Institutions, German Law Jour-
nal, Vol. 09, No. 11, 2008, pp. 1965-1985; Bogdandy, A., Dann, P., International Composite Ad-
ministration: Conceptualizing Multi-Level and Network Aspects in the Exercise of International Public 
Authority, German Law Journal, Vol. 09, No. 11, 2008, pp. 2013-2039; Bernstorff, J., Procedures of 
Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations, German Law Journal, Vol. 09, 
No. 11, 2008, pp. 1939-1964; Goldmann, M., Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard 
Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, German Law Journal, Vol. 09, No. 11, 
2008, pp. 1865-1908 (particularly Part IV 1. and IV 2.); Bogdandy, A., The European Lesson for Inter-
national Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, EJIL , 
Vol. 23, No. 2, 2012, pp.315–334.
5  Something similar has been pointed out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland Halldor As-
grimsson at the University of Iceland in January 2002. (URL=https://www.mfa.is/news-and-publica-
tions/nr/1902. Accessed 02 March 2017.)
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binding decisions, in contrast to the General Assembly. Of course, such binding 
decisions are binding only on the member states of the United Nations.6
The Security Council of the United Nations is the primary body for consider-
ation of disputes. Thus, over three fifths of disputes which the United Nations 
dealt with was the exclusive responsibility of this body, and over 82% of disputes 
within the shared competence of the Security Council and General Assembly.7 
Since 1970, more than 90% of the cases on which the United Nations discussed 
were entrusted to the Security Council.8
Chapter VII of the Charter is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Its text is specific and unique 
in international law. It allows the Security Council to make binding decisions if it 
determines that somewhere in the world peace and security are disturbed. It also 
authorizes the Security Council to ask the member states of the United Nations 
for the use of force to safeguard international peace and security. 9 It represents an 
exception to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states (Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter).
Chapter VII of the Charter provides for the conclusion of additional agreements on 
the use of military contingents at the request of the Security Council. It also guaran-
tees the right of states to self-defense. Furthermore, authorizes the Security Council 
to determine the aggressor in the conflict and that, accordingly, appoints itself to-
wards the parties to the conflict.10 Of course, all of the above applies only to situa-
tions where no permanent member of the Council files the right to veto a decision.
The decisions that the Security Council is empowered to make under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter can be divided into decisions involving the use of force and de-
cisions that do not involve the use of force. Decisions that do not involve the use 
6  See: Degan, V. Đ., Međunarodno pravo, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2011, pp. 439-441
7  Bennett, A. L .; Oliver, J. K., Međunarodne organizacije, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 125
8  Ibid.
9  Today almost all countries of the world are members of the United Nations. United Nations, 
URL=http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-pres-
ent/index.html. Accessed 02 November 2016.
10  The Security Council is very reluctant to declare one side in the conflict as the aggressor, even when 
the public has it very clearly that it is aggression. The closest to that qualification was on 31 of March 
1976 in Resolution No. 387, in connection with the intervention of South Africa in Angola, and 15 
of December 1982 in Resolution No. 527, in connection with the intervention of South Africa in Le-
sotho. Texts of the resolutions available at: URL=http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sym-
bol=S/RES/387(1976) and URL=http://www.un.org/en/ga/ search / view_doc.asp? symbol = S / RES 
/ 527,1982. Accessed 02 November 2016.
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of force are often economic or political sanctions.11 Decisions involving the use 
of force may be taken by air, sea or land forces.12 Their goal is re-establishment of 
international peace and security through diplomatic, economic or military action.
The above shows that the Security Council (i.e. the United Nations) has vast pow-
ers if international peace and security are violated. The problem in practice is that 
these powers are not used (enough).13 Until the ‘90s the Security Council did not 
refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter even when it called for the application 
of sanctions.14 Due to the impossibility of agreement between the major powers 
Chapter VII of the Charter mostly represents just a dead letter. Total activity of 
the United Nations with regard to threats to peace, breach of the peace and acts 
of aggression was assessed as ineffective and disappointing. High hopes that were 
placed in the security system remained unfulfilled mainly because of the bulky 
apparatus of the United Nations and its inability to act if there is no cooperation 
between major powers.
With regard to the sovereignty of the member states of the United Nations it can 
be said that it is untouched, except in the implementation of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. If the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it has the right to demand action 
by all member states of the United Nations for peace to be re-established.
3.  SOVEREIGNTy Of THE MEMbER STATES Of 
SUPRANATIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIzATIONS (THE 
EUROPEAN UNION)
A state is a type of an organized political and social community that acts as the high-
est legal order of the community and is not subject to any other order.15 The defini-
tion of supranational international organizations differs from this understanding 
of the state, which implies the complete substitution of the traditional concept of 
sovereignty. One part of the sovereignty of the member states of supranational or-
ganizations transfers to the organization itself. Its member states lose the exclusive 
right to make the rules that will be directly applicable in the territories of the mem-
ber states, and directly applicable to their legal and physical persons. The above is 
11  Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.
12  Ibid., article 42
13  By 1990, economic sanctions in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations have 
been applied only twice: in 1966 a partial economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and in 1968 
their extension. (Bennett, A. L.; Oliver, J. K., op.cit. note 7,  pp. 137)
14  Ibid., pp. 138.
15  Andrassy, J., Međunarodno pravo, Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1949, pp. 37.
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contrary to the traditional understanding of the sovereignty of state.16 States agree 
to such renunciation of their sovereignty in order to achieve their internal objec-
tives and interests. Currently, the only such organization is the European Union.
Supranationality implies that the member states of such an organization waive of 
part of their sovereignty. Decisions taken by such organization are binding to all 
its member states. The member states of such organizations essentially transfer 
some of their sovereign powers to a higher level, i.e. the level of international or-
ganizations. Therefore supranationality itself implies the existence of sovereignty. 
It is sovereignty of member states that voluntary transfer its own national powers 
to an international organization.17
The supranational character of the European Union does not mean “state above all 
states”, but refers to two characteristics of this organization: supremacy and direct 
applicability of its rights in relation to the national rights of its Member States. If 
the European Union adopts a rule, it binds all its Member States. It does not mat-
ter whether any of the Member States voted against this rule. If some of them do 
not respect it, a proceeding against that state may be initiated before the judicial 
body of the Union. The process may not only be run by some other Member State, 
but also a legal or physical person of any Member State.
Many decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed stated. 
One of the most important among them is the decision in the Van Gend en 
Loos case.18 This case significantly affected the development of EU law. From that 
point, the Court began to directly differentiate the legal system of the EU from 
legal system of international law. Also, the Court in this case found that the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community affirmed a new legal relation-
ship in which both individuals and states have rights and obligations.
16  Lindseth, P., Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example 
of the European Community, Faculty Articles and Papers, Columbia Law Review, 1999, pp. 628-738; 
Lindseth, P., The Contradictions of Supranationalism: Administrative Governance and Constitutionali-
zation in European Integration Since the 1950s, University of Connecticut School of Law Articles and 
Working Papers, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 2004, pp. 363-406.
17  Lindseth, P., The Contradictions of Supranationalism: Administrative Governance and Constitutionali-
zation in European Integration Since the 1950s, University of Connecticut School of Law Articles and 
Working Papers, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 2004, pp. 397.
  The term „supranational“ was first used in the establishing treaty of the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Today, this agreement represents the only founding act of an international organization 
which defines the jurisdiction of any of its bodies as supranational. (Miščević, T., Novi teorijski pravci u 
izučavanju međunarodnih organizacija, Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, Beograd, 2007, pp. 356)
18  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1
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In the Costa v. E.N.E.L. case the Court of Justice of the European Union estab-
lished the supremacy of European Union law over the laws of its Member States.19 
The Court pointed out that the grant of jurisdiction to the European Union limit 
the sovereign rights of Member States.
The right of the European Union and the acts adopted by this organization are 
superior to the national rights of the Member States.20 There are three main argu-
ments for this: international legal obligations with respect to contracts, ensuring 
the effectiveness and uniform application of European Union law and emphasiz-
ing the autonomy of the EU legal order.21 In addition, Member States are disabled 
to enact laws and other acts that would be incompatible with the obligations of 
the state within the Union.
The European Union has some attributes of a State. It has created some of the 
symbols of statehood with a flag and an anthem.22 Also, the launch of the euro 
clearly marked a major advance in the integration process.23 The EU regulations 
are directly applicable in all Member States; that is, there is no need for national 
implementing measures to be taken in order for regulations to have binding force 
within the Member States.24 
The European Union is not a federation - though various academic observers re-
gard it as having the characteristics of a federal system.25 Similarly, it cannot be 
identified with the confederation.26 The prevailing school of thought is of the 
opinion that the European Union constitutes an advanced, international political 
19  Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585
20  This does not come from the founding treaties, nor is it stipulated in the constitutions of Member 
States. It is stated only in The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which never entered into 
force. Article 4 (3) of the European Constitution establishes the principle of loyalty, which obliges the 
Member States to adopt measures to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising from the Constitution 
for Europe or are a result of acts of the institutions of the Union. However, the rule of supremacy of 
EU law in relation to the right of Member States was introduced by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union. (Mahmutović, A., Uvod u pravo Evropske unije, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Travniku, 
Travnik, 2015, pp. 204-205)
21  Ibid., pp. 206
22  Nugent, N., The Government and Politics of the European Union, Duke University Press, Sixth edition, 
Durham, 2006, pp. 548
23  Ibid., pp. 582
24  Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
25  Hazak, G., The European Union—A Federation or a Confederation?, Baltic Journal of European Studies, 
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 2, No. 1 (11), 2012, pp. 63
26  A confederation is a system of government or administration in which two or more distinct political 
units keep their separate identity but transfer specified powers to a higher authority for reasons of 
convenience, mutual security, or efficiency. (McCormick, J., The European Union: Politics and Policies, 
Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1999, pp. 85)
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entity with a correspondingly welldeveloped legal system.27 The EU’s competences 
are set out in the EU Treaties, which provide the basis for any actions the EU insti-
tutions take. The EU can only act within the limits of the competences conferred 
on it by the Treaties, and where the Treaties do not confer competences on the EU, 
they remain with the Member States.28
The obligation of the EU Member States to comply with EU law is a subject of 
international law which is the addressee of the pacta sunt servanda rule. When 
Member States enter into an agreement, they are expected to willingly commit to 
its content. 
Related to the goals of the research we seek to understand whether or not we are 
witnessing the replacement of the existing national identity of the Member States 
with the identity of the European Union?
Replacement of one identity with another one does not mean the disappearance 
of the previous identity, but only an upgrade and reorganization of the existing 
hierarchical identity characteristics. The European Union is not likely to become 
a state. This cooperation means just that the Member States have created supra-
national institutions that can make decisions opposed by some Member States. It 
can be said that in one sense, the European Union is a product of state sovereignty 
because it has been created through voluntary agreements among its Members. 
However, in another sense, it fundamentally contradicts conventional under-
standings of sovereignty because these agreements have undermined the juridical 
autonomy of its Members.29
Constitutional court of Germany in Maastricht-Urteil case pointed out that the 
performance of sovereign authority by the European Union is founded on the per-
mission of its Member States and that these states are still remaining sovereign and 
in international matters mainly acting through their governments.30 “The result is 
not that the states are disappearing or necessarily losing their power, but that they 
operate and function in new ways and that international cooperation has become 
an increasingly vital part of governmental institutions work.”31 
27  Jones, Mark L., The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis using H.L.A. 
Hart’s Model of Law and a Legal System, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 1984, pp. 
28
28  Article 5 (2) of the Treaty on European Union
29  Krasner, S. D., Think again: Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, URL=http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/20/
think-again-sovereignty/. Accessed 17 March 2017.
30  BVerfGE 89, 155 (12 October 1993), Az: 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92
31  Sand, I. J., From National Sovereignty to International and Global Cooperation: The Changing Context 
and Challenges of Constitutional Law in a Global Society, Scandinavian Studies In Law, 1999-2012, pp. 
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Some authors do not agree with this. For example, Inger-Johanne Sand has re-
viewed the situation as a form of de-nationalization. She has explained that ter-
ritories of Member States remain with the states but significant parts of the au-
thorities are spread to organizations on higher levels. She also pointed out that 
the nation-states are not disappearing. They just have become part of interaction 
and networks of some other dynamics.32 We agree with her when she said that na-
tional constitutions of most European states were originally created in a different 
time when focus was on sovereignty and nationally based problem-solving. Today 
decision-making needs cross-boundary problem-solving.33 The European Union 
is a new and unique institutional structure, but it will coexist with, not displace, 
the sovereign-state model.34
4. CONCLUSION
The paper presents the basic characteristics of the sovereignty of the member states 
of international organizations. Due to the division of the organization on delib-
erative and supranational, it is shown that the sovereignty of the member states of 
supranational organizations is much more limited when compared to deliberative 
organizations. The extent to which states are able to contest the exercise of sover-
eign powers by an international organization depends on the degree of conferrals 
of powers that have been made to the organization. 
Today the only supranational international organization is the European Union. The 
main characteristic of the term “supranational” is that it is a legal concept, and refers 
to issues of superiority and direct applicability of the rules of the European Union on 
the territory of the Member States. The traditional view of sovereignty is replaced by 
the new concept of sovereignty and the interdependence of the countries.
Member States of the European Union have transferred significant parts of their 
constitutional legislative, executive and judicial powers to the authorities of the Eu-
ropean Union. The competencies of the European Union lie beyond national bor-
ders and interests. This implies that the European Union can make binding decisions 
not only for the Member States, but also for legal entities and individuals within the 
Member States. This distinguishes the European Union from all other international 
organizations. Membership in such an organization reduces the sovereign rights of 
294-295
32  Ibid., pp. 295
33  Ibid., pp. 298
34  Krasner, S. D., Think again: Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, URL=http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/20/
think-again-sovereignty/. Accessed 17 March 2017.
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the Member States. However, the European Union is product of state sovereignty 
because it was created through voluntary agreements among its Member States.
Deliberative international organizations, on the other hand, were created to meet 
the common objectives of its members, but do not influence their sovereignty 
much. All their member states are represented by their representatives in the bod-
ies of deliberative organization, who represent the interests of their country, and 
not the interests of the organizations of which they are members. The decisions 
adopted at their meetings are not directly applicable in the territories of the mem-
ber states, and especially not on their citizens and legal persons who have domicile 
in the territories of the member states. In order for them to be applicable, it is 
necessary for them to be translated into laws by state authorities.
In conclusion we can point out that membership in an international organization 
could reduce certain state powers, but it is still within the sovereign power of a 
state to decide not to be part of an international organization. We did not want to 
compare deliberative and supranational organizations merely for the sake opposing 
them but rather with the intention of showing that the scope of the sovereignty of 
the member states of international organizations depends on the will of the states.
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ABSTRACT
The European Agenda on Security of April 2015 indicates that the Union needs a more joined-
up inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach. Explicitly, it states that “given the increasing 
nexus between different types of security threats, policy and action on the ground must be fully 
coordinated among all relevant EU agencies, in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and be-
yond.” Furthermore, it suggests that the Union needs to bring together all internal and external 
dimensions of security. This paper will take a look at the new Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on 
the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and analyse whether there has been improve-
ment in the possibility for an inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach for agencies from 
the Area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. The paper will try to answer the question 
of prospect of progress in joining internal and external dimensions of security of the Union, 
considering the rising threat of terrorism and the continuing migration crises that have been 
shaking EU since the adaptation of the European Agenda on Security. 
Keyword: EU agencies, European Agenda on Security, inter-agency cooperation, Frontex, 
CFSP 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Agentification is a phenomenon affecting not only the Member States of the 
Union, but also the Union itself. According to the EU Agencies website, the EU 
Agencies Network comprises 45 EU Agencies.1 The many studies of EU agencies2 
in literature clearly demonstrate that due to the non-existence of legal provisions 
1  EU agencies network, URL=https://euagencies.eu/ . Accessed 10 February 2017.
2  See for example : Everson, M.,Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters? European Law Journal , Vol 1, 
No 2 , 1995, pp 180-204; Everson, M, Administering Europe ? , Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol 36, No 2, 1998, pp 195-215; Vos, E., Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for 
EU Agencies, Common Market Law review , Vol 37, 2000, pp  1113-1134.; Craig, P.; EU Adminis-
trative law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp 143-190; Busuioc, E.M., European Agencies : 
Law and Practice of accountability, Oxford University Press, Oxford,2013.; Chamon, M.; EU Agencies 
– Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2016. 
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there is no academic agreement on many legal aspects regarding EU agencies. Ac-
cordingly, without any prejudice to the existing academic debates on the topic of 
EU agencies, the paper shall first identify the basic terms and definitions relating 
to EU agencies, then move on to defining inter-agency and cross-sectoral coopera-
tion (approach) and what it would entail in the selected field of study (Union se-
curity). The research in this paper derives from two sources: legal and policy docu-
ments. The legal document sources include among others Treaty provisions, basic 
agency regulation and agency annual reports), whereas policy documents include 
Commission communications and European Parliament regulations. Building on 
these sources and focusing on the possibility of cross-sectoral and inter-agency co-
operation of EU agencies that are engaged in matters of Union security, especially 
bearing in mind the new Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border 
and Coast Guard (Frontex), the paper will conclude with a possible answer to the 
underlying question: is there progress in joining internal and external dimensions 
of security of the Union?  
2. WHAT ARE EU AGENCIES?
There is no definition of EU Agencies in the Treaties, but there are several defini-
tions in secondary EU legislation and policy documents. For example, EU Staff 
Regulations refer to agencies as “Union bodies to whom these Staff Regulations ap-
ply under the Union acts establishing them.”3The European Commission refers to 
EU agencies in various policy documents regarding EU Agencies, two of which 
contain further definitions. The 2002 Communication of the Commission on the 
European Regulatory Agencies states that “[…] various decentralised organisations 
which can be grouped together under the general umbrella of European agencies have 
certain formal characteristics in common: they were created by regulation in order to 
perform tasks clearly specified in their constituent Acts, all have legal personality and 
all have a certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy.”4The 2005 Com-
munication of the Commission changes the definition slightly: “European Regula-
tory Agency shall mean any autonomous legal entity set up by the legislative authority 
in order to help regulate a particular sector at European level and help implement a 
Community policy.”5
3  Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Condi-
tions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community
4  Communication from the Commission - The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agen-
ciesCOM (2002) 718 final, p. 2-3.
5  Communication of the Commission on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies 
COM (2005) 59 final, definition.
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Furthermore, there is no consensus on the definition of EU agencies in academic 
debates. For example, Everson in 19956 and Vos in 19977 found that the defini-
tion of EU agencies was lacking. According to more recent definitions by e.g. Bu-
suioc(2013), “agencies are specialised, non-majoritarian bodies, established by second-
ary legislation, which exercise public authority and are institutionally separated from 
the EU institutions and are endowed with legal personality”8, and Chamon (2016): 
“EU agencies may be defined as permanent bodies, under EU public law, established 
by the institutions through secondary legislation and endowed with their own legal 
personality.”9 Building on the said authors’ findings and the above-mentioned EU 
legal document, we propose a definition of EU agencies for the purpose of this 
paper: EU agencies may be defined as hybrid sui generis permanent bodies with 
legal personality, autonomous but created by EU institutions on the basis of EU 
legislation to perform specific tasks.
As previously mentioned, the Treaties do not offer a definition of EU Agencies, 
but there are numerous legal bases for the establishment of EU Agencies in sec-
ondary legislation as well. Communication of the Commission (2005) states that 
agencies are an instrument for implementing a particular Union policy, and that 
its basic act must be built on the provision of the Treaty which forms the specific 
legal basis of the policy in question.10Aside from this policy-related legal basis, 
Article 352 (1) TFEU is also used as a legal basis in exceptional cases.
According to the EU agencies website, there are 45 agencies11and the consensus 
is that they had developed over a three-generation period, starting with the first 
two agencies: The European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training 
(CEDEFOP), and The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (EUROFOND) in 1975.The second generation followed 
in 1990 and the third, ongoing one in 2000.12However, there is no consensus in 
6  Everson, op. cit. note 1, p. 185.
7  Vos, op. cit. note 1, p.1114. 
8  Busuioc,op. cit. note 1,p. 21.
9  Chamon, op. cit. note 1, p. 10.
10  COM (2005) 59 final, legal basis. Current legal basis for EU Agencies: Articles 19 (2) TFEU 43 
TFEU; 66 TFEU, 74 TFEU; 77 TFEU, 78 TFEU, 82 TFEU, 83 TFEU, 85 TFEU, 87 TFEU, 88 
TFEU, 91 TFEU, 100 (2) TFEU, 114 TFEU; 153 TFEU; 168 TFEU; 192 TFEU; 28 TEU;  42 TEU, 
45 TEU. See more on legal basis in: Chamon, op. cit. note 1, p. 18 -21.
11  EU agencies network, URL= <https://euagencies.eu/> Accessed 10 February 2017. 
12  See more on the “agentification” process in the EU: Vos, E.; European Agencies and Composite EU Execu-
tive in Everson, M; Cosimo, M.; Vos, E. (ed.), European Agencies in between Institutions and Member 
States, Kluwer Law International, Alphenaan den Rijn, 2014, p. 11 – 20;  Busuioc, op. cit. note 1,p. 
13 ; Chamon, M.;op. cit. note 1, p. 13-18. 
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the literature or in the Commission’s official documents on how these 45 existing 
agencies should be classified. 
Authors provide different classifications of agencies, drawing mainly on their func-
tions prescribed in the respective constituent acts.13 Academics strongly disagree 
with the Commission’s simplification of classifying agencies as regulatory and 
executive. For example, in the 2002 Communication, the Commission defined 
regulatory agencies as “agencies that were created by regulation in order to perform 
tasks clearly specified in their constituent Acts, all have legal personality and all have a 
certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy”, and executive agencies as 
“agencies that are responsible for purely managerial tasks, i.e. assisting the Commission 
in implementing the Community’s financial support programmes and are subject to 
strict supervision by it.”14 Today the EU distinguishes between decentralised agen-
cies (set up by the EU to perform technical and scientific tasks that help the EU 
institutions in implementing policies and decision-making), executive agencies, 
agencies under common foreign and security policy, and EUROATOM agencies.15
By moving from regulatory to decentralised agencies, the European Commission 
shifted the terminology, thus oversimplifying it for any serious debate on the clas-
sification of agencies. Although relevant for other studies, a detailed classification 
of agencies is not relevant for the present one. The differences between Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agencies and other EU Agencies (called 
regulatory and executive in the Commission’s terminology and other literature)
are evident even without analysing the typology and classification that exist in 
literature: their legal basis, the EU policy they belong to and the Union’s compe-
tences in terms of related policies. The chapters below will discuss the possibility 
of cooperation between the CFSP agencies and agencies from the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice, with reference to the call of the European Agenda on Security 
from April 2015 for a more joined-up inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach 
of the Union especially in bringing together all internal and external dimensions 
of security. 
13  Vos, E.; Agencies and the European Union, In Verhey, L. and  Zwart, T. (ed.) Agencies in European and 
Comparative Perspective, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003, pp. 119-121.; Craig, P;,op. cit. note 1, pp 154-
159; Busuioc, op. cit. note 1, p 37 – 42; Chamon, op. cit. note 1, p. 18-45 
14  COM (2002) 718 final, p. 2-3.
15  Decentralised agencies, URL= https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/decentralised- 
agencies_en. Accessed 12 February 2017
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3. INTER-AGENCy AND CROSS-SECTORAL APPROACH
As stated above, aside from having different legal bases, the today’s 45 EU agencies 
operate in different regulatory areas (security, human rights, food, financial sector, 
space, CFSP etc.).Before analysing the possibility of an inter-agency and cross-
sectoral approach in the field of the EU security, it is necessary to define inter-
agency cooperation (collaboration) and cross-sectoral collaboration (cooperation).
Cross-sectoral cooperation or collaboration as a need of the modern world is grow-
ing. Bryson, Crosby and Middleton Stone offer a framework for understanding 
cross-sectoral collaborations, and define them as “linking or sharing of informa-
tion, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to 
achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector 
separately.”16Cross-sectoral collaboration presumes collaboration of at least two or-
ganisations (entities) that hardly relate to each other, but need to address same 
problem. In literature, collaboration (or cooperation) is determined according 
to various elements: leadership, resources, role of organisation, reputation etc.17 
Considering the sources form the literature, one can assume that inter-agency co-
operation (collaboration) of EU Agencies can be a form of cross-sectoral coopera-
tion, where two or more agencies from different sectors (i.e. regulatory areas) that 
hardly relate to each other cooperate to achieve joint outcome. 
The possibility of an inter-agency and cross-sectoral cooperation arises from the 
European Agenda for Security. The Agenda was introduced by the European Com-
mission in April 2015. It implements the political guidelines of the Commission 
in the area of security and replaces the previous Internal Security Strategy (2010-
2014).In the light of new and complex security threats to the EU and its Member 
States, in its Agenda the Commission highlights the need for further synergies and 
closer cooperation at all levels of security. Among other security relevant issues, 
the Agenda calls for “a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach. 
Given the increasing nexus between different types of security threats, policy and action 
on the ground must be fully coordinated among all relevant EU agencies, in the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs and beyond. These agencies provide a specialised layer of sup-
port and expertise for Member States and the EU. They function as information hubs, 
help implement EU law and play a crucial role in supporting operational cooperation, 
16  Bryson J.M., Crosby B.C., Middleton Stone M. The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Col-
laborations: Propositions from the Literature, Public Administration Review, (Special Issue),  2006, pp. 
44-55, p. 44 ;  See more in literature on cross-sectoral collaboration: Crosby B.C., Bryson J.M., A 
Leadership Framework for Cross-Sector Collaboration, Public Management Review, No 7, Issue 2 , 
2005, pp 177-201
17  Busuioc, M.; Friend or foe? Inter-agency Cooperation, Organizational Reputation, and Turf; Public ad-
ministration, Vol. 94, No. 1, 2016 (40–56), p. 41. 
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such as joint cross-border actions. It is time to deepen cooperation between these agen-
cies. The Commission will launch a reflection on how to maximise their contribution, 
through closer inter-agency cooperation, coordination with Member States, compre-
hensive programming, careful planning and targeting of resources.”18The Agenda lists 
and defines EU agencies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as follows: 
the EU law enforcement agency (Europol), the EU agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders (Frontex), the EU judicial coop-
eration agency (Eurojust), the European police college (Cepol), the EU agency for 
large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA), and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). However, it does not define what the agencies 
“beyond” these are. The list of the agencies “beyond” must be read from other 
Union documents on security. 
When considering the external and internal security issues in the EU, the focus 
should be on the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy: Shared 
Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (EUGS). The EUGS was present-
ed on 28 June 2016 by the High Representative and adopted by the European 
Council in October 2017. The EUGS identified priorities for Union security: the 
security of the EU; the neighbouring countries (State and Societal Resilience to 
our East and South); how to deal with war and crisis (An Integrated Approach to 
Conflicts and Crises); stable regional orders across the globe (Cooperative Region-
al Orders); and effective global governance (Cooperative Regional Orders).19Most 
importantly, the EUGS called for strengthening of the internal and external 
security.20Furthermore, the joint Council conclusions on implementing the EU 
global strategy in the area of security and defence stress the need for strengthening 
the nexus between internal and external policies, updating existing or preparing 
new regional and thematic strategies and stepping up public diplomacy efforts.21
18  The European Agenda on Security (COM(2015) 185 final), URL= http://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0185, see more on European Agenda on Security 
in: Ham van, P.K  The EU’s joined-up approach to security | Clingendael Report, September 2016 
URL=<https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Clingendael_report_The_EUs_joined_up_ap-
proach_to_security.pdf>Accessed 12 February 2017
19  See more on EUGS: Duić, D. EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and the role of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security in Primorac, Z., Bussoli, C., Recker, (ed.), 
Economic and Social Development – 16th International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social 
Development – “The Legal Challenges of Modern World” Split: Varaždin Development and Entrepre-
neurship Agency, 2016, pp. 289-299. 
20  EU Global strategy on foreign and security policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Eu-
rope.  URL=http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Accessed 
12 February 2017 
21  Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence, 
14009/16 CFSP/PESC 889 CSDP/PSDC 629 COPS 321 POLMIL 122 CIVCOM 214,URL=<http://
Dunja Duić: EU AGENCIES PROCEDURE – IS THERE A POSSIBILITY FOR AN INTER... 327
The documents of the European Commission, the European Council, the Coun-
cil and the High Representative show that there is a consensus on the aspiration 
to achieve cohesion of internal and external security aspects in Union policies. 
According to the Union division of competences, Security is covered by two main 
policies: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP - external security of the 
Union) and Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ - internal security of the 
Union). 
Both policies were introduced into the EU legal system by the Maastricht Treaty 
with the creation of the Union pillar structure.22The CFSP was at the time Second 
pillar regulated under Title V TEU, and Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(Justice and home affairs at the time) was Third pillar regulated under Title VI 
TEU.23The Title VI TEU Amsterdam was changed from Justice and home affairs 
to Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and regulation of external 
borders, visa, asylum, immigration and other policies were moved from the Third 
Pillar to Title IV TEC.24In the current Treaty regulation under Lisbon Treaty, the 
Third Pillar was abolished – the result is that today all policies relating to “internal 
security” of the Union form Title V (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). For the Area of Free-
dom Security and Justice, the following applies: ordinary legislative procedure, 
ordinary types of legal instruments, and full power of EU institutions including 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CFSP remained dif-
ferent from all other EU policies. All provisions of this policy can still be found 
in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).It has special legal instruments and sui 
generis competences, and EU institutions have special competences in the area of 
the CFSP.25
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14-conclusions-eu-global-strate-
gy-security-defence/>
22  See more on pillar structure: Wessel, R., The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU 
External Relations, Common Market Law Review; Issue. 37: No. 5; 2000 pp. 1135-1171
23  Art J – J 11 (CFSP) and Art. K- K9 Maastricht Treaty 
24  Art. 29–42 TEU Amsterdam Treaty 
25  See A 21–27 TEU 
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Table 1. Articles from Treaties relevant for the security of the Union 26 27
External security (CfSP)26
Title V TEU
(Article 23–46 TEU)
Internal security (AfSJ)
Title V TfEU
(Article 67–89 TfEU)27
   Common provision (23-41 TEU) 
   Common security and defence 
policy (42-47 TEU) 
  general provision (67-76 TFEU) 
   policies on border checks, asylum and immigra-
tion (77-80 TFEU)
  judicial cooperation in civil matters; (81 TFEU) 
   judicial cooperation in criminal matters (82-86 
TFEU) 
  police cooperation (87-89 TFEU) 
When considering the possibility of inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach in 
the matters of Union security, it could be inferred that the possibility of such co-
operation could be achieved through the cooperation between CFSP agencies and 
AFSJ agencies. 
As previously mentioned, there are six EU agencies in the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice: the EU law enforcement agency (Europol), the EU agency for the 
management of operational cooperation at the external borders (Frontex), the EU 
judicial cooperation agency (Eurojust), the European police college (Cepol), the 
EU agency for large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA), and the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). On the other hand, there are 
three EU agencies in the CFSP: the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU 
Foreign and Security Policy Institute, and the European Union Satellite Centre 
(EUSC). 28
Of the above agencies, the one that has been in focus for the last few years is the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Exter-
nal Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) established 
26  See more on the Common foreign and security policy in general : Cardwell, P. J. ; EU external rela-
tions law and policy in the post-Lisbon era. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague; 2012.;Eeckhout; Piet; EU 
External Relations Law; Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.; Eckes, C. ; External Relations Law: 
How the Outside Shapes the Inside.  In: D. A. Arcarazo& C. Murphy (Ed.), EU Security and Justice 
Law: After Lisbon and Stockholm (pp. 186-206). Hart Publishing.; Oxford, 2014 , pp 186-206 ;
27  See more on Area of freedom security and Justice in general  : Peers, S.; Mission accomplished? EU 
Justice and Home Affairs law after the Treaty of Lisbon. Common Market Law Review, 48(3), 2011,  pp. 
661–693. Peers, S.; EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011.
28  Types of EU agencies: URL= https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/decentralised- 
agencies_en#search-for-an-agency. Accessed 13 February 2017
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by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 (which was repealed by Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 establishing European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) on 
14 September 2016).Given that these are the last amendments to the regulation 
on the AFSJ agencies, the paper will analyse the new Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 
on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex)29 to answer whether there 
has been improvement to the possibility for an inter-agency and cross-sectorial 
approach with the CFSP agencies.
4.  EUROPEAN bORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCy 
(fRONTEX) 
The legal bases for the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex) are Articles74 TFEU and 77(2)(c) TFEU (ex 66 TEC and 62(2)
(c) TEC)).30Frontex is an Area of Freedom Security and Justice agency, first es-
tablished in 2004 with the task of improving the integrated management of the 
Union’s external borders.31The number of the today’s main tasks of Frontex has 
been increased: under the new Regulation, the agency has been tasked with en-
suring a coherent European integrated border management: “The key role of the 
Agency should be to establish a technical and operational strategy for implementation 
of integrated border management at Union level; to oversee the effective functioning of 
border control at the external borders; to provide increased technical and operational 
assistance to Member States through joint operations and rapid border interventions; 
to ensure the practical execution of measures in a situation requiring urgent action 
at the external borders; to provide technical and operational assistance in the support 
of search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea; and to organise, coordi-
nate and conduct return operations and return interventions.32Moreover, the list of 
29  Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 
on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/
EC
30  A 74 TFEU: “The Council shall adopt measures to ensure administrative cooperation between the 
relevant departments of the Member States in the areas covered by this Title, as well as between those 
departments and the Commission. It shall act on a Commission proposal, subject to Article 76, and 
after consulting the European Parliament.” Art 77 (2) (c) The European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning any 
measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external 
borders.
31  Art (1) Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union
32  Article (11) Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 Sep-
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task has grown from six main tasks under Article (8) of Council Regulation (EC) 
2007 to twenty-one specific tasks under Article (6) of the current Regulation.33 Al-
though the current tasks are more specific, they can still be divided into regulatory 
tasks (assistance to the Commission and Member States) and operational tasks 
(joint operational activities).34 Finally, it is important to mention that Frontex, 
unlike any other AFSJ agency, has autonomous decision making powers.35
In terms of cooperation possibilities, Articles 13 and 14 of the Council Regulation 
(EC) 2007 previously very briefly regulated Frontex cooperation with Europol and 
international organisations (Article 13) and cooperation with third countries.36The 
new Regulation states: “For the purpose of fulfilling its mission and to the extent 
required for the accomplishment of its tasks, the Agency may cooperate with Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as well as with international organisations in 
matters covered by this Regulation in the framework of working arrangements con-
cluded in accordance with Union law and policy. Those working arrangements should 
receive the Commission’s prior approval.”37Article 52 further states: “The Agency shall 
cooperate with the Commission, other Union institutions, the European External Ac-
tion Service, EASO, Europol, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Eurojust, the European Union Satellite Centre, the European Maritime Safety Agency 
and the European Fisheries Control Agency as well as other Union bodies, offices and 
agencies in matters covered by this Regulation, and in particular with the objectives of 
better addressing migratory challenges and preventing and detecting cross-border crime 
such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism.”38Interestingly, 
the number of EU agencies and bodies that Frontex is able to cooperate within 
creased from just one (Europol) to eight specific EU agencies (but not excluding 
cooperation with other bodies and agencies), with the possibility of cooperation 
tember 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard
33  Art ( 6) (2), Art (8) Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard
34  Rijpma, J.; Hybrid agentification in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice andits inherent tensions : 
the case of Frontex in M Busuioc, M Groenleer, and J Trondal (eds), The agency phenomenon in the 
European Union (pp. 84 -102), Manchester University Press, Manchester , 2012  , p- 90 – 91 
35 Ibid, p. 89 
36  See more in literature on this subject: Ott, A.; Vos, E.; Coman-Kund, F.; European Agencies on the 
Global Scene : EU and International law Perspective in Everson, M; Monda, C.; Vos, E. ( eds.) European 
Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (pp 87 – 123), Kluwer Law International, Alphen 
aan den Rein, 2014, p 109-111; Vara, J. S; The External Activates of AFSJ Agencies : The Weakness of 
Democratic and Judicial Controls; European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 20, No. 1, 2015, p 115-136 
, p 121 
37  (43) Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard
38  Ibid Art 52.
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being determined according to specific objectives. Reading this stricto sensu, if 
a new security objective appears, it will be hard to manage the cooperation of 
Frontex with any other Union body of agency considering the fact that the list of 
objectives that presume cooperation under Article 52 is finite. 
Conclusively, the aspects mentioned in this chapter (tasks of the agency and co-
operation) are more explicitly regulated under the new Regulation. Although this 
can be regarded as an improvement, it should be noted that over-regulation of 
tasks gives less opportunity for cooperation with other actors and less possibility 
to adjust to new unforeseeable situations (as for example the migration crisis of 
2015).  
5.  AGENCIES IN THE COMMON fOREIGN AND SECURITy 
POLICy 
The three EU agencies in the CFSP are the European Defence Agency (EDA), 
the EU Foreign and Security Policy Institute, and the European Union Satellite 
Centre (EUSC).
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by Council Joint Action in 
2004 as an agency in the field of defence with a mission to support the Council 
and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in 
the field of crisis management.39 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a specific provi-
sion on the EDA (Article 45 and 42(3) TEU).40 Consequently, in July 2011, the 
Council adopted Decision 2011/411/CFSP replacing Council Joint Action from 
2004. The Agency’s tasks involve contributing to identifying EU countries military 
capability and evaluating observance of their capability commitments, promoting 
the harmonisation of operational needs; putting forward multilateral projects to 
fulfil military capability objectives; ensuring coordination of programmes imple-
mented by member states and management of specific cooperation programmes; 
supporting defence technology research and coordinating and planning joint re-
search activities.41
39  Art. 2 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European 
Defence Agency, 
40  Article 45 and Article 42(3) TEU. 
41  Art 5 Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operation-
al rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. See more on 
EDA in literature: Ferrar, S. L.; The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defence Reform or Forming 
Fortress Europe?;Transnational law and Contemporary Problems, 16, 2007, p. 570 – 600; Heuninckx, 
B.; Towards a Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime? European Defence Agency and European 
Commission Initiatives; Public Procurement Law Review Volume 17, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 1-20. 
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The EU Foreign and Security Policy Institute was created by Council Joint Action 
in 2002 as an agency under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and is now 
regulated by Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP.  The Institute is set to contribute 
to development of EU strategic thinking in the CFSP field including conflict 
prevention and peace-building and strengthening the EU’s analysis, foresight and 
networking capacity in external action.42
The Council adopted Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP and established the European 
Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN) in 2001.43 This Joint Action was replaced with 
the Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP that now governs the European Union 
Satellite Centre (SATCEN). The SATCAN products and services result from the 
exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite and 
aerial images.44
6.  IS THERE A POSSIbILITy fOR AN INTER-AGENCy AND 
CROSS-SECTORIAL APPROACH bETWEEN fRONTEX AND 
CfSP AGENCIES?
To answer the research question of whether there has been progress in joining 
internal and external dimensions of security of the Union on the case study on 
EU agencies, the paper will move on to a specific analysis of the possibility of an 
inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach between Frontex and the CFSP Agen-
cies. The conclusion will be drawn by comparing CFSP Agency functions (tasks) 
with Frontex functions (tasks) specified in their founding acts. 
Inter-agency cooperation (collaboration) of EU Agencies has previously been de-
fined as a possible form of cross-sectoral cooperation, wherein two or more agen-
cies, that hardly relate to each other, from different sectors (i.e. regulatory areas), 
cooperate to achieve a joint outcome. Moreover, it has been found that although 
their activity addresses security, CFSP Agencies and Frontex come from different 
sectors(regulatory areas, i.e. EU policies). Frontex has been put in focus due to the 
fact that a new Regulation that has been in force since September 2016 made im-
portant changes to said founding acts. The founding acts of CFSP agencies were 
changed after entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and they all date from 2011 
and 2014. 
42  Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP of 10 February 2014 on the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies. 
43  Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre 
(2001/555/CFSP). 
44  Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and 
repealing Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre. 
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Firstly, the new Frontex Regulation provides a list of EU agencies and bodies 
that Frontex is expected to collaborate with. The only CFSP agency on the list 
is the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen).45SatCen produces results from 
the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data including satellite and 
aerial images which can be of use to Frontex in its operational tasks. Conclusively, 
pursuant to the regulation in the founding act of Frontex, the possibility of coop-
eration with SatCen is provided for, possible and can be considered as an improve-
ment in the inter-agency and cross-sectoral approach considering the fact that in 
previous Frontex Regulation the only possibility provided for was the cooperation 
with Europol.46
The European Defence Agency function, in accordance with Article 5 of 
Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP, is to support the Council and the Member 
States in matters of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and 
armaments.47This function is incompatible with the functions of Frontex listed 
in Article 8 of Regulation 2016/162448 and by deduction there is no possibility 
for direct inter-agency cooperation. There could however be indirect cooperation 
in the sense that some equipment used by Frontex be developed through research 
supported by the European Defence Agency. 
Lastly, the EU Foreign and Security Policy Institute, whose function is foreign 
policy analysis, is an agency that can cooperate with Frontex to a large degree 
in tasks relating to monitoring migration flows and risk analysis, assessment of 
threats and challenges at external borders etc.49If the EU Foreign and Security 
Policy Institute was added to the list from Article 52 of bodies and agencies that 
Frontex shall cooperate with, the cooperation would be much easier. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article offers two definitions for the purpose of this research. Firstly, it de-
fines EU agencies as hybrid sui generis permanent bodies with legal personality, 
autonomous but created by EU institutions on the basis of EU legislation in order 
to perform specific tasks. Further, drawing on literature sources, it considers that 
45  Art 52 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard 
46  Art 13 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004  
47  Art 5 Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operational 
rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP.
48  Art 8  Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard
49  Ibid. 
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inter-agency cooperation (collaboration) of EU Agencies can be a form of cross-
sectoral cooperation, where two or more agencies that hardly relate to each other, 
from different sectors (i.e. regulatory areas), cooperate to achieve a joint outcome. 
It is established that, in the matter of Union security, cross-sectoral and inter-
agency approach is the cooperation between CFSP and AFSJ agencies. The deci-
sion to analyse cross-sectoral and inter-agency approach through a case study of 
EU agencies stems from the fact that the most exposed AFSJ Agency in the last 
few years has been Frontex, which has undergone substantial changes as a result of 
the new Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard. 
Frontex tasks are more explicitly regulated in the new Regulation and this can 
be considered an improvement. However, over-regulation of tasks gives less op-
portunity for cooperation with other actors and less possibility to adjust to new 
unforeseeable situations. The aspects of the Regulation as analysed indicate that 
the number of EU agencies and bodies that Frontex is able to cooperate with has 
been increased and that the possibility of cooperation is determined by specific 
objectives. Regarding the cooperation between Frontex and the three CFSP agen-
cies, it was found that the possibility for cooperation has been provided for in the 
new Frontex Regulation for European Union Satellite Centre and that there can 
be cooperation with the EDA and the EU Foreign and Security Policy Institute, 
but that the Frontex Regulation does not explicitly provide for cooperation with 
these two agencies. 
The overall conclusion is that the new Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) offers better possibilities for inter-agency 
and cross-sectoral approach in the matters of Union security. It remains to be seen 
whether these improvements will be implemented in practice. 
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ABSTRACT
The recast Brussels I Regulation entered into force on 10 January 2015. The application ra-
tione temporis of this Regulation is regulated in its Article 66, which provides that judgments 
issued in proceedings started before the mentioned date, are subjected to the rules of the original 
version of the Regulation, adopted in 2000. However, the latter entered into force at differ-
ent times in different Member States, depending on the date of their accession to the EU. As 
a consequence, in a dispute falling into the material scope of the Regulation, the judges must 
first determine, which act is temporally applicable, which can sometimes be difficult, especially 
concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
As was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the EU, the Regulation of 2000 can be applied 
to the recognition and enforcement of a judgment from another Member State only if, upon 
the issuance of the judgment, it was already in force in both the state of origin and the state of 
enforcement. But even in such case, the application of the Regulation is only automatic if also 
the judicial proceedings were started after the entry into force of the Regulation in both states. 
If the proceedings were started before that time, the Regulation can only be applied if the court 
of origin based its jurisdiction on the same rules as can be found in the Regulation or on an 
international convention in force between the Member States “involved”. In all other cases, 
national rules or an international convention concerning the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments must be applied. The article represents a thorough study of the different most 
common cases where the problem of the application ratione temporis of the Regulation arises 
or could arise. The article specifically addresses the application ratione temporis of the recast 
Brussels I Regulation and the relationship between the original and the recast version of the 
Regulation.
Keywords: Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 1215/2012, Brussels I Regulation, recast Brussels 
I Regulation, scope of application, application ratione temporis, recognition and enforcement 
of judgments, exequatur, Brussels Convention, Lugano Convention, jurisdiction, international 
jurisdiction, foreign judgments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, the recast Brussels I Regulation1 entered into force. The transi-
tional provision of Article 66 regarding the temporal scope of application reads as 
follows:
1.   This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted, to au-
thentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settle-
ments approved or concluded on or after 10 January 2015.
2.   Notwithstanding Article 80, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 shall con-
tinue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted, to au-
thentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settle-
ments approved or concluded before 10 January 2015 which fall within 
the scope of that Regulation.
In cross-border disputes, falling into its material scope of application, the courts 
will thus have to assess their jurisdiction following the rules of the recast regula-
tion, if the proceedings have been started on or after 10 January 2015. Further-
more, judgments from other EU Member States shall be recognized and enforced 
under the rules of the recast regulation only if the proceedings have been started 
on or after the mentioned date. Article 66 provides for no exception to this rule. 
This means that for many years to come, the Brussels I Regulation of 20002 or the 
national law of the Member State of enforcement will remain applicable to the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments issued in proceedings started before 10 
January 2015. Thus, it is very important that the courts have clear understanding 
of which legislation is applicable to the case at hand.
The Brussels I Regulation was adopted in December 2000. Article 76 of the Regu-
lation determined that the Regulation was to enter into force on 1 March 2002. 
Regarding the temporal scope of application of the Regulation, the transitional 
provision of Article 66 provides:
“1. This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted and to 
documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments after 
the entry into force thereof.
1  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast) [2012] OJ L 351.
2  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12.
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2. However, if the proceedings in the Member State of origin were insti-
tuted before the entry into force of this Regulation, judgments given after 
that date shall be recognised and enforced in accordance with Chapter III,
(a) if the proceedings in the Member State of origin were instituted after 
the entry into force of the Brussels or the Lugano Convention both in the 
Member State of origin and in the Member State addressed;
(b) in all other cases, if jurisdiction was founded upon rules which accorded 
with those provided for either in Chapter II or in a convention concluded 
between the Member State of origin and the Member State addressed which 
was in force when the proceedings were instituted.”
The case law of the national courts shows that these apparently clear rules, when 
applied to the real cases, prove(d) to be quite problematic, especially regarding the 
recognition and enforcement3 of judgments. The original version of the Regula-
tion namely entered into force at different times in different Member States. What 
to do if, for example, at the time of issuing a judgment the original Regulation 
was in force in the country of origin of the judgment (e.g. in Slovenia in 2012), 
but not yet in the country where the enforcement of this judgment would later be 
sought (e.g. in Croatia), whereas the enforcement is sought when the Regulation 
is already in force also in the country of enforcement (e.g. in 2014)? What if the 
proceedings were instituted when the Regulation was in force in the country of 
origin (e.g. Italy in 2003), but not in the country of enforcement (e.g. the Czech 
Republic), whereas the judgment was issued when the Regulation was already in 
force in both countries “involved” (e.g. in 2005)? What if the judgment is de-
livered when the Regulation was in force in both countries (e.g. in Croatia and 
Slovenia in 2014), whereas the proceedings were instituted when the Regulation 
was in force only in the country of enforcement (e.g. in Slovenia in 2012), but not 
in the country of origin (e.g. Croatia)?
The Regulation of 2000 namely entered into force in different Member States 
in the moment of their accession to the European Union (hereinafter the EU). 
Almost half of today’s Member States entered the EU after the “initial” entry into 
force of the Regulation in March 2002. The question of the application of the 
Brussels I Regulation ratione temporis (and thus the application of the transitional 
provision of Article 66) has thus not lost its relevance in the several years following 
3  In this article, the term “enforcement” will be used in the sense of private international law, i.e. in the 
sense of the declaration of enforceability (exequatur) and not in the sense of the specific acts in the 
enforcement proceedings (e.g. seizure), which are conducted under the national law of the country 
where the enforcement is sought.
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the entry into force of the Regulation, as is usually the case regarding the tran-
sitional provisions in legislative acts, but continues to be relevant even after the 
adoption of the recast Regulation, limiting its temporal scope of application only 
to proceedings started after 10 January 2015.
Namely, if the Regulation of 2000 is applicable, it must naturally be applied as a 
whole, i.e. including its own transitional provision providing for an exceptional 
application to the judgments issued in proceedings started before the entry into 
force of this Regulation. Therefore, much time will still have to pass before a clear 
and unequivocal interpretation of Article 66 of the Brussels I Regulation of 2000 
will no longer be needed. This article will attempt to systematically present when 
during this on-going transitional period the original and the recast version of the 
Brussels I Regulation are temporally applicable. When they are not, the national 
laws of the Member States or, if they exist, the international treaties between the 
states “involved” must be applied.
Before we can begin the search for answers to the above questions, two deciding 
moments must be defined: first, for the purposes of application ratione tempo-
ris –What is the moment when the proceedings were initiated?; and second, for the 
purposes of application ratione temporis –When did the Regulation enter into force?
2. WHEN WERE THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED?
Different legal systems consider different moments as the starting point of judicial 
proceedings. This was obvious, for example, when the lispendens rule of Article 21 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 29 of the Brussels I bis Regulation) had to be 
interpreted. Some of the Member States namely consider the filing of the lawsuit 
as the beginning of the proceedings; some other Member States consider that pro-
ceedings start with the service of the introductory document on the defendant; 
the third group, however, considers that the determining moment is the handing 
over of the lawsuit to the person authorised for service. Furthermore, the moment 
of the beginning of the proceedings is not everywhere also the moment of the 
lispendens coming into existence. In Slovenian law, for example, the proceedings 
are instituted upon the filing of the lawsuit, but the moment of the establishment 
of lispendens is the service of the introductory document on the defendant, i.e. 
when the litigation is deemed to be started.4
4  Articles 179 and 189 of the Slovenian Civil Procedure Act of 1999 (Zakon o pravdnem postopku), Of-
ficial Gazette No. 26/1999, with further amendments 
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In 1984 the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter the CJEU)5 first declined to 
provide an autonomous interpretation of the term “court first seised” and referred 
the courts to the application of their national rules.6 However, as this approach 
proved to be problematic, since the courts of more than one country could con-
sider that they were the “court first seised”, the European legislature decided to 
insert a new rule in Article 30 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 32 of the Brus-
sels I bis Regulation). This rule provides that 
“a court shall be deemed to be seised: 1. at the time when the document 
instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the 
court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the 
steps he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant, or 
2. if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at 
the time when it is received by the authority responsible for service, pro-
vided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was 
required to take to have the document lodged with the court.” 
Article 30 expressly refers only to the rules on lispendens and the so-called re-
lated actions. It is questionable whether the interpretation of the term “court first 
seised” from this article can also be applied to the transitional provision of Article 
66. The problem is accentuated by the differences in different language versions 
of the Regulation, e.g. in the Slovenian version, the same term is used regarding 
lispendens and in Article 66, whereas different terms are used in the English and 
the French versions: “court first seised” and “tribunal saisi” (Article 27), and “pro-
ceedings instituted” and “actions judiciairesintentées”(Article 66), respectively.
The CJEU has not yet had the opportunity to provide an answer to this question, 
and the case law of national courts, according to the information available, diverg-
es. For example, in 2002 the Austrian Supreme Court adopted the interpretation 
that in spite of the restrictive introduction of Article 30 of the Brussels I Regula-
tion, the rule it contains should also be used to interpret the moment when the 
“proceedings are instituted” for the purposes of Article 66.7However, in December 
2003 and December 2004 the German Bundesgerichtshof found that the determin-
ing moment in Germany was the service of the lawsuit,8i.e. that the national law 
5  For the purposes of clarity, the current name of this court will be used throughout this article. 
6  CJEU, Zelger v. Salinitri, 129/83 of 7 June 1984.
7  Judgment No. 3 Nd 509/02 of 18 December 2002.
8  BGH, XI ZR 474/02 of 16 December 2003, and BGH, XI ZR 366/03 of 7 December 2004. In 2003 
the appellate court in Koblenz, Germany, decided on a case where the lawsuit was filed with the court 
before the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation, whereas this lawsuit was served on the defend-
ant after the entry into force of the Regulation. The court decided that Article 66 does not determine 
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is applicable to the question of when the lawsuit was filed.9 In February 2004 and 
in December 2005 the same court applied the interpretation of Article 30 of the 
Regulation to Article 66 and found that the determining moment was the filing 
of the lawsuit.10In 2005, an English court decided that the moment when the 
proceedings are initiated must be determined according to the national law of the 
country where the proceedings are being conducted.11
In the case of lispendens, where a “competition” between the courts of two or 
more countries must be resolved and the issuance of conflicting judgments pre-
vented, it is understandable that all courts must consider the same moment as the 
starting point of the proceedings. This is, however, probably not necessary in the 
case of the rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments from other 
Member States. Nevertheless, at least the law applicable to this question should 
be determined. If there were namely more options, the recognition or the declara-
tion of the enforceability of the same judgment could be assessed under different 
rules in different countries – in some of them the Brussels I Regulation would be 
considered applicable, in others, the conditions for such application would be 
considered to not be satisfied. In this regard, it seems reasonable to apply the law 
of the country where the proceedings which led to the issuance of the judgment 
were conducted.12Still, in such case, actions filed in different Member States at the 
same moment could be subjected to different rules – in one country the Brussels 
I Regulation and in the other the formerly applicable rules. Therefore, it would 
nevertheless be prudent to set up a uniform interpretation of the moment when 
the proceedings were initiated for the purposes of the temporal application of the 
Regulation.
the moment of the beginning of the proceedings, and also that the interpretation of Article 30 cannot 
be applied to the transitional provision; therefore, the national law of the Member State where the 
proceedings are being conducted must be applied, in this case German law (OLG Koblenz, No. 23 U 
199/02 of 7 March 2003, and the same also OLG Düsseldorf, No. I 23 U 70/03 of 30 January 2004, 
and OLG Düsseldorf, No. I 24 U 86/05 of 22 December 2005.
9  In German law proceedings are started when the lawsuit is served on the defendant (“Klageerhebung”, 
Article 261 of the German Civil Procedure Act (Zivilprozessordnung)).
10  BGH, III ZR 226/03 of 19 February 2004, and in BGH, III ZR 191/03 of 1 December 2005. Same 
also OLG Frankfurt, No. 16 U 26/04 of 25 November 2004.
11  High Court – queen’s Bench Division England, Advent Capital Plc v. GN Ellinas Imports- Exports 
Ltdand S. Trading Limited, No. [2005] EWHC 1242 (Comm) of 16 June 2005.
12  See also A. Borrás in: T. Simons, R. Hausmann (ed.), Brüssel I – Verordnung, Kommentar zur VO (EG) 
44/2001 und zum Übereinkommen von Lugano, IPR Verlag GmbH, München 2012, p. 1006.
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3.  WHEN DID THE REGULATION Of 2000 ENTER INTO fORCE/
bECOME APPLICAbLE?
The date of the applicability of the Regulation is the decisive moment in the 
determination whether the Regulation is applicable to the recognition and the 
enforcement of a certain judgment or not. The answer is clear concerning the 
recast version of the Regulation – it became applicable in all Member States of 
the EU on 10 January 2015. However, the Regulation of 2000 entered into force 
in March 2002 in the then Member States, in May 2004 in the ten new Member 
States, in 2007 in Romania and Bulgaria and in 2013 in Croatia. The question 
which showed to be the most problematic is whether the Regulation had to be in 
force/applicable in both countries “involved” at the beginning of the proceedings 
or at the moment of the issuance of the judgment, or if it suffices that the Regu-
lation was, at that time, in force only in the country of origin of the judgment 
(the country of origin) or, perhaps, only in the country where the recognition or 
enforcement is sought (the country of enforcement).
For example, in the Slovenian case law we can find several decisions in which the 
Brussels I Regulation was applied regarding the declaration of the enforceability 
of judgments from Member States which joined the EU before 2004, which were 
delivered after 1 March 2002, when the Regulation entered into force in those 
countries, but before 1 May 2004, when Slovenia entered the EU and the acquis 
communautaire became applicable. The courts expressly state that such judgments 
were issued after the Regulation entered into force.13 On the other hand, we can 
also find Slovenian case law in which it is explained that the proceedings had to be 
instituted after the entry into force of the Regulation in both states “involved”.14
The international doctrine is in agreement that, for the purposes of Article 66, the 
entry into force of the Regulation is the first day when the Regulation was in force 
in both the country of origin and the country of enforcement. If, at the moment 
13  For example, Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter the SC RS), 
No. Cp 2/2005 of 25 August 2005, regarding the recognition of an Italian judgment of 2003, where 
the court assessed whether it could apply the Brussels I Regulation and for that purpose verified on 
which rules the jurisdiction of the court of origin was based. It would have been correct for the court 
to establish that the Regulation is not applicable, since in 2003 it was not yet in force in Slovenia. See 
also Judgment of the SC RS No. Cpg 5/2006 of 26 February 2007 and Judgment No. Cp 22/2008 
of 15 January 2009. In the cases where the judgment was delivered after the entry into force of the 
Regulation in the country of origin and in Slovenia, however, this court often did not (expressly) verify 
when the proceedings were started, in order to establish whether the basis for jurisdiction of the court 
of origin had to be reviewed, e.g. Judgment of the SC RS No. Cp 13/2009 of 18 February 2010.
14  In Judgment No. Cp 7/2010 of 31 January 2011, the SC RS correctly justified the application of the 
Brussels I Regulation by establishing that the Polish judgment had been delivered in 2008 and the 
proceedings had been started in 2005.
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of the issuance of the judgment, the Regulation was not in force in both countries, 
its provisions cannot be applied to the recognition or declaration of the enforce-
ability of such judgment. On the other hand, the Regulation is always applicable 
if the proceedings were instituted and the judgment was delivered after the Regu-
lation had entered into force in both countries. Concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments issued after the entry into force of the Regulation in 
both countries, whereas the proceedings were instituted before the entry into force 
in both countries, the Regulation is applicable only under the special conditions 
of the transitional provision of Article 66.15
In 2012 the CJEU confirmed this interpretation. In the case Wolf Naturprodukte 
GmbH v. SEWAR spol. s r.o.16 the court ruled as follows: “Article 66(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be 
interpreted as meaning that, for that regulation to be applicable for the purpose of 
the recognition and enforcement of a judgment, it is necessary that at the time of 
delivery of that judgment the regulation was in force both in the Member State of 
origin and in the Member State addressed.” The case concerned the enforcement 
in the Czech Republic of an Austrian judgment delivered in 2003, whereas the 
Regulation entered into force in Austria in 2002 and in the Czech Republic in 
2004. At the moment of the issuance of the judgment, the Regulation was thus in 
force in the country of origin, but not yet in the country of enforcement, whereas 
it was already in force in both states at the time when the enforcement was sought.
The position that the Regulation in principle had to be in force in both countries 
already at the moment when the proceedings were instituted is logical if we would 
like to protect the defendant from the so-called exorbitant jurisdictions provided 
for in many national legislations. If the Regulation was not yet in force at the 
time of the beginning of the proceedings, the court will namely apply the national 
rules of the country of origin to determine its international jurisdiction. In cannot 
be self-evident that the judgment issued in such proceedings can profit from the 
more advantageous Brussels regime of recognition and enforcement just because 
15  See, e.g., P. Stone, EU Private International Law, 2nded., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, p. 236; A. 
Borrás in: T. Simons, R. Hausmann (eds.), op. cit. note 12, pp. 1004, 1005; P. Oberhammer in F. 
Stein, M. Jonas (eds.), Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 22nd ed., 2011, Band 10, Article 66, No. 
8, p. 777, and the references cited there; A. Galič, Die Anerkennung von gerichtlichen Entscheidungen in 
Slowenien, in: M. Kengyel, W. H. Rechberger (eds.), Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht: Bestandsauf-
nahme und Zukunftsperspektiven nach der EU-Erweiterung, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Graz, 
Vienna 2007, pp. 134, 135; M. Becker, K. Müller, Intertemporale Urteilsanerkennung und Art. 66 
EuGVO, in: IPrax, 2006, pp. 432-438.
16  C-514/10 of 21 June 2012.
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the country of origin has joined the EU while the proceedings were conducted.17 
It is, however, also important to emphasise that the same is true in the inverse case, 
i.e. if the country of origin was a Member State at the beginning of the proceed-
ings (thus the Regulation was already in force), whereas the country which is later 
requested to recognise this judgment was at that moment not yet a Member State. 
In disputes against defendants with domicile outside the EU18 the Member States 
will namely (in principle) apply the national rules that can provide for exorbi-
tant jurisdiction (as, for example, jurisdiction on the basis of the location of any 
property of the defendant(Article 58 of the Slovenian Private International Law 
and Procedure Act of 1999 (hereinafter the PILPA)19 or jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the plaintiff (Article 14 of the French Civil Code)). Even though 
the proceedings were initiated in one of the “old” Member States in the period 
between 1 March 2002 and 1 May 2004 (or the respective dates in 2007 and 2013 
regarding the accession of Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia), this does not entail 
that the jurisdiction was determined under the Brussels I Regulation.20 Therefrom 
we can deduce the need toreview the basis of jurisdiction in each individual case, 
even though the judgment was issued when the Regulation was already in force in 
both countries.21
17  Thus, in September 2013 the SC RS, in a situation where the Regulation was, at the time of the issu-
ance of the foreign judgment (2007), not yet in force in the country of origin of the judgment (Croa-
tia), but was already in force in the requested country (Slovenia), correctly decided that the Regulation 
was not applicable to the recognition of such judgment, even though at the time of the recognition 
proceedings the Regulation was already in force in both countries (Judgment No. Cpg 3/2013 of 10 
September 2013). However, some courts in the “old” Member States have encountered problems in 
such cases: e.g. the first instance court in Coburg (Germany) declared a Czech judgment from 2002 
enforceable under the Brussels I Regulation, even though the Czech Republic accessed the EU only in 
2004 (the opposite decision was later adopted by the appellate court in Bamberg: OLG Bamberg, No. 
3 W 17/05 of 9 February 2005).
18  Recognition and enforcement are very often requested in the country where the defendant has his/
her domicile or headquarters, since the defendant’s property or its biggest part is most often in that 
country.
19  Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku.
20  See also A. Galič, op. cit. note 15, pp. 134, 135, especially footnote No. 26.
21  We can mention two digressions from this logic: first, the Regulation is never applicable to judgments 
delivered before the Regulation was in force in both countries, regardless of the basis for the interna-
tional jurisdiction, which can also in these cases be perfectly acceptable and “accords” with the Regu-
lation’s rules; and second, the Regulation is always applicable to judgments delivered in proceedings 
started after the entry into force of the Regulation in both countries, even though the jurisdiction 
could, if the defendant was domiciled outside the EU, be exorbitant on the basis of the application of 
the national rules on international jurisdiction.
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4.  THE APPLICATION RATione TempoRiS Of THE RULES ON 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 
The rules on international jurisdiction are usually not very problematic from the 
point of view of their application ratione temporis. The Regulation is applicable 
to proceedings instituted after its entry into force in the country where the pro-
ceedings are being conducted. Since international jurisdiction is determined at 
the beginning of proceedings (the existence of international jurisdiction is one of 
the formal prerequisites for the court to start deciding on the merits of the case), 
international jurisdiction is not assessed again in subsequent stages of proceedings 
(it can only be verified if, regarding the circumstances at the beginning of the pro-
ceedings, international jurisdiction was determined correctly).
The question might arise as to how courts should act in cases where the Regulation 
entered into force after the beginning of the proceedings but before the court (of 
first instance) decided on its jurisdiction. The Brussels I Regulation does not con-
tain an express provision regarding this question. However, it can be deduced from 
the case law of the CJEU that the decisive moment is the beginning of the pro-
ceedings (“when the procedure is set in motion”;Ger. “wenn die Klageerhobenist”).22
As was explained above, the setting in motion of the proceedings is, however, 
interpreted differently in different Member States. In a case where the lawsuit was 
filed before the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation in Slovenia, but the 
first instance court was deciding onits jurisdiction when the Regulation had al-
ready entered into force, the Supreme Court of Slovenia decided that jurisdiction 
had to be assessed under the national rules on international jurisdiction (i.e. the 
PILPA) applicable at the beginning of the proceedings.23 Also the Austrian Su-
preme Court decided in 2003 that the Regulation was not applicable to lawsuits 
filed before the entry into force of the Regulation, even if the Regulation entered 
into force during the proceedings.24 In German law, however, proceedings begin 
with the service of the lawsuit on the defendant (as is also true for the coming into 
existence of the perpetuatiofori and the lispendens).25 In cases where the Regulation 
had not yet entered into force at the moment of the filing of the lawsuit, whereas it 
was already in force at the moment of the service of the lawsuit on the defendant, 
in assessing their jurisdiction the German courts would apply the Regulation.26
22  CJEU, Sanicentral GmbH v. René Collin, 25/79 of 13 November 1979. 
23   SC RS, Judgment No. III Ips 164/2008 of 3 February 2009.
24  OGH, No. 7 Ob 89/03v of 30 June 2003.
25  Klageerhebung, Rechtshängigkeit, Article 261/3 of the German Civil Procedure Act (Zivilprozessord-
nung).
26  OLG Koblenz, No. 23 U 199/02 of 7 March 2003, the same also in OLG Düsseldorf, No. I 23 U 
70/03 of 30 January 2004.
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It has also proven to be problematic which choice of court agreements had to 
be assessed under the Regulation, regarding the time of their conclusion and of 
their assertion in proceedings. Very early the CJEU had an opportunity to decide 
on the question of which legal act had to be applied in assessing the choice of 
court agreement if such was concluded before the entry into force of the Brussels 
Convention (the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation with very similar provi-
sions regarding choice of court agreements), while the proceedings in which this 
agreement was submitted were commenced when the Convention was already 
in force. The CJEU decided that the legislation in force at the beginning of the 
proceedings had to be applied, and not the legislation in force at the conclusion 
of the agreement. Therefore, in cases where the agreement was invalid under the 
national law of the chosen court, but valid under the Regulation, it is deemed to 
be valid.27 Such was also the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court in 2008. In 
cases where the choice of court agreement was concluded before the entry into 
force of the Brussels I Regulation, and the lawsuit was filed after the entry into 
force of the Regulation in both countries, the jurisdiction had to be assessed under 
the Regulation.28
Article 66 of the Regulation does not tackle the intertemporal application of the 
Regulation in the possibly problematic situations of lispendens, i.e. especially in 
cases where the first action was filed before the entry into force of the Regulation 
and the second one after its entry into force. When resolving this issue regarding 
the intertemporal application of the Brussels Convention, the CJEU decided for 
an analogous application of the transitional provision29 in that the Convention 
was applicable (i.e. that the court second seized must dismiss the claim after the 
court first seized has accepted its jurisdiction) if the court first seized based its 
jurisdiction on rules according with the jurisdictional rules of the Convention 
or the international treaty in force between the “involved” states when the pro-
ceedings were instituted; “if the court first seised has not yet ruled on whether it has 
jurisdiction, the court second seised must apply that article provisionally”.30 There is, 
27  CJEU, Sanicentral GmbH v. René Collin, 25/79 of 13 November 1979. For more on the question of 
the application ratione temporis of the choice of court agreements in the Brussels I Regulation, see J. 
Kramberger Škerl, Choice of Court Agreements in the Brussels I Regulation, in: Recent Trends in Euro-
pean Private International Law – Challenges for the national legislations of the south-east European 
countries: collection of papersIX Private International Law Conference, September 23, 2011, Saints 
Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law, 2011, pp. 127, 128.
28   OGH, No. 5Ob201/08g of 23 September 2008.
29   Article 54/2 of the Brussels Convention (the wording is parallel to Article 66/2 (b) of the Regulation).
30  CJEU, Elsbeth Freifrau von Horn v. Kevin Cinnamond, C-163/95 of 9 October 1997.
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in our opinion, no reason not to apply the same interpretation to Article 66 of the 
Regulation.31
4.   THE APPLICATION RATione TempoRiS Of THE RULES ON 
THE RECOGNITION AND ENfORCEMENT Of JUDGMENTS 
IN THE REGULATION Of 2000
Under Article 66 of the recast Regulation, this Regulation is only applicable to the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments issued in proceedings started after 10 
January 2015. The mere issuance of the judgment after that date does not suffice. 
If the proceedings were commenced earlier, the original version of the Regulation 
will apply.
As has been explained earlier, the Regulation of 2000 applies to the recognition of 
enforcement of judgments issued in proceedings started after its entry into force 
in the State of origin of the judgment as well as in the State of enforcement. In 
Article 66/2 the Brussels I Regulation of 2000 determines its application in the 
transitional period, i.e. in cases where, at the beginning of court proceedings, the 
Regulation had not yet entered into force in the country where the proceedings 
are being conducted or in the country where the recognition of enforcement of 
the judgment issued in the first country is later requested. In such cases, only if 
the conditions of this article are satisfied does the Regulation replace the national 
law and the existing international treaties between the Member States at issue.32
The purpose of the transitional provision is to guarantee that the Regulation would 
only be applicable if certain prerequisites are fulfilled, on the basis of which the 
Member States have enacted the simpler regime of the “movement” of judgments 
in the EU. The goal is to achieve predictability, i.e. that the parties can, at the 
beginning of proceedings, know under which conditions the judgment issued in 
these proceedings would be effective in other countries. Furthermore, the milder 
conditions for the recognition and enforcement of judgments from other Member 
States are based mainly on the supposition that the dispute was decided on the 
merits by a court whose jurisdiction was based on a connecting factor which is 
acceptable for the country of origin of the judgment as well as for the country in 
which the enforcement is requested (i.e.it was not the case of an exorbitant juris-
diction used against a person domiciled in the country of enforcement).33
31   Cf. P. Oberhammer in F. Stein, M. Jonas (eds.), Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 22nd ed., Band 
10, Article 66, No. 16, 2011, p. 779.
32  Which agreements these are is determined in Article 69 of the Brussels I Regulation.
33  See, e.g., P. Stone, EU Private International Law, 2nd ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, p. 237.
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Besides the determination of the moment when the lawsuit was filed, the defini-
tion of the moment when the judgment was issued can present difficulties, as the 
laws of different Member States also differ on this question. The convincing opin-
ion of the majority of authors is that the answer must be sought in the national 
law of the country where the judgment was issued.34
In this regard, another question should be addressed: What to do if the conditions 
for the recognition or enforcement under the Regulation are fulfilled regarding 
one part of the judgment (concerning the claims or the defendants) but not for 
the other part? In principle, partial recognition of a foreign judgment is possible if 
different parts are sufficiently autonomous and not interdependent. According to 
this principle, it should be possible to recognise the first part of the judgment un-
der the Regulation’s rules, and the other part under the national rules. If, however, 
the parts are not sufficiently autonomous, we should return to the finding that 
Article 66/2 only provides for exceptional application of the Regulation, therefore 
the Regulation cannot be applied if only one part of the judgment fulfils its condi-
tions and the other not; the national rules should prevail in such cases.
Regarding the structure of Article 66/2, three situations must be distinguished: 
first, the Regulation was not in force either at the beginning of the proceedings 
or when the judgment was issued; second, the Regulation was not in force at the 
beginning of the proceedings, but was in force when the judgment was issued; and 
third, the Regulation was in force at the beginning of the proceedings and when 
the judgment was issued.
5.1  The Proceedings were Initiated and the Judgment was Issued before the 
Entry into force of the Regulation of 2000
Article 66/1of the Brussels I Regulation determines that the “Regulation shall apply 
only to legal proceedings instituted and to documents formally drawn up or registered as 
authentic instruments after the entry into force thereof.” The Regulation rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments are thus normally applicable only to 
judgments issued in proceedings started after the entry into force of the Regulation 
in both countries “involved”. The exceptions of the second paragraph of Article 
66 apply only to judgments issued after the Regulation was already in force. There-
fore, it is not possible (regardless of the basis for international jurisdiction or any 
other circumstance) to apply the Regulation to the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments issued before the Regulation was in force in both the country of ori-
34  See, e.g. P. Oberhammer in F. Stein, M. Jonas (eds.), Kommentar zur Zivil prozessordnung, 22nd ed., 
Band 10, Article 66, No. 7, 2011, p. 776 and the references cited there.
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gin and the country of enforcement. The national rules regulating the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments will apply.
5.2.  The Proceedings Were Initiated before the Entry into force of the 
Regulation of 2000, while the Judgment was Issued after the Entry into 
force of the Regulation
Article 66/2 of the Regulation of 2000 refers to cases when the rules of the Regula-
tion are exceptionally applicable to the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
issued in other Member States after the entry into force of the Regulation, even if 
the condition under the first paragraph is not fulfilled (i.e. at the moment of the 
beginning of the proceedings the Regulation was not yet in force). This is possible: 
“(a) if the proceedings in the Member State of origin were instituted after 
the entry into force of the Brussels or the Lugano Convention both in the 
Member State of origin and in the Member State addressed;
(b) in all other cases, if jurisdiction was founded upon rules which accorded 
with those provided for either in Chapter II or in a convention concluded 
between the Member State of origin and the Member State addressed which 
was in force when the proceedings were instituted.”
5.2.1.   The proceedings were initiated after the entry into Force of the Brussels or 
the lugano Convention in both the Country of origin and in the Country of 
enforcement
The exception of point a) is applicable regarding “old” Member States, i.e. the 
countries where the Brussels Convention of 196835 was applicable before the entry 
into force of the Brussels I Regulation of 2000, as well as regarding the countries 
which were, at the beginning of the court proceedings, bound by the Lugano 
Convention. The Brussels I Regulation is namely the successor of the Brussels 
Convention and its wording is very similar to the wording of the convention, 
with some actualisations and amendments. The Lugano Convention of 198836 
was concluded between the then Member States of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and the then Member States of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA). The Lugano Convention had practically the same wording as the 
Brussels Convention, as its purpose was to enlarge the successful “Brussels regime” 
35  Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.
36  Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.
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to EFTA members. The Lugano Convention was open to accession by other coun-
tries, however only Poland accessed and the Convention entered into application 
there in 2000.37 Poland became a Member State of the EU in 2004, when the Lu-
gano Convention was replaced, in relation to other Member States, by the Brussels 
I Regulation. In 2007, the EU concluded a recast Lugano Convention with Ice-
land, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.38 The text of the new Convention 
is in concordance with that of the Brussels I Regulation of 2000.
Article 66/2(a) of the Brussels I Regulation expressly determines that the Brussels 
or Lugano Conventions had to be in force at the beginning of court proceedings 
in both the country of origin and the country of enforcement. The situation is 
thus analogous to cases where the proceedings started after the entry into force of 
the Brussels I Regulation and should not present much difficulty.
Nevertheless, in 2006, the German Supreme Court decided on the following case. 
The proceedings started when the Brussels Convention was in force in both the 
country of origin and the country of enforcement, while the judgment was de-
livered when the Brussels I Regulation was already in force in both countries. 
The jurisdiction of the court was based on Article 13 of the Brussels Convention, 
which determines jurisdiction in consumer disputes. The parallel Article 15 of the 
Regulation was, however, slightly different, so that the jurisdiction could not have 
been based on that article, even though the actually applied Article 13 of the Con-
vention was not violated. The question arose whether it is possible to refuse a dec-
laration of enforceability under Article 35/1 of the Brussels I Regulation, which 
provides that the judgment is not declared enforceable if the Regulation’s rules on 
the protection of consumers were not respected in the proceedings of origin of the 
judgment. The court judged that that was not possible.39
The court left open the question of what should be done if it is established that 
the court of origin of the judgment erroneously applied the provisions of the Brus-
sels Convention. Commentators are of the opinion that the requested court can 
review the correctness of the application of the provisions of the Brussels or the 
Lugano Convention in the case of a consumer or insurance dispute or exclusive 
jurisdiction.40
37  A. Borrás, I. Neophytou, F. Pocar, 13th Report on National Case Law Relating to the Lugano Conventions, 
May 2012, URL=https://www.bj.admin.ch//content/dam/data/wirtschaft/ipr/lugjurispr-13-e.pdf. Ac-
cessed on 14 February 2014, p. 21.
38  Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters, UL L 339 of 21 December 2007.
39  BGH, Judgment of the IX Senate No. IX ZB 102/04 of 30 March 2006. 
40  N. Joubert, M. Weller in: T. Simons, R. Hausmann (eds.), op. cit., pp. 1010, 1011.
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5.2.2.   The Jurisdiction was Based on the Rules of Chapter ii of the Regulation 
If the proceedings were initiated before the entry into force of the Brussels I Regu-
lation or one of the aforementioned conventions, the application of the Regula-
tion’s rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments from other Member 
States is also possible if the jurisdiction of the court which issued the judgment 
was based on “rules which accorded with those provided for […] in Chapter II”, i.e. 
the chapter devoted to international jurisdiction.
The question could arise whether the requested court must verify if the jurisdic-
tion would have existed in general, i.e. under any of the rules of the Regulation, or, 
on the other hand, it must be verified whether the actually applied rule “accords” 
with any of the rules of the Regulation. Namely ,we can think of a case where the 
court in the country of origin would base its jurisdiction on one of the exorbitant 
jurisdictions, for example because some movable property of the defendant is situ-
ated in that country, whereas we would see from the circumstances of the case 
that the court could have established its jurisdiction also, for example, because the 
contractual obligation was to be fulfilled in that country (such rule is provided for 
in Article 5/1 of the Regulation).
Since Article 66/2 provides for exceptions and the exceptions must be interpreted 
strictly, and the Regulation furthermore expressly states that the jurisdiction was 
founded on rules which accorded with those of its Chapter II, we think that, 
from the point of view of the Regulation, it would be correct to assess only the 
specific basis for jurisdiction cited in the foreign judgment.41 Thus, the question 
which must be resolved is whether, in case the Regulation had already been in 
force in the country of origin and would thus be applied, the court would have 
had jurisdiction on the basis of the cited connecting factor. There are certainly 
many cases where it is difficult to take that decision and draw a line between rules 
41  It must be noted that the adoption of the opinion that the courts should verify if the court of origin 
could have had jurisdiction on the basis of a circumstance that that court had not actually deemed 
as determining would open new questions and problems. Under Article 35/2 of the Regulation, the 
requested court is namely, when reviewing the jurisdiction, bound by the establishment of the facts on 
which the court in the country of origin based its jurisdiction. Therefore, the requested court could in 
no case establish that the jurisdiction in a specific case could have also been based on other facts not 
established by the court of origin. Thus, the specific basis of jurisdiction cited by the court of origin 
will be decisive. It could be established that the facts established by the foreign court could obviously 
serve as a connecting factor regarding another basis of jurisdiction that is acceptable from the point of 
view of the Regulation, but in such a case the question again arises what to do if the national law of the 
country of origin applied by the court of origin does not provide for such a basis for jurisdiction.Cf. 
P. Oberhammer in F. Stein, M. Jonas (eds.), Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 22nded., Band 10, 
Article 66, No. 11, 2011, p. 778. The author is of opinion that the court in the country of enforcement 
is not bound by the rules on jurisdiction applied by the court of origin; however, it is bound by that 
court’s findings on the facts.
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which “accord” and those which do not. It is naturally not necessary that the ap-
plied provision contains exactly the same wording as the Regulation, however 
the purpose and the meaning of the applied rule should be compared to that of 
the Regulation’s rule, and the principle of the strict interpretation of exceptions 
should also be respected.
The task of the courts is made easier by the list of exorbitant jurisdictions contained 
in Annex I to the Regulation. Those are the jurisdictions that are certainly not ac-
ceptable from the point of view of the Regulation so that judgments issued on the 
basis of such jurisdictions (in proceedings that started before the entry into force 
of the Regulation) cannot be recognised or declared enforceable under the Regula-
tion. Besides the already cited jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s property 
(provided for, e.g., in the national legislation of Slovenia,42the United Kingdom, 
and Croatia), such exorbitant jurisdictions also include jurisdiction based on a 
temporary residence of the defendant in Slovenia (Article 48 of the PILPA)43, ju-
risdiction on the basis of the plaintiff’s nationality(France), or jurisdiction on the 
basis of the service of the lawsuit on the defendant (United Kingdom).44
In assessing whether the jurisdiction was based on rules similar enough to those 
of the Brussels I Regulation, one must also pay attention to the so-called derived 
jurisdictions of Article 6 of the Regulation (Article 8 of the Brussels I bis Regula-
tion). These are the possibilities of the joinder of actions that are provided for by 
the Regulation in the case of multiple defendants, counter-claims, third party 
proceedings, and connected actions in rem and in personam. If there are several 
claims or several defendants, it must be verified if the joinder of actions regarding 
different claims or defendants would also have been permitted under the Brussels 
I Regulation. If, for example, in the case of multiple defendants, the jurisdiction 
regarding one of the defendants has been based on a choice of court agreement 
and for the second one on the basis of the joinder of actions, the condition of 
Article 66/2 would not have been fulfilled regarding the second defendant, since 
the Brussels I Regulation only permits a joinder of actions before the court of the 
place of domicile of one of the defendants and not before any of the courts compe-
42  Article 58 of the PILPA provides: “(1) A court in the Republic of Slovenia shall also have jurisdiction in 
disputes regarding property claims when the object of the suit is located in the territory of the Republic 
of Slovenia. (2) If any of the defendant’s property is located in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, 
then a court in the Republic of Slovenia shall also have jurisdiction if the defendant’s permanent resi-
dence or head office is in the Republic of Slovenia, provided that the plaintiff proves as probable that 
the decision can be enforced out of this property.”
43  Article 48/2 of the PILPA provides: “If the defendant does not have his/her permanent residence in the 
Republic of Slovenia or any other country, then a court in the Republic of Slovenia shall have jurisdic-
tion if the defendant’s temporary residence is in the Republic of Slovenia.”
44  See Annex I to the Brussels I Regulation.
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tent for the first defendant under the Regulation (Article 6/1 of the Regulation).45 
The CJEU interprets the rules on the joinder of actions strictly, since this is an 
exception to the general rules; in the case Réunioneuropéenne the CJEU thus re-
jected the joinder of actions before the court of the place of the performance of 
the contractual obligation.46
Finally, it should be emphasised that the exception of Article 66/2(b) is only ap-
plicable if the judgment contains information on the basis for jurisdiction applied 
by the court of origin. If this information is not provided it should be deemed that 
the condition of the “according” rule on jurisdiction is not satisfied.47
5.2.3.   An international Treaty Concerning international Jurisdiction was in Force 
Between the Country of origin and the Country of enforcement at the Time 
when the proceedings were initiated
The second situation regulated by Article 66/2(b) is that an international treaty 
between the countries “involved” was in force at the beginning of the proceedings 
that provided for common rules on international jurisdiction. Since the main 
purpose of the transitional provision is to guarantee that the jurisdiction of the 
court which issued the judgment was based on a connecting factor acceptable to 
all countries “involved”, i.e. that no exorbitant jurisdiction was applied against 
a person domiciled in the country of enforcement, such purpose can also be at-
tained if the jurisdiction was based on a common rule on international jurisdic-
tion adopted by the country of origin and the country of enforcement. Thus, in 
such cases, the rules of the Brussels I Regulation are also applicable to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments (naturally, only those delivered after the entry 
into force of the Regulation in both countries).
As in the case of judgments delivered under the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels 
or Lugano Conventions, the possibility of the refusal of recognition or a declara-
tion of enforceability on the basis of Article 35/1 of the Regulation (i.e. because 
certain most important rules of the Regulation were not applied regarding the 
jurisdiction of the court of origin) must also be denied in cases where the jurisdic-
45  See, e.g., S. Corneloup and C. Althammer in: T. Simons, R. Hausmann (eds.), op. cit., p. 302. Under 
the Regulation the court must thus not only be in the country but also in the place of the domicile of 
the defendant.
46  CJEU, Réunioneuropéenne v. Spliethoff’sBevrachtingskantoor, C-51/97 of 27 October 1998.
47  N. Joubert, M. Weller in: T. Simons, R. Hausmann (eds.), op. cit., pp. 1011, 1012, and the case law of 
the Austrian Supreme Court and the Swiss courts cited therein.
Jerca Kramberger Škerl: THE APPLICATION “RATIONE TEMPORIS” OF THE BRUSSELS I ... 359
tion was (correctly) founded on a bilateral agreement between the countries. A re-
view of jurisdiction from the point of view of public policy is also excluded(Article 
35/3 of the Regulation).
5.3.  The Proceedings Were Initiated and the Judgment Was Issued after the 
Entry into force of the Regulation
Regarding the original and the recast version of the Regulation, in cases where the 
court proceedings started after the entry into force of the Regulation in both the 
country of origin as well as the country of enforcement, the Regulation applies 
without a review of any other circumstances being necessary (naturally within its 
scope of application ratione personaeand rationemateriae).
It must also be emphasised that in this case, the rules on the recognition and the 
enforcement from the Regulation are applicable regardless of whether the jurisdic-
tion was, in the specific case, also determined under the Regulation.48The Regula-
tion’s rules on jurisdiction are namely in principle (with some exceptions) only 
applicable if the defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State, otherwise the 
national rules should be applied to determine the international jurisdiction of the 
court of origin. Thus, it can happen that the possibly existing exorbitant jurisdic-
tions from the national legislation are applied and the judgment will nevertheless 
be able to be recognised and enforced in other EU Member States under the 
“Brussels regime” (except for the exception of Article 72 of both Regulations).49 
The exorbitant jurisdictions cannot even be asserted indirectly, via the public pol-
icy defence, because Article 35/3 of the Regulation of 2000 (Article 45/3 of the 
recast) expressly forbids the review of jurisdiction from the point of view of public 
policy.50 If, in such cases, it is not guaranteed that the court decides on the basis of 
a jurisdiction that is acceptable in the EU context, at least predictability is guar-
anteed, since it is clear from the beginning of the proceedings that the judgment 
48  See, e.g., P. Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws, 4th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 221.
49  Article 35/1 of the Brussels I Regulation. Article 72 of the Regulation determines the following: “This 
Regulation shall not affect agreements by which Member States undertook, prior to the entry into 
force of this Regulation pursuant to Article 59 of the Brussels Convention, not to recognise judgments 
given, in particular in other Contracting States to that Convention, against defendants domiciled or 
habitually resident in a third country where, in cases provided for in Article 4 of that Convention, 
the judgment could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction specified in the second paragraph of 
Article 3 of that Convention.”
50  It would only be possible to assert, on the basis of Article 35/1, that the court did not apply the Reg-
ulation’s rules on jurisdiction in insurance and consumer matters or on exorbitant jurisdiction, even 
though it should have done so – i.e. that the court incorrectly applied the national rules instead of the 
Regulation.
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issued in these proceedings will profit from the “Brussels regime” of recognition 
and enforcement.
6. CONCLUSION
In principle, the procedural rules in force at the time of the proceedings are ap-
plied. Hence, since during the proceedings (from the beginning of the proceedings 
until the judgment takes effect) the procedural rules can change, such situations 
are regulated in the transitional provisions of the newer legislation. The Brussels I 
Regulation of 2000, arguably the most important EU act in the field of EU Civil 
Procedure, and its successor the recast Brussels I Regulation of 2012 contain such 
provision in Article 66.
The transitional provision of the Regulations demands the application of each 
Regulation in cases where court proceedings were initiated after the entry into 
force of such Regulation. Regarding the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments from other EU Member States, however, the Brussels I Regulation of 2000 
provides for an exception: the Regulation is also applicable in cases where the 
proceedings were started before its entry into force, but only if the judgment was 
issued after its entry into force and the jurisdiction of the court issuing the judg-
ment was based on a connecting factor which is acceptable in the EU context or 
at least by the two “involved” states.
Many problems in the interpretation of the aforementioned rules arose regard-
ing the moment of the entry into force of the Regulation of 2000. In an absolute 
sense, the Regulation entered into force on 1 March 2002, but naturally only 
in the then EU Member States. In the countries that entered the EU later, the 
Regulation entered into force on the date of their accession, i.e. in 2004, 2007, or 
2013. Which date should thus be deemed as the date of the entry into force of the 
Regulation, if it entered into force on different dates in the country of origin of 
the judgment and in the country where the recognition or the declaration of the 
enforceability of the judgment is requested? The interpretation adopted by legal 
doctrine was finally confirmed by the CJEU in 2012, when it adjudged that, for 
the purposes of the application of Article 66 of the Regulation, the Regulation is 
deemed to have entered into force on the later of the aforementioned dates.
The analysis of the most common possible situations where the application of the 
Regulation of 2000ratione temporis could prove problematic shows that the judge 
must executea meticulous task in interpreting the transitional provision of Article 
66. The work of the courts can be especially difficult in cases where the application 
of the Regulation depends on the question of whether the court that issued the 
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judgment based its jurisdiction on a substantially same rule as is contained in the 
Regulation. The courts must also be vigilant of the possible application of the rules 
on the joinder of proceedings that must also be assessed from the point of view of 
the Regulation’s provisions on such joinder. In the event of doubt, we suggest a 
strict interpretation of the transitional provision.
Lastly, a brand new issue must be mentioned when speaking of the application ra-
tione temporis, namely the so-called Brexit. The United Kingdom will soon leave 
the EU, probably somewhere in 2019. Under which rules should the remaining 
Member States recognize and enforce British judgments after that date? Under 
both versions of the Brussels I Regulation, the “Brussels regime” is provided for 
the “judgments given in a Member State”. Does this mean that the State of origin 
had to be a Member State at the moment of the issuing of the judgment or also 
at the moment when the enforcement is sought in another (still) Member State? 
This is just one of the numerous questions and problems Brexit raises in private 
international law that will have to be resolved in the following years.
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THE EffECTIVENESS Of MUTUAL TRUST IN CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EU
ABSTRACT
According to the sociologist Niklas Luhman trust represents a ‘confidence in one’s own expecta-
tion to another person’s behavior. With such understanding of the etymology of the term “trust”, 
its position in the everyday life has paramount importance in the social interaction of humans. 
Therefore, the understanding of the term ‘mutual trust’ must be derived from its definition as 
a basic fact of social life and a component of human behavior. This term has reached new level 
of meaning in Europe with the creation of the European Union. The whole apparatus of cross-
border cooperation in criminal and civil matters in the EU is centered around the principle 
of “mutual trust” and its influence regarding “mutual recognition”. In this article the authors 
will address these aspects from different point of views: cross-border cooperation in criminal 
matters and in civil matters in order to determine whether “mutual trust” really exist between 
the designated stakeholders in criminal and in civil matters, and try to identify the reasons for 
the drawbacks. Having in mind that these two fields are completely different, the authors will 
try to find common ground in the actual effective implementation of the principle of ‘mutual 
trust’ and understand the functioning of the principle in these two fields. Alternatively, their 
proposition is that the main stakeholders in the EU should use their resources in building a 
long term ‘actual trust’ instead of politically motivated ‘mutual trust’ that creates notable dif-
ficulties in the functioning of the ‘mutual recognition’ in the EU.
Keywords: Mutual trust, mutual recognition, European Union, recognition and enforcement, 
foreign judgments, EU private international law, EU criminal law.
1.  INTRODUCTION
One of the main objectives of the European instruments of cross border cooperation 
in criminal and in civil matters is to achieve the ‘free movement of court decisions’, 
to create a ‘genuine judicial area’ within the ‘area of freedom security and justice’ 
and recognizing and enforcing all judgments given in Member States in the Euro-
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pean Union without a formal recognition procedure.1As a prerequisite for achieving 
such objectives the EU has established the principle of mutual recognition as a key 
concept and a vital rule for construction of an area which unites the diversity of 28 
Member States.2In order to have proper functioning of the internal market (later 
in other areas) this principle3 has been established as an alternative for the full sub-
stantive harmonization which in general is unachievable.4Having in mind that full 
substantive harmonization cannot be achieved, in order to effectively materialize 
free movement of goods/services/people Member States have to recognize standards 
of another Member State which can be potentially lower or at least different than 
their own.5However this “cheap alternative”6 of full substantive harmonization as it 
is sometimes referred to7,does not mean that Member States should not have some 
degree of minimum approximation of their legal standards. Nevertheless the ques-
tion is how much degree of equivalence or approximation of standards is essential 
precondition for mutual recognition.8In all of these cases in which mutual recogni-
tion is carried out, mutual trust is the main component for its functioning.9
The idea of introducing mutual recognition in the area of recognition of de-
cisions between the Member States was also based on the principle of mutual 
‘confidence’.10 Further in the Commissions’ White Paper from 1985,the mutual 
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 
- Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union’, COM (2014) 144 final of 11 March 
2014.
2  This article has been written during the United Kingdom’s prospective withdrawal from the European 
Unionknown as ‘Brexit’ and its final outcome.  
3  Firstly, introduced with the Cassis de Dijon case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolver-
waltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 00649). See also Communication from the Commission con-
cerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in case 
120/78 (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1980] OJ C 256, p. 2–3
4  Möstl M., Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recondition, Common Market Law Review, No.47, 
2010, p.406. 
5  Weller, M., Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Private International Law, Journal of 
Private International Law, Issue 1, 2015,  p.76.
6  Möstl M., op.cit. note 4,  p. 407
7  Möstl M., op.cit. note 4, p.407; Kerber W.,Vanden Bergh R., “Unmasking Mutual Recognition: Cur-
rent Inconsistencies and Future Chances”,Marburg Papers on Economics, No. 11, 2007, available at 
URL=<https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2007-11_kerber.pdf>;
8  Möstl M., op.cit. note 4,  p.418.
9  Weller, M.,, op.cit. note 5, p. 65; Canor I., My brother’s keeper? Horizontal solange: “An ever closer distrust 
among the peoples of Europe”, 50 Common Market Law Review, Issue 2, 2013, p. 400; Wischmeyer, 
T., Generating Trust Through Law? – Judicial Cooperation in the European Union and the ‘Principle of 
Mutual Trust’, 17 German L. J., 2016, p. 341.
10  Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968) by Mr P. Jenard OJ  No. C 59/1, pp. 46-47.
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‘confidence’ has been restated as the ‘principle of mutual trust’ which is precondi-
tion for mutual recognition in the single market.11In this fashion, the principle has 
been adopted and explained, establishing the nexus between mutual recognition 
and mutual trust.12
The whole idea of the cross border cooperation in the EU is ‘to make sure that the 
bridges built between Member States’ legal systems are structurally sound’.13The 
basis for the functioning of the whole EU legal system in the EU is mutual 
trust.14In view of the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the 
European Convention on Human Rights it was stated that the principle of mu-
tual trust is at the heart of the EU and a “fundamental premise” of the European 
legal structure.15 Often it is reiterated that ‘mutual trust is cornerstone of judicial 
co-operation in the EU’.16Moreover, this position is reassured even by the ECtHR 
where it is stated that the Brussels regime in the EU ‘is based on the principle of 
‘mutual trust in the administration of justice’ in the European Union’.17
The principle of ‘mutual trust’ from the perspective of the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign decisions in the EU18 is manifested through the principle of ‘mu-
tual recognition’. However, ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition,’ understood 
as terms and principles, are not synonyms. Mutual recognition of judgments is a 
goal, an objective,19 while the principle of mutual recognition is a legal principle 
of EU law20, a cornerstone of the internal market, and a fundamental principle in 
judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.21 On the other hand, mutual 
trust is an obligation of all the authorities of a Member State to trust the authori-
11  Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission of the European Communities 
to the European Council, COM (85) 310 final, Brussels, 14.06.1985, para.93  
12  Wischmeyer, T., op.cit. note 9,  p. 351
13  The EU Justice Agenda for 2020, p. 144
14  European Commission, Press Release ‘Building Trust in Justice Systems in Europe: ‘Assises de la Justice’ 
Forum to Shape the Future of EU Justice Policy’, 21 November 2013.
15  See Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para.168 and 169.
16  European Commission, Press Release Towards a true European area of Justice: Strengthening trust, mo-
bility and growth, 11 March 2014.
17  Avotiņš v Latvia,  app.no. 17502/07,  par. 49.
18  But also in other fields of EU law.
19  Arenas García R., Abolition of Exequatur: Problems and Solutions – Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust 
and Recognition of Foreign Judgments: Too Many Words in the Sea, yearbook of Private International Law, 
2010, p. 362.
20  C-120/79 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1980] ECR 00731. 
21  Kramer, X., Cross-Border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial? Towards Principles of 
European Civil Procedure, International Journal of  Procedural Law, 2011,  p. 209.
Boban Misoski, Ilija Rumenov: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MUTUAL TRUST IN CIVIL ... 367
ties of the other Member State and therefore to assume their decisions,22 and is 
the cornerstone in the construction of a true European judicial area.23In the area 
of criminal justice, mutual trust between Member States has been strengthened by 
progressively establishing, throughout the EU, a set of fair trial rights by means of 
common, EU-wide, minimum standards to protect persons suspected or accused 
of a crime.24 Thus, mutual trust is a factual and political ground for the imple-
mentation of mutual recognition: and on the other hand when mutual trust exists, 
mutual recognition should be improved.25
Such position shows how important ‘mutual trust’ is for the area of freedom securi-
ty and justice in the EU. This article will initially provide a brief explanation of the 
understanding of trust as a psychological, philosophical and social phenomenon. 
Further this article will address two aspects of mutual trust from different point of 
views. The first part will elaborate the mutual trust of cross-border cooperation in 
criminal matters while the second part will refer to the cross border cooperation in 
the EU in civil matters (highlighting the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decisions, especially the child abduction cases), in order to determine whether 
“mutual trust” really exists between the designated stakeholders in criminal and in 
civil matters, and try to identify the reasons for the drawbacks.
2. UNDERSTANDING Of TRUST IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
Trust is something that we became acquainted with from our earliest age. For ex-
ample, the first demonstration of social trust in the baby is in the ease of his feed-
ing or the depth of his sleep.26In context of such events, trust is understood as an 
essential truthfulness of others as well as a fundamental sense of one’s own trust-
worthiness.27 In the transition from infancy to adulthood along, there are different 
points of trust and with that people in general are having different level of natural 
trust as their “trust baseline” or default level of trust.28 Over this “trust baseline” 
22  Arenas García R., op.cit. note 19, p.  375.
23  European Council, ‘The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
the citizens’, [2010] OJ C 115, p. 11.
24  The EU Justice Agenda for 2020, p. 144
25  Arenas García R., op.cit. note 19, p. 362.
26  Erikson identifies eight stages trough which healthy individual passes from infancy to adulthood. The 
first stage is where the basic interactions with his/her parents leads to trust or mistrust.  Erikson E., 
Childhood and Society, Paladin Grafton Books, London, 1950,  p.222. 
27  The general state of trust, furthermore, implies not only that one has learned to rely on the sameness 
and continuity of the outer providers, but also that one may trust oneself and the capacity of one’s 
own organs to cope with urges; and that one is able to consider oneself trustworthy enough so that the 
providers will not need to be on guard least they be nipped. Erikson E., op. cit. note 26, p.222
28  Cross F., Law and Trust, 93 Georgetown Law Journal 1457, 2005, p. 1462.
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there are other factors which influence the development of trust or mistrust such 
as the surrounding circumstances and what is being entrusted.29
From philosophical perspective, it is argued whether trust can be attributed to 
machines because they are lacking will.30 More over such position trough wide 
interpretation can be even extended to the state institutions.31
The understanding of the term ‘mutual trust’ must be derived from its definition 
as a basic fact of social life that is the understanding of trust as a component of 
human behavior. Trust is described as ‘confidence in one’s expectations for other 
peoples’ behavior’.32 Therefore, trust directly influences the perception of com-
plexity of life with all its incidents and possibilities. Trust is a behavior meant to 
reduce complexity to the degree that decisions about present alternatives of ac-
tions can be taken with a view to the future.33 On the other hand, trust is reduced 
where control is guaranteed.34 In this context, law plays important role in society, 
because it provides certainty by control.35 So from a sociological point of view, law 
and trust represent functional equivalents.36 In context of cross-border coopera-
tion within the EU, the search for better procedures represents a search for the 
balance between trust and control.
3.  MUTUAL TRUST Of CROSS-bORDER COOPERATION IN 
CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE EU
Ius Puniendi is traditionally considered as emanate power of one state. However, 
with the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the EU’s Area of Freedom Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) it appeared that the EU Member States have individually re-
duced this original right which was until than jealously guarded and considered as 
un-transferable and un-detachable part of a state sovereignty. Furthermore, start-
ing with the establishment of the mutual recognition of the decisions in the crimi-
nal matters, based upon the principle of mutual trust, the EU Member States have 
steadily moved towards the creation of the mutual EU Criminal Law. In this fash-
ion, Andre Klip37 has noted that the European criminal justice system is emerging 
29  Ibid.
30  Jones K., Trust as an Affective Attitude, Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 1, October 1996, p.14.
31  Ibid.
32  Luhmann N., Vertrauen, 4th ed., Frankfurt, 2000,  p.1, (translated by Weller, M., op.cit. note 5, p. 68).
33  Weller, M., op.cit. note 5, p. 68.
34  Luhmann N., op.cit. note 32, p. 19.
35  Weller, M., op.cit. note 5, p. 68.
36  Weller, M., op.cit. note 5, p. 69.
37  Klip, A., European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach, 2nd edition, Intersentia, Cambridge/ Ant-
werp, 2012, p. 425
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trough the gradual establishment of Union bodies and offices such as Europol, 
Eurojust, the European Judicial Network, and the European Public Prosecutor’s 
office38, by merging the two areas as provided by the Treaty of Lisbon. As he con-
tinues, this was a result of the Member States’ obligation to enforce the Union 
law and the application of the supervisory mechanism that allows the Union to 
be characterized as a criminal justice system sui generis that applies the rule of law.
Bearing this in mind, it is of essential importance to examine whether the prin-
ciple of mutual trust in the criminal matters between the Member States was the 
driving force for such expansion and creation of the EU Criminal Law. 
Considering the beginnings of this idea, namely the implementation of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) or better known as 
Schengen Agreement, it was obvious that the EU Member States needed instru-
ment which would replace the existing cumbersome procedures for mutual co-
operation in the area of criminal law.39 With the establishment of the principles 
developed in the internal market of the EU, several problems have risen regarding 
the crimes, as part of the third pillar of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which 
were performed in the Schengen area. These problems were primarily based on 
the fact that until then assistance between the EU Member States in the criminal 
justice area rested solely upon the bilateral or multilateral Treaties which were 
overburdened, overcomplicated and ineffective as such.40 Solution to this was the 
creation of the EU instrument for recognition of the EU Member State’s decisions 
in the area of the criminal justice and as such to accept it into the national criminal 
justice system.41 These were the reasons for establishing the idea of mutual recog-
nition. However, this principle could not be accepted if it was not based upon the 
principle of mutual trust of the EU Member States’ criminal justice system, trust 
that the other Member State’s criminal justice system is equally democratic and 
bears equally effective mechanisms for protection of the human rights. In essence, 
this means that one EU Member State recognizes a decision performed within the 
criminal justice system of another EU Member States trusting that this decision 
was performed considering the same or similar procedural guarantees as estab-
38  Caianiello, M., The Proposal for a Regulation on the Establishment of an European Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice: Everything Changes, or Nothing Changes, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
justice, No.21, 2013, pp. 5-25.
39  Spencer, J.R., in European Union Law, Bernard C. and Peers S., Eds., Oxford University Press, 2014, 
pp. 755-756.
40  Chalmers, D., Davies,G. and Monty, G., European Union Law, 2-nd Edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, pp. 583-586; or Woods, L., Watson, P., Steiner and Woods EU Law, 11-th Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 576-578.
41  Kaczorowska, A.,European Union Law, 3-rd Edition, Routledge, 2013, pp.  943-945.
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lished within the criminal justice system of the recognizing state. Furthermore, 
this principle of mutual recognition based upon mutual trust means that the crim-
inal justice systems of the EU Member States are based upon same principles and 
bear same ethical and legislative values which are of immense importance for just 
and effective criminal justice system.42As Valsamis Mitsilegas defines mutual rec-
ognition - “a journey into the unknown”, where national authorities are in prin-
ciple obliged to recognize standards emanating from the national system of any 
EU Member State on the basis of mutual trust, with a minimum of formality.43
Besides the general determination for mutual recognition44 and general idea of 
trust between the EU Member States, the situation of lack of legal mechanisms 
for effective implementation of these principles was still present. This situation has 
been circumvented by the enactment of several Framework Decisions which gave 
the incentive of practical implementation of the principle of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust in the area of criminal justice. Framework decision for establish-
ment of the European Arrest Warrant was the first and most frequently used in the 
series of these mechanisms, enacted by the European Council.45
 These mechanisms were enacted as tools for efficient recognition46 of the deci-
sions between the Member States brought in the context of the criminal justice 
procedures. It is needles to mention that these instruments were initially meant to 
support the criminal procedures that were commenced for the cross-border crimes 
and/or to provide assistance to the Member States in the criminal procedures 
which had cross-border elements within the EU Member States.
42  See for example art. 4 of the Directive 2010/64/EU of The European Parliament and of The Coun-
cil of 20 October 2010 on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings, 
URL=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:280:0001:0007:en:PDF
43  Mitsilegas, V.,: The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition In Criminal Matters in the EU, 
Common Market Law Review, No. 43, 2006, 1277-1311, p. 1281.
44  Sullivan, G., The European Arrest Warrant: Abuse of Process as a Bar to Extradition, New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, Volume 0, 2009, Special edition. pp. 37-44; Lavenex, S., Mutual Recognition 
and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy, Journal of European Public Policy 14:5, 
August 2007, pp. 762–779.
45  Under the Principle of mutual trust there are 8 Framework Decisions that provide mutual recognition: 
European Arrest Warrant (2002/584/JHA); European Evidence Warrant (2008/978/JHA); Frame-
work Decision Mutual Recognition of Freezing Orders (2003/577/JHA); Framework Decision on 
Mutual Recognition of Supervision Orders as an alternative to detention (2009/829/JHA); Mutual 
Recognition of Fines (2005/214/JHA); Mutual Recognition of Confiscation Orders (2006/783/JHA); 
Mutual Recognition of Probation Orders and other Non-custodial Penalties (2008/947/JHA) and 
Mutual Recognition of Prison Sentences (2008/909/JHA). Spencer, J.R., op.cit note 39, pp. 766-767.
46  See inter alia: Borgers, M. J., Mutual Recognition and the European Court of Justice: The Meaning of 
Consistent Interpretation and Autonomous and Uniform Interpretation of Union Law for the Development 
of the Principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, No. 18, 2010, pp. 99–114.
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Considering the effects of these mechanisms, additional Framework decisions and 
Council Directives’ were enacted in the area of Substantive Criminal Law,47 as 
well, as part of the optimistic necessity for unification of the legislation regarding 
the most important crimes, which were tangling the EU interests as union.48
Regarding the principle of mutual trust within this period it was obvious that it 
has remained as basic principle for the implementation of these Framework deci-
sions between the Member States, but also served as an apparatus for examination 
of their efficient implementation. As Linda Groningen has observed that regarding 
the mutual trust in criminal matters between the EU Member States the problems 
of legitimacy, asymmetry and constitutional pluralism exist on system level, and 
considering the necessary development of the EU criminal law these problems will 
have to be solved in order to uphold the virtues of the criminal justice system.49
Namely, with the process of expanding of the EU over 28 Member States50 and in 
the ambiance of the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, it appeared that the imple-
mentation of the principle of trust within these mechanisms was more perceived 
as distrust and as mechanisms that highlighted the differences of the criminal 
47  Harmonization trough Framework Decisions in the area of Substantial Criminal Law was performed 
by establishing criminalization and providing legal definitions regarding the following crimes: terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA); drug-dealing (2004/757/JHA); child sexual abuse and pornography (2011/92/EU); 
cybercrime (2013/40/EU); bribery(2003/568/JHA); money-laundering (2001/500/JHA); human 
trafficking (2011/36/EU); human smuggling (2002/946/JHA); racism and xenophobia (2008/913/
JHA); frauds in relation to electronic payments (2001/413/JHA); counterfeiting the euro currency 
(2000/383/JHA) and frauds against EU budget (OJ [1995] C316).Together with the Directive on the 
freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (2014/42/
EU). Spencer, J.R., op. cit. note 39, pp. 770-771. See also: Mostl M.,Preconditions and Limits of Mutual 
Recondition op. cit. note 4, p. 407, or Herlin-Karnell, E., Waiting for Lisbon… Constitutional Reflections 
on the Embryonic General Part of EU Criminal Law, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice No. 17, 2009, pp. 227–242; or: Elholm, T., Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily 
Mean Increased Repression?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17, 2009, 
pp. 191–226.
48  Such problem Andre Klip identifies with the EU frauds cases. See: The Substantive Criminal Law 
Jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 20 ,2012, pp. 367—376; See inter alia: Klip, A., European Criminal Policy, European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Vol. 20,  No. 3–12, 2012, p.5. or: Hetzer, W., 
Fight against Fraud and Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 14/1, 2006, pp. 20–45.
49  Groning, L., A Criminal Justice System or a System Deficit? Notes on the System Structure of the EU 
Criminal Law, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, No. 18, 2010,  pp. 
115–137. 
50  For example see the Croatian example with the implementation of the EAW regarding the principle 
of mutual recognition: Sokol, T., Implementation of European Arrest Warrant in Croatia: A Risk for the 
Functioning of Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters in the EU? European journal of crime, criminal 
law and criminal justice 23, 2015, pp. 258-280. 
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justice systems between the Member States51. This perspective was even more re-
inforced by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR52 regarding the proper protection of 
the human rights by the EU Member States. 
However, despite the fact the in the recent years the principle of trust in the 
criminal matters was questioned more than ever, its influence and significance has 
not been reduced at all. Furthermore, considering the provisions regarding the 
articles 82-98, Chapters 4 and 5, of Title V, Part Three of the TFEU, proscribing 
that the EU Criminal Law provisions are enacted as part of the regular legislative 
procedure of the EU (art. 288 TFEU), can be only concluded that in regard to the 
AFSJ of the EU the legal activity is aimed in further strengthening of the strive 
for establishment of one mutual EU Criminal Law53. This process of creation of 
the EU Criminal Law is done through harmonization process by the enactment of 
European Parliament’s and Council’s Directives in the area of Procedural Criminal 
Law, such as: Directive on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal 
Proceedings (2010/64 EU); Directive on the Right to Information in Criminal 
Proceedings (2012/13 EU); Directive on the Right to a Lawyer in Criminal Pro-
ceedings (2013/48 EU) and Directive on procedural safeguards for children who 
are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings (2016/800 EU). 
This general trend was further supported with the European Council’s Stockholm 
Programme54 where its priorities were defined as endeavor for process of recogni-
tion and enforcement of all judgments given in Member States in the European 
Union without a formal recognition procedure.55  While specifically in the area of 
criminal justice, mutual trust between Member States has been strengthened by 
progressively establishing, throughout the EU, a set of fair trial rights by means of 
51  See: Willems, A., Mutual Trust as a Term of Art in EU Criminal Law: Revealing Its Hybrid Character, 
European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2016 pp. 212-249; or Helenius, D., Mutual Recog-
nition in Criminal Matters and the Principle of Proportionality, Effective Proportionality or Proportionate 
Effectiveness? New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 5, Issue 3,2014; or: Öberg, J., Subsidiarity 
and EU Procedural Criminal Law, European Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, 2015, pp. 19-45.
52  See: Banach-Gutierrez J.B., Christopher Harding, Fundamental Rights in European Criminal Justice: An 
Axiological Perspective,European journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice, No. 20, 2012, 
pp. 239-264.
53  See more: Spronken, T., EU Policy to Guarantee Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis 
of the First Steps and a Plea for a Holistic Approach, European Criminal Law Review,  2011, p. 212-233
54  European Council, The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protect-
ing Citizens (2010/C 115/01).
55  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 
- Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union’, COM (2014) 144 final of 11 March 
2014.
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common, EU-wide, minimum standards to protect persons suspected or accused 
of a crime.56
4.  MUTUAL TRUST Of CROSS-bORDER COOPERATION IN 
CIVIL MATTERS IN THE EU (WITH SPECIfIC REfERENCE TO 
CHILD AbDUCTION CASES)
Recognition and enforcement represents one aspect of private international law 
whose goal is to avoid re-litigation and provide for harmonized decisions in which 
the parties’ rights are protected.57 The principle of territoriality and the rise of the 
sovereignty among the countries provided for the limitations of the authority of 
judgments to within State boundaries. Due to these facts, no foreign judicial deci-
sion could be executed proprio vigore in another country.58 That places the coun-
tries involved between two separate necessities: on one side, they have to protect 
their sovereignty and the integrity of their legal system,59 and on the other they 
have to satisfy the party’s needs by sparing them of starting a new action in front 
of a court of a foreign country on an issue and between the same parties which 
was already decided by a court of another country.60 In essence this relates to the 
balance between ‘trust’ in the procedural and substantive law standards of foreign 
legal systems and the extent of the ‘control’ of the state of enforcement that it im-
poses on the foreign decision and through that on the foreign legal order. 
56  Ibid.
57  Whytock, Christopher A., Faith and Scepticism in Private International Law: Trust, Governance, Politics, 
and Foreign Judgments (January 14, 2015). Erasmus Law Review, No. 3, November 2014, p. 121.
58  Lenhoff A., Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical - Critical Analysis, Louisiana Law 
Review, Vol. 16 No. 3, 1956, pp. 465-466; Castel J.G., Recognition and Enforcement of foreign Judg-
ments in Personam and in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada,  E.G., McGill Law Journal, 
Vol 17 No.1, 1971,  p.14; Michaels R., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Rüdiger 
Wolfrum ed., Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law,  Heidelberg and Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009,  par. 1. 
59  Whytock defines these actions as ‘governance values’ and provides that governance values focus on pol-
icies facilitating, guiding or restraining collective activity. These values have implications that extend 
beyond the parties to particular disputes. Governance values include efficiency, which is concerned 
with avoiding the expenditure of societal resources to re-litigate issues that have already been litigated, 
and with reducing transaction costs in transnational business. Further it elaborates that “Governance 
values also include certainty and predictability, which help ‘to establish the security of contracts, pro-
mote commercial dealings, and generally further the rule of law among states that are interdependent 
as well as independent”, Whytock, op.cit. note 57,  p. 120.
60  Rights values focus on justice for particular litigants in particular cases. These values emphasise what 
Arthur von Mehren calls the ‘principle of correctness,’ which ‘expresses the concern that legal justice, as 
understood by the society in both substantive and procedural terms, be done. Rights values also entail 
the ‘concern to protect the successful litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or evasive 
tactics on the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent. Whytock, op.cit. note 57, p. 120.
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With the Amsterdam treaty norms of private international law are established in 
the first pillar.61 As a result of that, the EU has direct competences over recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions coming from the EU Member 
States in particular legal fields.62 This directly influences the ‘trust’ between the 
countries where in the EU this principle is raised to a new level of ‘mutual trust’ 
and in the field of recognition and enforcement is manifested through the prin-
ciple of ‘mutual recognition.’ This aspect in turn influences the ‘control’ of foreign 
judicial decisions in the EU where fewer and fewer standards are required and the 
tendency is to fully abolish exequatur. 
The idea of the abolition of the exequatur has been in development for almost 20 
years. Its origin can be traced back to the summit of the European Council held 
in Tampere on 15-16 October 1999(Tampere summit),63 which is known as a 
starting point of the development of the European Union as an area of freedom, 
security and justice.64 Among the 62 conclusions,65 regarding cross-border recog-
nition and enforcement the European Council held that: 
[E]nhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the 
necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between au-
thorities and the judicial protection of individual rights.66
In civil matters, the Commission was called upon to make a proposal for further 
reduction of the intermediate measures which were still required to enable the rec-
ognition and enforcement of a decision or judgement in the requested State.67 The 
idea was that such decisions would be automatically recognized throughout the 
61  Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ 1997, C 310. With this Treaty the responsibility for creating legislation with 
regard to international judicial co-operation in civil matters was shifted from the third pillar to the first 
pillar, i.e. the Community legislator, Wischmeyer, T., op. cit. note 9, p. 354.
62  Stone P.,  EU Private International Law: Harmonization of Laws, (first ed.), 2006, p. 4.
63  Even before the summit in Tampere, there were considerations about the abolishment of the exequa-
tur, nevertheless because of differences of procedural law regarding enforcement it became official EU 
policy at the Tampere summit, Kramer, X., Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis Regulation: 
Towards a New Balance between Mutual Trust and National Control over Fundamental Rights, Nether-
lands International Law Review (NILR), Vol. 60 Issue 3, 2013,  p. 348.
64  The Tampere Summit was the first summit in which the head of states and governments of 15 EU 
Member States come together to discuss the justice and home affairs policies of the European Union. 
European Commission, Fact Sheet #3.1 Tampere Kick-start to the EU’s policy for justice and home 
affairs, available at URL=http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20040617/tampere_09_2002_en.pdf. Ac-
cessed 12 March 2016.
65  For the full Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, see URL=http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. Accessed 12 March 2016.
66  Point 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in Tampere.
67  Visitation rights was pointed out as one of the fields, point 34 of the Presidency Conclusions of the 
summit in Tampere.
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Union without any intermediate proceedings or grounds for refusal of enforce-
ment, and could be accompanied by the setting of minimum standards on specific 
aspects of civil procedural law.68
From that moment on it started to be considered that mutual recognition is a 
‘cornerstone of judicial cooperation.’69 The first instrument that abolished exequa-
tur for particular decisions was the Brussels II bis Regulation.70 This policy initi-
ated legislative activities that at the beginning were expected to lead to abolition 
of exequatur71 in the new Brussels I Regulation.72 The Commission conducted 
consultations on the basis of the Green Paper of 200973 and proposed only par-
tial abolition, maintaining safeguards in the form of extraordinary remedies that 
permitted a limited review of the jurisdiction to be enforced but with no public 
policy exception.74 However, the final result is that the Council adopted a recast 
Brussels I Regulation that abolished exequatur generally but permits an applica-
tion by any interested party for refusal of recognition (including public policy)75 
and application by the person against whom the enforcement is sought for refusal 
of enforcement.76 In this way the possibility of opposing recognition and enforce-
ment was maintained in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but limited significantly by 
the fact that the exceptions must be expressly invoked by application.77
The return mechanism for the child abduction cases in the Brussels IIbis Regula-
tion represents a manifestation of the concept of ‘mutual recognition’. This policy 
should reflect the integration and the trust that exists in the European Judicial 
68  Point 33 of the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in Tampere.
69  Kramer, X., op. cit. note 63, p. 348.
70  The abolishment of exequatur in family matters was outlined in Programme of measures for imple-
mentation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters [2001] 
OJ C12/1.
71  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and The European Economic 
and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters COM (2009) 174 final 
p.4. For more on evolution of the systems for the recognition and enforcement in the EU see text to n 
450 Part II ch V sec 5.1.
72  More on the Brussels Ibis Regulation see text to note 477 Part II ch V sec 5.1.
73  Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 175 final.
74  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748 
final.
75  Article 45 Brussels Ibis Regulation.
76  Article 46 Brussels Ibis Regulation.
77  Scott M. J., A question of trust? Recognition and enforcement of judgments, Nederlands Internationaal 
Privaatrecht (NIPR), 2015, p. 29.
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Area.78At the core, there are two main rationales for this policy stance:  the eco-
nomical and the political.79 Regarding the former rationale, this abolition of the 
exequatur increases the economic welfare of the European economic actors and 
citizens80. Regarding the latter rationale, ‘mutual recognition’ exists to ensure that 
judgments circulate freely within the European Union.81 In civil and commercial 
matters, to achieve these goals brings certainty and efficiency.82 However, the im-
plementation of this policy in the aspect of parental responsibility issues, namely 
child abduction cases, creates a certain discomfort. 
The basis for the functioning of this return mechanism is that the Courts and the 
Central Authorities cooperate among themselves. Each case holds its peculiarities 
and at the same time basic principles have to be taken into account by the relevant 
institutions. This means that the Court must apply the rules of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation and protect the principles of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention. 
This aspect is in conflict with the short time in which these procedures should 
be completed. These ‘procedures’ refer not only to the measures that the Court 
should take regarding the case in the Member State of refuge, but also to the trans-
fer of the information and documents to the Court of habitual residence of the 
child. Problems may arise because of the language barriers which are result of the 
multi-lingual character of the EU and as a consequence represent a problem for 
direct communication between the relevant authorities. This can be a real danger 
to the proper transfer of the guiding principles according to which the Court of 
refuge rendered the non-return order. They could easily be neglected and improp-
erly applied, according to the application guidelines provided in article 42(2) (c) 
of the Brussels II bis Regulation.83 Article 11(8) of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
gives discretionary power to the Court of habitual residence of the child to de-
termine whether or not to issue a certificate of enforceability to the extent that it 
follows the guiding principles. In such an event, procedural steps which have been 
taken after a non‑return decision has been rendered are not decisive and may be 
regarded as irrelevant for the purposes of implementing the Regulation.84 This 
78  McEleavy P., The new child abduction regime in the European Union: Symbiotic relationship or forced 
partnership? Journal of Private International Law, Issue 17, 2005 p.32.
79  Cuniberti G. and Rueda I., Abolition of Exequatur. Addressing the Commission’s Concerns, Rabels 
Zeitschrift, 2011,  p. 286-316(31).
80  Cuniberti G. and Rueda I., op.cit. note 79,  p. 291.
81  Ibid.
82  McEleavy P.,  op. cit. note 78,  p. 32.
83  Ibid.
84  Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 par. 80.
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position is provided so that the Regulation might achieve its full effect, which is 
the immediate return of the children.85
If the Court of habitual residence renders a certified decision, that decision cannot 
be appealed,86 but only rectified, according to the Member State of origin.87Even if 
national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwithstand-
ing any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child, the court of origin 
may declare the judgment enforceable.88 By excluding any appeal against the is-
suing of a certificate pursuant to Article 42(1), other than an action seeking recti-
fication within the meaning of Article 43(1), the Regulation seeks to ensure that 
the effectiveness of its provisions is not undermined by abuse of the procedure.89 
Moreover, Article 68 does not list among the redress procedures any appeal against 
decisions taken pursuant to Section 4 of Chapter III of the Regulation.90 Once 
a non‑return decision has been made and brought to the attention of the court 
of origin, it is irrelevant, for the purposes of issuing the certificate provided for 
in Article 42 of the Regulation, if that decision has been suspended, overturned, 
set aside or, in any event, has not become res judicata or has been replaced by a 
decision ordering return, insofar as the return of the child has not actually taken 
place. If no doubt has been expressed as regards the authenticity of that certificate 
and if it was rendered in accordance with the standard form set out in Annex IV 
to the Regulation, opposition to the recognition of the decision ordering return 
85  If the position were otherwise, there would be a risk that the Regulation would be deprived of its useful 
effect, since the objective of the immediate return of the child would remain subject to the condition 
that the redress procedures allowed under the domestic law of the Member State in which the child 
is wrongfully retained have been exhausted. That risk should be particularly balanced because, as far 
as concerns young children, biological time cannot be measured according to general criteria, given 
the intellectual and psychological structure of such children and the speed with which that structure 
develops. See Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 par 81.
86  Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau[2008] ECR I-05271 par. 84.
87  Article 43 Brussels IIbis Regulation. In the Rinau case it was stated that this article reflect ‘procedural 
autonomy’ meaning that the enforceability of a judgment requiring the return of a child following a 
judgment of non-return enjoys procedural autonomy, so as not to delay the return of a child who has 
been wrongfully removed to or retained in a Member State other than that in which that child was 
habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. This procedural autonomy 
of the provisions in Articles 11(8), 40 and 42 of the Regulation and the priority given to the jurisdic-
tion of the court of origin, in the context of Section 4 of Chapter III of the Regulation, are reflected in 
Articles 43 and 44 of the Regulation, which provide that the law of the Member State of origin is to be 
applicable to any rectification of the certificate, that no appeal is to lie against the issuing of a certificate 
and that that certificate is to take effect only within the limits of the enforceability of the judgment. 
Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 par. 63 and 64.
88  Article 42(1) Brussels IIbis Regulation.
89  Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 par. 55. 
90  Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271 para 85; Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni 
Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 par. 50
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is not permitted and it is for the requested court only to declare the enforceability 
of the certified decision and to allow the immediate return of the child. In doing 
so, the Court of the refuge is put in a position to ‘trust’ the foreign order even if 
this trust not been reciprocated by the authorities of the Member State of habitual 
residence of the child.91
As much as the rationale of this abolition of exequatur can be accepted, that the 
child must be returned to the place from which it was abducted, still, the ‘imposed 
mutual trust’ creates a certain discomfort. The principle of mutual recognition 
corresponds with the principle of mutual trust. It is said that where mutual trust 
exists, mutual recognition should be improved.92 Nevertheless, in child abduction 
cases the question arises, which should be first? Does this statement mean that the 
Member States should firstly develop increased trust among their legal systems 
and then they should abolish every possibility of opposing enforcement of a certi-
fied decision, or they should rely on the imposed trust gained through the politi-
cal sense of the EU institutions transposed in the Brussels IIbis Regulation and 
it is through its implementation that they should build actual trust? The answer 
seems to fall somewhere in the middle. The EU should firstly develop necessary 
facilities, something that is manifested in the enhanced cooperation between the 
relevant authorities (for example, EJN), the Justice scoreboard93, and the Guide-
lines for proper implementation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation measures which 
should represent a ‘physical’ manifestation of the proper implementation of the 
Regulation by the authorities. These activities taken together can establish actual 
trust. Then for the final stage, full abolition of the exequatur should be introduced 
and the authorities should help the children involved in the cases. It is left for the 
future amendments to the Brussels II bis Regulation to gradually accept the dif-
ferences between the legal systems of the EU and their distrust of one another and 
to build trust as it should be built. This is achieved by showing that the ‘other’ 
legal system applies the same rules properly, as they are applied in the domestic 
court, and caring for what is most significant: the child’s best interest. In such way 
the trust would cease to be imposed and become a reality, something that the EU 
needs desperately. It will be a trust in the fact that the whole EU system functions 
91  The CJEU strongly insists that review is only permisiable in the Country of origin and with that pro-
vides for almost irrefutable presumption of compatibility of member States’ laws and judgments with 
European fundamental rights and with the CFR, Canor I., My brother’s keeper? op.cit. note 9,  p.410; 
McEleavy P., op.cit. note 78, p. 33.
92  Arenas García R., op.cit. note 19,  p. 362.
93  EU Justice scoreboard, 
  URL=http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm. Accessed 12 
March 2015.
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as a whole and not as a ‘battlefield’ where Member States strive to prove whose 
system is better.
ECtHR has addressed the issue of the relationship between Article 8(1)94 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the enforcement of family 
law orders in general and the execution of return orders in particular.95 Article 8(1) 
of the ECHR and its violations were initially focused  on public law situations, 
but were later extended to private law situations and have been relied upon, with 
success, in child abduction cases and access rights.96This is especially important 
regarding how the exceptions provided in Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention are to be applied in a manner that is consistent with Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR and how the Courts of the EU Member States handle child 
abduction cases where the courts of the habitual residence have made use of their 
power under Article 11 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation.97 In a series of cases the 
ECtHR has held, in general, that returning a child under the procedures set out in 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation and in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Conven-
tion who has been wrongfully removed or retained is not in breach of obligations 
under the ECHR, in particular of Article 8 thereof.98 With such an approach 
of supporting the functioning of the child abduction regime established by the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, the 
ECtHR has shown that it supports the restitution of the status quo, which was 
unilaterally disturbed by the wrongful removal or retention. The ECtHR has in 
only a small number of cases, and mostly in exceptional circumstances, held that 
the return of a child after a wrongful removal or retention may constitute a breach 
of Article 8 of the ECHR.99
94  Article 8(1) of the ECHR provides that: 
  “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
95  See, cases Maumousseau and Washington v. France (Application No 39388/05); Lipkowsky and Mc-
Cormack v. Germany (Application No 26755/10); Sofia Povse and Doris Povse v. Austria (Application 
No 3890/11); Raban v. Romania (Application No 25437/08); Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy 
(Application No 14737/09); B. c. Belgique (Requête No 4320/11); Neulinger and Shuruk v. Swit-
zerland (Application No 41615/07) X. v. Latvia (Application No 27853/09); Ignaccolo-Zenide v. 
Romania, Application No 31679/96, (2001); Maire v. Portugal, (Requête no 48206/99); P.P. v. Poland, 
(Application no. 8677/03); H.N. v. Poland, (Application No. 77710/01); Raw and Others v. France, 
(Application No 10131/11).
96  Magnus U., Mankowski P.(eds) European Commentaries on Private International Law: Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, Sellier, European Law Publishers, 2012,  p. 390.
97  Beaumont P. and others, Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
International and Comparative Law quarterly, Vol.64, 2015, p. 40.
98  See, Maumousseau and Washington v. France (Application No 39388/05); Lipkowsky and McCormack v. 
Germany (Application No 26755/10); Sofia Povse and Doris Povse v. Austria (Application No 3890/11); 
Raban v. Romania (Application No 25437/08).
99  See, Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (Application No 14737/09); B. c. Belgique (Requête No 
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The aim of ECHR and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) gener-
ally is the same; both protect and guarantee fundamental rights and both contain 
provisions which are intended to protect the rights of the child. Nevertheless, 
they may not share the same methodology in the assessment of the existence of 
a violation, nor give exactly the same weight to the various factors which make 
up the process.100 It was nonetheless expected that these two legal orders would 
be addressed over the child abduction, because these cases have a high intensity 
of emotional charge and the participants in these proceedings would use almost 
every legal remedy at their disposal because they represent a ‘pathological aspect’ 
of the custody disputes. 
The Bosphorus case provides a solution and gives a certain order in the interac-
tion between ECtHR and CJEU legal orders in that it accepts the change in the 
dominance of the ECtHR over human right issues.101This case in a certain way 
was inspired by the Solange II case-law of the German Constitutional Court102 and 
gives input to  the reasoning of the ECtHR by developing a translation, a kind of 
‘Europeanisation of the Solange.’103 Bringing along the  inspiration of  the Solange 
II, the ECtHR in the case M. & Co. v. Germany [1990] ruled that applications 
against individual EU Member States concerning material acts of Community 
law were inadmissible only under one condition: ‘Provided that within that orga-
nization fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection.’104 This principle, 
which evolved during the Bosphorus judgment, was referred to as the ‘principle 
of compliance’ and provides that the ECtHR has no competence to review Com-
munity acts as such. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes a competence to review 
these acts indirectly through examining specific implementation measures at the 
national level.105 In the Michaud v. France Case, the ECtHR when applying this 
4320/11); Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No 41615/07) and X. v. Latvia (Applica-
tion No 27853/09).
100  Muir Watt H., Muir Watt on Abolition of Exequatur and Human Rights, Online Symposium: Abo-
lition of Exequatur and Human Rights, URL= http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/muir-watt-on-povse/. 
Accessed 10 April 2016.
101  Preshova D., ‘Legal Pluralism: New Paradigm in the Relationship Between Legal Orders’ in Marko No-
vakovic (ed.) Basic Principles of Public International Law: Monism & Dualism, Belgrade: Faculty of 
Law University of Belgrade, Institute of Comparative Law and Institute of International Politics and 
Economics, 2013, p.19.
102  Solange II, [1986], BVerfGE 73, p. 339
103  Groussot X. ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’ in M. Avbelj/J. Komarek 
(eds.) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, 2012, p. 319, (as cited by Presho-
va D., op.cit. note 101, p.18).
104  M. & Co. v. Germany, [1990] ECHR (Ser. A), p. 138
105  Kuhert K. ‘Bosphorus – Double Standards in European Human Rights Protection?’ Utrecht Law Review 
Volume 2, Issue 2, 2006. p. 188.
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‘principle of compliance’ stated that ‘…the Court may, in the interest of interna-
tional cooperation, reduces the intensity of its supervisory role’.106 This doctrine now 
represents a ‘bridge’107 between these two legal orders, moreover because the CJEU 
gave opinion that 
[T]he agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not 
compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) 
of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’108
However, this doctrine of ‘principle of compliance’ is not without criticism. The 
principle is criticized for representing a political gesture on behalf of the ECtHR 
and for the fact that it applies a much lower standard of protection of human 
rights to EU law than to non-EU law.109
The cases of child abduction have shown how complex the situation is regard-
ing the existence of several legal sources that can be applied in a certain case. 
The ‘Bosphorus presumption’ provides for some resolution between ECHR and 
EU law. Nevertheless, this aspect is just a starting position because in essence the 
national courts (local judges) have to decide this ‘mega-conflict’110 between two 
supra-national regimes which both purport to promote the interests of the child. 
For example, the local judge, when deciding for return of the child under Article 
11(8) Brussels IIbis Regulation, must act promptly and thoroughly because this 
fast-track procedure and the abolition  of the exequatur is counterbalanced by the 
particular duty to properly conduct ‘in-depth examinations’ as regards the reasons 
for such refusal (as was the case in Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, which was 
reiterated the Neulinger approach) and that the child is heard, unless is inappro-
priate (as was the case in Zarraga). If the Court of habitual residence of the child 
fails to do so, or does it unsatisfactorily, it is open to the applicant to challenge the 
order – including through an individual application to the ECtHR (as indicated 
in Povse v. Austria case). 
106  Michaud v. France (App. No. 12323/11), par. 104.
107  Requejo M., Requejo on Povse, Online Symposium: Abolition of Exequatur and Human Rights, 
URL=http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/requejo-on-povse/[page unavailable].  Accessed 12 December 
2016.
108  Opinion on the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and identifies problems with regard 
to its compatibility with EU law (2/13), Press Release No.180, 2014 (18.12.14).
109  Kuhert K.., op.cit. note 105, p. 188; Beaumont and others, op.cit. note 97,  p. 56.
110  Muir Watt H., op.cit. note 100,  p.1.
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The Brussels IIbis Regulation in Article 11(6)-(8) is positioned in such a way that 
the court of origin (the court where the child had his habitual residence before 
the wrongful removal or retention) is the final arbiter regarding child abduction 
cases.111 The procedure was designed as such because of the restoration of the sta-
tus quo ante, which is the main goal in the child abduction cases.112Nevertheless, 
infringement on human rights in correlation with the Charter of the EU and the 
ECHR can occur in both places, in the country of origin (country of the habitual 
residence of the child prior to the abduction) and the country of enforcement 
(country of refuge). This aspect cannot be disregarded, because the procedure pro-
vided in Article 11(6)-(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation is intended to have 
limitations in the country of enforcement for the reasons of the child’s best inter-
est and the unilateral disturbance of the jurisdictional regime by the abducting 
parent who voluntarily choose that forum. From the point of view of the Brussels 
IIbis regime,113 such conduct is intolerable and the CJEU allowed no exceptions 
to the concertation of the jurisdiction in the country of origin, (the country of the 
child’s habitual residence prior the abduction) including for human right protec-
tion (Article 24 of the Charter of the EU), reasoning that there are locally available 
remedies despite the fact that the abducting parent and the child are found else-
where.114 At the same time, the ECtHR in the Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy 
case evidently left a possibility to the abducting parent to raise human rights in-
fringement in the country of enforcement. Between these two standpoints, there 
is the Bosphorus presumption in the Povse v. Austria case, which tries to reconcile 
these two regimes by diminishing the distress of the national courts to be put in 
a position to choose between two competing international obligations115 and by 
that to demonopolize human rights protection. Following this presumption, the 
ECtHR did not find justification to rebut it and rejected the application. 
Such a position of the ECtHR regarding the application of Article 11(6) – (8) 
of Brussels IIbis Regulation ultimately leads to the two most essential questions 
regarding the abolition of the exequatur in the Brussels IIbis Regulation: Does 
the abolition of the exequatur, as a part of the child abduction procedure, deprive 
the child of adequate protection? And secondly, taking into consideration the 
procedure provided in the Brussels IIbis Regulation regarding child abduction 
111  Such situation is not exclusively attributed to child abduction cases, but also in criminal law in the 
Case Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW the CJEU reached similar result. Case C-303/05,  Advocaten voor 
de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, (2007) I-03633.
112  Perez-Vera report, Actes et Documents de la quatorzieme Session, Vol. 3, October 1980, p.106.
113  Case C-211/10 Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECR I-06673 par. 74; Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba 
Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 par. 69.
114  Canor I., op.cit. note 9, p.410.
115  Muir Watt H. op.cit. note 100, p. 3.
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cases, can the abductor and the child still possibly raise human rights infringement 
before the country of refuge, if in particular case the court of origin ordering the 
return did not deal or dealt inadequately with the human’s right challenge?
Regarding the first question, the CJEU and the ECtHR are in line in the reason-
ing that the court of origin is the forum in which all infringements of are to be 
addressed. The CJEU held this  position in the Zarraga Case and in the Povse 
(preliminary ruling) case, that questions concerning the lawfulness of the judg-
ment ordering return as such, and in particular the question whether the necessary 
conditions enabling the court with jurisdiction to hand down that judgment are 
satisfied,116are solely questions for the national courts of the Member State of ori-
gin to examine, in particular, by Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Article 42 of Regulation No 2201/2003.117 The ECtHR reached a similar 
conclusion by applying the Bosphorus presumption in the Povse case and provid-
ing, firstly, that the Austrian Courts (court of enforcement) had no discretion but 
to order the return of the child; secondly, that the CJEU in its preliminary ruling 
considered that the child and the mother could search for adequate humans right 
protection, namely Article 8 of the ECHR, in front of the Italian Courts (court of 
origin).118 With these two factors in mind and applying the ‘Bosphorus presump-
tion,’ the protection of these rights according to ECHR, which is provided by the 
ECtHR, is equivalent to the protection afforded by the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
In the context of the Povse case, there is also a condition which is in line with the 
Bosphorus presumption, that the parties must avail themselves of all local rem-
edies and challenge the order in the Court of origin (with the possibility of lodg-
ing an application with the ECtHR if such an attempt fails). All of these factors 
provide that in the cases with questions which are specific to the infringement of 
human rights and are conducted by the abolition of the exequatur in the Brus-
sels IIbis Regulation, are to be addressed in the Country of origin. However, this 
does not preclude the challenge of the return order in the country of enforcement, 
which is shown by the mere fact that Bosphorus presumption is rebuttable, but 
only in extreme cases. 
This aspect of the rebuttable presumption (praesumptio iuris tantum) under the 
Bosphorus presumption requires quite strict standards of proof of violation and 
the presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of the particular case, it 
is considered that the protection of ECHR rights was manifestly deficient. In such 
cases, the interest of international cooperation is outweighed by the Convention’s 
116  Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 par. 51.
117  Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247 par. 69.
118  Povse v. Austria (App. No 3890/11) par. 86.
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role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’ in the field of hu-
man rights.119 So the questions stands, can the abductor and the child still possibly 
raise human rights infringement before the country of refuge, if in that particular 
case the court of origin ordering the return did not deal or dealt inadequately with 
the human rights challenge? If this aspect is seen only through the Šneersone and 
Kampanella v. Italy case, then the answer would be yes.120 But this case does not 
bring into the equation the Bosphorus presumption. What this presumption does, 
together with all that  was said about the access to justice in the court of origin, is 
mandate that only severe disallowance to such access (which includes disallowance 
of application to the ECtHR) could lead to the possibility of effectively raising 
the access argument in front of the court of enforcement.121 From another point 
of view, if both safeguards are applied and used, that the parties use all of their 
remedies in front of the Court of origin (provided that they are accessible!) and if 
that court fulfils its obligations under Article 42 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
then there wouldn’t be any need to call for help from the courts of the country of 
refuge under the ECHR.122
With all of which was said, the ECtHR and the CJEU have put on the court of 
origin, very important role, to swiftly and thoroughly examine all of the circum-
stances when applying Article 11(6)-(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and to al-
low access to justice to the parent which wrongfully removed or retained the child 
in the country of refugee. This role is evidently not an easy one, but it’s necessary, 
because here at stake is very fragile right. That is the child future, its relation with 
the environment and its self-awareness. For that there could not be any excuses 
that the role is hard. 
5. CONCLUSION
Historically, countries had different approaches and different concepts regarding 
exequatur. From the first position of free circulation of judgments to the révision 
au fond, the balance has shifted to the extremes. Due to some practical aspects, it 
was much easier to lower the ‘control’ regarding the application of the substan-
tive law by the foreign court. As a consequence, ‘trust’ was achieved much faster 
regarding this requirement. Minimum ‘control’ of the application of the foreign 
substantive law is still kept if these errors amount to violation of public policy.  In 
fact, the ‘trust’ afforded to the foreign legal system is not so much based on the 
119  Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (App. No. 45036/98) par. 156.
120  Canor I., op.cit. note  9,  p.413.
121  Muir Watt H.,  op.cit. note  100, p. 4.
122  Ibid.
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abstract legal comity between the countries, but on the ‘trust’ of the administra-
tion of justice by the foreign courts when addressing individuals’ rights of access 
to justice in due time and without disproportionate effort in international cases. 
Therefore ‘trust’ is not something general, but is an effective individualization in 
the performance of the judicial authorities when addressing cross-border cases. As 
has been previously stated, ‘trust’ in other countries’ administration of justice may 
be conceptualized as a practice for optimizing the individual’s effective access to 
justice in cross-border cases. Such position is particularly visible within the EU 
Criminal law, bearing in mind that mutual trust cannot exist without institutional 
support. 
On the other hand, the idea of free circulation of judgments within the EU has 
existed for more than 35 years, but it was realized for the first time in the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation for limited cases of child abduction and access rights. The princi-
ples upon which this abolition of exequatur is build are ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual 
recognition’. So in a way, increased ‘trust’ (constructed in the EU in the political 
idea of ‘mutual trust’) between the Member States is responsible among other rea-
sons for the decrease of the ‘control’ that Member States have regarding exequatur. 
The basic formula is this: where ‘mutual trust’ exists, procedures for recognition 
and enforcement should be improved. However, this ‘trust’ (‘confidence in one’s 
own expectation to other person’s behavior’) is not something which was totally 
acquired through experience during the interaction between legal orders (‘actual 
trust’), but it is imposed ‘trust’, a political decision that Member States can have 
confidence not in their own expectation, but rather in the political assessment of 
the EU institutions that other Member States’ behaviors are satisfying expecta-
tions. As such, for this type of trust it can be said that it represents an ‘indirect 
trust’ gained through the assessment of the EU institutions. In some cases, it was 
shown that the lack of the imposed ‘mutual trust’ was creating problems and 
resulted in the circumvention of the application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
regarding ‘mutual recognition’. Thus, the cure which was proposed by the EU 
legislator is that the lack of ‘mutual trust’ should be improved by imposing an 
obligation for ‘mutual recognition’. Once more the problem is what comes first. 
Should ‘mutual trust’ be gained first and then the Member States should proceed 
in building system of ‘mutual recognition’ with further free circulation of judg-
ments in mind or through the process of ‘mutual recognition’ the EU should build 
‘mutual trust’?  What is necessary is that instead of building politically imposed 
‘mutual trust’, Member States should steadily build ‘actual trust’ through direct 
contact between the authorities of different Member States and with trust in each 
other’s administration of justice. In this approach, the work of the European ju-
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dicial network (EJN) and the European judicial training network (EJTN) play 
important roles. 
Therefore, a question of balance between the ‘trust and ‘control’ arises regarding 
the enforcement of parental responsibility decisions in the EU. If we look at the 
recent approach taken by the EU regarding the abolition of exequatur in Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, certain safeguards were kept. So total ‘trust’ was not achieved but 
rather the approach of limited ‘control’ was postponed to a later stage. ‘Control’ 
was taken in the form that the ex ante control by the state now is transformed to ex 
post control initiated by the parties. So the abolition of the exequatur in the Brus-
sels regime represents moving the coordination to a later stage of the implemen-
tation of recognition and enforcement. It is very realistic to assume that the new 
Brussel IIbis Regulation will follow these new tendencies in the Brussels regime. 
Again the question of balance regarding the Brussels IIbis Regulation translates to 
the answer of the question whether removing the requirement of exequatur could 
mean abandonment of certain ‘control’ and with that introducing new problems, 
without tackling what is important here, the child’s best interest. 
As much as the political will of the EU is understandable, there must be some kind 
of realistic expectations for the modalities of building ‘actual trust’. This cannot 
be achieved by imposing an obligation that Member States have to ‘trust’ other 
authorities. ‘Trust’ is not something which can be built by theoretical or political 
will. The persons who are implementing the Regulation have to have confidence 
in the other person’s behavior in the application of the Regulation. In addition, 
they have to understand the regulation and the values it protects. When they have 
understood these values and when they are certain that the other persons have 
also understood the values, then the ‘actual trust’ would emerge. Without ‘trust’ 
all that would be left are ineffective rules, as much as they are flawlessly drafted or 
constructed.  The protection of the best interest of the child is a universal value. It 
must be understood and it must be protected. 
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ABSTRACT
Contemporary developments in European procedural law reveal a growing interest in the pro-
tection and promotion of children’s (procedural) rights. The right of the child to be heard in 
proceedings resulting in decisions which directly or indirectly affect its rights and interests, is a 
procedural right of the child, granted by numerous European documents. One of such proceed-
ings is certainly divorce proceedings involving children. This paper is aimed at demonstrating 
and analysing the ways in which the right of the child to be heard is protected in European law 
as well as at examining whether the protection of the right of the child to be heard in divorce 
proceedings in Croatian law is harmonized with the standards of European law in this legal 
area. Considering that the latest reform of Croatian family legislation (2015) has proposed 
some new solutions relating to the expression of child’s views in divorce proceedings, the author 
has conducted empirical research to examine the experiences of application of those solutions 
in legal practice.  
Keywords: child, right to be heard, divorce, European law, Croatian law
1. INTRODUCTION
Making the justice systems across Europe more child-friendly is a key action under 
the EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child1. Pursuant to European child-friendly 
justice standards, the Member States are obliged to undertake measures which 
should enable the child, in accordance with its age and degree of maturity, to par-
ticipate in proceedings dealing with its rights and interests. Those measures should 
also ensure that such proceedings are child appropriate. As asserted by Vande-
kerckhove and O’Brien “in circumstances where children’s rights are at stake in a 
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Agenda for the Rights of 
the Child /* COM/2011/0060 final */, available at: URL=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52011DC0060. Accessed 12 January 2017.
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(court) case, it is important not only to look at the merits of the case, or the (legal) 
characteristics of the given situation, but also to consider the manner in which the 
court system actually deals with and relates to children throughout the course of 
the proceedings themselves.”2 The protection of the right of the child to be heard 
in proceedings directly or indirectly affecting its rights and interests are vital for 
the implementation of child-friendly justice standards.3 In terms of civil proceed-
ings, children’s rights in Europe are most often affected by parental divorce and 
relating proceedings.4 Children, as “principal victims of divorce”5, should enjoy a 
special form of protection of their (procedural) rights in this type of proceedings. 
Croatian family legislation obliges parents and other childcare providers to respect 
child’s views in accordance with its age and level of maturity. Likewise, in all pro-
ceedings resulting in decisions affecting a child’s right or interest, the child has the 
right to be appropriately informed about relevant circumstances of the case, to get 
advice and express its views, and find out about possible consequences of taking 
its opinion into consideration. The child as well needs to know that its opinion 
is taken in compliance with its age and level of maturity.6 This paper elaborates 
in detail how the right of the child to be heard is protected concrete in divorce 
cases by Croatian family legislation. First, it shows and analyses the protection of 
the right of the child to express its views in the context of European law. Then 
it examines the protection of the right of the child to express its views in divorce 
proceedings within Croatian family legislation. The paper also includes analysis 
and comparison between non-contentious divorce and contentious divorce pro-
ceedings in the light of the legal protection of the right of the child to express its 
views. For that purpose, the author has conducted empirical research of the ex-
pression of child’s views in the mandatory counselling procedure, which precedes 
judicial divorce proceedings involving minor children.7 The paper concludes with 
2  Vandekerckhove, A.; O’Brien, K., Child-Friendly Justice: turning law into reality, ERA Forum, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, 2013, pp. 524/525.
3  See the overview of EU activities on child-friendly justice in Tuite, M., The way forward: the implemen-
tation of the EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child, ERA Forum, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, pp. 543-556.
4  See the Summary of contextual overviews on children’s involvement in civil and administrative judicial 
proceedings in the 28 Member States of the European Union, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the Eu-
ropean Union, 2015, available at URL=https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/summary-of-contextual-over-
views-on-children-s-involvement-in-civil-and-administrative-judicial-proceedings-in-the-28-mem-
ber-states-of-the-european-union-pbDS0115277/?CatalogCategoryID=z4mep2Ow4uMAAAFOy-
2gi8_Ki. Accessed 14 January  2017.     
5  Freeman, M., according to Parkes, A., Children and International Human Rights Law: the Right of the 
Child to be Heard, Routledge, Abingdon/New york, 2013, p 90.
6  See Article 86. 
7  The research was conducted in the form of an on-line questionnaire forwarded to social welfare centres. 
The questionnaire included 17 questions related to the implementation of the mandatory counselling 
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an assessment of the compliance of the Croatian solutions with European legal 
standards in this legal area.
2.  PROTECTION Of THE RIGHT Of THE CHILD TO EXPRESS 
ITS VIEWS IN THE CONTEXT Of EUROPEAN LAW  
The right to be heard is a right of the child, granted by numerous European docu-
ments.8 The importance of the protection of the right of the child to express its 
view in proceedings resulting in decisions which directly or indirectly affect its 
rights and interests has been recognized in the case-law of European courts too.9 
procedure. The following 21 social welfare centre took part in the research: Zagreb-subsidiary Gornji 
grad (Uptown), Zagreb-subsidiary Trnje, Zagreb-subsidiary Novi Zagreb (New Zagreb), Split, Osijek, 
Zadar, Slavonski Brod, Gospić, Križevci, Pazin, Valpovo, Beli Manastir, Đakovo, Dugo Selo, Bjelovar, 
Pakrac, Ludbreg, Našice, Koprivnica, Zaprešić and Novi Marof.
8  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Council of Europe,  4 November 1950, ETS 5 (hereinafter: 
ECHR), under Article 10, proscribes that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. As Van 
Bueren explains, the law is clear that all children are included in term “everyone”. However, Article 
10 is principally focused on the necessity to protect against negative “interference” from the state, and 
for children negative protection may be inadequate, as children also frequently require a positive ob-
ligation placed on the state to create and protect accessibility. Van Bueren, G., Child Rights in Europe: 
Convergence and Divergence in Judicial Protection, Council of Europe, 2007, p. 83.
  The right of the child to express its views in proceedings is also granted by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016 (art. 24. p. 1: Children shall have the right to such 
protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall 
be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity.); 
European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised), CETS No.202, 27. 11. 2008 (see art. 5. 
and 6.); Recommendation No R (84) 4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on pa-
rental responsibilities (see Principle 3); Recommendation No R (87) 6 on foster families (see Principle 
7) etc. Considering that divorce proceedings involving minor children deal with the issue of contact 
with the child, one should not forget to mention the protection of the right of the child to express its 
views, enshrined in the Convention on Contact concerning Children, ETS No.192, 15.5.2003 (art. 6.: 
A child considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding shall have this right, unless this would 
be manifestly contrary to his or her best interests:
 –to receive all relevant information;
 –to be consulted;
 –to express his or her views.
9  The right of the child to be heard in civil proceedings is not expressly contained within the ECHR, 
nor has such a right been explicitly determined by the European Court of Human Right. Considering 
the principles of evolutive interpretation, the positive obligations inherent within Articles 6 and 8 as 
well as the case-law on hearing children to date, is to be argued that such a right can be derived under 
the ECHR. Daly, A., The right of children to be heard in civil proceedings and the emerging law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2011, 
pp. 441.
  For the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to the right of the child to express 
its views see, e.g.: T. v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121; Kutzner v Germany (2002) Appl. 
No. 46544/99, Sahin v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 765; Sommerfeld v Germany (2003), Appl. No. 
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Considering that the contents of particular European documents protecting the 
right of the child to be heard overlap, this chapter deals only with some of them, 
i.e. sheds light only on the most relevant ones for this study. The analysis of those 
European documents with respect to the protection of this children’s right starts 
with their foundation, i.e. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
10  (hereinafter: UN CRC). 
2.1.  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as the basis of 
regional European documents regulating the right of the child to be heard 
The UN CRC appears in the preamble of many regional European documents 
which regulate   children’s (procedural) rights. The European Court of Justice 
has recognized that all EU actions must respect fundamental rights and in this 
regard has noted that due account should be given to the UN CRC.11 As rightly 
highlighted by Couzens, the UN CRC “has confirmed that children are regarded 
as subjects of human rights and not just as subjects of protections” and that “this 
position creates a direct link between the state and children, without parents or 
other adults playing a role as intermediaries.”12 
The right of the child to express its views is set forth in Article 12 of the UN CRC:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard 
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the pro-
cedural rules of national law.13
31871/96, etc.
  For the case-law of the European Court of Justice relating to the right of the child to express its views 
see, e.g.: Case C-491/10  Aguirre Zarraga v Pelza  [2010] ECR I-14247; Case C-400/10 McB v L.E., 
[2010] ECR I-8965, etc.
10  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
11  O’Donnell, R., The role of the EU legal and policy framework in strengthening child friendly justice, ERA 
Forum, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, p. 512.
12  Couzens, M, Autonomy rights versus parental autonomy, The UN Children’s Rights Convention: theory 
meets practice, Alen, A. et al. (eds.), Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford, 2007, p. 407.
13  Article 12 of the UN CRC
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It may be argued that recognition of the child’s best interests in the sense of Article 
3 underpins all the other provisions in the UN CRC14. The right of the child to 
have its best interest assessed and taken as a primary consideration along with the 
right of the child to be heard are compulsory passages for all those who have the 
crucial task of deciding on the child’s future in a different official (judicial and 
administrative) context.15 Article 3 of the UN CRC provides:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social wel-
fare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, 
legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent 
authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of 
their staff, as well as competent supervision.16
In Zermatten’s opinion, we can give two significations to the expression ’’the best 
interest of the child shall be a primary consideration¨’. First, the best interest prin-
ciple is the fundament for a substantive right: the right of the child that its best 
interests will be assessed and determined and that it will be taken as a primary 
consideration whenever a decision concerning it is to be made. Second, it is a rule 
of procedure: whenever a decision affecting a specific child or a group of children 
is to be made, the decision-making process must be carried out through the con-
sideration of a possible impact on the child concerned and this impact must be 
accompanied with a primary consideration in the appreciation of different inter-
ests in play.17 The importance of the principle of priority protection of the best 
interests and well-being of the child as a starting point for any family proceedings 
which might affect its rights and interests is undoubted and divorce proceedings 
are no exception in this view. Not only that this principle should underpin all 
the national legislation provisions regulating divorce proceedings involving minor 
14  Freeman, M., Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 
2007, p. 1.
15  Zermatten, J., Best interests of the child, Child-friendly Justice: A quarter of a Century of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, Mahmoudi, S. et al. (ed.), Brill Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2015, p. 
42.
16  Article 3 of the  UN CRC
17  Zermatten, J., op. cit. note 15, p. 31/32.
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children but application and proper interpretation of this principle may fill legal 
lacunae, if any, pertaining to the protection of children’s rights in such proceed-
ings. 
On the other hand, one of the recurrent critiques to the best interest is that this 
principle is too vague and that it is difficult to implement it without guidelines 
that are more precise.18 Within the conflicting scenario of defining and enforcing 
the best interest principle, probably the most important right when dealing with 
the rights of children in marital breakdown relates to listening what children have 
to say.19
There are opposing opinions about whether the right of the child to express its 
views in divorce proceedings (granted by Article 12 of the UN CRC) and the best 
interests of the child (in the sense of Article 3 of the UN CRC) are complemen-
tary or conflicting. Sometimes the best interests of the child argument is used to 
encourage participation of the child in the proceedings and on some occasions 
hearing the child in divorce proceedings is deemed contrary to its best interests.20 
The Recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child suggest 
that all the State parties should facilitate the exercise of the right of the child to 
express its views either in judicial divorce proceedings or within the framework of 
family mediation or in any other similar procedure envisaged for the regulation of 
divorce and post-divorce parental responsibility. This right depends neither on the 
age of the child nor on the parents’ consent to its exercise. The Recommendations 
promote an individual approach to this issue or precisely, that it is advisable to 
assess the ability of the child to express its views.21 One should also bear in mind 
that the expression of child’s views is a child’s right and not its liability. The child 
has the right to decide whether it will express its opinion or not and whether it 
will express its views directly or through a representative or an appropriate body. 
18  Ibid, p. 36.
19  Farrugia, R., Children’s rights in family court proceedings, The UN Children’s Rights Convention: theory 
meets practice, Alen, A. et al. (eds.), Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford, 2007, p. 407. 
20  Hemrica, J., Heyting, F., Tacit Notions of Childhood: An Analysis of Discourse about Child Participation 
in Decision-Making Regarding Arrangements in Case of Parental Divorce, Childhoods, Vol. 11. No. 4, 
2004, pp. 449-468. 
21  “In cases of separation and divorce, the children of the relationship are unequivocally affected by de-
cisions of the courts. (…) For this reason, all legislation on separation and divorce has to include the 
right of the child to be heard by decision makers and in mediation processes. Some jurisdictions, either 
as a matter of policy or legislation, prefer to state an age at which the child is regarded as capable of 
expressing her or his own views. The Convention, however, anticipates that this matter be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, since it refers to age and maturity, and for this reason requires an individual 
assessment of the capacity of the child.” UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General 
comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard, 20 July 2009, CRC/C/GC/12, pp 12.
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A parent, guardian, lawyer or another person can appear in the role of a child’s 
representative. As proposed in the Recommendations, it must be stressed that in 
many cases, there are risks of a conflict of interest between the child and their most 
obvious representative parent. Certainly, such a conflict of interest may, but does 
not have to characterize divorce proceedings. Therefore, the author holds that the 
role of parents as primary representatives of the child, who convey child’s views 
to the court, should not be necessarily played by another person. Unless there is 
another firm ground, this role should be played by someone else only if it is clear 
that parents do not protect the best interest of the child or that they do not respect 
its opinion or when there is no agreement between parents on who has the right 
to represent the child with respect to issues relating to the protection of its rights 
and interests. 22
2.2.   European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights 
The European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights23 (hereinafter: EC 
ECR) aims to protect the best interests of children, providing a number of pro-
cedural measures to ensure them exercise of their rights.   The intention of the 
EC ECR was to supplement the UN CRC by assisting children to exercise their 
substantive rights set out in the Convention. It recognises that the most practical 
means for children to claim and enforce their rights is through legal proceedings.24 
Its application is exclusively related to family matters resolved before courts and 
competent administrative bodies. One of its most important features is that its 
provisions are always employed whenever proceedings affect a right of the child, 
regardless of whether the case revolves around the child or the child appears in the 
case collaterally. The former situation refers to cases where the child is the peti-
tioner and the latter to cases in which a right of the child is interfered with, which 
is typical for divorce proceedings.25
The right of the child to be informed and to express its views in proceedings is 
regulated by Article 3 of the EC ECR:
22  In this light also see Rešetar, B., Novi razvod braka u Republici Hrvatskoj pod utjecajem psihologije, soci-
ologije i međunarodnog prava (New Divorce in the Republic of Croatia under the Influence of Psychology, 
Sociology and International Law), Suvremeno obiteljsko pravo i postupak (Contemporary Family Law 
and Procedure), Rešetar, B. et al., Faculty of Law Osijek, 2017 (in print), p. 52. 
23  European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Council of Europe, 25 January 1996, ETS 
160
24  Fortin, J., Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, Third edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
p 73
25  Tako i Hrabar, D., Nova procesna prava djeteta - europski pogled (Children’s New Procedural Rights – Eu-
ropean View), yearbook of the Croatian Academy of Legal Sciences, Vol. 4, No.1, 2013, p. 71.
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A child considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding, in the case of 
proceedings before a judicial authority affecting him or her, shall be granted, and shall 
be entitled to request, the following rights:
   to receive all relevant information;
   to be consulted and express his or her views;
   to be informed of the possible consequences of compliance with these views and 
the possible consequences of any decision.26
As reasoned in the Explanatory Report to the EC ECR27, Article 3 has not given 
the child the right to consent to or to veto a planned decision as it covers many 
different types of cases and it would not always be in the best interests of a child to 
be given such a right in the case of certain decisions. As far as the child’s capacity 
to express its views is concerned, it is left to states to define the criteria enabling 
them to evaluate whether or not children are capable of forming and expressing 
their own views and states are naturally free to make the age of children one of 
those criteria. 
Hrabar stresses that apart from shedding light on special rights of the child in 
court proceedings, the EC ECR highlights the importance of amending the court’s 
role. According to the EC ECR, the court should be protective towards the child. 
The court deals with a case and the child, regardless of not being a party thereto, 
remains being in the spotlight, so the court should pay special attention to the 
child’s subjectivity, who is in principle unguarded due to its age and immaturity.28 
In this view, Article 9 of the EC ECR foresees the power of the judicial author-
ity to appoint a special representative for the child, irrespective of its capacity for 
understanding, in proceedings affecting the child where the holders of parental 
responsibilities are precluded from representing the child as a result of a conflict 
of interest between them and the child. Furthermore, the Parties to the EC ECR 
must examine the possibility of giving the judicial authorities a power to appoint, 
for the proceedings, a separate representative for the child, even when there is no 
conflict of interest between the child and the holders of parental responsibilities. 
In any case, a representative shall, according to Article 10 of the EC, provide all 
relevant information to the child if the child is considered by internal law as hav-
ing sufficient understanding, provide explanations to the child if the child is con-
sidered by internal law as having sufficient understanding concerning the possible 
26  Art 3. EC ECR
27  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Council of 
Europe, European Treaty Series - No. 160
28  Hrabar, D., op. cit. note 25, p. 78.
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consequences of compliance with its views and the possible consequences of any 
action by the representative, determine the views of the child and present these 
views to the judicial authority. The necessary requirement for fulfilling these obli-
gations is that none of them is contrary to the best interests of the child. ’’Deter-
mining the views of the child does not necessarily only mean speaking to the child 
and asking the child to express views verbally but also includes “observations” of 
the child by a representative or by, for example, an expert medical practitioner.”29 
It should be noted that the EC ECR also regards the right of the child to express 
its views as a right of the child and not as its liability. In any case, the child may 
refuse to express its views, regardless of whether it is to be heard in person or 
through a special representative. 
2.3.  Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
child-friendly justice
With the adoption of the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Coun-
cil of Europe on child-friendly justice30 (hereinafter: Guidelines), the concept of 
child-friendly justice has become part of the European legal and political frame-
work concerning the position of children in justice systems.31 Child-friendly jus-
tice aims to make justice systems more focused on children’s rights, more sensitive 
to children’s interests and more responsive to children’s participation in formal and 
informal decision-making concerning them.32 As accentuated in the foreword to 
the Guidelines, the Council of Europe adopted the Guidelines on child-friendly 
justice specifically “to ensure that justice is always friendly towards children, no 
matter who they are or what they have done. Considering that a friend is someone 
who treats you well, who trusts you and whom you can trust, who listens to what 
you say and to whom you listen, who understands you and whom you under-
stand. A true friend also has the courage to tell you when you are in the wrong 
and stands by you to help you work out a solution. A child-friendly justice system 
should endeavour to replicate these ideals.”33
29  Op. cit. note 27
30  Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010
31  Liefoard, T., Child-friendly justice: protection and participation of children in the justice system, Temple 
Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 2016, p. 905.
32  Ibid. 
33  Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010 and explanatory 
memorandum, Council of Europe Publishing, 2011, p. 7.
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When defining their scope and purposes, it was proclaimed that the Guidelines 
should ensure that in every proceedings, children’s rights, including the right to 
information, representation, participation and protection, are fully respected with 
due consideration to the child’s level of maturity and understanding and to the cir-
cumstances of the case. The Guidelines should apply to all ways in which children 
are likely to be, for whatever reason and in whatever capacity, brought into con-
tact with all competent bodies and services involved in implementing criminal, 
civil or administrative law.34 The foreword to the Guidelines and the Explanatory 
Memorandum indicate the situations in which the child may come into contact 
with judicial and non-judicial proceedings and divorce appears as the first example 
thereof.
The Guidelines makes reference to the right of the child to express its views in 
Chapter III – Fundamental principles and Chapter IV – Child-friendly justice, 
before, during and after judicial proceedings. The Fundamental principles suggest 
that the right of all children to be informed about their rights and be consulted 
and heard in proceedings involving or affecting them should be respected, bearing 
in mind their maturity and any communication difficulties they may have or their 
ability to shape their own viewpoints. It is also denoted that when assessing the 
best interests of the child, due weight should be given to their views and opinions. 
The part of the Guidelines elaborating child-friendly justice before judicial pro-
ceedings lays down that children should be thoroughly informed and consulted 
on the opportunity to have recourse to either court proceedings or alternatives 
outside court settings. 
In terms of child-friendly justice during judicial proceedings, the Guidelines dedi-
cate s special subchapter to the right to be heard and to express views: 
Judges should respect the right of children to be heard in all matters that affect them 
or at least to be heard when they are deemed to have a sufficient understanding of the 
matters in question. Means used for this purpose should be adapted to the child’s level of 
understanding and ability to communicate and take into account the circumstances of 
the case. Children should be consulted on the manner in which they wish to be heard.
Due weight should be given to the child’s views and opinion in accordance with his or 
her age and maturity. 
The right to be heard is a right of the child, not a duty of the child. 
34  Considering their content, it might be asserted that the Guidelines are mostly concerned with criminal 
proceedings, but the part referring to their scope and purpose reveals that they should apply to civil 
and administrative proceedings too. 
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A child should not be precluded from being heard solely on the basis of age. Whenever a 
child takes the initiative to be heard in a case that affects him or her, the judge should 
not, unless it is in the child’s best interests, refuse to hear the child and should listen to 
his or her views and opinion on matters concerning him or her in the case. 
Children should be provided with all necessary information on how effectively to use 
the right to be heard. However, it should be explained to them that their right to be 
heard and to have their views taken into consideration may not necessarily determine 
the final decision. 
Judgments and court rulings affecting children should be duly reasoned and explained 
to them in language that children can understand, particularly those decisions in which 
the child’s views and opinions have not been followed.35
Taking account of the fact that efficient protection of children’s procedural rights, 
including the right of the child to express its views, often depends on the skills and 
competences of those who carry the burden of the responsibility for representing 
the child, the Guidelines shed light on the importance of the possession of those 
skills and competences, but also on the ability to communicate with children in 
compliance with their level of understanding.
The Guidelines encourage the Member States to enhance their interdisciplinary 
approach in working with children. Cederborg justly concludes that ’’when chil-
dren are involved in legal matters, there is a need for collaboration between profes-
sionals from behavioural sciences and the legal system’’ and that ’’such interdisci-
plinary collaboration can clarify the knowledge necessary to increase the chance 
that children are understood from their unique perspectives and conditions.’’36 
Guideline 14 sets forth that all professionals working with children (police, law-
yers, judges, mediators, social workers and other experts) need to complete train-
ing in communication skills, in using child-friendly language and in developing 
knowledge on child psychology. As outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum, 
judges often lack qualifications to communicate with children and they rarely seek 
professional assistance in performing that task. In accordance with the data of the 
European Commission37 a legal obligation to provide multidisciplinary training to 
all professionals working for and with children on the rights and needs of children 
35  Guidelines 44 do 49
36  Cederborg, A., Children’s right to be heard from their unique perspectives, Child-friendly Justice: A quar-
ter of a Century of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Mahmoudi, S. et al. (ed.), Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2015, pp. 80/81.
37  See the Summary of contextual overviews on children’s involvement in civil and administrative judicial 
proceedings in the 28 Member States of the European Union, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2015, pp 27/28.
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and on proceedings adapted to them exists in 13 jurisdictions38 The legal obliga-
tion to provide mandatory training relating to communication with children in 
civil and judicial proceedings at all ages and stages of their development exists 
in 10 jurisdictions.39 Non-mandatory training opportunities for professionals on 
communicating with children involved in civil and administrative proceedings 
exist in 17 jurisdictions.40
The discussion on the protection of the right of the child to express its views, laid 
down in the  Guidelines, which truly represent one of the most significant contri-
butions to the contemporary, exceptionally important doctrine of children’s pro-
cedural rights41, concludes with a formulation from the foreword thereto: justice 
is child-friendly only if “listens to children, takes their views seriously and makes 
sure that the interests of those who cannot express themselves (such as babies) are 
also protected.”42
2.4.  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003
The importance of the protection of the right of the child to express its views in 
family proceedings resulting in decisions affecting its rights and interests has been 
recognized in some documents relating to the area of private international law. As 
far as the protection of the right of the child to express its views in divorce pro-
ceedings with an international element is concerned, the major role is played by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/200343 (hereinafter: Regulation) which con-
38  Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, 
UK-England and Wales and UK-Northern Ireland.
39  Austria (mandatory only for social workers) Belgium, France, Greece, Spain (mandatory only for judg-
es of special family courts) Luxembourg, Sweden, Slovenia, UK-England and Wales and UK-Northern 
Ireland (In UK- England and Wales and UK-Northern Ireland, general training in the form of Con-
tinuing Professional Development (CPD) is a mandatory requirement for all professions working with 
children, including the judiciary, solicitors, social workers and Children’s Guardians/Guardians Ad 
Litem).
40  Austria, Cyprus (training is mandatory for the officers of the Social Services who come into contact 
with children), Czech Republic, Estonia (some of the courses for judges are in fact mandatory), Greece, 
Finland, Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
UK- England and Wales and UK-Northern Ireland.
41  See also Korać Graovac, Smjernice Odbora ministara Vijeća Europe o pravosuđu naklonjenom djeci 
(Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice), Dijete i 
društvo (Child and Society), Vol. 13, No. 1/2, 2011, pp. 274.
42  Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010 and explanatory 
memorandum, Council of Europe Publishing, 2011, pp. 8.
43  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsi-
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tains uniform rules for jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility.44 Bearing in mind 
that in the EU, as disclosed by Župan, about 250,000 international divorce pro-
ceedings are initiated on an annual basis45, it is clear how proper and harmonized 
application of the Regulation contributes to legal security with respect to conduct-
ing that kind of divorce proceedings in the Member States.46
The Regulation points out that children should be given an opportunity to express 
their views in proceedings affecting them.47 The Regulation refers to the right of 
the child to be heard in various articles.48 In the sense of the Regulation, the child 
is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears 
inappropriate having regard to its age or degree of maturity. However, an excep-
tion to this principle, i.e. not hearing the child due to its age and degree of matu-
rity, should be interpreted very restrictively and one should particularly take into 
consideration that children’s rights are very important in proceedings relating to 
children and that generally, decisions on the future of the child and the relation-
ship with its parents and others are of vital importance in regard to its interests.49
The Regulation provides that the violation of the child’s right to be heard is one of 
the grounds for non-recognition of a judicial statement. Namely, Article 23 of the 
Regulation explicitly stipulates that a judgment relating to parental responsibility 
shall not be recognized if it is passed, except in case of urgency, without the child 
having been given an opportunity to be heard, thus violating the fundamental 
principles of procedure of the Member State in which recognition is sought. 
Pursuant to Article 41 of the Regulation, the right to contact with the child 
granted in an enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized 
and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of 
bility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000
44  Scope of the Regulation is determined in its Article 1: 
  Regulation shall apply, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal, in civil matters relating to:
  (a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment;
  (b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility. 
45  Župan, M., Europski prekogranični obiteljski postupci (European Cross-Border Family Proceedings),  Pro-
cesno – pravni aspekti prava EU (Procedural – Legal Aspects of EU Law), Petrašević, T. (ed.); Vuletić, 
I. (ed.), Faculty of Law of the Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Osijek, 2016,  pp. 126.
46  On the application of the Regulation in the Member States see in Boele-Woelki, K. (ed.), Gonzalez 
Beilfuss, C. (ed.), Brussels II bis: Its Impact and Application in the Member States, Intersentia, 2007.
47  See Recital 19 of the Regulation.
48  See Article 11 paragraph 2, Article 23 b), Article 41 paragraph 2 c) and Article 42 paragraph 2 a) 
49  Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation, pp 77. An electronic version availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf . Accessed 20 February 
2017.
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enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judg-
ment has been certified in the Member State of origin. However, the same Article 
prescribes that the judge of origin shall issue the certificate only if the child was 
given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered inappropriate 
having regard to its age or degree of maturity.
The Regulation does not modify the applicable national procedures for taking the 
views of a child. Techniques and strategies for taking the views of children are in 
the hands of national courts.50 After analyzing the protection of the right of the 
child to express its views, laid down in the Regulation, Zoeteweij-Turhan drew the 
conclusion that it is misleading to declare that the Regulation confers an absolute 
right to be heard at court to children in proceedings that fall within its scope. The 
conclusion is accompanied with the explanation that even though the aim of the 
Regulation is to uniform the procedural law with regard to the matters failing 
within the scope of the Regulation, the regulation of child consultation continues 
to be a matter of national law.51 A similar view has been brought up by Shannon, 
asserting that this is regrettable and can result in dependence of the child’s right 
to be heard on the Member State in which it is habitually resident.52 This prob-
lem has also been detected by Kruger and Samin and they link it to Article 23 of 
the Regulation, according to which a judgment relating to parental responsibility 
shall not be recognized if it is passed without the child having been given an op-
portunity to be heard, thus violating the fundamental principles of procedure of 
the Member State in which recognition is sought. They back their assertion with 
the following explanation: “This test seems overly prudent in the protection of 
national procedural autonomy. The test should rather be whether there was a vio-
lation of the Children’s Rights Convention. Such reference would confirm what 
should be the case already: the same standards of children’s rights apply all over the 
EU. Moreover, it would assist in converging the laws of Member States. This does 
50  The Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation underlines that regardless of 
who hears the child, a judge, an expert, social worker or other official, it is of the essence that that 
person receives adequate training, for instance how to best communicate with children. Similarly, the 
Practice Guide propagates that whoever takes the views needs to be aware of the risk that parents seek 
to influence and put pressure on the child and that the hearing shall be carried out properly and with 
appropriate discretion. See Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation, pp 77. An 
electronic version available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf 
.  Accessed 20 February 2017.
51  Zoeteweij-Turhan, M., Brussels ii bis: The right of the Child to be Heard in International Proceedings, 
Pravnik, Vol. 70 (132), No. 11-12, 2015, p. 873.
52  Shannon, G., The Internationalisation of Irish Family Law, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, Vol. 5, No. 
1, 2005, p. 80.
Nataša Lucić: PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO BE HEARD IN ... 405
not mean that national procedural rules on how, and by whom the child is heard 
must be changed, merely that the standard should be set straight.”53
3.  THE RIGHT Of THE CHILD TO EXPRESS ITS VIEWS IN 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN CROATIAN LAW  
In 2015, Croatia saw adoption of a new Family Act54 (hereinafter: 2015 Family 
Act) which has reformed Croatian family legislation to a great extent. When pre-
paring the latest reform in the field of divorce involving minor children, the Croa-
tian legislator put the emphasis on children.55 The reform was aimed at improv-
ing the child’s procedural position in divorce proceedings and at shaping a legal 
framework for making judicial decisions on divorce, which are expected to serve 
as a source of protection of the rights and interests of the child after proceedings 
completion. This chapter offers a detailed analysis of the provisions protecting the 
right of the child to express its views within the new Croatian family legislation56 
and provides an assessment of their harmonization with the European standards 
of legal protection of the right of the child to express its views, which are discussed 
in the previous chapter.
3.1.  fundamental principles  
What can be derived from the analysis of the provisions regulating divorce involv-
ing minor children in Croatia is that the child-friendly approach relies on three 
fundamental principles. The first one is the principle of priority protection and 
well-being of the child:
53  Kruger, T.; Samyn, L., Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements, Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, p. 157.
54  Family Act (Official Gazette no. 103/15)
55  The 2015 family legislation reform pays great attention to the child’s procedural position in all family 
matters and not only in divorce proceedings. Croatian legal theory has often warned about the need 
for improvement of the child’s procedural position in family proceedings. See, e.g., Uzelac, A.; Rešetar, 
B., Procesni položaj i zastupanje djeteta u sudskom postupku prema hrvatskom i komparativnom pravu – 
neka otvorena pitanja (Procedural Position of the Child before Judicial and Administrative Bodies in Family 
Matters – Some Open Issues), Dijete i pravo (Child and Law), Rešetar, B. (ed.), Faculty of Law Osijek, 
2009, pp. 163-194.; Hrabar, D, Zastupanje djece i postupovna prava djeteta pred sudskim i upravnim 
tijelima u obiteljskopravnim stvarima (Representation of the Child and Its Procedural Rights before Judicial 
and Administrative Bodies in Family Matters), Croatian Legal Journal, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2002., pp. 46-53. 
56  What turned out to be an incentive to reforms in this field was the results of a study of the case-law, 
revealing an embarrassingly small number of divorce proceedings in which the child was given an op-
portunity to express its views. See Rešetar, B., Pravna zaštita prava na susrete i druženja (Legal Protection 
of the Right to Contact with the Child), Faculty of Law Osijek, Osijek, 2011.
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Courts and public bodies adjudicating in cases indirectly or directly affecting children’s 
rights have to protect the rights of the child and its well-being before all.
The child is entitled to contact with both of its parents unless this is contrary to its well-
being.57
The second one is the principle of amicable resolution of family matters:
Encouraging amicable resolution of family matters is a task of all who provide the fam-
ily with professional aid or decide on family relations.58
The third principle refers to proportional and the weakest interference with family 
life. 
Measures which interfere with family life are eligible if they are necessary and if their 
purpose cannot be efficiently realized by undertaking more lenient measures, including 
precautionary assistance or support provided to a family.59
Taking account of all of the three principles, the protection of the best interest 
of the child in divorce proceedings is the primary task of all the participants in 
divorce involving minor children. One should also have regard to the fact that the 
protection of the best interest of the child needs to arise, if possible, from amicable 
resolution of family matters and without unnecessary interference with the family 
life of parents and their child. In this light, the Croatian legislator has opted for 
a divorce concept in which the exercise of children’s (procedural) rights foreseen 
in international documents is facilitated and in which the child is protected from 
unnecessary exposure to (judicial) examination of its views relating to the parents’ 
agreement where there is no doubt that such an agreement is justified and in com-
pliance with the best interests of the child during and after the divorce.
3.2.  Mandatory counselling and a parenting plan 
Spouses having a minor child together are obliged to attend mandatory counsel-
ling at the competent social welfare centre prior to the initiation of judicial divorce 
proceedings.60 In line with the legal definition thereof, mandatory counselling is a 
form of aid provided to family members to reach an agreement on family matters, 
57  Article 5  of the 2015 Family Act 
58  Article 9 of the 2015 Family Act 
59  Article 7 of the 2015 Family Act
60  Except prior to the initiation of divorce proceedings involving minor children, mandatory counselling 
shall be attended before the initiation of other judicial proceedings relating to the exercise of parental 
responsibility and the maintenance of contact with the child.
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within the framework of which the counsellors show great concern for the protec-
tion of family relations affecting the child and present the legal consequences of 
a failure to reach such an agreement and initiation of judicial proceedings regu-
lating children’s rights.61 The mandatory counselling procedure has substituted 
the mediation procedure envisaged by the former Family Act62 (hereinafter: 2003 
Family Act). The mandatory counselling procedure focuses on an attempt of di-
vorcing parents to reach an agreement on the exercise of their post-divorce paren-
tal responsibility and not on an attempt to reconcile, which was the case with the 
mediation procedure.63 In fact, if spouses wish to divorce based on an agreement, 
they shall draw up a parental responsibility agreement (hereinafter: PRA). A PRA 
is a written agreement of parents on the manner of the exercise of shared parental 
responsibility in the circumstances of separate life. In compliance of Article 106 of 
the 2015 Family Act and pursuant to Article 2 of the Regulation on the Required 
Form of a Parenting Plan64 (hereinafter: Parenting Plan Regulation), a PRA shall 
govern as follows: child’s residence, child’s contact with both of its parents, infor-
mation exchange and giving consent in relation to making decisions relevant for 
the child, exchange of child-relevant information, child maintenance as a liability 
of the non-resident parent and the manner of resolving possible controversial is-
sues. A parenting plan may regulate other issues relating to the exercise of parental 
responsibility if the parents deem them relevant for the child or if they require an 
agreement between the parents. 
What is posed here is the question how Croatian family legislation protects the 
right of the child to express its views about the content of the PRA, which sets 
grounds for making a decision on non-contentious divorce considering that the 
entire PRA affects the rights and interests of the child. The 2015 Family Act ex-
plicitly regulates that parents are obliged to introduce their child to the content of 
the PRA and provide it with the possibility to express its opinion in compliance 
with its age and degree of maturity. They shall also respect their child’s opinion in 
61  Mandatory counselling is conducted by an expert team at the social welfare centre situated in the place 
of the child’s residence or in the place of the parents’ last common residence. See art. 321. p. 1. and 2. 
of the 2015 FA.
62  Family Act (Official Gazette no. 116/03, 17/04, 136/04, 107/07, 57/11, 61/11, 25/13)
63  Examination of the data on the successfulness of the mediation procedure has shown that the number 
of cases in which reconciliation or mediation activities resulted in dropping the intention to get di-
vorced by one or both spouses is statistically negligible, so it can be asserted that ’saved marriages’ and 
’reconciliation’ are very, very rare. Uzelac, A., Novo uređnje obiteljskih sudskih postupaka - glavni pravci 
reforme obiteljskih parničnih postupaka u trećem Obiteljskom zakonu (New Regulation of Family Mat-
ters – Main Reform Courses of Contentious Family Proceedings in the Third Family Act) , Novo uređenje 
obiteljskih sudskih postupaka (New Regulation of Family Matters), Barbić, J. (ed.), Croatian Academy 
of Sciences and Arts, Zagreb, 2014, p. 26
64  Regulation on the Mandatory Content of a Parenting Plan (Official Gazette no. 123/15)
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accordance with the well-being of the child standard.65 Article 2 of the Parenting 
Plan Regulation prescribes what a proper parenting plan shall include, but it does 
not say anything about the expression of child’s views in accordance with its age 
and degree of maturity. Still, a PRA template, which is an integral part of the Par-
enting Plan Regulation, contains a field in which parents should indicate if they 
have given their child an opportunity to express its views about the content of the 
PRA. In case they have failed to do so, they shall state the appertaining reasons. 
The template also involves a field in which parents should display whether they 
have taken the child’s opinion into consideration or not. If they have not done 
that, they shall disclose their reasons. Concerning that pursuant to the Parenting 
plan Regulation, the required form of a PRA does not encompass expression of 
child’s views and that the fields referring thereto provide the parents with the pos-
sibility to indicate that they have not taken into consideration their child’s opinion 
about the content of the PRA, allowing them to state any ground for failing to 
do so66, the Parenting Plan Regulation implies that expression of child’s views in 
compliance with its age and degree of maturity does not have a binding character. 
yet, since the parents’ duty to introduce their child to the content of the PRA and 
allow it to express its views in compliance with its age and degree of maturity is 
set forth in the 2015 Family Act, which has superior legal force with respect to the 
Parenting Plan Regulation, the author believes that parents shall fulfil this duty of 
theirs regardless of the content of the Parenting Plan Regulation. 
The survey has demonstrated that there are some ambiguities in the interpreta-
tion of the regulations referring to the (lack of ) liability of incorporation of child’s 
views into a PRA. Precisely, more than ¼ of the centres which participated in 
the questionnaire relating to the mandatory counselling procedure67 have revealed 
that in the context of mandatory counselling, PRAs lacking a field intended for 
describing the child’s views can be concluded too (see Graph 1). Therefore, the 
author points to the need for amendment of the Parenting Plan Regulation in a 
way that incorporation of child’s views into PRAs shall become a liability of the 
parents.
65  Article 106 paragraph 4 of the 2015 Family Act.
66  The reason can be, for instance, their own assessment that the child’s opinion is not relevant.
67  See footnote 7.
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Graph 1 
Child’s views about the content of the PRA are mostly examined by its parents and 
the competent social welfare centre substitutes parents in interviewing the child 
only when there is a doubt that parents have not conveyed the child’s opinion cor-
rectly (see Graph 2).
Graph 2 
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Regarding the possibility of the child to express its views (not only about the con-
tent of the PRA but also about any other issues)  at the competent welfare centre 
within the mandatory counselling procedure which spouses shall attend before 
initiating divorce proceedings, the 2015 Family Act binds it to a parents’ consent 
thereto.68 Accordingly, there is the question how often children are heard within 
the mandatory counselling procedure which shall be implemented prior to the 
initiation of divorce proceedings. Then, are parents reluctant to give their consent 
to the child to express its views or they encourage it to do that? The survey has 
shown as follows:
1. The majority of the social welfare centres that responded to the questionnaire 
never or hardly ever require from the child to express its views within the manda-
tory counselling procedure which shall be implemented prior to the initiation 
of divorce proceedings (see Graph 3). Only 17.39% of the investigated centres 
require from the child to express its views in most cases and none of the centres 
asks the child to express its views in every case.
Graph 3 
68  During mandatory counselling, the child can be invited to express its views, but this requires consent 
of its parents. See Article 325 paragraph 3. The same applies to expression of child’s views during the 
mandatory counselling procedure which shall be implemented prior to the initiation of other judicial 
proceedings dealing with the exercise of parental responsibility and contact with the child. See Article 
329 paragraph 2.
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2. When social welfare centres require from the child to express its views within 
the mandatory counselling procedure which shall be implemented prior to the ini-
tiation of divorce proceedings, parents do not usually have any objections thereto. 
Indeed, most respondents have confirmed that parents never oppose this pos-
sibility.69 
3. Parents rarely invite their child to express its views within the mandatory coun-
selling procedure which shall be implemented prior to the initiation of divorce 
proceedings (see Graph 4).
Graph 4 
If the Recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child for 
Article 12 of the UN CRC70 are taken into consideration, Aras Kramar’s assertion 
seems to be right in principle. She claims that it does not make sense to bind the 
expression of child’s views within the mandatory counselling procedure to the 
69  Zagreb Social Welfare Centre – subsidiary Trnje,  Našice Social Welfare Centre and Zaprešić Social 
Welfare Centre have revealed that about 10% of parents are against the possibility of their child to be 
heard and thus express its views while Zagreb Social Welfare Centre – subsidiary Novi Zagreb (New 
Zagreb), Zadar Social Welfare Centre and Dugo Selo Social Welfare Centre have disclosed that about 
5% of parents oppose this possibility. In Valpovo, only 2% of parents argued that their child should 
be given such a possibility. Other social welfare centres have brought forth that parents never prevent 
their child to express its views within the mandatory counselling procedure.
70  As promoted in the Recommendations, the right of the child to express its view should not be subject 
to a parents’ consent thereto. See Chapter 2.1.
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consent of its parents.71 Nevertheless, the Croatian solutions are still compliant 
with the international standards applying to the right of the child to be heard in 
divorce proceeding. Namely, non-contentious divorce involving minor children 
can be implemented only if spouses draw up a PRA. The required form of a par-
enting plan encompasses expression of child’s views and hence, the child will be 
given an opportunity to express its views about divorce-related issues affecting 
its rights and interests. If parents do not prepare a PRA, their marriage will be 
dissolved in contentious proceedings in which child’s views will be examined in 
an appropriate way.72 The Croatian legislator uses such an approach to provide 
the child with a safeguard with respect to its right to be heard, protecting it from 
unnecessary participation in judicial proceedings. Indeed, when it comes to the 
protection of children’s procedural rights in divorce proceedings, one should not 
forget what Diduck and others have to say in this light: “children may neither 
want complete autonomy nor to be treated as objects”.73 
A PRA may be regarded as a binding document upon spouses if the parties submit 
it to court for verification and approval through a decree.74 As pointed out herein-
above, the 2015 Family Act assumes that a PRA is in principle better for the child 
than imposition of certain judicial solutions since parents know their children 
better than anyone else does.75 As accentuated by Farrugia, “parents may stop their 
spousal relationship but where they have children in common they will invariably 
continue to meet and share interaction at least until the children attain the age of 
majority (…)”. Considering the importance of an agreement on post-divorce pa-
rental responsibility both for the child and its parents, the Croatian legislator has 
set out that in case spouses do not conclude a PRA until mandatory counselling 
completion, spouses shall attend the first meeting with a family mediator.76 What 
71  Aras Kramar, S., Novi pristup uređenju postupka radi razvoda braka u Hrvatskoj (New Approach to the 
Regulation of Divorce Proceedings in Croatia), Collection of Contemporary Developments in Civil Pro-
cedure – achievements in national and comparative legal theory, Faculty of Law of the University of 
Split, Split, 2015, p. 246.
72  See Chapter 3.4.
73  Diduck, A. (2003), according to Fortin, op. cit. note 24, p. 242.
74  See Article 107 paragraph 1 and Articles 461-467 of the 2015 FA 
75  If it comes to a dispute between parents about the representation of the child on the occasion of 
verification and approval of the parenting plan or particular clauses thereof, this would suggest that 
an agreement on parental responsibility has not been reached and the court would be forced to reject 
the non-contentious divorce request and refer the spouses to the possibility of submitting a divorce 
petition. Aras Kramar, S. op. cit. note 71, p. 252.
76  Except in cases envisaged by Article 332 of the Family Act when family mediation is not carried out:
  1. if based an assessment of an expert team in a social welfare centre or of a family mediator, equal 
participation of spouses in the family mediation procedure is not possible due to domestic violence,
  2. if one or both spouses are deprived of the capacity to work and they cannot, despite professional 
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is also possible in this context is to draw up a parenting plan within the framework 
of family mediation. 
3.3.  family mediation
Family mediation is a procedure in which the parties, assisted by one of more 
family mediators, try to amicably resolve family matters77. Licensed family media-
tors are impartial and specially trained persons registered in the family mediator 
register. The benefits of family mediation are numerous. Before all, they refer to 
family members who are expected to independently make decisions for the benefit 
of the whole family. Moreover, family members are taught to efficiently com-
municate and negotiate in order to get fitter for the resolution of family disputes, 
irrespective of the changes and reorganization of family life.78 In terms of divorce 
involving minor children, the main purpose of family mediation in Croatian law 
is adoption of a parenting plan or an agreement on shared parental responsibility. 
A family mediator is obliged to inform the participants of family mediation on 
the need for attainment of the well-being of the child and is entitled to enable the 
child to express its views within the family mediation procedure if approved by 
its parents.79 This means that like in the mandatory counselling procedure, the 
expression of child’s views within family mediation is also subject to a parents’ 
consent thereto. 
If the parties do not reach an agreement on shared parental responsibility, the 
family mediator shall prepare a report on the termination of family mediation 
and state therein whether the parties have actively participated in the respective 
procedure or not.80 
3.4.  The right of the child to express its views in judicial divorce proceedings 
If having minor children together, only spouses who have concluded an agreement 
on shared parental responsibility (parenting plan) within mandatory counselling 
or family mediation are entitled to opt for non-contentious divorce. The parties to 
assistance, comprehend the meaning and legal consequences of the procedure,
  3. if one or both spouses are incapable of making judgements and reasoning and
  4. if a spouse’s residence or temporary residence is not known.
77  Article 331 paragraph 1 of the 2015 Family Act
78  Breber, M., Sladović Franz, B., Uvođenje obiteljske medijacije u sustav socijalne skrbi – perspektiva stručn-
jaka (Introducing Family Mediation to the Social Welfare System – Experts’ View) , Ljetopis socijalnog rada 
(Social Work yearbook), Vol. 14, No. 1, 2014, p. 122
79  Article 339 of the 2015 Family Act 
80  Article 337 paragraph 1 of the 2015 Family Act
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non-contentious divorce are spouses whereas the child is considered a party only 
in the part of the procedure relating to the approval of the parenting plan.81 Prior 
to the acceptance of a non-contentious divorce request, the court shall check if 
spouses and their child agree with the parenting plan and if it is compliant with 
the well-being of the child. If there is a suspicion that particular clauses of the 
parenting plan are contrary to the well-being of the child, the court might obtain 
further evidence by hearing the parents and the child, and require from the social 
welfare centre findings and opinion about the clauses concerned.82 To sum up, 
the existence of a parents’ agreement does not prevent a court from hearing the 
child in the event of a doubt about the compliance of the agreement with the best 
interests of the child. In author’s opinion, a good reason for hearing the child can 
be the court’s suspicion that the parents have deprived their child of the right to 
express its views about the parenting plan, without having a reasonable justifica-
tion in the child’s age and degree of maturity. 
The child is a party to their parents’ parenting plan as well as to the non-conten-
tious divorce procedure, so a decree on the approval of a parenting plan occurs to 
be prejudicial to the child.83 
If spouses do not draw up a parenting plan involving an agreement on the child’s 
residence, manner of the exercise of parental responsibility, maintenance of the 
contact between the child and its non-resident parent and the amount of child 
maintenance, the court shall ex officio regulate these issues in contentious divorce 
proceedings. One should keep in mind that the parties in contentious divorce 
proceedings are spouses whereas the child is a party to the part of the proceedings 
dealing with the above issues84 and it is represented by a special guardian.85 
Concerning that divorce proceedings deal with many issues affecting children’s 
rights and interests, Article 360 of the 2015 Family Act imposes the liability on 
the court to provide the child with the possibility, unless the child does not want 
that, to express its opinion regarding issues affecting its personal and property 
rights and interests. Unless there are firm grounds not to do so, which requires 
detailed clarification in the court’s decisions, the court is obliged to hear the child. 
The same Article governs that the court shall enable the child to express its views 
in an appropriate place and attended by a professional if it deems it necessary due 
to the circumstances of the case. It is highly important that the child is informed 
81  Aras Kramar,S. op. cit. note 71, p. 250. 
82  Ibid, p. 253.
83  Ibid, p. 251.
84  Ibid, p. 258
85  See Chapter 3.5.
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about possible consequences of respecting its opinion.86 Because of its age, the 
child can have a narrow perception of things and be deprived of analytical think-
ing. Therefore, the right of the child to be informed about possible consequences 
of honouring its opinion is a certain compensation for these deficiencies and an 
attempt to balance its position with respect to other participants in the proceed-
ings.87
If divorcing parents do not conclude a PRA, the competent social welfare centre 
shall warn them that the court, after ex officio initiating divorce proceedings based 
on a divorce petition filed by one of the spouses, is going to make a decision on 
issues relevant for the child88, enable the child to be heard and appoint a child’s 
special guardian.89 The right to a child’s special guardian is granted by Article 240 
paragraph 1 of the 2015 Family Act. The role of a special guardian is to represent 
the child and protect its rights and interests in divorce proceedings as well as to 
respect its opinion and wishes, which is elaborated in detail in the subsequent 
chapter. 
3.5.  The role of a child’s special guardian   
The aforementioned demonstrates that a child’s special guardian is utterly impor-
tant for the development of child-friendly justice systems, which is promoted in 
relevant European documents. In order to avoid situations in which children get, 
as depicted by Vandekerckhove and O’Brien “the shortest end of the stick, when 
their rights are “balanced” against rights of opposing adults”90, the Croatian leg-
islator has significantly enhanced the role of a child’s special guardian. Referring 
to recent case-law research with respect to the appointment and tasks of a child’s 
special guardian, laid down in the 2003 Family Act, Rešetar and Rupić single out 
the reasons behind the 2015 reform of the Croatian family legislation in this sub-
field. Those two authors claim that until the entry into force of the new law, the 
child had no special guardian in decision-making and child arrangement enforce-
86  This liability has been derived from international treaties (see Chapter II) and Article 86 of the 2015 
Family Act.
87  Hrabar, D., Europska konvencija o ostvarivanju dječjih prava – nov prilog promicanju dječjih prava (Euro-
pean Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights – a New Contribution to the Promotion of Children’s 
Rights), Collection of Works of the Faculty of Law in Zagreb, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1996, pp. 398/399.
88  Following a divorce petition, spouses may themselves propose a child’s residence, manner of the exer-
cise of their parental responsibility, maintenance of the contact between the child and its non-resident 
parent and amount of child maintenance, but the court is not bound to act in accordance with these 
proposals. Article 56 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 2015 Family Act.
89  Parents shall be warned by the court that it may rule that they shall bear the costs of a child’s special 
guardian. See Article 327 of the 2015 Family Act. 
90  Vandekerckhove, A., op cit. note 2, p. 524.
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ment processes even though it was clear that it had come to a conflict of interest 
between the child and its parents and the child needed more protection itself since 
enforcement orders represent the most delicate form of protection of the right to 
contact with the child. The same authors assert that the passivity and indifference 
to the protection of children’s rights shown by special guardians in cases involving 
separation of the child from its family, i.e. situations affecting the fundamental 
human right to family life, were no exception before.91 Encouraged by the poor 
state of the judicial practice and respecting the European guidelines for the protec-
tion of children’s procedural rights, the Croatian legislator reformed the position 
and tasks of a child’s special guardian. 
Taking account of all the above things clarifying the importance assigned by the 
Croatian legislator to parents’ agreements which are obviously contrary to the 
interests of the child, one can assume that in divorce proceedings a child’s special 
guardian should defend the child from situations in which it is likely to get “the 
shortest end of the stick” only where there is no such agreement.92 The interests of 
the child in proceedings dealing with the exercise of parental responsibility, con-
tact with the child and child maintenance are represented by a special guardian 
appointed for the purpose of that proceeding93 while the parents are not entitled 
to undertake any action on behalf of the child within the same proceeding.94 A 
child’s special guardian is a person who has passed the bar exam and works in the 
Centre for Special Guardianship. The duties of a child’s special guardian are as 
follows95:
- represent the child in proceedings for which he/she is appointed,
- inform the child about the case, its course and outcome in an appropriate way 
corresponding to the child’s age and degree of maturity, 
- if need be, contact with the child’s parents and other persons who have a close 
relationship with the child,
91  See Rešetar, B.; Rupić, D., Posebni skrbnik za dijete u hrvatskom i njemačkom obiteljskopravnom sustavu 
(Child Special Guardian in Croatian and German Family Law), Collection of Works of the Faculty of 
Law of the University of Rijeka, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2016, pp. 1176/1177. See also Rešetar, B., Emery, 
E. R., Children’s Rights in European Legal Proceedings: Why are Family Practices so Different from Legal 
Theories?, Family Court Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, pp. 65-77.
92  Of course, if they are not compliant with the best interests of the child, which shall be assessed by the 
court prior to their approval.
93  Exceptionally, the child may not be provided with a special guardian if it has turned 14 and has been 
recognized, by means of a decree, the capacity to undertake action in proceedings. See Article 240 
paragraph 4 of the 2015 Family Act 
94  Article 414 of the 2015 Family Act 
95  Pursuant to Articles 240 and 360 of the 2015 Family Act 
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- investigate the opinion of children under 14 years of age, respecting the stan-
dards defined in  the Ordinance on the Manner of Obtaining the Child’s Views96 
(hereinafter: Ordinance).
When prescribing the protection of the right of the child to express its views, 
the Croatian legislator took account of the child’s age, degree of maturity, and its 
mental and physical condition. In regard therewith, a child who has turned 14 
can personally express its views and if the court deems it necessary considering 
the circumstances of the case, the child can be accompanied with a professional. 
A child under 14 years of age may, if allowed by the court, express its views in a 
convenient place97 and through a person other than a child’s special guardian, 
such as psychologists and other persons possessing adequate qualifications, skills 
and competences needed for determination of child’s views.98 Respecting non-
discriminatory policies, the legislator intended to provide every child with the 
possibility to express its views. It is clear that the circumstance of a concrete case 
may require possession of special skills and competences by those who hear the 
child, particularly if children with deteriorated mental and emotional health are 
taken into consideration. 
4. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the legal protection of the right of the child to express its views in 
civil and administrative proceedings in European law implies several basic conclu-
sions:
1. the child has the right to express its views in all proceedings directly or indi-
rectly affecting the protection of its rights and interests,
2. the child has the right to freely decide whether it wishes to be heard or not,
3. the child has the right to freely decide whether it wishes to express its views 
directly or through a representative,
4. the child needs to express its views in a convenient environment where it feels 
safe,
96  Ordinance on the Manner of Obtaining the Child’s Views (Official Gazette no. 123/2015)
97  A convenient place is, according to Article 5 of the Ordinance, a place beyond the courtroom, which 
is fitted and adapted to working with children and which ensures privacy, child safety and undisturbed 
work, specially equipped court premises, a special room in a social welfare centre, the Centre for Spe-
cial Guardianship and other premises specified by the court. 
  Expression of child’s views may take place in the family home (if permitted by the parents), in a foster 
home or in the home of a natural or a legal person where the child resides.
98  See Article 2 of the Ordinance.
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5. in particularly delicate cases, relevant authorities should adopt a multidisci-
plinary approach to ensure the child the exercise of its right to be heard,
6. when the child expresses its views, its best interests and its private and family 
life should be fully respected.
Respecting the standards of European law in this legal area, the Croatian legislator 
gave due weight to the right of the child to express its views when undertaking 
the family legislation reform in 2015. Precisely, the right of the child to express 
its views in divorce proceedings is protected in Croatia in two ways, depending 
on whether there is an agreement on post-divorce parental responsibility or not. If 
there is such an agreement, it should be prepared in the form of a parenting plan 
which shall be supported by the child. If parents do not reach an agreement in the 
form of a parenting plan or if there is a doubt that its content is not compliant 
with the best interests of the child or if there is a conflict of interests between par-
ents and their child, the child shall be given an opportunity to be heard in court 
proceedings. Moreover, the child shall be provided with a special guardian for the 
protection of its (procedural) rights and interest in contentious divorce proceed-
ings. That way, the Croatian legislator ensures protection of children’s procedural 
rights in proceedings resulting in decisions which directly or indirectly affect their 
rights and interests. Divorce proceedings definitely belong to such proceedings 
where the child shall be protected from exposure to judicial examination without 
reasonable justification in the protection of its best interests.
The author shares the opinion that if parents have agreed on all the issues relat-
ing to the exercise of their post-divorce parental responsibility and if the child has 
been given an opportunity to express its views about its parents’ agreement, there 
is no need to examine the child’s views additionally before competent bodies. 
Otherwise, the child may be unnecessarily exposed to possibly unpleasant situa-
tions. When parents live in a family union, the state does not interfere with their 
family life and the life of their children unless there is a reasonable doubt that 
parents’ agreements on the manner of the exercise of their parental responsibility 
are not compliant with the best interests of their child or unless there is a suspi-
cion that they do not respect their child’s views in making decisions which affect 
its rights and interests. Indeed, there is no reason for the law to make a difference 
between situations in which parents live together and those in which they lead a 
separate life. 
Certainly, due attention should be paid to the fact that the possibility of parents 
to examine their child’s views and incorporate it into a PRA should not be inter-
preted as a possibility but as a liability of parents. Of course, this can be said under 
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the condition that the child’s age and degree of maturity are not regarded as an 
obstacle to examination of its opinion, which should be transparently presented in 
the PRA. The author holds that when parents state in the parenting plan template 
that their child has not expressed its views about the parenting plan and when 
parents indicate that they have not accepted their child’s opinion, without sup-
porting it with the child’s age and maturity, the court should not approve such a 
plan or agreement without hearing the child. Otherwise, the right of the child to 
be heard, which is granted by numerous international documents, will be violated 
and a PRA as such could be qualified as a controversial legal ground in the event 
of cross-border movement of the child. In this light, the author points to the need 
for amendment of the Regulation on the Required Form of a Parenting Plan in a 
way that examination of child’s views shall be mandatory in terms of the content 
of a PRA. Such a need has been confirmed by a survey conducted in social welfare 
centres, which has disclosed that some social welfare centres permit conclusion of 
PRAs that do not contain a field designated for describing child’s views. With this 
exception, the legislator’s idea to protect the right of the child to express its views 
within the mandatory counselling procedure which shall be implemented prior to 
the initiation of divorce proceedings seems to work successfully in practice. 
Hereby the light is shed on the need to conduct additional research of recent case-
law relating to the exercise of the right of the child to express its views in divorce 
proceedings in Croatia, particularly studies of judicial practice regarding:
- court’s approval of PRAs, depending on whether they include child’s views or 
not,
- court’s approval of PRAs, depending on whether the parents have taken into 
consideration child’s views about the PRA content or not, and
- protection of the right of the child to express its views in contentious divorce 
proceedings.
To conclude with, an affirmative answer can be given to the question of the com-
pliance of Croatian legislation with European standards in this legal area. Croatian 
legislation contains clearly elaborated mechanisms intended for efficient exercise 
of the right of the child to express its views in divorce proceedings without jeop-
ardizing any element constituting its best interests. Final assessment of the suc-
cessfulness of new legal solutions in practice requires performance of additional 
research.
In the end, one needs to stress that expression of views in divorce proceedings 
and other family matters hides a danger when children are involved therein. This 
danger can hinder efficient exercise of the right of the child to express its views if 
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persons who communicate with the child do not possess skills and competences 
needed for proper and appropriate communication with children. It should also 
be considered if there are reasonable grounds to introduce, like some other com-
parative European legislations, mandatory multidisciplinary training for Croatian 
experts who carry the burden of the responsibility for communicating with chil-
dren in justice.
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NEW TRENDS IN EUROPEAN fAMILy 
PROCEDURAL LAW
ABSTRACT
The system of the European family procedural law is based on the multiple cross-border in-
stitutes which are developing gradually. It represents a complex system of many interrelated 
regulations directly regulating the cross-border family relations, through which European legis-
lator seeks to equalize, where possible, or to connect the rules on jurisdiction and recognition, 
declaration of enforceability and enforcement. Also, speaking about the legal sources of the 
European family procedural law it is necessary to signify the interpretative power of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. This paper will discuss present actuality – the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
Recast, respectively the Proposal COM (2016) 411/2 published by the European Commission 
on 30 July 2016. The proposal, in major, predicts changes regarding the rules of jurisdiction, 
provisional and protective measures and enforcement rules, and also introduces the new rules 
on incidental questions, right of the child to express his views and new rule on concentration 
of local jurisdiction. However, it is inevitable to raise the issue whether some other provision 
required changes in terms of additional explanation, referring to the rules on the transfer of 
jurisdiction, in the light of the new CJEU ruling in the case Child and Family Agency vs. J.D.
Keywords: jurisdiction, enforcement, declaration of enforceability, Brussels IIbis Regulation 
Recast, Child and Family Agency vs. J.D
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of the unification of EU family law since its beginning in 
early nineties was the establishment of the principle of mutual trust between the 
Member States. It has been continuously built by adopting and improving the 
rules considering the free movement of the judgments, implying the rules on ju-
risdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement, constantly keeping in 
mind the protection of the best interest of the child. The aspiration to simplify and 
make the procedure more efficient is contributing to its straightening.  The field of 
family matters in EU is currently being regulated by the Brussels IIbis Regulation, 
Rome III Regulation, Maintenance Regulation, Regulation on matrimonial prop-
erty regimes, Regulation on the property consequences of registered partnerships, 
and with the closely connected Succession Regulation. Certainly, it is important 
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to note that the sources of European family law are also the conventions in family 
matters brought within the Hague Conference on Private International Law.1 The 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, characterised as the cornstone of judicial cooperation 
in family matters, is currently under revision. This paper will present the short 
overview of the European legislator’s efforts on making the rules improving the 
principle of mutual trust, until its final product – the Proposal for Brussels IIbis 
Recast (Chapter 2). It will be followed by the remarks on the Proposal; respec-
tively, the significant changes regarding the procedural matters, all with the pur-
pose of determining to what extent the objectives of the unification were achieved 
(Chapter 3-5). 
2.   UNIfICATION Of THE EUROPEAN fAMILy LAW IN 
MATRIMONIAL AND PARENTAL RESPONSIbILITy MATTERS
The European Union was originally focused on securing the economic freedoms 
rather than the family law matters until the Maastricht Treaty2 had created the 
idea of the European Union citizenship,3 providing the number of rights upon the 
European citizenship with emphasis on the right of free movement of the person.4 
However, the concept of citizenship established by the Maastricht Treaty did not 
bring effective rights to the EU citizens. They found themselves able to exercise 
their substantive rights, but unable to enforce the judgments determining those 
rights, especially in matrimonial matters.5 European Community had no author-
ity to adopt supranational legislation and the Council could only recommend the 
member states to adopt the conventions it had drawn up6 because the judicial 
cooperation in civil matters had not yet been transferred from the third pillar to 
the first pillar of European integration.7 At the meeting held in Brussels in 1993 
the European Council had considered the possibilities of extending the scope of 
1  Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; Convention 
of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation 
in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children; Convention of 23 
November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Mainte-
nance and Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.
2  Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191.
3  Article 8 TEU (Maastricht).
4  Ibid. Art K.1.
5  Perin Tomičić, I., Private International Law Aspects of the Matrimonial Matters in the European Union – 
Jurisdiction, Recognition and Applicable Law, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 57, No. 4-5, 
2007, pp. 848-880, p. 849.
6  Article K.3(2) TEU (Maastricht).
7  de Boer, T.M., What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, Nederlands Inter-
nationaal Privaatrecht, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2015, pp. 10-19, p. 10.
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the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters8 to matters of family law.9 After a few years of 
negotiations, a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters (hereinafter: Brussels II Convention)10 was 
agreed upon. As the treaty of Amsterdam11 allowed its conversion into regulation, 
the European Commission had quickly drafted a proposal for a regulation cover-
ing the same topics. The Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses12 
(hereinafter: Brussels II Regulation) was the first instrument adopted in the area 
of judicial cooperation in civil matters.13 The content of the Brussels II Regulation 
was taken over from the Brussels II Convention with few new provisions aimed 
to secure the consistency with certain provisions of the Council Regulation (EC) 
No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters14 (hereinafter: Brussels I 
Regulation).15 The Brussels II Regulation came into force on 1 March 2001. For 
the reason that the children born out of wedlock and children who are not mutual 
to both parents remained out of the Brussels II Regulation sphere16, there were 
proposals for its revision even before it entered into force.17 On May 2002 the 
8  1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters [1972] OJ L 299.
9  Explanatory Report on the Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial 
Matters (approved by the Council on 28 May 1998) prepared by Dr Alegría Borrás Professor of Private 
International Law University of Barcelona [1998] OJ C 221/27, p. 31.
10  Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters - Declaration, annexed 
to the minutes of the Council, adopted during the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 28 and 29 
May 1998 when drawing up the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters [1998] OJ C 221.
11  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the Europe-
an Communities and Related Acts [1997] OJ C 340/1.
12  Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children 
of both spouses [2000] OJ L 160/19.
13  Perin Tomičić, I., op. cit. note 5, p. 854. 
14  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 012. 
15  Brussel II Regulation, op. cit. note 12, Rec 6.
16  Pranevičienė, K., Unification of Judicial Practice Concerning Parental Responsibility in the European Un-
ion – Challenges Applying Regulation Brussels II Bis, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
2017, pp. 113-127, p. 117. 
17  Initiative of the French Republic with a view to adopting a Council Regulation on the mutual enforce-
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Commission presented a proposal which had covered both matrimonial matters 
and parental responsibility and had brought together all proposed innovation con-
cerning the abolition of exequatur for decisions on access rights, and expansion of 
the regulation’s substantive scope with regard to parental responsibility, coopera-
tion between central authorities and demarcation in relation to the Convention 
of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Pro-
tection of Children18 (hereinafter: 1996 Hague Convention).19 The new Regula-
tion, Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1347/200020 (hereinafter: Brussels IIbis Regulation), entered into force on 1 Au-
gust 2004 and applies from 1 March 2005.21
Still, at the time, there remained an unenviable situation for parties seeking a 
divorce.22 There were no Community provisions on applicable law in divorce. 
On 17 July 2006 the Commission presented a Proposal for a Council regula-
tion amending the Brussels IIbis Regulation as regards jurisdiction and introduc-
ing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters23 (hereinafter: 2006 
Proposal).24 Because of the extensive discussion regarding the 2006 Proposal the 
ment of judgments on rights of access to children [2000] OJ C 234. 
18  Council Decision of 5 June 2008 authorising certain Member States to ratify, or accede to, in the 
interest of the European Community, the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children and authorising certain Member States to make a declaration on the application 
of the relevant internal rules of Community law and Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children [2008] L 151/36.
19  de Boer, op.cit. note 7, p. 11.
20  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsi-
bility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338.
21  Ibid. Art 72.
22  Henderson, T., From Brussels to Rome: The necessity of resolving divorce law conflicts across the European 
Union, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2011, pp. 768-794, p.769.
23  Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction 
and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006) 399 final.
24  The Proposal was named Rome III, which led to the confusion due to the fact that the designation 
“Rome” has been used for instruments which only contained conflict of laws rules whereas “Brussels” 
indicated that only procedural issues were being addressed, such as jurisdiction, recognition and en-
forcement. Supra. Boele-Woelki, K., To be, or not to be: Enhanced cooperation in international divorce 
law within the European Union, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 4, 2008, pp. 779-
792, p. 783.
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adoption of the choice of forum was genially welcomed by the Member States 
while the conflict of law rules were highly unaccepted.25 When it became clear 
that the unanimity required for the adoption of the Rome III Proposal could 
not be obtained, eight Member States26 informally reported the Council regard-
ing their indentation to launch the enhanced cooperation mechanism and to re-
quest the Commission to draft a proposal to that end.27 The 14 participating 
Member States28 adopted Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal sepa-
ration (hereinafter: Rome III Regulation),29 which became applicable on 21 June 
2012.30
Finally, we come to the last proposal. Pursuant to the Article 65 of the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, every five years, the Commission shall present to the European 
Parliament, to the Council and to the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee, a report on the application of Brussels IIbis Regulation on the basis of the 
information supplied by the Member States. On 15 April 2014 the Commission 
had published a Report on application of the Brussels IIbis Regulation,31 which 
represented a first assessment of its application.32 Afterwards, on 30 June 2016 the 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforce-
ment of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibil-
ity, and on international child abduction (recast) (hereinafter: 2016 Proposal) was 
published.33
25  Ibid. p. 784.
26  Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.
27  Boele-Woelki, K. , op.cit. note 24, p. 785.
28  Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Por-
tugal, Romania and Slovenia.
29  Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation 
in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L343/10.
30  The Regulation applies in Lithuania from 2014 and in Greece from 2015, which gives the result of 16 
Member States included in enhanced cooperation. Source: Law applicable to divorce and legal separa-
tion, European E-justice Portal, URL=https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_law_applicable_to_divor-
ce_and_legal_separation-356-en.do?init=true. Accessed 18 January 2017.
31  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning ju-
risdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters 
of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, COM(2014) 225 final.
32  It was based on the inputs received from the members of the European Judicial Network in civil and 
commercial matters, available studies, the Commission’s Green Paper, the 2006 Proposal and the work 
done within the framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on the follow-up of 
the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions. Also, it took into account citizen letters, complaints, petitions 
and case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  Ibid. p. 4.
33  Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
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3.  bRUSSELS II BiS REGULATION RECAST
As it was noted in the 2016 Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum the objective 
of the recast was to further develop the European area of Justice and Fundamental 
Rights based on Mutual Trust, saying that among the two areas covered by the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation, the matrimonial and parental responsibility matters, the 
latter was identified to have caused acute problems which need to be addressed 
urgently34 while there is only limited evidence of existing problems regarding the 
matrimonial matters.35 As introduction to the review of certain proposed changes, 
it is to be highlighted that the 2016 Proposal introduced a definition of a child 
which covers any person up to the age of 18.36 The intention was to equalize the 
Regulation with the 1996 Hague Convention, in relation to non-child abduction 
child related matters within the scope of the Regulation.37 The word court has 
been replaced by the word authority, while judgment has been replaced with the 
decision. This goes in favour of the objective of strengthening the legal certainty 
and increasing of flexibility while erasing the differences in national rules and legal 
terminology of the Member States. This legal terminology has already been seen 
in recent date regulation such as Succession Regulation38, Regulation on matrimo-
nial property regimes39 and Regulation on the property consequences of registered 
partnerships.40 Also, it is difficult no to see the significant increase of the recitals, 
from 33 to 57. 
The following chapters will present the significant changes proposed by the 2016 
Proposal concerning the matrimonial matters and parental responsibility. As well, 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast), COM(2016) 411 final.
34  The 2016 Proposal identified the six main shortcomings concerning parental responsibility: child re-
turn procedure, placement of the child in another Member State, the requirement of exequatur, hear-
ing of the child, actual enforcement of decisions and cooperation between the Central Authorities. 
35  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, p. 1-2.
36  Ibid. Art. 2(1)(7).
37  Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., Parental responsibility and international child abduction in 
the proposed recast of Brussels IIa Regulation and the effect of Brexit on future child abduction proceedings, 
International Family Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2016, pp. 1-16, p. 13.
38  Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 OF the European Parliament and the Council of 4 July 2012 on ju-
risdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession [2012] OJ L 201/107.
39  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes [2016] L 183/1.
40  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the 
property consequences of registered partnerships [2016] L 183/1.
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they will include the areas not affected by the 2016 Proposal but considered to be 
needed introduced or amended. 
4.  MATRIMONIAL MATTERS 
4.1.  Exclusive and residual jurisdiction
The change proposed by the 2016 Proposal concerning the jurisdiction refers to 
the present rules on exclusive nature of jurisdiction41 and residual jurisdiction,42 
which had considered being very complex and confusing.43 While the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) gave the interpretation of the 
Article 3, 6 and 7 in the case Sundelind Lopez44 saying that domestic rules on pri-
vate international law of a Member State will only determine jurisdiction if none 
of the Brussels IIbis rules is applicable,45 there is still no clear answer to the ques-
tion whether jurisdiction may be derived from national law if the respondent is 
a national or resident of a Member State, and no court in a Member State would 
have jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulation, namely it is doubtful whether the 
application of national law under Article 7 is excluded if one of the requirement of 
Article 6 has been met.46 There is an example where French woman lives with her 
German husband in Canada. They separate and she returns to Paris with the in-
tention to initiate the divorce proceeding immediately. No court of Member State 
has jurisdiction under Article 3 to 5 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation since the par-
ties are not habitually residents in a Member State, they do not share a common 
nationally and the wife does not have the habitual residence in France for a suf-
ficient time. Is the wife able to rely on the French residual rules, or, is she unable 
because her husband has a German nationality and had special protection under 
the Article 6?47 The “exclusive nature” of the rules seems to suggest that domestic 
41  “A spouse who: (a) is habitually resident in the territory of a Member State; or (b) is a national of a 
Member State, or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her ‘domicile’ in the 
territory of one of the latter Member States, may be sued in another Member State only in accordance 
with Articles 3, 4 and 5.” Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit. note 20, Art 6.
42  “Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3, 4 and 5, jurisdiction shall 
be determined, in each Member State, by the laws of that State.” Ibid. Art 7(1).
43  Ní Shúilleabháin, M., Cross-Border Divorce Law. Brussels II Bis, Oxford Private International Law Se-
ries, Oxford, 2010, p. 156.
44  Case C-68/07 Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v Miguel Enrique Lopez Lizazo [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:740, 
para 24.
45  Kruger, T., Samyn, L., Brussels IIbis: successes and suggested improvements, Journal of Private Internation-
al Law, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, pp. 132-168, p. 139. 
46  de Boer, op. cit. note 7, p. 13.
47  Supra. McEleavy, P., The Communitarization of Divorce Rules: What Impact for English and Scottish 
Law?, The International and Comparative Law quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2004, pp. 605-642, p. 612.
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private international law cannot be applied.48 The 2014 Practical Guide for the ap-
plication of the Brussels IIbis Regulation was quite clear on this matter saying that 
because of the exclusive nature of the rules set out in Article 3 to 5, as is provided 
in Article 6, the rule in Article 7(1) only applies in relation to a respondent who is 
not habitually resident in nor a national nor domiciled in a Member State.49 The 
questions remained whether the 2016 Proposal had removed those obstacles in the 
interpretation and had given the solution to the above described situation. 
The 2016 Proposal connects those two articles in one, saying that where no author-
ity of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3, 4 and 5, jurisdiction 
shall be determined, in each Member State, by the laws of that Member State. This 
rule does not apply to a respondent who: (a) is habitually resident in the territory 
of a Member State, or (b) is a national of a Member State, or, has “domicile” in 
the territory of one of the Member States.50 It is to be admitted that the proposed 
rule very easily solved the doubts in the interpretation of existing rules. Regardless, 
there is a still unsolved issue for the situation as one mentioned above, but for the 
applicant to wait for the prescribed timeframes to be fulfilled. Possible solution 
could be found in the introduction of a forum necessitates for a situation where no 
court in Member State can assume jurisdiction,51 under conditions like already 
contained in the Maintenance Regulation,52 Succession Regulation, Regulation 
on matrimonial property regimes and Regulation on the property consequences 
of registered partnerships.53 
4.2.  Prorogation of jurisdiction
The proposal for the introduction of the rule on choice of court can be found in 
the 2006 Proposal, which introduced the prorogation in matrimonial matters, as 
48  Ibid., p. 140.
49  European Commission, Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation, 2014, p. 13, 
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf. Accessed 10 Ja-
nuary 2017. 
50  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, p. 37.
51  Kruger, T., Samyn, L. op. cit. note 45, p. 140.
52  Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recog-
nition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations 
[2009] L 7/1.
53  “Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6, the courts of a 
Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought 
or conducted or would be impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely connected. The 
dispute must have a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.” Ibid. Art. 7. 
Supra. Art 11 of the Succession Regulation, Art 11 of  Regulation on matrimonial property regimes 
and Art 11 of  Regulation on property regimes of registered partnerships.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES432
it already existed in respect to the parental responsibility.54 Meaning that in the 
proceedings relating to divorce and legal separation to the spouses are allowed a 
limited choice of court. According to proposed rule they may select forum within 
the European Union with which they have some connection with that Member 
State by virtue of the fact: (a) any of the grounds of general jurisdiction applies, or 
(b) it is the place of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for a minimum 
period of three years, or (c) one of the spouses is a national of the Member State 
or, has his or her “domicile” in territory of one of the Member States.55 Above 
mentioned rule had never given legal force. As already noted, the product of 2006 
Proposal, Rome III Regulation, only contains the rules on law applicable to di-
vorce and legal separation, while the originally proposed rules on jurisdiction in 
matrimonial matters remained unsettled by the way it was proposed at the time. 
Still, the adoption of the choice of court was at the time genially welcomed by the 
Member States unlike the conflict of law rules.56 Therefore, there was no reason 
for the drafter not to introduce this rule in 2016 Proposal giving that the forum 
choice can benefit the parties as it gives them additional control in a view of pre-
dictability and legal certainty and to help them to prevent the rush to court.57
5.   PROPOSED CHANGES CONCERNING THE PARENTAL 
RESPONSIbILITy
5.1.  Jurisdiction
5.1.1.  provisional, including protective, measures
The existing rule on provisional measures caused a problem in application by say-
ing that the provisions of the Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member 
State from taking provisional, including protective measures in respect of persons 
or assets in that State. It was unclear to which the word “person” had referred to.58 
If is to be interpreted in the relation to the 1996 Hague Convention,59 the rule re-
54  de Boer, T. M., The second revision of the Brussels II regulation: jurisdiction and applicable law, In: Boe-
le-Woelki, K. and Sverdrup, T. (Eds.), European challenges in contemporary family law, European family 
law series; No. 19, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2008, pp. 321-341, p. 4. (UvA-DARE version of article used. 
URL= http://dare.uva.nl/search?arno.record.id=285566. Accessed 9 January 2017). 
55  2006 Proposal, op.cit. note 23, p. 13.
56  Boele-Woelki, op. cit. note 24, p. 784.
57  Kruger, T., Samyn, L. op. cit. note 45, p. 144.
58  Ibid. p. 147.
59  “In all cases of urgency, the authorities of any Contracting State in whose territory the child or property 
belonging to the child is present have jurisdiction to take any necessary measures of protection.” 1996 
Hague Convention, op. cit. note 18, Art 11.
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fers to the child. But, the CJEU caused confusion in his ruling in the case Detiček60 
saying that a provisional measure in matters of parental responsibility ordering 
a change of custody of a child is taken not only in respect of the child but also 
in respect of the parent to whom custody of the child is now granted and of the 
other parent who, following the adoption of the measure, is deprived of that cus-
tody.61 The 2016 Proposal is giving the solution by adhering to the solution from 
the 1996 Hague Convention, precisely saying that in urgent cases the authorities 
of a Member State where the child or property belongings to the child is present 
still have jurisdiction to take provisional, including protective measures.62 But still 
there is a disparity in relation to the provisional measures taken in child abduc-
tion case in relation to the new Article 25(1)(b). Namely, Recital 29 explains that 
before refusing to return the child, the court should, however, consider whether 
appropriate measures of protection have been put in place or may be taken to 
eliminate any risks to the best interest of the child. It could be that in certain cases 
measures are ordered in respect of the child which could ensure the protection of 
the parent.63 
The Proposal moves the provision on provisional, including protective, measures 
to the jurisdiction chapter which means any measures made under this provi-
sion can be recognised and enforced in another Member State.64 This significant 
change is contained in new Article 48 clarifying that enforcement rules shall apply 
to provisional, including the protective measures, which brings the Regulation in 
line with the 1996 Hague Convention.65
5.1.2.   Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case. Case C-428/15 Child and 
Family Agency vs. J.D.66 
As it follows from the text of the Article 15 the rule on the transfer to a court bet-
ter placed to hear the case should be an extraordinary measure, but it is used fairly 
often in practice.67 In spite of that, the practitioners are faced with the problems 
60  Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:810.
61  Ibid. para 50 and 51.
62  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, Art 12.
63  Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., op. cit. note 37, p. 11.
64  Ibid. p. 10.
65  1996 Hague Covention, op. cit. note. 18, Art 11(2).
66  Case C-428/15 Child and Family Agency vs. J.D. [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:819.
67  Friedrich, L., The Experience of the National Central Authority, Recasting the Brussels IIa Regula-
tion Workshop 8 November 2016, Compilation of briefings for the JURI Committee, 2016, pp. 
45-55, p. 54, URL= http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571383/IPOL_
STU(2016)571383_EN.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2017.
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in its application68 and also there are the examples of poor interpretation of this 
rule. This is confirmed by the case where a child, living in Italy, was neglected by 
the mother and instituted in hospital. The residence of the father was unknown 
and the Italian authority initiated a question of his adoption by a grandmother 
living in Lithuania. After deciding that this issues fall within the scope of Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, the Italian Court issued a decision on the transfer of the proceed-
ings to a Lithuanian court where it omitted to set out the time limit by which the 
Lithuanian court should have been seized, thus leaving uncertain whether and 
when the Italian proceeding might have been resumed.69 Most common situa-
tion of the application of this rule was in cases where courts wanted to transfer a 
case concerning custody instituted after a motion by a parent who subsequently 
moved to another state with the child.70 However, 2016 Proposal is excluding this 
possibility by amending the rule on general jurisdiction in parental responsibil-
ity matters saying that where a child moves lawfully from one Member State to 
another and acquires a new habitual residence there, the authorities of the Mem-
ber State of the new habitual residence shall have jurisdiction.71 Still, with no 
proposed amendment of this rule the practitioners depend on the interpretation 
of the CJEU. While they were deprived from the CJEU’s answer in the Case E. 
v B.72 regarding the application of Article 15 in cases where there are no current 
proceedings concerning the child, there is a recent ruling in the Case Child and 
Family Agency vs. J.D. finally giving some explanation. 
Ms D, UK national, was a subject to a „pre-birth assessment“ carried out by the 
child protection authorities in UK in anticipation of the birth of her second child, 
R. The competent authorities considered that R. should after his birth be placed 
in the care of a foster family. Ms D. moved to Ireland shortly after. R. was born. 
68  Some of the problems were indicated by the Croatian practitioners as follows: possibility of receiving 
the case file in the foreign language, acceptance of the evidences presented by another court, situation 
where circumstances of the case change or the child moves to another country, possibility of submis-
sion of the request under Article 15 in the appeal procedure. Supra. Župan, M., Drventić, M., Croatian 
Exchange Seminar, Osijek, 13-14 October 2016, Report on the Croatian Good Practices, 2016, p. 12. 
The Report was drafted as a research output within the Project „Planning the future of cross-border 
families: a path through coordination“ (EUFam’s), coordinated by the University of Milan, co-funded 
by the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission, within the pro-
gramme “Projects to support judicial cooperation in civil or criminal matters” (Justice Programme), 
under the code JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7729. URL=  http://www.eufams.unimi.it/category/
research-outputs/. Accessed on 10 January 2017.
69  Tribunale per i minorenni di Roma, 25 January 2008, EUFam’s database: ITF20080125, URL= http://
www.eufams.unimi.it/category/database/. Accessed 10 January 2017.
70  Friedrich, L., loc. cit.
71  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, Art 7(1).
72  Case C‑436/13 E. v B. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2246.
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Shortly after, the Agency made an application to the District Court in Ireland for 
an order that the child should be placed in care. The Circuit Court ordered the pro-
visional placement of R. in foster care. The Agency further made an application to 
the High Court requesting that the substance of the case be transferred to the UK 
court, pursuant to Article 15. That application was supported by R.’s guardian ad 
litem. The High Court authorized the Agency to make an application to the UK 
court to assume jurisdiction. After Ms D.’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided to 
stay the proceedings and to refer to CJEU. It asked to explain whether Article 15 
applies to child protection proceedings based on public law, where such proceed-
ings are brought by a competent authority in a first Member State although it is 
an institution of another Member State that will have to bring separate proceed-
ings, under different legislation and relating to different factual circumstances. 
Also, it sought guidance regarding the interpretation and connection of the terms 
“better placed” and of “the best interests of the child”. The CJEU answered that 
Article 15 is applicable where a child protection application brought under public 
law by the competent authority of a Member State, where it is a necessary that 
an authority of that other Member State thereafter commence proceedings that 
are separate from those brought in the first Member State, pursuant to its own 
domestic law and possibly relating to different factual circumstances. Further, the 
CJEU explained that the concepts “better placed” and “the best interests of the 
child”, must be interpreted by taking into account their context and the objectives 
pursued by the Regulation. In order to determine the “better placed” concept, the 
court having jurisdiction must be satisfied that the transfer is such as to provide 
genuine and specific added value to the examination of that case, taking into ac-
count, inter alia, the rules of procedure applicable in that other Member State. 
The court having jurisdiction should not take into consideration the substantive 
law of that other Member State, doing so would be in breach of the principles of 
mutual trust between Member States and mutual recognition of judgments. In 
order to determine the “best interest of the child concept” the court having ju-
risdiction must be satisfied that that transfer is not liable to be detrimental to the 
situation of the child.
5.1.3.  incidental questions
The Commission proposed a new rule on the incidental questions saying that if 
the outcome of proceedings before an authority of a Member State depends on the 
determination of an incidental question falling within the scope of this Regula-
tion, this authority may determine that question. The more precise explanation of 
this rule could be found in the Recitals by giving the practical example as follows: 
“…if the object of the proceedings is, for instance, a succession dispute in which 
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the child is involved and a guardian ad litem needs to be appointed to represent 
the child in those proceedings, the authority having jurisdiction for the succes-
sion dispute should be allowed to appoint the guardian for the proceedings pend-
ing before it, regardless of whether it has jurisdiction for parental responsibility 
matters under this Regulation. Any such determination of an incidental question 
should only produce effects in the proceedings in question”.73 However, there is an 
obligation for the authority having jurisdiction to decide on incidental question 
to determine the law applicable to the incidental question. Usually in this kind 
of situations the authority has two possibilities; to apply his national conflict of 
law rules (lex fori) to determine the law applicable to the preliminary question, or 
he can use the conflict of law rules of the law of the main question (lex causae).74 
However, where the substantive law of the private international law has been har-
monized, the choice between two approaches leads to one solution: lex fori.75 It 
follows that, in relation to the proposed rule, the court deciding in e.g. succession 
proceeding and applying the law applicable to that matter, in relation to the raised 
incidental question will have to apply the law applicable for the parental respon-
sibility. According to the 1996 Hague Convention that would be the law of the 
State of the habitual residence of the child.76 
While the Commission obviously tried to resolve the situation such as the one 
from the case Matoušková,77 the question is was the proposer thorough enough 
by determining this rule. It is not for the sure that this rule will contribute to the 
highlighted legal certainty and flexibility by possibly imposing the obligation of 
application of foreign law to the authorities having jurisdiction to decide upon 
incidental question and by highly possible disparity of laws applicable to the main 
question and incidental question.
5.1.4.  Right of the child to express his or her views
The rule saying that the child has to be given the opportunity to be heard has al-
ready been a part of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, contained in Article 11(2) with 
the respect of cases in which the Art 12 and 13 of the Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction78 (hereinafter: 1980 
73  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, Rec 22.
74  Goessl, S., Preliminary question in EU private international law, Journal of Private International Law, 
Vol. 8, No 1, 2012, pp- 63-76, p. 64.
75  Ibid. 67.
76  1996 Hague Convention, op. cit. 18, Art 15 and 16.
77  Case C-404/14 Marie Matoušková [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:653.
78  Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague XXVIII, 
URL= https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=24. Accessed 15 January 2017.
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Hague Convention) had been applying. Currently, the importance of hearing 
children is not highlighted in the Regulation in general terms. The research within 
the Project “Conflicts of EU courts on child abduction”79 showed that the major-
ity of children in EU involved in proceedings under the Article (11)(8) were not 
heart by the courts; the overall data indicates that the child was heard in only 17 
per cent of cases.80 By setting the new rule under the Article 20 the Commission 
was giving stronger value to this matter by saying that the authorities of the Mem-
ber State shall ensure that a child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
is given the genuine and effective opportunity to express those views freely during 
the proceedings. The authority shall give due weight to the child’s views in ac-
cordance with his or her age and maturity and document its considerations in the 
decision. Clearly the Commission recognised the existing issues by strengthen the 
right of the child to be heard.81 Also, the above rule was additionally strengthened 
in the Recital 23 by calling upon the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union82 and the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child.83 
5.2.  Child abduction
The Article 11 of the 1980 Hague Convention prescribes that the judicial or ad-
ministrative authorities of Contracting State shall act expeditiously in proceedings 
for the return of children. Namely, to issue a decision within six weeks from the 
date of commencement of the proceedings. To be able to adjudicate child abduc-
tion proceeding in terms of rendering quality and within the timeframe decision, 
a judge must have certain knowledge and expertise.84 The cross-border abduction 
79  The Project was conducted by the principal investigator prof Paul Beaumont, University of Aber-
deen, funded from the Nuffield Foundation. It gathered and analysed proceedings involving Articles 
11(6)-(8) and 42 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation from every EU Member State apart from Denmark. 
Supra. URL= http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/conflicts-of-eu-courts-on-child-abduction-417.
php, Country reports available on: URL=http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/Conflicts_of_EU_
Courts_on_Child_Abduction_Country_Reports_25_May_(Final).pdf.  Accessed 15 January 2017.
80  Beaumont, P.,Walker, L., Holliday, J., Conflicts of EU Courts on Child Abduction: The reality of Article 
11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings across the EU, Journal of Private International Law,  Vol. 12, No. 2, 
2016, pp. 211-260, URL=http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers-455.php, p. 25. Acce-
ssed 16 January 2017.
81  Ibid. p. 6.
82  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391, Art 24(1).
83  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Tre-
aty Series, vol. 1577, Art. 12. URL=http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 
Accessed 13 February 2017.
84  Župan, M., Poretti, P., Concentration of jurisdiction in cross-border family matters – child abduction at 
focus, Vinković, M. (edt), New developments in EU labour, equality and human rights law, 2015, 
Osijek, pp. 341-359, p. 346.
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cases are complex and sensitive but arise only on frequently for the individual 
judge when handled by every individual local family court. As a result, judges are 
less familiar with the procedures and provisions involved.85 The advantages of the 
concentration of jurisdiction in child abduction cases can be manifested following 
advantages for the court system: clear system of jurisdiction, efficient case man-
agement and reviews of the performance.86 Also, concentration of jurisdiction in 
Hague cases has been recommended by the academic’s writing for many years.87 
Therefore, one of the most important innovations of the 2016 Proposal is the pro-
vision on concentration of local jurisdiction. This new rule requests the Member 
States to ensure that that the jurisdiction for the applications for the return of a 
child is concentrated on a limited number of courts.88 It is explained that, de-
pending on the structure of the legal system, jurisdiction for child abduction cases 
could be concentrated in one single court for the whole country or in a limited 
number of courts, using, for example, the number of appellate courts as point of 
departure and concentrating jurisdiction for international child abduction cases 
upon one court of first instance within each district of a court of appeal.89
The second novelty governs that the court may declare the decision ordering the 
return of the child provisionally enforceable notwithstanding any appeal, even 
if national law does not provide for such provisional enforceability.90 This rule is 
described as useful in systems where the decision is not yet enforceable while it is 
still subject to appeal. As a result, a parent would be able to have access to the child 
based on a decision provisionally declared enforceable while the appeal proceed-
ings concerning that decision will be carried out on request of the other parent.91 
Regarding this provision it is certainly needed to add that when deciding upon 
the provisional enforceability the court should keep in mind that the child’s best 
interests will be most effectively served if coercive measures are only applied once 
it is clear that the return order will not be changed or annulled.92
85  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33, p. 3.
86  Supra. Župan, M., Poretti, P., op. cit. note. 84, p. 350.
87  Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., op.cit. note 37, p. 3.
88  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33,  Art. 22.
89  Ibid. Rec 26.
90  Ibid. Art 25(3).
91  Ibid.  p. 16.
92  Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice under the 
Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Part IV – En-
forcement, 2010, p. 19, URL=https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=5208. 
Accessed 10 February 2017.
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Another novelty concerns the limitation of the number of appeals against a re-
turn order. It prescribes that only one appeal shall be possible against the deci-
sion ordering or refusing the return of the child.93 Experience has shown that the 
appeal process in return cases can cause long delays before a final determination 
of the matter. This may be so even where a first instance decision has been made 
promptly. It should also be noted that the enforcement of a return order can be 
delayed because several levels of legal challenge exist and it is often not possible to 
enforce a return order until these have all been exhausted.94 This proposed rule is 
supporting the requirement for the prompt return of the child and minimising the 
ability of the abducting parent to turn the appeal system in their favour.95
5.3.  Abolition of the declaration of enforceability
The time for obtaining exequatur varies between the Member States; it can take 
from couple of days to several months, depending on the jurisdiction and the 
complexity of the case.96 There might also be contradictory situations where a 
Member State must enforce access rights under the Regulation while, at the same 
time, the recognition and/or enforcement of custody rights granted in the same 
decision may be challenged and perhaps refused in the same Member State be-
cause decision on both rights are currently subject to different procedures under 
the Regulation.97 The amended rule says that a decision on matters of parental 
responsibility in respect of a child given in a Member State which is enforceable in 
the other Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without 
any declaration of enforceability required.98 While current Brussels IIbis Regu-
lation only abolished this requirement for decisions granting access and certain 
decisions ordering the return of a child, the Proposal now provides for a single 
procedure for the cross-border enforcement of all decisions in matters of parental 
responsibility. 1996 Hague Convention contains the exequatur in its provision, 
but sets out that each Contracting State shall apply to the declaration of enforce-
ability or registration a simple and rapid procedure.99 Despite the difference, by 
93  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note 33. Art 25(4).
94  Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The link with interna-
tional instruments and third countries, Recasting the Brussels IIa Regulation Workshop 8 November 
2016, Compilation of briefings for the JURI Committee, 2016, pp. 63-73, p. 66, URL=http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571383/IPOL_STU(2016)571383_EN.pdf. Ac-
cessed 12 January 2017.
95  Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., op. cit. note 37, p. 3.
96  2016 Proposal, op. cit. note. 33, p. 4.
97  Ibid.
98  Ibid. Art. 30(1).
99  1996 Hague Covention, op. cit. note. 18., Art 26 (2).
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requesting a “simple and rapid procedure”, the drafters sought to avoid long delays 
that may occur until a decision can be enforced and this amendment does not 
contradict the 1996 Hague Convention, considering that it renders the enforce-
ment of decisions in matters of parental responsibility more effective.100
5.4.   Enforcement of the decision granting right of access or entailing the return 
on a child
Under the current rules the right of access granted and return of a child entailed 
in an enforceable judgement given in a Member State shall be recognized and 
enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of en-
forceability without any possibility of opposing its recognition.101 The CJEU 
strengthened those strict rules by ruling in the case of Povse102 and soon confirmed 
in the case Zarraga.103 As a consequence, and for the first time, a conflict of Euro-
pean Supranational Courts has arisen, with the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter: ECHR) ruling in the Case of M.A. v Austria104 considering the out-
comes of the implementation of the rule potentially contrary to the best interests 
of the child.105 
Finally, there is a new rule governing the grounds for refusal of enforcement of 
decisions in matter of parental responsibility, not excluding the decisions granting 
right of access or entailing the return on a child. Besides, there is a new Article 49 
saying that the provision in the Chapter on recognition and enforcement on mat-
ters of parental responsibility shall apply accordingly to decisions given in a Mem-
ber State and ordering the return of a child in another Member State pursuant the 
1980 Hague Convention. Thus, the Article 40(2) drew attention by ordering that 
enforcement of a decision may be refused by virtue of a change of circumstances 
since the decision was given, if the enforcement would be manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the Member State of enforcement. The Proposal states two 
bases on which a violation of public policy can be found. First, the child being of 
sufficient age and maturity now objects to such an extent that the enforcement 
100  Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, op. cit. note 94, p. 71.
101  Brussels IIbis Regulation, op. cit. note 20, Art 41(1) and Art 42(1).
102  Case C‑211/10 PPU Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:400.
103  Case C-491/10 PPU Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, para 
48.
104  Judgement M.A. v. Austria (2013), Application no. 4097/13, para 136.
105  Pretelli, I., Child Abduction and Return Procedures, Recasting the Brussels IIa Regulation Workshop 
8 November 2016, Compilation of briefings for the JURI Committee, 2016, pp. 1-18, p. 11-12, 
URL=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571383/IPOL_STU(2016) 
571383_EN.pdf. Accessed 1 February 2017.
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would be manifestly incompatible with the best interest of the child and secondly, 
other circumstances have changed to such an extent since the decision was given 
that its enforcement would now be manifestly incompatible with the best inter-
est of the child. The first exception is compactable with the general approach of 
the proposal which seeks to give more weight to children’s right especially the 
child’s right to be heard.106 Second exception is contrary to the CJEU ruling in the 
case Povse where court precluded a review in the state of enforcement because of 
a change in circumstances even if the enforcement was manifestly incompatible 
with the best interest of the child.107 The described rule obliviously goes in the way 
of better protection of child’s right and in the favour of increasing the mutual trust 
between Member States. Its real effectiveness remains to be seen in the interpreta-
tion and application by the Member State courts. 
6.   CONCLUSION
The 2016 Proposal had not introduced significant improvement regarding mat-
rimonial matters, although they proved to be necessary. The drafter missed the 
opportunity to introduce the choice of forum in proceedings relating to divorce 
and legal separation by which had not eliminated the possibility of forum shop-
ping and forum racing. While this matter was already thoroughly researched by 
the both Commission and academics, there was already the existing draft of the 
rule governing this matter. Also, the introduction of the rule on forum necessitates 
in matrimonial matters was held beneficial by a number of commentators in order 
to fill the gap that occurred between the rule on general and residual jurisdiction, 
but still not included in the Proposal. However, there are quite significant im-
provements to be found regarding the parental responsibility. The proposal clearly 
seeks to enhance children’s rights, referring explicitly to the EU’s Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. First of 
all, the child return procedure was significantly improved by introducing the rules 
on concentration of local jurisdiction, provisional enforcement of return order, 
limited number of appeal and by introducing the guarantee for the enforcement 
of protective measures. They are undoubtedly correspondent with the objective of 
simplifying the procedures and enhancing their efficiency. The same could also be 
stated concerning the abolishment of the exequatur in the parental responsibility 
matters. Finally, there is a substantial improvement regarding the right of the child 
to express his views and also regarding the new ability for the court in the State 
where the child is present to refuse enforcement of the return order issued by the 
106  Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., op. cit. note 37, p. 9.
107  Ibid.
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court of child’s habitual residence on the basis of public policy if the enforcement 
of the order is manifestly incompatible with the best interest of the child. Still, the 
biggest objection to the drafters is not amending the rule on transfer of jurisdic-
tion in parental responsibility matters, which had shown the non-uniformity in 
application and necessity of its amendment in terms of clarification of incurred 
questions.
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TRIAL WITHIN REASONAbLE TIME IN  
EU ACqUIS AND SERbIAN LAW
ABSTRACT
Since the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, it has become clear that 
the EU prioritizes the protection of human rights as an EU policy. One of the key standards set 
out in the Charter is the right to a fair trial and, within it, the right to trial within reasonable 
time.
The extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provides key guidance 
in the interpretation of this standard both within the Council of Europe and within the EU. 
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union also started to build its particular case 
law related to trial within a reasonable time. 
In this paper, the authors will present the developments related to the interpretation of the 
standard of trial within a reasonable time as a part of the EU acquis. Furthermore, the authors 
will explore the binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the EU candidate 
countries. Lastly, the authors will analyze the steps that Serbia has taken in order to improve 
its practices in this field, particularly through the adoption of the Law on the Protection of the 
Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time. Using the comparative and exegetic method, the au-
thors will assess the effectiveness of the normative approach utilized by the Serbian government 
aimed at ensuring improved compliance with the trial within reasonable time standards and 
its impact on the EU accession process. 
Key words: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; The Right to a Fair Trial; The Right 
to Trial within Reasonable Time; Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reason-
able Time.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The right to trial within a reasonable time became a component of the standard of 
independent and fair trial in the 20th century.1. The right to judicial protection, or 
the right of access to justice, is a human right that implies the right to trial within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court, established by law.  It is 
beyond doubt that the legal foundation of this approach lies in the interpretation 
of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter: ECHR) by the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter: ECtHR).2
Historically speaking, the standard of trial within a reasonable time can be traced 
back to th eMagna Carta Libertatum.3In the comments on Magna Carta that 
were printed in 1642 as a part of his “Institutes of the Laws of England”, Sir Edward 
Coke described “delay” as a kind of “denial”.4Indeed, justice delayed is justice 
denied, or even injustice, as William Gladstone pointed out. This quote became a 
globally popular maxim. 
The XX century brought the adoption of supranational legal instruments that are 
now the cornerstones of this standard. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights5 represents a milestone in the development of human rights. 
Its Article 10 states that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlines: “All persons shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals.  In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall 
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law... Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have 
the right to be...tried without undue delay...”Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter: 
ECHR) prescribes that “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or 
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hear-
ing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
1  Poznić, B., Rakić-Vodinelić, V., Civil Procedure Law, Law Faculty, Union University in Belgrade and 
Public Enterprise Official Gazette,Belgrade, 2015, p. 175.
2 Ibid. p. 69.
3  Magna Carta Libertatum, The Great Charter of Freedoms, an English constitutional document passed 
in 1215.
4  Martin, W, Because delay is a kind of denial, Timeliness in the Justice System, Ideas and Innovations, 
Monash University Law Chambers, Melbourne, 2014, pg. 3.
5  Passed and proclaimed a Resolution by the UN General Assembly 217 (III) on Dec. 10, 1948.
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by law.” The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights represents a unique document 
on fundamental rights protected in the EU.  It involves all the rights contained in 
the European Court of Justice’s case law, the rights and freedoms contained in the 
ECHR, as well as other rights that arise from common constitutional traditions 
of the EU countries and other international documents.6In addition to equality 
before the law7, Article 47 of this Charter prescribes that „everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law…”
As justice delayed is justice denied, everyone is entitled to have their rights decided 
on within a reasonable time, without unnecessary delay. Adjudication within a 
reasonable time is a standard set in the judiciary in terms of its efficiency. Not 
abiding by this standard, or, in other words, delaying proceedings and decisions, 
is one of the key problems in most national judicial systems; it is therefore not 
surprising that, in the past few years, at least a third of applications submitted to 
the ECtHR are related to the breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time. 
Trial within a reasonable time is the most frequently analyzed area of the fair trial 
standard, and it seems that this trend will not change soon. The reasons for this 
are twofold: first, the parameters that define a reasonable time are developed at a 
rather slow pace; and second, in order to observe this standard, national judicial 
system needs to reform, and these reforms are complex and slow processes, which 
often include numerous cases of trial-and-error solutions. This is particularly the 
case given that efficiency of the judicial systems is undoubtedly one of the major 
challenges that national judicial systems face nowadays.8On the other hand, the 
need for efficiency is sometimes juxtaposed with the need to respect human rights 
and ensure equal justice - courts all over the world are expected to perform their 
duties expeditiously, but never at the expense of a legitimate trial.9So how do su-
pranational and national legal and judicial systems try to ensure that the standard 
of the trial within reasonable time is observed?
6 URL=http://www.ec.europa.eu. Accessed 28 October 2016.
7  Article 20.
8 URL=http://www.humanrights.is. Accessed 8 November 2016.
9  Gyampo, R.E.V, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Call for Timeous Court Rulings in Ghana, Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol. 21, 2014, p. 36.
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2.   NATIONAL REMEDIES fOR bREACH Of RIGHT TO TRIAL 
WITHIN REASONAbLE TIME IN THE CONTEXT Of THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The success of the European Convention depends on the interaction between the 
domestic systems of human rights protection and the European umbrella held 
by the ECtHR.10Over the history, ECtHR has found more violations of Article 
6 of the ECHR than of any other Convention Article.11 However, the issue of 
introduction of special effective domestic remedies, in terms of Article 13 of the 
ECHR, regarding violations of the right to trial within reasonable time was not 
raised until the adoption of the seminal Kudla v. Poland judgment.12 Until that 
judgment, the ECtHR’s position was that Article 6, paragraph 1 constituted a 
lex specialis in relation to Article 13 of the Convention13 and was not considered 
even when Article 6(1) was found to be violated.14 However, in Kudla v. Poland 
judgment the court acknowledged that the Article 13 claim is not absorbed by 
the claim under Article 6(1) and clearly pointed out that complaints related to 
excessive length of proceedings should in the first place be addressed within the 
national legal system.15After the adoption of this decision, the adoption of the 
conclusions of the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights16and of 
the Recommendation (2004) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the improvement of domestic remedies,17several national systems started devel-
oping domestic remedies that could address the specific issue of breach of right to 
trial within reasonable time.18
10  Rotfeld D., Welcome Speeches, The improvement of domestic remedies with particular emphasis on cas-
es of unreasonable length of proceedings, Workshop held at the initiative of the Polish Chairmanship 
of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, Directorate General of Human Rights, Council 
of Europe, 2006, p. 5, URL=http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Pub_coe_Domestics_remedies_2006_
ENG.pdf. Accesssed January 29, 2017.
11  According to HUDOC data, 22328 violations of Article 6. 
12  Kudla v. Poland App No 30210/96, ECHR 2000-XI, [2000] ECHR 512, (2002) 35 EHRR 198, 
(2002) 35 EHRR 11, [2000] Prison LR 380, (2000) 10 BHRC 269, IHRL 2853 (ECHR 2000), 26th 
October 2000
13  Article 13 envisages the right to an effective remedy
14  Harris D. J., O’Boyle M., Bates E., Buckley C., Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, p. 777.
15  Kudla v. Poland, App No 30210/96, ECHR 2000-XI, [2000] ECHR 512, (2002) 35 EHRR 198, 
(2002) 35 EHRR 11, [2000] Prison LR 380, (2000) 10 BHRC 269, IHRL 2853 (ECHR 2000), 26th 
October 2000par. 155. 
16  Proceedings. European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights and Commemorative Ceremony of 
the 50th Anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 3-4 November 2000, 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002, p. 39.
17  Which includes separate sections devoted to domestic remedies against unreasonably long proceedings
18  See item III of the Recommendation and paragraphs 20-24 of the Appendix to Recommendation.
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Some countries have adopted separate statutes to introduce a judicial remedy ad-
dressing the unreasonable length of proceedings. Italy, which was infamous for a 
high number of applications before the ECtHR and ECtHR judgments in which 
violations of Article 6 were established, adopted the so-called Pinto Act19, which 
allows any party to criminal, civil, administrative and tax proceedings to complain 
of a breach of the reasonable time requirement and obtain financial compensation 
from a domestic court.20 The Act lays down the criteria that judges must follow 
to verify the reasonable length of the trial, to consider the impact the duration of 
the trial has on the case, and to quantify and award damages. However, the Act 
does not provide for any measures to expedite the proceedings. Even though the 
introduction of the Pinto Act has to some extent reduced the number of applica-
tions against Italy before the ECtHR, it has also created an additional burden 
on domestic courts.21 As a result, the Pinto Act was perceived by scholars as an 
expensive placebo.22 In 2012, the Pinto Act was amended – the novelties included 
the provisions whereby access to the “Pinto” remedy was made conditional upon 
the termination of main proceedings, and compensation was excluded or limited 
in some cases. However, the purely compensatory nature of the “Pinto” remedy 
has been maintained.23
The Czech Republic has instituted reforms following the Hartman judgment24, in 
which the ECtHR found that appeals to the Constitutional Court, enabling in-
dividuals to challenge any final decision of another state body, were not effective. 
In response to the judgment, Act No. 192/2003 was adopted. This Act has added 
a provision to the Act on courts and judges, under which it is possible to seek a 
remedy for excessive delays in judicial proceedings by applying for a deadline to be 
19  Legge 24 marzo 2001, n. 89 “Previsione di equa riparazione in caso di violazione del termine ragione-
vole del processo e modifica dell’articolo 375 del codice di procedura civile”, Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 78, 
3.4. 2001
20  Crisafulli F., The Italian Experience, The improvement of domestic remedies with particular emphasis 
on cases of unreasonable length of proceedings, op.cit. note 10, 39
21  Candela Soriano M., “The Reception Process in Spain and Italy”, The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems (eds. H. Keller and A. Stone-Sweet), Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 427.  In Gaglione 
and others v. Italy, Application No. 45867/07, the ECtHR found that delays by the Italian authorities 
in enforcing “Pinto decisions” ranged from 9 to 49 months, and that in 65% or more of the cases there 
was a 19-month delay (paragraphs 38 and 8).
22  See in particular Carnevali D. “La violazione della ragionevole durata del processo: alcuni datisull’ap-
plicazione della ‘legge Pinto’” ,C. Guarnieri e F. Zannotti (eds), Giusto processo?, Milano, Giuffré pp. 
289-314
23  Report Doc. 1386 Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 Septem-
ber 2015, par.15.
24 Hartman v. The Czech Republic, Application no. 53341/99
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set for the completion of a particular stage or formality in the process.25 The EC-
tHR conducted an examination of in abstracto conformity of this remedy with the 
Convention, and found it was ineffective, because the request only constituted an 
extension of the ordinary appeal. This prompted an additional legislative amend-
ment, whereby the possibility was established for the court against the decision of 
which the appeal was filed to deal with the appeal itself, without having to transfer 
the case to the higher court – given that such practice has caused further delays in 
proceedings.26
In Poland, an Act on complaints against infringements of party’s right to be tried 
without undue delay was adopted in 2004.27 The Act relates to criminal and civil 
court proceedings, including enforcement proceedings, and proceedings before 
administrative courts. According to this Act, a party is entitled to file a complaint, 
seeking ascertainment of the fact that the proceedings in question infringed the 
party’s right to have a case examined without undue delay. The criteria for evaluat-
ing whether the case was examined without undue delay are based on the practice 
of the ECtHR, and, as a rule, the complaint is examined by a superior court. 
Complaints may be filed only if the proceedings are still pending. In 2009, the 
regulatory framework was amended to enable the triggering of this mechanism 
even in preparatory proceedings, and the obligation to grant just satisfaction was 
set within a given pecuniary range. 
In Bulgaria, following the pilot judgments in Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bul-
garia28  and Finger v. Bulgaria,29 in which the ECtHR required that Bulgaria in-
troduce remedies to deal with unduly long criminal proceedings, and introduce a 
compensatory remedy in cases of unreasonably long criminal, civil and adminis-
trative proceedings, an administrative compensatory remedy was introduced and 
entered into force in 2012.30 The remedy was introduced through the Judiciary 
Powers Act, which prescribes that applications for compensations for unduly long 
proceedings are addressed to the Minister of Justice through the Supreme Judi-
cial Councils’ Inspectorate. The time-limit for examination of applications is six 
25  Schorm, V.A., The Czech Experience, The improvement of domestic remedies with particular emphasis 
on cases of unreasonable length of proceedings,op. cit. note 10, pp.33-38 
26  Schorm, V. A., Remedies against excessive length of judicial proceedings in the Czech Republic, The right 
to trial within a reasonable time and short-term reform of the European Court of Human Rights, 
p. 39-42, URL=http://www.mzz.gov.si/fileadmin/pageuploads/Zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/knjiznica/
bled_proceedings.pdf.Accessed January 28, 2017.
27  Dz.U. 2004 nr 179 poz. 1843
28 Application No. 48059/06 and 2708/09
29  Application No. 37346/05
30  Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in states parties - Selected examples, 2016, p. 
18. 
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months. The applications can be directed against acts, actions or omissions of 
judicial authorities, but not for such delays stemming from the overburdening of 
the judicial system as a whole.31 The merits of the application and the amount of 
compensation are determined in light of the Court’s case law.
There are numerous examples of other countries that have developed specific do-
mestic remedies, including Slovenia, Croatia, Cyprus and Germany. Last years’ 
EU justice scoreboard32 has shown that the length of first-instance proceedings in 
most countries has been reduced in 2014 compared to 2010, which shows that 
there are improvements with regards to the length of proceedings before national 
courts.  
figure 1. 
Source: 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, p.6
It must be underlined that the mere existence of national legal remedies in cases 
of breach of the right to trial within reasonable time is not the sole reason behind 
reduced duration of the length of proceedings in any Council of Europe country.
Evidence from the EU Justice Scoreboard source shows that numerous national 
judicial systems, including the ones that have introduced special national legal 
remedies in cases of violation of the standard of trial within reasonable time, are 
also taking other steps to ensure that justice is not delayed, such as the intro-
31  CM/Inf/DH(2012)36  
32  The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, available at URL=http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/
justice_scoreboard_2016_en.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2017.
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duction of timeframes in proceedings or introducing active age monitoring and 
backlog reduction systems.33Some countries as the case was in the Netherlands, 
have introduced additional programmes to reduce the excessive case backlog and 
provided instruments that will, in addition to ensuring that those whose right to 
a trial within reasonable time is violated have access to an effective remedy, also 
steer the judges towards working more efficiently and with a view to respecting 
the standards set by the ECtHR. After all, as indicated above, the domestic judi-
cial systems are instrumental in ensuring that the rights set out in the ECHR are 
indeed exercised and duly protected.
3.   PROTECTION Of THE RIGHT TO A PUbLIC HEARING 
WITHIN REASONAbLE TIME IN THE CONTEXT Of ARTICLE 
47 Of THE EU CHARTER Of fUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The right to a hearing within reasonable time is one of the general principles of 
EU law – it is enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, but also draws inspiration from the ECHR and its interpre-
tative case law.34 The way in which the EU interprets and implements the right 
to a public hearing within reasonable time is specifically important given Serbia’s 
path towards EU accession and in particular the negotiation of Chapter 23.35
The Court of Justice and the General Court have developed jurisprudence on this 
issue, especially in the field of competition law. As Advocate General Mengozzi 
pointed out, “the observance of a reasonable time has been seen by the Communi-
ty judicature above all as a test for establishing a possible breach of certain general 
principles of community law such as...protection of legitimate expectations, the 
principle of legal certainty, protection of the rights of defence, as well as the right 
to due process.”36 Moreover, he claimed that this right imposes on institutions a 
time limit for exercising the powers vested in them. 
In landmark Baustahlgewebe case37 the Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter: 
CJEU) recognized the violation of that right by the Court of First instance. More 
33 Ibid., p. 32
34  Borraccetti M., Fair Trial, Due Process and Rights of Defence in the EU Legal Order,The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument,p. 102. 
35  On judicial inefficiency and slowness as an obstacle to EU accession see Uzelac, A, Vladavina prava 
i pravosudni sustav: Sporost pravosuđa kao prepreka pridruživanju, Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj 
Uniji, Izazovi institucionalnih prilagodbi, Drugi svezak, Institut za javne financijeZaklada Friedrich 
Ebert,Zagreb, 2004. pp. 99-123.
36  Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-523/04 Commission v the Netherlands, pars. 57-60
37  Case C-185/95 Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [1998], ECR 
I-8417, par. 29
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importantly, in this case the CJEU, by analogy with the ECtHR judgments in 
Erkner and Kemmache judgments38 declared that the reasonableness of the time 
of the trial must be appraised in the light of circumstances that are specific to each 
case, the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the com-
petent authorities. As in other human rights issues, the CJEU has drawn inspira-
tion from various human rights instruments, most notably the ECHR, but also 
from the European Social Charter.39 However, the ECHR was only an inspiration 
and the CJEU did not find itself bound by these interpretations.  
However, concerning the issue of just satisfaction with regards to breaches of the 
right to trial within reasonable time, in landmark cases Kendrion40, Gascogne41 
and Gascogne Germany42 the CJEU opted to follow the solution already utilized 
in the Der Grüne Punkt judgment43, where it had concluded that there had been 
an infringement of the right to trial within reasonable time, but had also required 
a separate action for damages to be lodged before the General Court. Firstly, the 
CJEU started its analysis regarding Article 47 of the CFR and the related principle 
of effective judicial protection. Referring to the ECtHR case Kudla v. Poland, the 
CJEU asserted that if a violation of the right to trial within reasonable time was 
breached, an effective remedy had to be available. However, contrary to what was 
considered to be an effective remedy in that case by the applicants – the setting 
aside of the judgment on the appeal – the CJEU found that it would not remedy 
the infringement.44 However, the CJEU found that a claim for damages brought 
against the EU pursuant to Articles 268 and 340, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union did constitute an effective remedy for sanc-
tioning such a breech.45  Moreover, the Court stated that such a claim may not 
be filed to the CJEU as a part of the appeal, but has to be made directly to the 
General Court.46
38  Application No. 9616/81, Erkrenr Hofauer v. Austria, Application Nos. 12325/86 and 14992/89 
Kemacche v. France
39  Lawson R., “International and European Human Rights Instruments”, Monitoring Fundamental Rights 
in the EU: The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (Essays in European Law) (Philip 
Alston, Olivier De Schutter, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 233
40  C 50/12 P Kendrion v Commission [2013] EU:C:2013:771, (judgment of 26 November 2013)
41  Case C 58/12 P Groupe Gascogne v Commission [2013]EU:C:2013:770, (judgment of 26 November 
2013)
42  Case C 40/12 P, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission [2013]EU:C:2013:768, (judgment of 26 
November 2013)
43  Case C 385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2009] ECR I -6155, 
par. 190-196
44 Op. cit. note  40, par.88
45 Ibid., par. 93
46 Ibid., par. 95
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When it comes to the relationship between the protection of the right to trial 
within reasonable time in the ECHR and the Charter, in its case Europese Gemeen-
schap v Otis NV and others,47the CJEU stated that Article 47 of the Charter secures 
in the EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR and that was 
therefore necessary to refer only to Article 47.  Clearlz, the CJEU will go on to set 
its own standards regarding the interpretation of the standard of reasonable time 
as protected by the Charter and the notion of effective remedies for protecting that 
right and resort to the already existing remedies in cases of breach of that right.48
However, in some cases, this remedy also means that the party whose right to hear-
ing within reasonable time has been violated by the General Court would have to 
seek judicial protection and just compensation before that same court. Moreover, 
the General Court would have to ascertain that there was a causal link between the 
excessive length and the harm. Despite the general suspicion regarding the lack of 
impartiality in such a solution (there is no guarantee that a different composition 
of the General Court will decide in the action on damages), the instrument itself 
is not particularly different from other effective remedy instruments that have 
been put in place for violation of the same right, as guaranteed by the ECHR, 
in national legal systems. Consequently – it suffers from the same drawbacks; 
its resolution seeks additional time, it creates more work for the court (which is 
already heavily burdened with cases), and just compensation is reduced to pecuni-
ary compensation. Interestingly, the Court was very firm in its position that there 
was no need for creating additional instruments to ensure an effective remedy for 
breaches of this provision of the Charter. Rather, the Court decided to rely on the 
existing remedy system, which is a practice rather contrary to the one taken by 
national systems after the Kudla v. Poland judgment. 
For a country on its path to EU accession, such as Serbia, this means that, before 
the closing of Chapter 23 and becoming a full EU member, it must ensure that 
the observance of the standard of trial within reasonable time is fully internalized 
in its judicial system. Serbia will have to ensure that national judicial remedies for 
breach of this standard are just an auxiliary measure to ensure that a case is tried 
within reasonable time rather being the core measure for ensuring this right. 
47  Case C-199/11Europese Gemeenschap v Otis and Other [2012]EU:C:2012:684 (judgment of 6 Novem-
ber 2012)
48  More on the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR see Coric Eric, 
V.,Odnos Evropskog suda pravde i Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, doctoral thesis, Law Faculty, Belgrade 
University, 2013.When it comes to the issue of just satisfaction, the approaches of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR are also somewhat divergent – for more see Ćoric V, Kneževic Bojović, A, Vukadinović, S. 
Odštetni zahtevi pred evropskim nadnacionalnim sudovima, Naknada štete i osiguranje – Savremeni 
izazovi, XIX Međunarodni naučni skup, Udruženje za odštetno pravo, Institut za uporedno pravo i 
Pravosudna akademija, 2016, p. 167-182
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4.  THE RIGHT TO A fAIR TRIAL IN THE SERbIAN LAW
Serbia has taken a number of steps to ensure that cases are tried within reasonable 
time. These include, inter alia, the setting of the timeframe for taking of procedur-
al actions in the Civil Procedure Act,49 introducing the right to trial within reason-
able time as a principle in the Criminal Procedure Code,50 and the adoption the 
National Backlog Reduction Programme.51 In 2015, Serbia has adopted a separate 
statute introducing a new effective legal remedy for breaches of the right to trial 
within reasonable time, in line with comparative tendencies, mainly focusing on 
the fulfilment of its obligations related to the implementation of the ECHR.52
The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 
which prescribes that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination 
of their rights and obligations.”53The Constitution established the Constitutional 
Court54and introduced constitutional appeal that “can be filed against individual 
acts or actions of state institutions in charge of public authorities, which breach or 
deny human and minority rights and the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, provided that other legal remedies for their protection are either exhausted 
or unavailable”.55In the Vinčić and Others vs. Serbia(44698/06 et al.)56ECtHR 
maintained that a constitutional appeal is generally considered effective for all ap-
plications submitted after August 7, 2008, when the first meritorious decision on 
49  Articles 10, 303 and 308 of the Serbian Civil Procedure Act, Official Gazette No. 72/2011, 49/2013-de-
cision of the Constitutional Court, 74/2013- decision of the Constitutional Court and 55/2014.
50  Article 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code Official Gazette No. 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 
32/2013, 45/2013 and 55/2014.
51  The latest Programme for the 2016- 2020 period was adopted on August 10, 2016, available at
  URL=http://www.vk.sud.rs. Accessed 10 February 2017.
52  Even though a remedy did exist in the Civil Procedure Act as will be explained below.
53  Article 32 of the Constitution.
54  Article 166 of the Constitution which prescribes that the Constitutional Court is an “autonomous 
and independent state body which shall protect constitutionality and legality, as well as human and 
minority rights and freedoms”, whose “decisions are final, enforceable and generally binding“. 
55  Article 170 of the Constitution. The same is envisaged by Article 82 of the Law on the 
Constitutional Court (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 109/2007, 99/2011, 
18/2013 – a decision by the Constitutional Court and 40/2015 – other law). 
56  The European Court of Human Rights passed a verdict on Dec. 1, 2009 concerning thirty one appli-
cations against the Republic of Serbia, Nos.: 44698/06, 44700/06, 44722/06, 44725/06, 49388/06, 
50034/06, 694/07, 757/07, 758/07, 3326/07, 3330/07, 5062/07, 8130/07, 9143/07, 9262/07, 
9986/07, 11197/07, 11711/07, 13995/07, 14022/07, 20378/07, 20379/07, 20380/07, 20515/07, 
23971/07, 50608/07, 50617/07, 4022/08, 4021/08, 29758/07 and 45249/07, filed because of the 
breach of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 Par. 1 of the Convention) in domestic court proceedings-la-
bor disputes.
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a constitutional appeal passed by the Serbian Constitutional Court was published 
in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia.57Given the number of constitu-
tional appeals submitted to the Constitutional Court, as well as the duration of 
the proceedings before this court, it was questionable whether a constitutional ap-
peal complies with the criteria established in the practice of the ECtHR in terms 
of urgency and speeding up of proceedings.58In order to resolve this dilemma, the 
Law on Court Organization introduced new provisions,59which brought a new 
means of legal protection – a request to protect the right to trial within a reason-
able time.60
4.1.  The Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time
The Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time61(hereafter: 
the Law) was passed on May 7, 2015. However, the provisions of the Law on 
Court Organization apply to the proceedings for the protection of the right to 
trial within reasonable time initiated before this Law entered into force, and those 
proceedings are continued in line with the Law on Court Organization. Accord-
ing to the new law, the right to trial within reasonable time, in addition to liti-
gation and criminal proceedings also covers enforcement proceedings and non-
contentious proceedings.62This law does not cover administrative proceedings, 
which, according to the standards of the ECtHR, should be also be covered by the 
right protected under Article 6 – namely, ECtHR case law established that Article 
6 of the ECHR also covers disputes between private persons and state bodies if 
administrative proceedings affect the realization of property rights.63Contrary to 
that, the Supreme Court of Cassation, at the 5th session of the Department for 
57  URL=http://www.zastupnik.mpravde.gov.rs/cr/articles/presude/u-odnosu-na-rs/vincic-i-drugi-protiv-
srbije-44698-06-i-dr..html. Accessed 29 July 2015.
58  It should be noted that Article 8 of the Law on Court Organization (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia,No. 116/2008, 104/2009, 101/2010, 31/2011- and other law, 78/2011, 101/2013, 106/2015, 
40/2015 other law and 13/2016) prescribes that “a party and other participants in court proceedings 
are entitled to appeal against the work of the court when they believe proceedings are delayed, irregular 
or under any illicit influence on their course and outcome”. 
59  Articles 8a, 8b i 8v, but all of the provisions ceased to be valid when the Law on the Protection of the 
Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time entered into force on Jan. 1, 2016, URL=http://www.vk.sud.
rs. Accessed 8 November 2016.
60  Milutinović, Lj, Facing the implementation of the Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Rea-
sonable Time in court proceedings, Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Serbia, the Council 
of Europe, 2015, p. 8.
61  The Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia, No.40/2015.
62  Article 2 of the Law 
63  Milutinović, Lj., op.cit. note 60, pp. 13-14. 
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the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time, held on Sept. 15, 
2014, adopted a legal position that the beginning of a reasonable time starts when 
the Administrative Court receives an application. Consequently, the duration of 
the proceedings before administrative bodies does not count in when reasonable 
time is assessed. 
The holders of the right to trial within a reasonable time are all parties in court 
proceedings, including enforcement proceedings and the participants in non-con-
tentious proceedings, as well as injured parties in criminal proceedings, private 
plaintiffs and injured persons as plaintiffs, provided that they filed a property-legal 
claim. According to the law, a public prosecutor as a party in criminal proceedings 
is not entitled to protection against the breach of the right to trial within a reason-
able time64. Assessment criteria for the duration of trial within a reasonable time as 
prescribed by the Law65and interpreted by the Supreme Court of Cassationare in 
line with the interpretation of the ECtHR66in relation to the application of Article 
6 of the ECHR. 
Legal remedies for the protection of the right to trial within a reasonable time 
envisaged by the Law are the following:
1.  a complaint to speed up the proceedings
2.  an appeal, and
3.  a just satisfaction claim. 
A complaint and an appeal can be filed by the end of the proceedings. A deci-
sion which acknowledges or rejects an appeal or complaint must be thoroughly 
explained, and it must not affect the factual or legal issues that were the subject of 
the trial or investigation.67
4.1.1. Complaint
According to the Law, a complaint is filed to the court that adjudicates upon the 
proceedings, if the right to trial within a reasonable time was breached by the pub-
lic prosecutor, considering that it is the court chairman, not the public prosecu-
tor, who decides if there was a breach. If the breach was committed during court 
proceedings, the complaint is filed to the court in charge of the proceedings.68A 
64  Article 2 of the Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable time. 
65  Article 4 of the Law
66  Poznić, B, Rakić-Vodinelić, V., op. cit. note 1, pp. 175-176.
67  Article 3 and Article 5 of the Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time.
68  Milutinović, Lj., op.cit. note 60, p. 16.
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decision about a complaint must be made within two months after its filing.69A 
complaint can be rejected or dismissed without an examination procedure if it is 
obviously ungrounded, considering the duration of the proceedings stated in the 
complaint.70The court chairman dismisses or acknowledges the complaint and 
establishes if the breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time occurred,  a 
decision against which the judge and the public prosecutor cannot appeal. In the 
decision that acknowledges a complaint and establishes a breach of the right to 
trial within a reasonable time, the court chairman points out the judge or public 
prosecutor the reasons of the breach of the party’s right and orders the judge to 
conduct procedural actions which effectively speed up the proceedings. The im-
mediate higher public prosecutor has maximum 8 days since the reception of the 
decision to issue a binding instruction that orders the public prosecutor to con-
duct procedural actions to effectively speed up the proceedings.71
4.1.2.  Appeal
A party is entitled to an appeal if their complaint was dismissed, or if the court 
chairman does not pass a decision within two months since the filing of the com-
plaint. The appeal can also be filed if the complaint was acknowledged, but the 
immediate higher public prosecutor failed to issue a binding instruction within 8 
days after the court chairman’s decision was received. An appeal can also be filed if 
the court chairman or immediate higher public prosecutor failed to order the judge 
or public prosecutor to conduct procedural actions which effectively speed up the 
proceedings, or if the judge or public prosecutor failed to conduct the requested 
procedural actions within a given deadline.72The appeal is filed to the court chair-
man who adjudicated on the complaint, and if in the proceedings in question a 
party claims to have suffered a breach of its right to trial within a reasonable time 
before the Supreme Court of Cassation, a three-member chamber of the Supreme 
Court of Cassation conducts and decides on the appeal proceedings.73According 
to Article 17 of the Law, no appeal is possible against a decision dismissing an 
appeal.74A decision may dismiss an appeal without an examination procedure if it 
69  Oral hearing is not held, and the Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings is implemented on other 
matters (Article 7 of the Law).
70  The very examination procedure begins when the court chairman requests a judge or a trial chamber, or 
the public prosecutor to deliver a report within 15 days or as soon as possible (if a special law prescribes 
urgency for such proceedings).
71  Articles7-12 of the Law).
72  Article 14 of the Law.
73  Article 16 of the Law.
74  An appeal is not filed to the response and an oral hearing is not held. For other matters, the provisions 
of the Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings are applied. 
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is obviously ungrounded in terms of the proceedings duration stated in the appeal. 
If an appeal is not dismissed or rejected for the given reason, an examination pro-
cedure is conducted.75 No appeal can be filed against the decision of the chairman 
of an immediate higher court on an appeal.76
4.1.3.  Just satisfaction claim
The Law envisages the following types of just satisfaction:
-   the right to monetary indemnification for non-property damage suffered by a 
party through a breach of their right to trial within a reasonable time; 
-   the right to the announcement of a written statement by the State Office of the 
Ombudsman which establishes that the party suffered a breach of their right to 
trial within a reasonable time; and
-   the right to the announcement of a verdict which acknowledges the breach of 
the party’s right to trial within a reasonable time. 
A party whose complaint was adopted and who did not file an appeal, a party 
whose appeal was dismissed and the first-instance decision about the acknowledge-
ment of the complaint confirmed, and a party whose appeal was acknowledged are 
entitled to just satisfaction.The Republic of Serbia has an objective responsibility 
for non-property damage caused by a breach of the right to trial within a reason-
able time.77
The law also envisages a possible attempt of settlement with the Office of the Om-
budsman and the possibility to submit a settlement proposal. If an agreement is 
reached, the Office of the Ombudsman concludes an out-of-court settlement with 
the party, which represents an executive document.78 During the attempt of settle-
ment and after concluding the settlement, the party has no right to initiate an 
action against the Republic of Serbia for monetary indemnification.79A party may 
also initiate an action for the indemnity of property damage caused by a breach 
of the right to trial within a reasonable time against the Republic of Serbia within 
one year since it acquired the right to just satisfaction. The Republic of Serbia has 
75  Article 18 of the Law.
76  Article 21 of the Law.
77  Articles 22-23 of the Law.
78  Article 24 of the Law.
79  A party may initiate an action against the Republic of Serbia within one year since the day it acquired 
the right to righteous redress. The proceedings for such action are based on the provisions of the Civil 
Procedure Law. The monetary indemnification may amount between EUR300 and EUR3000 per case 
in RSD countervalue .
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an objective responsibility for such damage and monetary indemnification and a 
remuneration for property damage are paid by the court or the public prosecutor’s 
office which breached the right to trial within a reasonable time.80 The concluded 
settlement has the power of an executive document.
4.2.  STATISTICAL DATA AbOUT THE NUMbER Of VERDICTS 
REGARDING bREACHES Of THE RIGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN 
A REASONAbLE TIME bEfORE NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
ECTHR fROM 2015 TO 2017
According to the Serbian Constitutional Court’s data, 543 decisions were passed 
in 2015, which acknowledged constitutional appeals about a breach of the right to 
trial within a reasonable time in finalized proceedings.81Even though in most cases 
a breach of the right to a fair trial was established, the number of such breaches 
was significantly less in 2015 than in 2014 (a total of 544, which is 1,415 less 
compared to the previous year). The situation is the same with the reduced num-
ber of breaches of the right to trial within a reasonable time (in 2015 the court 
investigated such breaches only in relation to finalized proceedings).82
In 2015, the Department for Trial within a Reasonable Time of the Supreme 
Court of Serbia83received 4,114 cases, compared to the 1,117 received in 2014. 
3,400cases were resolved, while in 2014, 543 cases were resolved. Of that number, 
in 2015. 3,024 cases were resolved meritoriously, compared to 392 in 2014, with 
1,297 cases remaining unresolved in 2015, compared to 583 from 2014.84There-
fore, the percentage of resolved cases in 2015 was 72.39%, of which number 
88.94% cases were resolved meritoriously.85
According to the Council of Europe’s data, from January 1, 2016 to January 11, 
2017 five verdicts were passed against the Republic of Serbia due to a breach of 
the right to trial within a reasonable time. In the past 5 years (from Jan 11, 2012 
80  Articles 31-31 of the Law. 
81  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, Review of the Constitutional Court’s Work in 2015, 
URL=http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/Storage/Global/Documents/Misc/Преглед_2015.pdf. Accessed 9 
January 2017, p. 11.
82 Ibid, p. 12.
83  Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic of Serbia, Analysis of the Work of Courts of General and 
Special Jurisdiction for 2015, URL=http://www.vk.sud.rs/sites/default/files/attachments/Analiza rada 
svih sudova u Republici Srbiji za 2015. godinu.pdf, p 3. Accessed January 10, 2017.
84 Ibid., p. 14.
85  There is no available information for 2016 and 2017 yet.
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and Jan. 11, 2017) a total of 27 verdicts were passed due to breaches of the right 
to trial within a reasonable time.86
While there seems to be some improvement in the number of established 
breaches of the right to trial within reasonable time, the length of certain 
proceedings in Serbian courts has not been reduced. quite to the contrary, 
in the Doing Business report, the ranking of Serbia related to enforcement 
of contracts has been reduced compared to its’ 2016 ranking87with a stag-
gering 635 days needed for enforcement of a commercial contract from the 
time the action is filed to payment, which includes 495 days for trial and 
judgment. The Supreme Court of Cassation reports do not measure the av-
erage length of proceedings, but it is indicative that according to this court’s 
data for 2015, that the workload of judges sitting in courts of general ju-
risdiction consisted, on average, of 49.11% of old cases, where as much as 
875099 cases were between 5 and 10 years old.88 In case of courts of special-
ized jurisdiction in Serbia (Administrative court, commercial courts), this 
percentage was much lower – 18.49 on average, where the majority of old 
cases were 2-5 years old.89
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It seems that despite the efforts made over the last decade in various national 
systems to ensure that breaches of the right to trial within reasonable time are 
duly sanctioned and that this right is duly observed, there is no universal an-
swer or model on how to best proceed with this exercise. Some models have in 
fact created additional workload for courts while only marginally contributing 
to the overall reduction of the instances of breach of this right – regardless of 
whether such breaches are registered before national courts or the European Court 
of Human Rights. The approach taken by the European Union, while strongly 
re-affirming the right to trial within reasonable time, did not however provide 
a practical mechanism that could be easily replicated on national level. The EU 
86 URL=http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. Accessed 11 January 2017.
87  URL=http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/serbia#enforcing-contracts shows that 
Serbia has gone down by 8 places in 2017, so now it ranks 61st in relation to this indicator compared 
to the 53rd place it held in 2016. Accessed March 15, 2017.
88  Statistika o radu sudova opšte nadležnosti u Republici Srbiji u 2015. godini, Vrhovni kasacioni sud, 
Beograd, 2016, p. 9. URL=http://www.vk.sud.rs/sr-lat/godi%C5%A1nji-izve%C5%A1taj-o-radu-su-
dova. Accessed March 15, 2017.
89  Statistika o radu sudova posebne nadležnosti u Republici Srbiji u 2015. godini, Vrhovni kasacioni sud, 
Beograd, 2016, p. 8. URL=http://www.vk.sud.rs/sr-lat/godi%C5%A1nji-izve%C5%A1taj-o-radu-su-
dova. Accessed March 15, 2017.
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seems to rely on the integrity of the judges sitting at its court rather than create 
additional mechanisms as outside incentives for its judges to observe their duties. 
In that respect, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has not done much in changing the procedural law in the EU member states or 
accession countries
However, this approach may still be sending a strong message – one of the need 
to instill the core values of both the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into the actions of each and every 
judge acting in the European justice area. This is not just an issue of knowledge of 
law, although informed and trained judges are more likely to abide by these rules. 
This is also an issue of attitude, and an issue of integrity. And while the existence 
of effective remedies can serve a very straightforward purpose – compensating the 
party that sustained harm due to excessive length of proceedings - the need to 
have judges who observe this rule in their everyday work remains as strong as ever. 
As Lord Heward CJ stated in a seminal English case on impartiality of judges (R 
V. Sussex), “not only must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done”. The 
core problem with the observance of this value will not be remedied through com-
pensation alone – all such efforts must be coupled with those aimed at increasing 
knowledge and attitudes towards the observance of this rule. 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to give legal analysis of the procedures for the political control of 
the European Commission by the European Parliament. The author has used the legal method 
for the analysis of legal acts which introduce in the EU political system the tools of political 
control which have been known in different systems of government based on the separation of 
powers. The use of comparative method has to facilitate the answer to the question whether the 
EU lawmaker could and should use the instruments of the political control which have been 
prescribed in the national legal systems.
Well-known instruments of the political control, such as parliamentary questions, inquiry, and 
the vote of no confidence, have been prescribed in different acts. However, legally prescribed 
conditions for the use of these instruments are usually quite strict. It seems that they exist only as 
legal and political possibility but they don’t have any practical value. Therefore, it could be said 
that the political control of the Commission by the Parliament is more an idea than reality.
Key words: European Union, European Parliament, European Commission, Political Con-
trol, Parliamentary Questions, Committees of Inquiry, Vote of No Confidence
1.  INTRODUCTION
The European Parliament has the right to control the European Commission. This 
control, which is political in nature, has different aspects, and includes different 
procedures. The purpose of this work is to analyze these procedures, and to answer 
the question what is the democratic capacity of this control. 
The control ranges from the right of the MEPs to ask questions, and to make 
inquiries, to the duty of the Commission to submit reports to the European Par-
liament, and finally the right of the Parliament to vote no confidence in the Com-
mission. 
The purpose of this work is to analyze legal provisions which enable the Parlia-
ment to control the work of the Commission, to explain procedural aspects of 
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the political control, and to show its strengths and weaknesses. The issue of the 
political control of the Commission by the Parliament can be observed from dif-
ferent angles. The legal and the political angles are the most important, and they 
are tightly interdependent. Although there can be some unwritten conventions on 
the political control, it is mostly prescribed in different legal acts. Our intention 
is to analyze legal acts which are relevant at the level of the European Union. This 
is important since the legal provisions constrain the activities of both institutions, 
and set the legal basis for the political control. Of course, the legal framework is 
not a value in itself since it depends on the interests and political attitudes of the 
political actors in the European Union. Therefore, the main scientific method 
which has to be implemented in this work is the legal method. It is going to be 
complemented with the comparative method since our intention is to compare 
the legal acts of the European Union with the legal acts of its Member States. 
This is justified for two reasons. First, since the Member States have established 
or joined the European Union, it is natural that the EU law took over some prin-
ciples of the relationship between the legislative and the executive of these states. 
Second, since the legal provisions in the Member States are not the same in all 
aspects, it is useful to analyze them in order to find those with the best possible 
democratic capacity for the European Union institutions.
Of course, it is not enough to know the legal framework since the practice often 
deviates from the legal provisions. It is important to explore how the institutions 
of the Union really function. Therefore, the political method has to be used. Since 
this work is based primarily on the legal analysis, the political method is going to 
be used only as an auxiliary method.
The political system of the European Union is based on the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers. It is one of the basic notions of the constitutional as well as po-
litical systems in all the states of the European Union. Therefore, it has to be one 
of the pillars of the European Union’s political system. Of course, there is much 
space and reasons for the criticism of the very idea of the separation of powers. 
However, the purpose of this work is not to criticize the very idea but to explore 
the main aspects of its fulfillment regarding the relationship between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Commission.  
2.  LEGAL bASIS
The legal basis for the European Parliament’s control over the executive is laid 
down by the treaties establishing the European Union. Article 17 of the Lisbon 
Treaty prescribes the political control of the European Parliament over the Com-
mission. However, the procedural aspects of this control are also very important 
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since they influence the content and the possibility of the fulfillment of the prin-
ciple of the political control. Namely, the provisions on the procedure don’t just 
give the answer to the question about the steps that have to be taken in order to 
realize the political control. They have a substantial importance since they influ-
ence to some extent the very relationship between two institutions. 
The Lisbon Treaty follows the tradition of the European constitutionalism since 
the European constitutions contain only principles on the relationship between 
legislature and executive. However, much of the provisions, including those on 
procedural aspects of the political control, by their very nature can not be con-
tained in the constitutions or the treaties. 
Some other means of the political control have been prescribed too. For example, 
Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 
193 of the Treaty on the European Community) prescribes the establishment of 
the temporary committees of inquiry, on the request of one quarter of the mem-
bers of the Parliament. Article 230 (ex Article 197 of the TEC) contains provisions 
on the oral or written questions put to the Commission by the members of the 
Parliament. The provisions on the motion of censure are contained in the article 
234 (ex Article 101 of the TEC), as well as in the article 17 of the Treaty on the 
European Union. First, the article 234 prescribes that the European Parliament 
can not vote on the confidence before three days expire between the submitting 
the motion and the voting itself. Second, for the resignation of the Commission to 
happen, two-third majority of the votes cast, including the majority of the compo-
nent members of the Parliament is necessary. The Treaty also regulates what is go-
ing to happen in this case: the Commission will be obliged to resign, while it will 
continue to operate, dealing only with current tasks until the election of the new 
Commission. The Treaty also regulates that the term of office of the new members 
of the Commission shall expire on the date on which the term of office of the 
members of the Commission obliged to resign as a body would have expired.
It seems that the provisions in the treaties are relatively detailed, at least concern-
ing some of the means of the political control. This is the case with the provisions 
which regulate the vote of no confidence in the Commission, and, to lesser extent, 
with the provisions on the committees of inquiry. On the other hand, some of 
the instruments for the political control, such as the case with the parliamentary 
questions, have just been briefly regulated. These provisions have a constitutional 
character. Therefore, it is necessary for them to be included into the treaties or at 
least the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, which have a character of the constitu-
tion in material sense.  
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The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament are very important legal source 
of the political control of the Commission. In their Title V („Relations with other 
Bodies“), Article 119 is dedicated to the motion of censure on the Commission. 
However, it is only one of the aspects of the relationship between the Parliament and 
the Commission since the political control means much more than mere motion of 
censure. It is only the final proof that there is no political confidence of the Parlia-
ment regarding the Commission. Before it happens, there are some instruments and 
provisions which enable Parliament to control the work of the Commission. These 
instruments also have to be enacted by legal acts, such as the Rules of Procedure. 
Chapter 3 of the same title of the Rules is dedicated to the parliamentary questions, 
an institute which is well-known in the parliamentary systems. The Annex II of the 
Rules contains criteria for questions and interpellations for written answers. 
As it could be seen, the legal basis for the political control of the Parliament over 
the Commission is well developed. It includes the usual means of the control. 
Now, it is important to understand the content of these provisions, particularly 
since it is not possible to claim that the relationship between the institutions of the 
European Union is based on the principles of the parliamentary system, although 
there are some of its features.
3.   THE RIGHT ON INfORMATION AS A MEANS Of THE 
POLITICAL CONTROL
The right on information of the Parliament is the first degree of the political control.1 
First of all, the Parliament has to have the information on the work of the Commis-
sion in order to control it and formulate attitudes on its work. Second, the right on 
information of the Parliament can lead to the political control of the Commission 
directly or implicitly.2 Namely, any question of a MEP implicitly can have negative 
1  „Most studies of Pqs have tended to focus on the issue of accountability and control. A series of coun-
try specific studies indicate that Pqs are somewhat useful for holding the government to account.“ 
– Martin, S., Parliamentary Question, the Behaviour of Legislators, and the Function of Legislatures: An 
Introduction, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011, 259–270, p. 261; „Parliament had 
a number of powers described as ‘supervisory’ in the Treaty consisting of the right to question the 
Commission (orally or in writing), to debate its activities and, ultimately, to adopt a motion of censure 
on it.“ – Corbett, R., The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Intgeration, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke and New york, 2001, p. 124; „A parliamentary question is, by definition, a request for 
information. Regular questioning can by used by parliament to hold the government to account.“ – 
yamamoto, H., Tools for Parliamentary Oversight, A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments, 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 2007, p. 49.
2  Some authors argue that this is particularly important for the national opposition parties. – Proksch, 
S.-O., Slapin, J.B., Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union, European Journal of 
Political Research, 50/2010, 53–79, p. 54.
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political consequences for the Commission,3 and can be used as a trigger for further 
investigation of its policies although the question itself can not have so sharp negative 
political consequences such as the vote of no confidence.4 The parliamentary ques-
tions are particularly important for the national opposition parties, since it is one of 
few means which they have at their disposal for the control of the Commission, or, 
to be more precise, for the access to information. The parliamentary questions are 
even more important if we take into consideration another political factor – political 
groups which are active in the European Parliament. Namely, the parliamentary ques-
tions give the freedom to the MEPs to communicate with the Commission without 
previously getting explicit permission from their political group.
The Rules of Procedures differs between the questions for oral answers with de-
bate, and the questions for written answers.5 According to the Rule 128 of the 
Rules of Procedure, “questions may be put to the Council, the Commission or 
the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy by a committee, a political group or Members 
reaching at least the low threshold with a request that they be placed on the agenda 
of Parliament“. Comparative analysis show that it is usual for the parliamentary 
questions to be posed by any member of the parliament even when he/she doesn’t 
have support for such an activity from any other member of the parliament. It is 
quite natural since all members of the parliaments have the right to be informed 
about the activities of the executive, which is necessary prerequisite for successful 
fulfillment of their duties.
The questions have to be submitted in writing to the President. He/she will im-
mediately refer them to the Conference of Presidents,6 who will decide whether 
the question will be placed on the agenda of the Parliament. If this doesn’t happen 
during three months after the question has been submitted, it will lapse. It seems 
that the right to ask the question is limited, and that it depends to some extent on 
the will of the Conference of Presidents. However, it is important for the MEPs to 
have unlimited right to submit parliamentary questions. Maybe this could create 
3  „It is this instrument that gives MEPs and their parties the most direct access to oversight.“ 
– Ibid., p. 56.
4  The purpose of the parliamentary questions can be different, as we shall see later. Theoretically speak-
ing, the authors define 14 different purposes of the parliamentary questions. – Russo, F., Wiberg, M., 
Parliamentary Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps Toward Comparison, The Journal of 
Legislative Studies Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2010, 215–232, pp. 217–218. 
5  In practice, there are four times more written than oral questions. – Dann, Ph., Looking through the 
federal lens: The Semi-parliamentary Democracy of the EU, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/02, New 
york, 2002, p. 30.
6  It is composed of the presidents of the political groups in the Parliament.
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a situation that too many questions would be submitted which would influence 
the efficacy of the Parliament’s proceedings. However, it is “an accident” of the 
parliamentary systems which has to be accepted as something unavoidable. 
questions must be referred to the addressee at least a week before the sitting of the 
Parliament begins, in order for the Commission to have enough time to prepare its 
answer. The procedure can be ended with voting. As some authors point out, the 
voting on the parliamentary questions is possible in some parliaments. Therefore, it 
is not unusual that the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament prescribes the 
possibility of voting on the oral questions.7 If one takes into consideration the fact 
that the debate is also a part of the procedure, the conclusion is that this is relatively 
powerful means of control. It is interesting that small number of European parlia-
ment’s contain this possibility in the respective rules of procedure.8
The Rules of Procedure also contains the provisions on the question time. The 
MEPs have the chance to ask the Commissioners questions about particular hori-
zontal theme(s) which are decided by the Conference of Presidents one month 
before the session. The number of the Commissioners who are going to be pres-
ent at the session is limited to two, or three, and they are in charge of the themes 
which are at the agenda. The problem with the question time is threefold. First, 
the MEPs can’t ask all kind of questions since they are limited by the decision of 
the Conference of Presidents. This could be observed as negative solution since the 
leaders of the political groups in the Parliament still have the greatest influence 
in the process of questioning the Commission for they decide about the issues 
which the Commission can be questioned about. The limitation comes also from 
the fact that two or three Commissioners can’t be competent for answering all the 
questions. Of course, the reverse solution would be more in accordance with the 
principle of democratic control – all the Commissioners would attend the sessions 
of the Parliament and would be obliged to ask the questions posed to them. 
The national parliaments regulate the issue of the question time in different ways. 
In some countries, the MPs can ask the questions at any session of a parliament,9 
while in others, they can do it at the end of each month,10 or on particular days.11 
7  Here, the Rule 123 (2) to (8) shall be applied mutatis mutandis.
8  Russo, F., Wiberg, M., op. cit., note 3, p. 222.
9  See Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure of the Croatian Parliament; Article 258 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.
10  In Serbia, for example. – See: Petrov, V., Parlamentarno pravo (Parliamentary Law), Pravni fakultet 
Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2010, p. 154.
11  The members of the Bundestag can put questions to the Federal Government on Wednesdays in weeks 
of sittings (Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag, Annex 7, see also Annex 4 I (1)). 
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Another procedural aspect of the question time is quite usual: it is prescribed that 
a MEP has the right to ask the question, and to pose the additional question after 
the answer of a Commissioner, while the latter has the right to clarify his/her an-
swer, after a MEP asks his/her additional question.
The written questions are much more appropriate, since they enable MEPs to ask 
questions at any time, and to any Commissioner. The Article 130 of the Rules of 
Procedure prescribes that each MEP has the right to submit written question to 
the Commission. An MEP has the right to get the answer in written form. The 
question has to be submitted to the President of the Parliament who will decide 
on its permissibility. Each MEP has the right to submit up to 20 questions during 
the three months period. The answer has to be submitted for three or six weeks, 
depending on the character of the question (priority or non-priority question). In 
our opinion, this period is too long, and one could fear that the very submitting 
of the question could lose its purpose. This is particularly so if one takes into ac-
count the fact than in most national parliaments this length of time is consider-
ably shorter (from six days to a month).
As it could be seen, there are no spontaneous questions. In our opinion, they 
should be prescribed, since in that way the MEPs would get more efficient way to 
receive information and to control the Commission. Sometimes the MEPs need 
immediate information, or they want to immediately point out the issues which 
are in the competence of the Commission.12 It is true that written questions are 
principally more appropriate. They enable a Commissioner to give more detailed 
information, since he/she often can’t give detailed answer immediately. However, 
even in the case of spontaneous questions, it would be possible for a Commis-
sioner to give just a brief answer, with the duty to submit detailed written or oral 
answer in precisely defined time framework. 
There are two more instruments for information. These are minor interpellations 
for written answers (Rule 130a), and major interpellations for written answer with 
debate (Rule 130b). The first ones are based on the questions for written an-
swer, which can be submitted by a committee, a political group, or at least five 
per cent of the members of the European Parliament. Using these questions, the 
abovementioned subjects can submit to the Commission questions on concretely 
defined issues. The addressee has to submit answer for two weeks, although this 
deadline could be prolonged if necessary after the consultation of the President 
with those who have submitted the question. It has to be stressed that the role of 
12  We agree with the authors who claim that spontaneous questions ar useful for those members of parlia-
met who want to stress some failures of the government or of some of its members. – Russo, F., Wiberg, 
M., op. cit., note 3, p. 221.
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the President in the case of this kind of questions is limited since he/she only has 
the right to assess whether these questions are generally in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure. 
The major interpellations for written answer with debate means that the same sub-
jects as the abovementioned can submit the questions and that the debate on the 
answer is possible if requested by a committee, a political group, or at least five per 
cent of the component members of the Parliament. This kind of interpellation is 
similar to the interpellation which is known in the national parliaments. The dif-
ference is that the debate can’t have as its consequence the vote of no confidence. 
Namely, the Rules of Procedure prescribes the possibility that the discussion on 
the interpellation finishes with the adoption of a resolution, since the Rule 123 
can be used in this situation. However, the Rule 123 doesn’t mention the possibil-
ity of the vote of no confidence. 
It is a departure from the notion of parliamentarism, since the essence of the 
interpellation is not only that the members of a parliament get information but 
also to show their dissatisfaction with the government’s work. This dissatisfaction 
can have as its eventual consequence the vote of no confidence. First of all, the 
interpellation means getting information about a problem of general interest, not 
about a concrete issue. Second, the interpellation means the possibility to discuss 
about the issue. Third, it means the possibility to influence the actions of a govern-
ment directly.13
The parliamentary questions have been used extensively during past few decades.14 
The fact that parliamentary questions have been used more after the introduction 
of the direct elections of the Parliament,15 leads to the conclusion that the MEPs 
use them as a means of political control, as well as a means for promotion of their 
political attitudes. If the parliamentary questions have this important political role 
and nature, the procedural aspect of their utilization has to be clearly prescribed. It 
has been argued that the MEPs who belong to the national opposition parties use 
them more often than the MEPs of the ruling parties.16 It is quite understandable 
why it is the case. The members of national opposition parties don’t have many 
possibilities to get information about the work of the Commission, since they 
13  Sánchez de Dios, M., Wiberg, M., Questioning in European Parliaments, Journal of Legislative Studies, 
Vol. 17, No 3, 2011, 354–367, p. 355, 364.
14  For example, the number of written questions to the Commission rose from 1.647 in 179 to 5.327 in 
2006, while the number of oral questions rose from 42 in 1979 to 87 in 2006. – Simić, J., Evropski 
parlament akter u odlučivanju u Evropskoj uniji, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2010, pp. 145–146.
15  Corbett, R., op. cit. note 1, p. 124.
16  Proksch, S.-O., Slapin, J.B., op. cit. note 1, p. 54.
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don’t govern in their respective national states. Without information, these MEPs 
can’t participate in the work of the Parliament successfully. Therefore, parliamen-
tary questions are real means of the control, as some authors point out regarding 
their meaning in the national parliaments.17 The significance of the parliamentary 
questions, as a tool in the hand of the national opposition parties, is even bigger 
if one has in mind the way of the selection of the members of the Commission. 
They are proposed by the national governments, and then agreed by the Presi-
dent of the Commission.18 The MEPs practically don’t have an influence on their 
nomination. Therefore, it is very important for them to get a chance to submit 
questions to these Commissioners, since parliamentary questions can be the only 
means of control of the work of individual Commissioners, as well as of the entire 
Commission. 
It is also interesting to stress that the euro-skeptical MEPs use parliamentary ques-
tions more often than other MEPs.19 This, of course, doesn’t’ have anything with 
the procedures prescribed by the Rules of Procedure, since the right to submit 
parliamentary questions is equal for all MEPs. On the other side, it seems that the 
euro-skeptical MEPs use the parliamentary questions not only for the purpose of 
information or control but more as a means of promotion of their political posi-
tion. This doesn’t mean promotion their attitudes to the wide layers of citizens, 
but more in narrower circles of political elites. Namely, for the MEPs it is much 
harder to use the parliamentary questions as a means of their promotion in wider 
audience than it is the case for the national parliamentarians. Some questions have 
to be published, which is the case with the questions for written answer, which 
have to be published at the Internet page of the Parliament (Rule 130 (7)). It is the 
same with the minor interpellations for written answer (Rule 130a (2)), and major 
interpellations for written answer with debate (Rule 130b (5)). These rules have a 
positive role in a sense that they enable even ordinary citizens to be informed on 
particular issues in the competences of the Commission, as well as on the relation-
ship between the Parliament and the Commission. However, it can’t be expected 
that this would be really useful for the citizens since they will not find out more 
about the work of MEPs by simply following the Internet page of the Parliament. 
The MEPs’ actions depend mostly on their party affiliation and not on their na-
tionality. They act more as representatives of their political parties, and European 
17  Sánchez de Dios, M., Wiberg, M., op. cit. note 11, p. 359.
18  Hix, S., G. Noury, A., Roland, G., Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, Cambridge 2007, p. 
17.
19  Martin, S., op. cit. note 1, p. 261.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES480
political groups.20 This fact influences the character of the parliamentary questions 
as a tool for political control even more than they could be understood merely 
as a tool for getting information. Considering this fact, it is not surprising that 
the Commission decided to adopt new arrangements for handling with the ques-
tions.21 
4.  THE COMMITTEES ON INqUIRy
The European Parliament has the right to control various institutions through 
committees of inquiry.22 This power of scrutiny23 has been particularly impor-
tant after the signing of the Treaty of the European Union.24 The very Parliament 
considers the committees as exceptional instruments of political control.25 The 
committees can be set up in order „to investigate alleged contraventions or malad-
ministration in the implementation of Union law“ (Rule 198 (1) of the Rules of 
Procedure).26 First of all, this kind of activity can’t be limited to the relationship of 
the Parliament and the Commission, although it includes it. Second, these com-
mittees are ad hoc bodies, which can be established if required by one-fourth of 
MEPs. Third, they can’t be established for the discussion on the issues of general 
policy, but only about concrete issues, and only when there is a doubt on violation 
of the law. 
20  Hix, S., Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European 
Parliament, American Journal of Political Sciences,  Vol. 46, No. 3/2002, 688–698, p. 689.
21  „The Commission at the same time decided on new arrangements for handling parliamentary ques-
tions (faster answers and the attribution of authorship to responsible Commissioners, which had not 
been the case in the past) (...)“ – Corbett, R., op. cit. note 1, p. 83.
22  „While it set up commissions of inquiry between 1993 and 1999 to look into suspicions of maladmin-
istration and violation of community regulations (concerning the circulation of goods and the ‘mad 
cow’ epidemic), in 1999, in the face of suspicions of fraud, nepotism and maladministration involving 
members of the Santer Commission, the EP preferred to delegate its powers of review to a Committee 
of Independent Experts.“ – Pinelli, C., The Powers of the European Parliament in the New Constitutional 
Treaty, The International Spectator 3/2004, 83–96, p. 85.
23  „A parliamentary inquiry is the reflection of parliament’s constitutional role in overseeing the govern-
ment.“ – yamamoto, H., op. cit. note 1, p. 39.
24  Sobiech, A., The European Parliament and the European Commission: Institutional Changes, Tilburg 
Foreign L. Rev. Vol. 8, No. 281, 1999-2000, 281–296, pp. 292–293.
25  See Preamble of the Proposal for the Regulation of the European Parliament on the detailed provisions 
governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry and repealing Decision 95/167/
EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
26  „‘Contraventions’ in this sense mean violations of EU law, while ‘maladministration’ includes, inter 
alia, administrative irregularities, omissions, abuses of power, unfairness, malfunction or incompe-
tence, discrimination, avoidable delays, refusal to provide information, and negligence.“ – Poptcheva, 
E.-M., Parliament’s investigative powers, Committes of inquiry and special committees, European Parlia-
mentary Research Service, 2015, p. 2.
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The Parliament decides on the creation of a committee, on the proposal of the 
Conference of Presidents, after discussion on the reasons for its creation. In our 
opinion, this provision is not quite acceptable. First of all, a serious condition for 
the creation of a committee, namely relatively high number of MEPs who have 
to propose its creation, has been prescribed. This is a condition which most of 
the political groups in the Parliament can’t fulfill if they act alone since they don’t 
have strong enough caucus.27 Therefore, if the Parliament didn’t wish to allow to 
only one MEP to submit the motion for establishing of a committee,28 it could 
at least allow it to political groups. It could be understood that this condition 
has been prescribed in order to prevent baseless proposals for inquiry. However, 
such strictness could cause the opposite effect, namely inability of most MEPs 
to use this means of control. Second, the Parliament has the right to decide if a 
committee has to be created. It seems that this Parliament’s right would be justi-
fied if less number of MEPs would be given the right to propose the creation of 
a committee. In a situation when this right has to be exercised by relatively high 
number of MEPs, it is inappropriate that the Parliament has the right to decide 
on the initiative for creation of a committee, since parliamentary majority could 
use its dominance to prevent it. In some national legal systems, it is possible that a 
committee is created simply by the initiative of certain number of members of the 
parliament, without the approval of the parliament.29 It is a good solution, since 
it enables parliamentary minority to use the inquiry as a means of control. It is in 
the nature of the inquiry to become a means of protection against the executive 
which could practically become unaccountable. Therefore, the solution in the EU 
law is not appropriate. On the other hand, the good thing is that the Conference 
of Presidents can’t change the subject of the inquiry. If this could be the case, the 
27  At the moment, only two biggest political groups have sufficient number of MEPs to propose the crea-
tion of a committee. All other political groups have to find MEPs from other political groups in order 
to have enough MEPs who would have the right to make a proposal for the creation of a committee.
28  As it has been noted, in most countries even a single MP may submit a motion to set up of a commit-
tee. – yamamoto, H., op. cit. note 1, p. 41.
29  European national parliaments contain different provisions on this issue. For example, the Rules of 
Procedure of the French National Assembly prescribes in the Article 141 (1) that the establishment of 
a committee will be the result of the favourable vote in the Assembly. In Italy, according to Article 141 
of the Chamber of Deputies Rules of Procedure, the Chamber decides to carry out an inquiry. The 
same solution has been adopted in Austria. On the contrary, according to Article 44 of the Basic Law 
of Germany, the Bundestag shall have the duty to establish the committee of inquiry on the request of 
one quarter of its members. The Constitution of Latvia prescribes in its Article 26 that a committee 
of inquire will be set up on the request of at least one third of MPs. In Portugal, according to Article 
181 of the Constitution, „the parliamentary committees of enquiry are compulsorily set up whenever 
so requested by one-fifth of the members of the Assembly entitled to vote, up to the limit of one per 
member and per legislative session.“ In Slovenia, according to article 93 of the Constitution, the Na-
tional Assembly has to order parliamentary inquiry if it is required by one-third of the MPs.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES482
MEPs would not have any guarantee that their proposal would be adopted as they 
submitted it. 
The composition of the committee has to be decided by the Parliament, at the 
proposal of the Conference of Presidents, while its members have to belong to dif-
ferent political groups. This is quite natural solution, which has to be adopted in 
order to prevent possible misuse of this instrument of control.
Although the committees have the right to investigate, to call witnesses, to require 
documents, or to hold hearings, they can’t oblige the officials to appear before 
them in order to testify, since the officials can authorize subordinated officials to 
appear before the committee. The Commission (just like other institutions) has 
the right to refuse the cooperation with the committee on the ground of secrecy or 
security. These provisions, however, could be misused in order to prevent a com-
mittee from doing its job. If an official has the right not to appear before a com-
mittee, the importance of the committee inquiry decreases. On the other hand, 
the problem also lays in the fact that the Parliament doesn’t have at its disposal 
sanctions against those who refuse to cooperate with it. The importance of the 
inquiry could be understood if one moves from the legal to the political field. The 
absence of legal sanctions could be at least partly compensated with the political 
sanction, i.e. the threat of the Parliament that the Commission could be voted out 
of office in the case of refusal of cooperation.30 However, it is hard to believe that 
this kind of threat can have serious impact on the relationship between the Parlia-
ment and the Commission except in some controversial cases when doubts are so 
serious that the Commission could be faced with the vote of non-confidence. In 
“normal” situations, when there are no serious controversies, parliamentary in-
quiry hardly can have the removal of the Commission as its consequence.
Another problem could appear at the end of the procedure of investigation. 
Namely, a committee has to submit the report within 12 months, although this 
can be extended twice for the period of three months. The adoption of recom-
mendations to the Commission can be the final result of the inquiry. However, 
the Commission (or any other institution) is not legally binding to adopt these 
recommendations. 
The European Parliament adopted in 2012 new Proposal for the Regulation, 
which made some changes.31 In 2014, the Parliament adopted legislative resolu-
30  „In this sense, in 1997, the EP threatened the Commission with a motion of censure if it did not follow 
up on the recommendations of the BSE committee of inquiry in due time.“ – Poptcheva, E.-M., op. 
cit. note 22, p. 4.
31  Proposal for the Regulation of the European Parliament on the detailed provisions governing the exer-
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tion, on which discussion had to be continued with the Council and the Com-
mission. The latter expressed fears that the regulation would introduce too strong 
legal instrument in the hands of the Parliament for control of the Commission’s 
activities. According to the regulation, the committee of inquiry can: hear mem-
bers of Union institutions or members of governments of the Member States; 
obtain evidence from officials or other servants; request experts’ reports; request 
documents; etc. (Article 12 (1)). The committee has the right to get any document 
which it requests if it finds that this is necessary for the investigation. The commit-
tee also has the right to request from any person who is a resident of the Union to 
participate in a hearing before it (Article 15 (1)). If there is a committee’s request, 
the Commission shall designate one or more of its members to appear before a 
committee and testify. So, if there is a committee’s request, the Commission can’t 
refuse to cooperate with it. 
5.  VOTE Of NO CONfIDENCE
The power of the European Parliament to vote no confidence in the Commission 
is its final and the most important means of political control. It has been intro-
duced by the Treaty of Rome (1958),32 and has been strengthened since then. The 
procedure of vote no confidence has to be analyzed in the connection with the 
procedure for the Commission’s election. The procedure is such that the Council, 
acting by qualified majority,33 nominates the president of the Commission, and 
then he/she presents his/her program to the Parliament. After that, the discussion 
begins. The Council participates in the discussion as it has made this nomination. 
The Parliament confirms the President of the Commission by the majority votes 
of all MEPs. The elected President of the Commission and the Council have to 
agree on the other members of the Commission. The list of candidates for the post 
of Commissioners shall be made after the consultation with the Member States. 
The nominated members of the Commission are then subjected to hearings, after 
which the Parliament will elect them as a body. After that, the Council shall ap-
prove the Commission. 
According to Article 234 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
the Parliament has the right to vote no confidence in the Commission. The Parlia-
ment can vote on the motion of censure at least three days after it was submitted. 
cise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry and repealing Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
32  Article 144. Also, according to the article 206 B of the same treaty, the Parliament can decide on the 
budgetary responsibilty of the Commission, on the recommendation of the Council, adopted by the 
qualified majority.
33  See Article 17 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union.
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The debate on the motion can start at least 24 hours after the MEPs have been 
informed that it had been submitted. The vote on the motion can be undertaken 
at least 48 hours after the debate started. These provisions seem quite logical. The 
MEPs need some time to prepare for discussion, to discuss about the motion, and 
to examine its reasonableness. Since the motion shall be forwarded to the Com-
mission, it needs time to prepare its defense, and to try to convince the Parliament 
not to vote in favor of the motion. 
The decision on motion has to be made by the two-thirds majority of the votes 
cast, which includes votes of the majority of all members of the Parliament. The 
Commission will be obliged to resign, but will continue to deal with everyday 
business until the new Commission is elected. Although known, it is quite unusu-
al solution for the government to be voted out of office by two-thirds majority.34 
Since it is very hard to achieve this majority,35 the Commission can be sure that 
it would be hardly possible for the Parliament to use this means of control.36 The 
provision, according to which the vote of no confidence would lead to the Com-
mission’s resignation if the absolute majority of MEPs vote it, would be better 
solution. The vote of no confidence would be a realistic possibility in the case of 
the conflict between the Parliament and the Commission. One could understand 
why different majorities in the Parliament have been prescribed for the election 
and the removal of the Commission. The election by absolute majority has been 
prescribed in order to facilitate the election of the Commission. On the other 
hand, the two-thirds majority for its removal has been prescribed in order to pre-
vent too often initiatives for removal, even when there is no objective chance or 
reason for the removal. However, such a strict condition for the removal doesn’t 
seem justified although it contributes to the stability of the Commission. Namely, 
the Commission doesn’t have to be so stable that it is practically impossible for the 
Parliament to remove it. 
The Rules of Procedure of the Parliament contains more detailed provisions on 
the vote of no confidence. According to Rule 119, one tenth of the MEPs may 
34  It seems that it is the case in 10 per cent or even less number of parliaments. – See: yamamoto, H., op. 
cit. note 1, p. 67.
35  „In practice, this means a large coalition must be in favour of sacking the Commission, and since 
the Commission is an oversized coalition in the first place, putting together a two-thirds coalition to 
remove the Commission is very difficult.“ – Hix, S., G. Noury, A., Roland, G., op. cit. note 17, pp. 
183–184. 
36  This is one of the reasons why the threat of vote of no confidence has been described as a practically 
useless „nuclear bomb“. – See: Dann, Ph., op. cit., note 5, p. 24. Some authors argue that this right of 
the Parliament is similar to the right of the US Congress to recall the President than on the right of the 
European parliaments to depose the government. – Hiks, S., Politički sistem Evropske unije, Službeni 
glasnik, Beograd, 2007, p. 74.
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submit the motion of censure. But, if a motion has been voted on in preceding 
two months, a new one may be submitted by one-fifth of the MEPs. It seems 
that these conditions are not too strict, which is positive since the one-tenth is a 
reasonable and relatively easy to achieve number of MEPs who have the right to 
submit the motion. One could argue that this condition is too easy to achieve, 
which could be misused by small political groups, or even groups of individual 
MEPs who just want to promote themselves instead to do serious parliamentary 
work.37 This could be possible but it doesn’t mean that conditions for submission 
of motions have to be more rigorous. Namely, even if motions are submitted for 
strictly political or propaganda purposes, which don’t have direct causes in the 
Commission’s policies, the discussion which follows the motion could be useful in 
the sense that it could reveal weaknesses of the Commission’s political positions. 
Second, if the conditions for the submission of motions would be more rigorous, 
it could prevent MEPs to submit the motions even when they don’t have purely 
propaganda reasons for the submission. It also has to be stressed that the MEPs 
usually claim that the Commission lacks the competence in a sphere of its action 
which means that strictly political arguments for the censure don’t prevail,38 which 
is quite different than in the national parliaments.
The Commission is responsible to the Parliament as a body. The EU law recog-
nizes only the collective responsibility of the government.39 The individual respon-
sibility of the Commissioners has not been prescribed in any treaty. Individual 
responsibility of ministers is one of the features of most parliamentary systems. 
Although there are some systems where only collective responsibility is known, it 
is not in the nature of the very parliamentary system.40 One could argue that the 
European Union doesn’t have the parliamentary system of government. Neverthe-
less, it is based on the principle of separation of powers, and of the principle of 
37  „The censure may also be used in another political perspective, which is closer to what the French 
political scientist Georges Lavau called the ‘tribunitian function’ of the opposition. As the Rules of 
Procedure of the EP allow one tenth of its members to present a censure motion, minor groups, op-
posed to the Commission in general, or even to European integration in itself, have sometimes used 
this institution to make their protesting voice heard. This was the case with two motions tabled by an 
extreme-right wing French MEP in 1990 and 1991.” – Magnette, P., Appointing and Censuring the Eu-
ropean Commission : The: Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community Context, European 
Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2001, pp. 292–310.
38  Ibid. Some authors stress that there is no firm conception of the nature of the responsibility of the 
Commission to the Parliament, namely whether it is political responsibility or responsibilty for con-
ductiong the administrative affairs. – Simić, J., op. cit., note 14, p. 140.
39  Kohler, M., European Governance and the European Parliament: From Talking Shop to Legislative Power-
house, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2014, 600–615, p. 606.
40  According to yamamoto, in 53 out of 88 analyzed parliaments, individual responsibility exists. – 
yamamoto, H., op. cit. note 1, p. 68.
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the political responsibility of the Commission to the Parliament, which is known 
in both systems of government based on the separation of powers with the gov-
ernment as one of the executive powers (parliamentary and semi-parliamentary 
systems). It is in the nature of the principle of political responsibility that both 
collective and individual responsibility are prescribed. If there is no individual 
responsibility, the parliament’s power to control executive is limited in the case 
that the government is decisive in the decision to protect its member who is under 
critics of the parliament. 
What has been said before doesn’t mean that there is no individual responsibil-
ity of Commissioners at all. According to the Treaty of Nice (amendment to the 
Article 217 of the EC Treaty), members of the Commission will have to resign on 
the President’s request, if he/she has obtained the Commission’s approval.41 This 
can be understood as an indirect tool of political control of the Parliament and 
of individual responsibility.42 Whether the President will request the resignation 
depends on two factors. First, it depends on the relationship of forces of political 
groups in the Parliament, since the President has to estimate whether the Com-
missioner in question can count on the support of the Parliament, and whether 
the Parliament’s attitude would change if the President would refuse to ask for the 
Commissioner’s resignation. Second, it depends on the reasons for the Commis-
sioner’s resignation. 
6.  CONCLUSION
Procedural aspect of the political control is very important for the regulation of 
the relationship between the Parliament and the Commission. It has important 
political consequences. Legal regulation, established by different treaties as well as 
the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, depends on the political conception of the 
relationship between legislative and executive powers in the European Union. On 
the other side, the same legal regulation also influences the functioning of the Par-
liament and the Commission. Therefore, procedural aspect of the political control 
is legal as well as political in its nature. 
The Member States are parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies. Their 
constitutional systems are, at least formally, based on the principle of the sep-
aration of powers. Therefore, the relationship between the Parliament and the 
Commission has to be based on the same principle. However, the nature of the 
41  Fairhurst, J., Law of the European Union, Pearson Longman, Essex, 2006, p. 88.
42  For example, the Parliament can threat to the President of the Commission that it will vote no confi-
dence in the Commission if he doesn’t remove a Commissioner.
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European Union is different from the nature of the Member States. Therefore, 
the relationship between its legislative and executive can’t be the same as the re-
lationship between the legislative and the executive in the parliamentary or semi-
presidential democracies. This is the reason why one can’t be surprised by the fact 
that there are some inconsistencies in the regulation of relationship between the 
Parliament and the Commission. However, the specific nature of the European 
Union can’t be justification for the absence of some means of political control, or 
for inadequate regulation of these means. For example, the right of the Parliament 
to vote no confidence in the Commission is so limited that it doesn’t have much 
practical importance. Procedural provisions are very strict, although they are such 
for political reasons. Procedure and politics are intertwined.
Indeed, some elements of the systems based on the separation of powers are miss-
ing. For example, the Commission can’t threat the Parliament that it is going to 
dissolve it. Therefore, one could argue that it is justified to enact strict provisions 
for the Commission’s removal. The equilibrium must exist. If the Commission 
can’t influence the Parliament’s existence, the Parliament shouldn’t influence the 
Commission’s influence, or it could do it under strict conditions. We don’t think 
that this is good argumentation since it justifies that the means of the Parliament’s 
political control over the Commission has almost entirely formal character with-
out real political significance. 
The procedural provisions have to be changed in many ways in order to strengthen 
the Parliament’s influence over the Commission, particularly considering the vote 
of no confidence as a means of control. This would inevitably mean strengthening 
the already existing elements of the parliamentary system in the European Union’s 
political system. Whether it is possible or not is a political issue.
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ABSTRACT
The article will discuss the main features of different procedural rules on EU State Aid law. 
The monitoring system of state aid control is based on ex ante verification pursuant to Article 
108(3) TFEU. Since the European Commission has a central role, special emphasis will be on 
four different types of procedures: the procedure regarding notified aid, the procedure regarding 
unlawful aid, the misused aid procedure and the existing aid procedure. 
Key words: State Aid, European Union, European Commission, Procedural Regulation 
1. INTRODUCTION1
State aid generally distorts competition. Granting aid to individual undertakings 
affects allocation of resources, which can have adverse consequences on investment 
and development in the end. State aid can also influence the market production-
wise and disturb the balance among competitors.2
Favouring domestic service providers can trigger the application of State aid rules. 
In EU law, any aid, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favour-
ing certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, is prohibited, as far 
as it affects trade between Member States. Even though State aid is prohibited in 
general, in some cases it may be found compatible with the internal market, if it 
promotes legitimate goals and satisfies the principle of proportionality. 
In order to be characterised as aid, an advantage granted to the recipient has to be 
of economic nature and such that it could not be realised under normal market 
conditions. Measure must imply actual or potential use of public resources, and 
be selective, i.e. directed specifically at certain undertaking or type of goods. The 
1  This paper has been supported in part by Croatian Science Foundation under the project “Flexicurity 
and New Forms of Employment (Challenges regarding Modernization of Croatian Labour Law (UIP-
2014-09-9377) “and in part by the University of Rijeka project No. 13.08.1.2.03 “Social security and 
market competition“. 
2  Hancher, L., Sauter, W., EU Competition and Internal Market in the Health Care Sector, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 262.
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last condition, which needs to be determined, is whether the measure distorts 
competition or affects trade between Member States. In principle, prohibition of 
State aid is usually concentrated on distortion of trade between Member States. It 
is interesting that under the existing case law, it is not necessary to prove that the 
granted aid actually caused distortion or disturbed the position of consumers. The 
most important thing is to show that the position of undertaking has been rein-
forced in any manner whatsoever, which would otherwise not have been possible. 
The mere possibility suffices. Increasing number of proponents insist, however, 
that the accent should be placed on stronger analysis of the impact on restriction 
of competition.3
Basic principles are found in Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU4, as well as abun-
dance of case law. Article 107 TFEU structurally consists of three parts. The first 
paragraph provides a general definition of aid contrary to internal market; the 
second paragraph enumerates so-called automatic exemptions, whereas the third 
paragraph prescribes certain categories of aid that can be declared compatible with 
the internal market. Therefore, any aid that distorts or threatens to distort compe-
tition by favouring certain undertakings or production of certain goods is prohib-
ited, as far as it affects trade between Member States. However, certain situations 
are considered acceptable.5
There are two possibilities to justify aid that has been found incompatible with 
the internal market. Prohibition from Article 107 TFEU is never absolute or un-
conditional. Exceptions are contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said Article. 
Paragraph 2 enumerates type of aid, which will always be exempted. This provi-
sion is of minor importance, given its limited scope. Paragraph 3, on the other 
hand, is more interesting, because it describes situations in which the Commission 
is entitled to authorise certain type of aid. As always, all exceptions are interpreted 
very strictly.   
3  Bacon, K., European Union Law of State Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 13.
4  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47.
5   Article 107(2) TFEU enumerates examples of aid that are always deemed compatible with the internal 
market. These include: a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that 
such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; (b) aid to 
make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; (c) aid granted to the 
economy of certain areas if the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in 
so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused buy that 
division.  
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Pursuant to Article 107(3) TFEU6, Commission has been granted wide powers to 
exempt a certain aid. A significant number of block regulations in this segment 
facilitates Commission’s job. When a certain aid is not covered by regulation, 
Commission may grant the exception by referring to guidelines and instructions. 
In other words, a general prohibition of aid is complemented by the provisions of 
Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU, which give the Commission a certain amount of 
flexibility.  
6  Article 107(3) (a) TFEU refers to aid to promote economic development of areas where the standard 
of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment. It is interpreted jointly with 
subparagraph (c) of the same provision, which points out that aid to facilitate the development of cer-
tain economic activities or of certain economic areas may be considered compatible with the internal 
market. These provisions are the base for granting regional aid. Although subparagraph (a) does not 
mention EU interests, case law determines that the Commission must always be guided by the Union’s 
interest when granting certain exceptions. Claiming that the measure has positive impacts on a certain 
region is not sufficient; what matters is the impact on trade between Member States. Therefore, even 
though aid falls under the category of aid described under paragraph 3, the Commission has the final 
say. This subparagraph may be linked to subparagraph (c), but the main difference lies in the criterion 
of “underdevelopment”. Comparison under subparagraph (a) is made taking into account the entire 
Union, whereas under subparagraph (c) comparison is made in relation to the national average. Such 
aid should be granted in the manner which develops less advantaged regions and which supports in-
vestments and creation of new jobs. Scope of this subparagraph is very limited and specific, because the 
Commission is the one that evaluates problems existing in certain regions. It is therefore not surprising 
that this provision has rarely been applied. 
  Subparagraph b) contains exceptions for aid to promote execution of an important project of common 
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In order to 
assist recipients and providers of aid, the Commission has developed additional criteria to help by its 
assessment. The economic crisis in recent years heated up debates about potential aid to resolve serious 
disturbances in the economy of a Member State. In order to satisfy this criterion, disturbance must 
affect the entire national economy. It is said that this provision has blossomed after great economic 
turmoil in some Member States.
  Pursuant to subparagraph (c), the Commission is entitled to grant aid to facilitate development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trad-
ing conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. It captures a wider spectrum of aid than 
subparagraph (a). This exception is also the one which is most commonly used. All sector and regional 
aid falls under this provision. The Commission’s policy is more directed at granting horizontal aid used 
in certain activities or areas. In one of its judgments, the Court of Justice determined that all decisions 
in which the Commission adopts regional aid charts for each Member State should be interpreted so 
as to represent the integral part of Guidelines on regional State aid, and are considered binding only if 
accepted by Member States.
  When it comes to granting aid to promote culture and heritage conservation (Article 107(3) (d) 
TFEU), it is important to highlight that the concept of culture is also interpreted narrowly. The com-
mercial factor must not be neglected, because it can be a decisive element. Although sport is relatively 
closely linked to the notion of culture, is sometimes difficult to determine whether it falls under this 
exception. Heritage conservation is, in principle, covered by this subparagraph. Cultural activities are 
therefore subject to Commission’s control. In other words, culture enjoys no special status when it 
comes to State aid. 
Monika Milošević, Ana Knežević Bojović: TRIAL WITHIN REASONABLE TIME IN EU ACQUIS... 493
Economic and social aspects are investigated. Arguments for and against the aid 
are put in balance. There are several questions, which the Commission always 
seeks to clarify.7 In the end, it all boils down to compliance with the principles of 
necessity and proportionality.8
According to Article 108 TFEU, the Commission shall in close cooperation with 
Member States, control all systems of existing aid schemes. If there is a necessity, 
it shall propose any appropriate measure required for effective functioning of the 
internal market. Commission will issue notices to the Member States to submit 
their comments. If the Commission still finds out that the aid is not compatible 
with the internal market or it is being misused, it shall decide that the State con-
cerned abolishes or alters aid within certain period. In case of no compliance with 
the Commission’s decision, the Commission or any other interested state may 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Besides the Commission’s central role, the Council has certain powers in excep-
tional circumstances. It can act on the application by the Member State. In those 
cases, if the case has already been initiated by the Commission the application has 
an effect of suspending the procedure before the Commission, until the Council 
has made its attitude known. It may unanimously decide that the aid is compat-
ible with the internal market. The Council has three months to give its opinion. If 
it does not act in the prescribed time, the Commission can proceed with its deci-
sion (Article 108 (2) TFEU).
The Commission has to be informed of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it con-
siders that the intended plan is not compatible with the internal market, it shall 
initiate the formal procedure. Member States have to await for the Commission’s 
final decision before they can put the measure into effect (Article 108(3) TFEU). 
The Commission has a power to adopt decisions addressed to Member States in 
which it permits or prohibits aid and which are subject to review by the General 
Court in the first instance and the Court of Justice on appeal.
Article 109 TFEU gives the possibility to the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, to enact regulations 
for the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and to determine the condi-
tions in which Article 108(3) shall apply and the categories of aid exempted from 
this procedure.
7  See State aid action plan - Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005-2009 
(Consultation document) {SEC (2005) 795}, COM/2005/0107 final.
8  See Pošćić, A; Gliaiuti di StatonellaRepubllica di Croazia, in: Cosio, R., Sgroi A., Smokvina, V. 
(eds.),Italia – Croazia, ordinamenti a confronto,G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2015, pp. 57-79.
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The state aid system is based on the ex ante control. The Member States have to 
notify the Commission with plans to grant new aid or alter existing aid. However, 
the Commission has investigative powers and can act upon the complaint of any 
interested party or on its own initiative. Before it has been discussed, that in prin-
ciple the Commission has a central role in the monitoring system except the situ-
ation concerning the Council. Another important feature not to be disregarded 
is that the administrative procedure is a procedure between the Commission and 
the Member State responsible for granting aid. The interested parties enjoy very 
limited procedural rights.9
Although the main features of the state aid control are contained in the Article 
108 TFEU, there was a necessity for the regulation of procedure in details. The 
first Procedural legislation was No. 659/9910 that codified the Commission’s prac-
tice and existed case law. The Regulation has been amended several times. In order 
to simplify and rationalize, the Regulation has been codified in 2015.11In the next 
chapters, the main features of four different types of procedures depending on the 
type of the aid in question will be scrutinised.
2. PROCEDURE REGARDING NOTIfIED AID
The new aid and the modified aid must be brought to the Commission’s attention. 
The Commission has two possibilities: either to approve the measure on the basis 
to the simplified procedure or to apply a normal preliminary review procedure. If 
there are doubts with the compatibility of the aid with the internal market, Com-
mission will open formal investigative procedure.
There are exemptions of the notification duty: aid covered by a Block Exemption 
Regulations ,de minimis aid not exceeding €200,000 per undertaking over any 
period of 3 fiscal years or aid granted under an aid scheme already approved by 
the Commission. 
The aid must be reported in a “sufficient time”. In other words, it must be notified 
in the draft stage in order to have time and possibility to change the draft after the 
Commission’s observations. Usually the Member State requests for the informal 
9  Mazzocchi, F., The Procedure before the Commission, in: Santa Maria, A. (ed.), Competition and State 
Aid, An Analysis of the EU Practice, second edition, Wouters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2015, p. 
109.
10  Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [1999] OJ L 83/1. It was 
amended several times (in 2006 and two times in 2013).
11  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2015] OJ L 248/9.
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opinion even before the notification.12 The Member State must provide all the 
necessary information in order to enable the Commission to take a decision. The 
Member States are not allowed to put the measures into effect until the final deci-
sion. It derives from the Article 108(3) TFEU. The standstill obligation applies 
until the Commission adopts the final decision (the “positive” decision, the “no 
aid” decision or the “negative” decision).13
After receiving the complete notification from the Member State, the Commis-
sion has three possibilities. If the Commission, after the preliminary examination, 
finds that the notified measure is not state aid, it shall issue a decision. Secondly, if 
after a preliminary examination it finds that no doubts are raised as to the compat-
ibility with the internal market of a notified measure, it shall decide that the mea-
sure is compatible with the internal market (“decision not to raise objections”). 
The decision shall specify which exception under the TFEU has been applied. 
The last possibility is to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU 
(“decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure”).The last one concerns 
the situation where the Commission has doubts about the compatibility of the 
notified measure with the internal market. 
All decisions have to be issued in the period of two months. Where the Commis-
sion has not taken a decision in the period of two months the aid shall be deemed 
to have been authorized. The Member State concerned may implement the mea-
sures in question after giving the Commission prior notice. The Commission has 
the last possibility to issue a decision in the period of 15 working days (Article 4 
of the Regulation). This form of silent consent was implemented in the Regulation 
after the case Lorenz to protect the state interests.14
It has to be mentioned that even after the positive decision or after the decision 
that the measure does not constitute aid, the Commission has the power to revoke 
it, if it was based on imprecise information (Article 11 of the Regulation).15
Before going into the analysis of the formal investigation procedure, it has to be 
emphasized that in the 2009 Commission published the Notice on a simplified 
procedure for treatment of certain types of aid.16. The idea is to examine, in shorter 
time, certain types of state measures which only require the Commission to verify 
12  Mazzocchi, op. cit. note 9, p. 113.
13  Ibid. p. 115.
14  Case 120-73 Gebrüder Lorenz GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany et Land de Rhénanie-Palatinat 
[1973] ECR-01471, Mazzocchi, op. cit. note 9, p. 116. 
15  Ibid.p. 117.
16  Commission Notice on a Simplified procedure for the treatment of certain types of State aid, [2009] 
OJ C136/3
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that the aid is in the accordance with the existing rules and practice. The categories 
of aid on which the simplified procedure applies are elaborated in the Notice in 
detail. Those categories include aid measures falling within the “standard assess-
ment” sections of existing frameworks or guidelines, measures corresponding to 
well established Commission decision-making practice and situations that contain 
prolongation or extension of existing schemes. If the criteria for the simplified 
procedure are fulfilled, the Commission will issue a short-form decision. 
2.1.  The formal Investigation Procedure
If the Commission has still doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the 
internal market, it can initiate the formal investigation procedure. It shall sum-
marise the relevant case law issues with a preliminary assessment of the aid char-
acter of the proposed measure (Article 6 of the Regulation). The Member States 
and the interested parties17 have a period of one month to submit comments that 
can be exceeded if justified. The Commission opens the formal investigation pro-
cedure only if it has serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the 
internal market. One element that surely indicates “serious doubts” is a duration 
of the preliminary procedure.18The comments received shall be submitted to the 
Member State concerned. The Member State concerned may reply to the com-
ments submitted within a prescribed period, which shall normally not exceed one 
month. In some exceptional circumstances, the period can be extended (Article 6 
of the Regulation). The Commission shall, as far as possible, endeavour to adopt 
a decision within a period of 18 months from the opening of the procedure. This 
time limit may be extended by common agreement between the Commission 
17  It is interesting to note that any interested party may submit comments following a Commission de-
cision to initiate the formal investigation procedure. Also interested party may submit a complaint to 
inform the Commission of any alleged unlawful aid or any alleged misuse of aid. The interested party 
shall complete a form with the mandatory information requested therein.
  Where the Commission considers that the interested party does not comply with the compulsory 
complaint form, or that the facts and points of law put forward by the interested party do not provide 
sufficient grounds to show, on the basis of a prima facie examination, the existence of unlawful aid or 
misuse of aid, it shall inform the interested party thereof and call upon it to submit comments within a 
prescribed period which shall not normally exceed 1 month. If the interested party fails to make known 
its views within the prescribed period, the complaint shall be deemed to have been withdrawn (Article 
24 of the Regulation) According to the doctrine, there are certain doubts regarding the position of 
the interesting party. The discipline of sending complaints has been changed after the Regulation No. 
734/2013 (Council Regulation (EU) No734/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, [2013] OJ L 
204/15) because there were divergence of views between the Commission and the courts.See Mazzoc-
chi, op. cit. note 9, pp. 123,124.
18  See Mazzocchi, op. cit. note 9, p. 120 and Case T-73/98, Prayon-Rupel
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and the Member State concerned. The procedure of reviewing the state aid is an 
adversary procedure.19
In particularly complex cases, the Commission may request any other Member 
State, an undertaking or an association of undertakings to provide all market in-
formation necessary to enable the Commission to complete final assessment. It 
should be again noted that the interested parties do not have the same rights as the 
Member States.20In addition, the person receiving aid is not in a special position 
because the proceeding is not against the addressee of the aid.21
The Commission will close the formal investigation procedure by a decision. There 
are a few scenarios. The first one is a situation where the Commission finds that, 
after the modification by the Member State concerned; the notified measure does 
not constitute aid. The second one refers to the context where the Commission 
finds that, after the modification by the Member State concerned, the doubts as to 
the compatibility of the notified measure with the internal market have been re-
moved and shall decide that the aid is compatible with the internal market (“posi-
tive decision”). The Commission may attach to a positive decision conditions and 
may lay down obligations to allow compliance with the decision (“conditional 
decision”). The last one concerns the situation where the Commission finds that 
the notified aid is not compatible with the internal market (“negative decision”) 
(Article 9 of the Regulation).
As stated above, the Commission may revoke the previous decision, only in situa-
tions where it was based on incorrect information that was a decisive factor for the 
decision. In these situations, the Commission will open the formal investigation 
procedure. Article 11 of the Regulation speaks only of a revocation of positive, 
conditional or no aid decision. Nevertheless, the case law established that the re-
vocation is not restricted only to the last circumstances.22
3.  PROCEDURE REGARDING UNLAWfUL AID
The unlawful aid is not the same as incompatible aid. The possible situations en-
compassing unlawul aid include aid that has not been notified and has been put 
into effect before the Commission’s authorisation, the aid that has been notified 
19  Ibid. p. 122.
20  More details on the request for information made to other sources can be found in Article 7 of the 
Regulation.
21  Mazzocchi, op. cit. note 9, p. 123.
22  See Case T-25/04 González y Díez, SA v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
II-03121
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but put into effect before the authorisation and aid that has been given in breach 
of the authorisation terms. The simplified procedure is not applicable.
In general, the procedure is the same as for the notified aid. There are some par-
ticularities. The Commission is vested with the power to examine any information 
regarding alleged unlawful aid from whatever source. Usually the competitor is the 
one to give the information.23 Here the Commission acts after a complaint or on 
its own initiative. Over the years there were certain doubts and misunderstand-
ing of the Commission position in this situation. The Courts and the Commis-
sion were struggling with the unconditional nature of the obligation to start the 
procedure after receiving the complaint. Regulation 734/2013 introduced certain 
conditions to be fulfilled in order to confer the Commission a power to start a 
preliminary examination. The interested party must submit the complaints in a 
particular form. 
The Commission has a power to issue injunctions. There are three types of po-
tential injunctions. After the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, 
the Commission may request information from any other Member State, from 
an undertaking, or association of undertakings. Where, despite a reminder, the 
Member State concerned does not provide the information requested within the 
period prescribed by the Commission, or where it provides incomplete informa-
tion, the Commission shall by decision require the information (“information 
injunction”). Those are interlocutory decisions. Another option is that the Com-
mission, after giving the Member State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
comments, adopts a decision requiring the Member State to suspend any unlaw-
ful aid until the Commission has taken a decision on the compatibility of the aid 
with the internal market (“suspension injunction”). Those injunctions have been 
rarely used in practice. The injunctions may only be effective in situation where 
the Member State has not entirely paid or the state aid is expected to be to be paid 
in instalments.24 The last possibility is to issue the so called “recovery injunctions”. 
The Commission can adopt a decision requiring the Member State to recover any 
unlawful aid provisionally, until the Commission decides on the compatibility of 
the aid with the internal market. Three criteria have to be fulfilled: there are no 
doubts about the aid character of the measure concerned, there is urgency to act 
and most importantly there is a serious risk of the substantial and irreparable dam-
age to the competitor. (Article 13 of the Regulation).
23  Mazzocchi, op. cit. note 9, p. 129.
24  Ibid.note 7, p. 134.
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If the Member State fails to comply with a suspension injunction or a recovery 
injunction, the Commission shall be entitled, while carrying out the examination 
on the substance of the matter on the basis of the information available, to refer 
the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union directly. It shall apply for 
a declaration that the failure to comply constitutes an infringement of the TFEU 
(Article 14 of the Regulation).
In case of negative decisions, the Commission shall decide that the Member State 
shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary (“recovery 
decision”) unless it is contrary to the general principles of EU law or the limita-
tion period of 10 years has expired.25The aid to be recovered pursuant to a recovery 
decision shall include interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the Commission.
4. PROCEDURE REGARDING MISUSED AND EXISTING AID
Procedure regarding misused aid refers to the aid used in violation of the Commis-
sion decision. The Commission is obliged to open the formal investigation pro-
cedure and can order the recovery of the misused aid at the end of the procedure. 
The procedure applicable to unlawful aid is used. 
According to the Regulation, the existing aid may cover the aid that existed prior 
the entry into force of the Treaty in certain Member States and is still applicable 
after the entry into force of the Treaty; aid schemes and individual aid which have 
been authorised by the Commission or by the Council; aid which is deemed to 
have been authorised; aid for which the ten year period has been expired (these is 
the only exception of the rule that the unlawful aid may not be considered to be 
existing aid), aid which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be estab-
lished that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and sub-
sequently became an aid due to the evolution of the common market and without 
having been altered by the Member State. The existing aid is not notified but is 
under the constant review by the Commission. 
If the Commission, after reviewing the information obtained by the Member 
States, concludes that the existing aid scheme is not, or is no longer, compatible 
with the internal market, it shall issue a recommendation proposing appropriate 
measures to the Member State concerned. If the Member State accepts the pro-
posed measures, it is bound to implement them. In case of no acceptance, if the 
Commission after having taken into account the arguments of the Member State 
25  On limitation periods forthe recovery of aid see Article 17 of the Regulation and Papi Rossi, A., 
Recovery of Unlawful and Incompatible Aid, in: Santa Maria, A. (ed.), Competition and State Aid, An 
Analysis of the EU Practice, second edition, Wouters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2015, pp.141-177.
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concerned still considers that those measures are necessary, it shall initiate the for-
mal investigation procedure. The procedure is the same as for the new notified aid 
except for the standstill clause. 
5.  CONCLUSION
There is a division of competences between the Commission and national courts. 
The Commission has a central role in determination whether the aid is compatible 
with the internal market. It is also the main policymaker. The Commission ap-
plies four different types of procedures: the procedure regarding notified aid, the 
procedure regarding unlawful aid, the misused aid procedure and the existing aid 
procedure. The national courts play an important role in safeguarding the stand 
still clause and in the case of enforcement of Commission’s decisions.
Consolidated text of the Regulation serves as a tool for better understanding of the 
rules, their simplification and achieving uniformity in their application. Since the 
development of the internal market is a continuous process, clear and appropriate 
measures are required. It is also of vital importance to maintain the fundamental 
principles of EU law, such as equal treatment, legitimate expectations and propor-
tionality. 
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ABSTRACT
The public health system is a public service that aims to improve the quality of life of the 
citizens. Therefore, this kind of public service is crucial for normal functioning of any state 
system, alongside education and the other social services. In the context of the purpose behind 
this research and the context of the focus of the paper under the term `health services` will be 
used to describe the primary, secondary and tertiary health protection, which means that the 
dental health protection and the pharmacy services will be out of the scope of this research. The 
analysis showed that the health services are categorically connected with the position, the orga-
nization, the management and funding of the health system (the legislation, the government 
bodies, the executives, the health institutions, the health services, human resources, citizens, 
IT service and other technical segments). This means that the influence of the socioeconomic 
development of the state reflects, directly, at the public health system.
The EU integration process of the Republic of Macedonia has showed that the existing health 
system was needed to be reconstructed (legally and institutionally) so it could be competitive, 
efficient and effective. During these decades, having in mind, the EU recommendations the 
national health policy framework was rapidly changed. 
Through survey of the relevant literature, questionnaires and interviews made for the article we 
will try to give an answer if the parallel existence of the primary, secondary and tertiary public 
and private health system is justified having in mind the population of the country. Further-
more, should the secondary and tertiary segment of the public health system serve as back up to 
the private system, in a situation where there is a lack of doctors and other specialized medical 
staff, as well as lack of medical equipment to perform basic work. The question is how to find 
a financially sustainable public health system under which the health insured individuals get 
adequate and quality health service.
Key words:  public healthcare, health system, reforms, patients’ rights.
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT Of THE PUbLIC 
HEALTH SySTEM AND HEALTH PROTECTION LAW REGIME 
IN THE REPUbLIC Of MACEDONIA
In 1991, after the breakup of yugoslavia, Macedonia became an independent 
country, but the influence of the concept of socialist health insurance was held 
up for many years later. Namely, as in any democratic country, the Republic of 
Macedonia considers the social freedoms and rights of its citizen as fundamental 
human right.1In addition, after the independency, the health protection remains 
as priority in the national policy and health strategy. 
The right to health care is social right guaranteed by article 39 in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Macedonia „Every citizen is guaranteed the right to health care. 
Citizens have the right and duty to protect and promote their own health and the 
health of others“. This means that every citizen may ask for service and health pro-
tection from the Macedonian health institutions, regardless of their employment 
status. As a result, in 1991, the Health protection Law, which nullified the Law 
on Healthcare from Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Official Gazette of SRM 
10/83, 43/85,50/87, 27/88, 36/89 and 42/90) and the Law on the conditions and 
manner of achieving reimbursement of health services, pointed on pages (Official 
Gazette of SRM No. 15/76) was passed. Respecting the principles of mutuality 
and solidarity the right to health protection through compulsory health insurance 
and voluntary health insurance was established.2
The Republic of Macedonia needed to overcome the consequences from the for-
mer system, which was not applicable in democratic state with unilateral gover-
nance. We inhered public health system that was good implemented by the geo-
demographic position, but hard to maintain.  This model of mandatory health 
insurance system – socialistic insurance is funded from the Fund Budget (Health 
Insurance Fund), the Central budget and the incomes from the individual health 
insurers.3However, the liquidity of the health system depends of the national 
economy, the employment of the population, the incomes of individuals and 
companies, etc. yet, the design, creation and implementation of the health policy 
and public health system is still in the hands of the executive bodies (The Govern-
ment, the Ministry of Health, the Health Insurance Fund and the public health 
1  Article 34,35 and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.
2  See article 3, Health protection Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.38/91, 46/93, 
55/95, 10/2004, 84/2005, 65/2005, 5/2007, 77/2008, 67/2009, 88/10, 44/11, 53/11).
3  The contributions from health insurance fall under the revenues of the off-budget funds under the 
Budget of the Republic Macedonia, which with the transfers from the central budget never show defi-
ciency in performance.
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organizations). The citizens and the civil society in the area of the health care and 
health protection are not consulted, therefore their needs are not considered. This 
is one of the reasons why in general the health care system has overall not been 
efficient. However, at the end, the National health strategy and health institutions 
that are established should follow the Principle: finance should follow functions.
The Health protection law of 1991 had 11 amendments and additions.4This en-
abled changes in the ownership structure of the institutions. For the first time 
formally was provided the private health care (establishment of private hospital 
organizations and services). The responsibilities and complexity of work in the in-
stitutions were re-defined, which in turn was used to determine the activities and 
powers of both public and private institutions. In 2000, the Health Insurance law 
was passed, which to date has been subject to a record 32 amendments.5In 2007, 
the Ministry of Health of the Republic Macedonia adopted the National Health 
Strategy 20206, which emphasized the need for reform in the Macedonian health 
care system and the need for improvement of the public health in accordance with 
international standards and rules. This strategic document prompted the adoption 
of a whole set of legal acts. In 2008, the Law on the Protection of Patients’ Rights 
entered into force.7In 2009, the Law on health care records was also passed with 
a few amendments.8In 2009 they start with implementation of the electronically 
Health Insurance Card. Till 2015-th R. Macedonia signed agreements with eight 
Member States on using the European Health Insurance Card.9In 2010 the Public 
HealthLaw entered into force, which has been subject to several amendments as 
well.10  In 2012 the current Law on Health Care was passed, and up to today it has 
4  The Health protection Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.38/91, 46/93, 55/95, 
10/2004, 84/2005, 65/2005, 5/2007, 77/2008, 67/2009, 88/10, 44/11, 53/11).
5  Law on health insurance, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.25/2000; 96/2000, 
50/2001, 11/2002,31/2003, 84/2005, 37/2006, 18/2007, 36/2007, 82/2008, 98/2008, 6/2009, 
67/2009, 50/10, 156/10, 53/11, 26/12, 16/13, 91/13,187/13,43/14, 44/14, 97/14, 112/14, 113/14, 
188/14, 20/15, 61/15 , 98/15, 129/15, 150/15, 154/15, 217/15, 27/16. Still , there is no official con-
solidated version on the Law. 
6  URL=http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/the_for-
mer_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/health_strategy_2020.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2017
7  Patients right Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 82/08, 12/09, 51/11.
8  Law covering the records in health care, Official Gazette of the Republic of  Macedonia , No. 20/2009, 
53/11, 164/13, 150/15.
9  Commission Staff  Working Document  The Former yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia  Report 2015 
, SWD(2015) 212 final , Brussels, 10.11.2015.,  pp. 34
10  Public Health Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of  Macedonia , No. 22/10; 136/11; 144/14; 
149/15; 
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been amendment over 10 times,11The Law on Voluntary Health Care Insurance,12 
and over 20 laws and numerous bylaws were also instituted.13
According to the current Law on health protection, the advancement of the ef-
fective treatment and early detection of diseases is done on three levels: primary 
secondary and tertiary level of health care. This demands a reorganization of re-
sponsibilities and share powers among healthcare facilities depending on the com-
plexity of the needed health service and individual health practitioners’ health 
offerings. The primary care is under municipal jurisdiction in coordination with 
the central government. However, in the secondary level, this situation opened 
up the opportunity for the establishment of private hospitals and institutions, 
and to strength up their position in the national health system. They increased 
the competition at state hospitals and institutes covering secondary health care. 
At the moment, legally there are several state institutions that offer secondary and 
tertiary healthcare. Specifically, according to a current analysis of the territory 
of Republic of Macedonia there is a University Clinical Center (university clin-
ics and clinical hospitals) offering tertiary health protection.  Specialized/clinical 
and general hospitals, (there are three hospitals in Tetovo, Shtip and Bitola), 13 
general hospitals, several special hospitals, and health institutes that are providing 
specialist-consultative services.14
For the purpose of this article, in the beginning of 2017, we made a survey in the 
southeastern part of the country for which is competent the clinical hospital in Sti-
pas a secondary health care sector (note: As we said at the beginning of this paper 
the dentists and the pharmacy sectors are excluded).The target group of 70 patients 
that have public health insurance was randomly chosen (the people that were wait-
ing to be examine at the primary and at the secondary level health institutions). In 
the queues, most of them were women from 18 to 64 years (see table 1 and table 2), 
77,1% with high education. Most of the questioned people are satisfied from the 
services from the chosen doctor in the primary health sector (table 3), highlighting 
as advantage saving time. Almost half of them (48,6) said that they use public health 
services, but also more than a half (51,1) are doing parallel checkups ( second opin-
ion), using both public and private health services (see fig.1).
11  Law on Health protection, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.43/12, 145/12, 
87/13,164/13, 39/14,43/14, 188/14, 10/15,61/15, 61/15, 154/15, 192/15 37/16. This act has also 
been amended several times and, still, there is no consolidated version of this Law.
12  Law for voluntary health insurance, Official Gazette of the Republic of  Macedonia NТ.145/12, 192/15
13  All Laws are published at the official web site of the Ministry of Health of The Republic of Macedonia, 
till 2015. For more see:  URL=http://zdravstvo.gov.mk/zakoni-2/.
14  Official website of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Macedonia, URL=http://zdravstvo.gov.
mk/sekundarna_i_tercierna/, last updated 2015.  Accessed 31 January 2017. 
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Table 1 Gender
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Male 28 40,0 40,0 40,0
Female 42 60,0 60,0 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
Table 2. Age
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid under 18 2 2,9 2,9 2,9
from 18 to 64 61 87,1 87,1 90,0
over 64 7 10,0 10,0 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
Table 3. Are you satisfied from the services of your chosen doctor primary health care ?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid yes 34 48,6 48,6 48,6
Satisfactory 26 37,1 37,1 85,7
No 10 14,3 14,3 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
figure1
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Only the patients from the primary level, through the doctor in the primary 
health care sector, may be directed at the secondary sector. Perhaps the crucial 
novelty in this entire system of legal, organizational and functional moderniza-
tion is the Integrated National Electronic system for scheduling and recording of 
medical interventions, so called, “My Appointment”. This system start with its 
implementation in 2013 and has several goals: electronic scheduling of medical 
check up, scheduling intervention and review in order to lessen the confusion and 
waiting lines in health care offices and facilities; the creation of unified and reli-
able database, quick and simple record updates on patient data; the creation of an 
electronic medical record (dossier); the setup of a quality health care service at the 
expense of reduced administrative work; the creation of a detailed timetable for 
the admission of patients in all doctors’ offices; the introduction of new work pro-
cesses through the introduction of electronic medical record, electronic prescrip-
tion, electronic referral, electronic scheduling of examinations and other services. 
In addition, the system aims to reduce the number of duplicate examinations and 
interventions, establishing faster communication and consultation between the 
primary, secondary and tertiary health care, providing better quality of service and 
reduction of the risk of wrong professional decisions. Financial savings are also a 
consideration behind the plan. Electronic processing of documents will replace 
the current paper referrals and prescriptions. Accurate and timely data for all the 
segments covered by the health system, and the opportunity for patients to access 
their own information and useful data through the internet is also a goal. Still, 
the survey indicates that 42.9 % are not satisfied with this concept (see table 4). 
Emphases couple situations as a weakness: that the people cannot chose the doctor 
specials that they prefer and very often they wait more than two –three months 
to appoint, and the second situation is that the appointed term in not in the line 
with the real situation at the hospital and the set time is extended ( still there are 
long waiting lines). (See table 5). Furthermore, they are not satisfied from the 
quality of the serves they receive. (See table 6) 
Table. 4 Are you satisfied from the „My appointment“ concept?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
yes 15 21,4 21,4 21,4
Satisfactory 25 35,7 35,7 57,1
No 30 42,9 42,9 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
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Table 5. Are the doctors ontime and efficent according „My appointment“ ?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid yes 23 32,9 32,9 32,9
Satisfactory 31 44,3 44,3 77,1
No 16 22,9 22,9 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
Table 6. Are you satisfied from the quality of the services that your receive at the hospital?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid yes 10 14,3 14,3 14,3
Satisfactory 30 42,9 42,9 57,1
No 30 42,9 42,9 100,0
Total 70 100,0 100,0
Despite mentioned, we should underline, that the interviewed patients are com-
plaining that the hygiene and the medical furniture are below average (the waiting 
rooms, toilets, beds and the sheets are not clean and old), the medical staff ( except 
the doctors)is not polite, most of the time there is deficit of the basic medical sup-
plies and in some cases they are advice to buy on there one. On the other hand, 
there is new medical equipment that is not used in full capacity because there is 
not enough qualified doctors and healthcare staff, reconstruction of the existing 
buildings and building new ones are priority.15Although, this survey was made in 
one region, more or less, reflects the overall situation in the state.
With this “avalanche” of legal acts and electronic / automated developments, relat-
ing to the health care and health system in general a radical turn in the conception 
of the national health and national health policy was created. But it become obvi-
ous that not much thought has been put into whether such an extensive legislative 
changes could be implemented and whether there is the de facto capacity for them 
to be realized in practice? Is this national health care strategy compatible with 
the lifestyle of the citizens and their current socio-economic situation? Will these 
permanent changes encourage a development and improvement of the currently 
established system or they will cause distortion in the overall health system?
15  In 2015, the Ministry of Health announced  investment from 30.000.000 EUR for construction of 
new and modern hospital in Stip.  URL=http://zdravstvo.gov.mk/klinichka-bolnica-shtip/. Accessed 
15 December 2017.
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2.  REPUbLIC Of MACEDONIA AND POLICy ALIGNMENT WITH 
THE EU AND WHO
The Republic of Macedonia has shown anopenness to international standards in 
the field of social rights by harmonizing and changing its legislation regarding 
fundamental human rights and citizens’ health protection.16After independence, 
Macedonia has shown an interest to get closer to the European states and its con-
tinental law system, and within a few years, its integration to the European Union 
became a focal strategy. Considering the commitment of the Republic of Macedo-
nia to the European Community, European Union and its member states signed 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the Republic of Macedonia in 
200117, first SAA in the region. By the SAA Agreement, the Republic of Macedo-
nia is obliged to improve the level of health and safety protection of workers, using 
as a reference the levels of protection that exist in the European Community.18In 
2006, based on official country reports, data and detailed descriptionsprovided 
from the relevant institutionsof the current Macedonian health system,19WHO 
European Regional office placed Republic of Macedonia as a country with transi-
tional health system.20 In 2007, leaded by the EU health policy Health 2020 and 
WHO strategy and priorities, the Ministry of Health of Republic of Macedonia 
brought a Health strategy of the Republic of Macedonia 2020. The strategy cares 
out the vision of safe, efficient and just national Health Care System.
The health condition of the Republic of Macedonia is more or less at the level of the 
southeastern European countries, but far behind the EU member countries.21Still, 
the last couple of years the Reports22from the European Commission in the area 
16  Public Health Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 22/10; 136/11; 144/14; 
149/15, 37/16.
17  Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Former yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, of the 
other part, Council Of The European Union, 2001/0049 (acv). 6726/01. limite. yu 6. 
coweb 20,  Brussels, March 2001,
 URL=https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/saa03_01_en.pdf.
18  See article 168 (3) TFEU [2008] OJ C115/123.
19  Health systems in transition, the Former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia health system review, Vol.8, 
No.8, 2006.
20  URL=http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/98890/E89275sum.pdf?ua=1. Accessed 
12 December, 2016
21  Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in European Union Health Systems [2006] 
OJ C146/01.
22  Commission Staff Working Document  The Former yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia  Report 2015 , 
SWD(2015) 212 final , Brussels, 10.11.2015 and Commission Staff Working Document  The Former 
yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia  Report 2016, SWD(2016) 362 final , Brussels, 09.11.2016
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of the health protection have a status of moderately prepared with recommendation 
to ensure efficient and high-quality healthcare.23
The free movement of people and goods emphasis the inequality of good health at 
Union level which imply the necessary to promote common health policy and co-
ordination between the national programmes of the EU Member States. Further-
more, the Union and the member states foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international organizations in the sphere of public health. To 
foster the health of the European citizens, the Community has made numerous 
studies, many activities and adopted several programmes in the field of public 
health and in the field of health in generally. In 2003, these separate programmes 
were replaced by a single integrated EU Public Health Programme (Decision No 
1786/2002/EC)24, later with the Second Public Health Programme (Decision No 
1350/2007/EC)25 and the Third Programme in the field of health which is called 
Health for Growth (Regulation (EU) No 282/2014)26 established for 2014-2020. 
The Health for Growth Programme was build up on the two previous health 
programmes from 2003-2008 and 2008-2013. The current Programme efforts to 
fulfill several objectives: to promote health, to protect citizens from cross-border 
threads, to improve safer healthcare and to build up sustainable health systems. 
Additionally, to improve the quality of the health services, the patient rights and 
the health protection of the European citizens, the Community encourage co-
operation and exchanging information in the field of public health between the 
Member States.27
When a Member State raises a specific public health problem in the field, which 
has been the subject of prior alignment measures, it shall bring it to the attention 
of the Commission, which shall immediately examine whether to propose appro-
priate measures to the Council.28 Furthermore, in accordance with article 168(6)
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt recommendations 
23  Commission Staff Working Document The Former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Report 2015, 
Chapter 48, p. 68.
24  Decision No 1786/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
adopting a programme of Community action in the field of public health (2003-2008) [2002] OJ L 
271. 
25  Decision No 1350/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 
establishing a second programme of Community action in the field of health (2008-13) [2007] OJ L 
301/3.
26  Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on 
the establishment of a third Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (2014-2020) and 
repealing Decision No 1350/2007/EC) [2014] OJ L86/1.
27  See Article 168 (3) TFEU [2012] OJ C326.
28  Article 114 , paragraph 8, Chapter 3- Approximation of Law , TFEU
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for the public health matters, in full respect of the responsibilities of the Member 
States for the design  of their health policies, the institutional organization and 
delivery of health services and medical care. Public health matters fall in the area 
of shared competences between the Union and the Member State.29 In fact, the 
dual nature of the competences in the area of public health is reflected in the dif-
ferent types of measures that the EU can take.30 The EU action in public health 
seize to set up a high level of human health protection standards and sustainable 
public health system. The public health is crucial pillar for every develop society 
and the Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the importance of that, by building up a coher-
ent public health system by encouraging cooperation between the Member States 
and lending support to their national health policies and actions.31The EU health 
policy boost to prevent diseases and to improve and promote healthy lifestyle. The 
implementation of the Third Programme of EU`s action in the field of health in 
the Member States and participate countries gains to build up consist, equal and 
efficient health systems. In the line with the EU 2020 Strategy and the WHO 
priority objectives, the Union focuses on consolidation of the institutional and 
the legal framework in the field of public health, which implicates on the public 
health policies and activities in the Member States and the potential candidate 
countries for EU membership.
3.  CONCLUSION 
The health systems varied from county to country as a reflection of different de-
mographic and socio-economic position, despite they are build up on similar com-
mon values and principals. Still, the Union support the Member States healthcare 
systems and policies, encourage cooperation and promotes the coordination be-
tween their national programmes and best practices. 
29  See Article 4 , paragraph 2 (k), Consolidated versions of the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union - Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union - Protocols - Annexes - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovern-
mental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007,Official Journal 
C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 0390
30  See Article 168 (5)  TFEU. `The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions may also adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human 
health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, measures concerning moni-
toring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health, and measures which have 
as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.`
31  See Article 168 (2) TFEU
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On the other hand, the current health care system in Republic of Macedonia has 
proved to be uncompetitive, inefficient, ineffective and without a clearly defined 
responsibilities of health institutions/organizations. There is a lack of coordination 
between authorities in-charge as well. As a result, some citizens in certain parts of 
the country are faced with unavailable and untimely health care system and public 
health services. 
This gap in the quality of treatment is behind the revamp of the entire health 
system and the frequent amendments to the legislation which are ongoing, but 
ultimately destabilize the health system. The existence of private health facilities 
and specialty hospitals did not result in a spur of competitiveness among public 
institutions and hospitals to attempt to rival the private health sector; on the con-
trary, it resulted in collapsing the public system financially. Most of the citizens 
did not receive more options in choosing a better quality and more timely health 
care services, rather they were faced with an inequality in their ability to secure 
and upgrade their individual health and the health of their family (only higher 
income earners can afford private health services).
Naturally, the modernized health care system introduced certain improvements, 
such as: specialization and training of medical staff, better control over it, more 
effective patient records and in general, the application of health care improve-
ment according to international standards, building and rehabilitating health care 
facilities, training of health personnel, providing equipment, essential medicines 
and supplies, etc.
Resent survey and analyses have shown that there is a functional separation be-
tween the primary, secondary and tertiary health protection on one hand and 
among the public and the private health systems on the other hand. So, the ex-
isting health system is based on a fragmentation and lack of communication be-
tween the health institutions (vertically / horizontally, state/private). Also, the an-
nual 2015 reports from the World Health Organizations indicate that Macedonia 
is a country with the highest infant mortality rate, as well as the highest rate of 
death among pregnant women in the region.32
These numbers should put all stakeholders at a state of alarm. Having in mind the 
public health reform and the EU law on patients’ health care rights, another aspect 
that needs to be explored is if the creators of the public health policy considered 
the birth rate / mortality ratio situation, or they were just trying to keep up with 
the European legislation regarding this issue. 
32  URL=http://www.who.int/countries/mkd/en/. Accessed 30  November 2016.
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Having in mind the actual position of the health system seen through the sur-
vey and the interviewed people, maybe we should ask do we need to reform the 
reformed health system? The Republic of Macedonia needs a sustainable public 
health system, which will provide quality and equal services to every citizen. Citi-
zens ought to enjoy the benefits of the health care services regardless of the place 
of living or their working position.
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